No public access
doctoral thesis
Nature and value of prenatal and postmortal nonexistence

Marin Biondić (2014)
Sveučilište u Rijeci
Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci
Odsjek za filozofiju
Metadata
TitlePriroda i vrijednost prenatalnog i postmortalnog nepostojanja
AuthorMarin Biondić
Mentor(s)Boran Berčić
Abstract
U radu se bavim analizom vrijednosti prenatalnog i postmortalnog nepostojanja. Temeljna pretpostavka rasprave jest da kada biće umre, ono prestaje postojati. Ukoliko je to uistinu točno; a čak i ako nije; pitanje je zašto je smrt loša za osobu koja je umrla, ako smrt rezultira nepostojanjem? Nakon temeljnih terminoloških odrednica i pretpostavki, u radu iznosim četiri modela koji objašnjavaju vrijednost smrti. Prvi od njih je Epikurov model, prema kojemu je smrt neutralna za osobu koja je umrla. Drugi model jest Nagelov model; tzv. deprivacijsko objašnjenje; koji eksplicira Aristotelovu ideju da je smrt krajnje zlo. Prema Nagelovom modelu, zlo smrti je neiskustveno zlo koje se sastoji od lišavanja dobara života. Treći jest Feldmanov model; sofisticiraniji model deprivacijskog objašnjenja; koji za posljedicu ima tvrdnju da je smrt u većini slučajeva loša za osobu koja je umrla, ali ponekad može biti dobra ili neutralna za osobu koja je umrla. Četvrti model, jest model koji zlo smrti objašnjava teorijom neostvarenja kategoričkih želja. Analizom navedenih modela, zaključujem, da ako smrt jest zlo za osobu koja je umrla, onda je najbolje objašnjena uz određene preinake Feldmanovog modela. Meutim, svi navedeni modeli; osim onog Epikurovog; moraju odgovoriti na pitanje je li prenatalno lišavanje jednako tako loše kao i postmortalno lišavanje, ili nije ni postmortalno lišavanje loše budući da nije ni prenatalno, kako je to mislio Lukrecije. Smatram da deprivacijska teorija može riješiti Lukrecijev problem, ali se u konačnici susreće s problemom vrijednosti, tj. s nemogucnošću dokazivanja neiskustvenog zla „nepokolebljivim“ epikurejcima. Budući da se „nepokolebljivim“ epikurejcima ne može dokazati da je smrt loša za osobu koja je umrla, moj zaključak o vrijednosti smrti za osobu koja je umrla završava u blagoj „epikureizaciji“ deprivacijske teorije. Drugim riječima, zaključujem da je smrt vrsta zla koja nas ne bi trebala u značajnoj mjeri zabrinjavati.
Keywordsannihilation comparativism death deprivation desires Epicureanism hedonism nonexistence termination time value
Parallel title (English)Nature and value of prenatal and postmortal nonexistence
Committee MembersElvio Baccarini (committee chairperson)
Bojan Borstner (committee member)
Boran Berčić (committee member)
GranterSveučilište u Rijeci
Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci
Lower level organizational unitsOdsjek za filozofiju
PlaceRijeka
StateCroatia
Scientific field, discipline, subdisciplineHUMANISTIC SCIENCES
Philosophy
UDK13
PHILOSOPHY. PSYCHOLOGY
Philosophy of mind and spirit. Metaphysics of spiritual life. The occult
Study programme typeuniversity
Study levelpostgraduate
Study programmePostgraduate doctoral study programme Philosophy and Contemporaneity
Academic title abbreviationdr. sc.
Genredoctoral thesis
Language Croatian
Defense date2014-06-03
Parallel abstract (English)
In my dissertation I am dealing with the value analysis of the prenatal and the postmortal nonexistence. The basic hypothesis of the discussion is that when the person dies she ceases to exist. As far as this is true; and even if it is not; the question is why is death bad for the person who died if death results with nonexistence? After basic determination of terminology and assumptions, in my work I present four models which explain the value of death. The first one is the Epicurus’ model, according to whom the death is value Nagel's model, the so called deprivation explanation, which explicates Aristotle’s idea of death as the ultimate evil. According to Nagel´s model, the evil of death is unexperienced evil which consist of the deprivation of goods of life. The third model is Feldman's model; more sophisticated model of the deprivation explanation; which as a result has the statement that death is in most cases bad for the person who died but sometimes it can be good or neutral for the person who died. The fourth model is the model which explains the evil of death with a theory of unrealized categorical desires. By analyzing mentioned models, I conclude, that if death is a bad for the person who died, than it is best explained with slight modification of Feldman’s model. However, all mentioned models; except the one of Epicurus; have to answer the question is the prenatal deprivation as bad as the postmortal deprivation, or postmortal deprivation is not bad since it is not prenatal, as Lucretius thought. I believe that deprivation explanation can resolve Lucretius' problem, but in the end it meets the problem of value, that is, it meets the impossibility of proving unexperienced evil to “unshakeable” Epicureans. Since it is impossible to prove to “unshakeable” Epicureans that death is bad for the person who died, my conclusion about the value of death for the person who died, ends with the mild „epicurusaisation“ of the deprivation theory. In other words, I conclude that death is a kind of evil which should not worry us too much.
Parallel keywords (Croatian)epikurizam hedonizam komparativizam lišavanje nepostojanje smrt terminacija uništenje vrijednost vrijeme želje
Versionaccepted version
Resource typetext
Access conditionNo public access
Noteaccepted version
URN:NBNhttps://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:668042
CommitterAleksandra Moslavac