

# Media discourses of nation and cultural differences: a case study of Westdeutscher Rundfunk

---

**Krtalić Muiesan, Iva**

**Doctoral thesis / Disertacija**

**2019**

*Degree Grantor / Ustanova koja je dodijelila akademski / stručni stupanj:* **University of Zadar / Sveučilište u Zadru**

*Permanent link / Trajna poveznica:* <https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:162:121978>

*Rights / Prava:* [In copyright](#) / [Zaštićeno autorskim pravom.](#)

*Download date / Datum preuzimanja:* **2024-04-19**



**Sveučilište u Zadru**  
Universitas Studiorum  
Jadertina | 1396 | 2002 |

*Repository / Repozitorij:*

[University of Zadar Institutional Repository](#)

SVEUČILIŠTE U ZADRU

POSLIJEDIPLOMSKI SVEUČILIŠNI STUDIJ  
HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI

**Iva Krtalić Muiesan**

**MEDIA DISCOURSES OF NATION AND  
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: A CASE STUDY OF  
WESTDEUTSCHER RUNDFUNK**

**Doktorski rad**

Zadar, 2019.

SVEUČILIŠTE U ZADRU  
POSLIJEDIPLOMSKI SVEUČILIŠNI STUDIJ  
HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI

**Iva Krtalić Muiesan**

**MEDIA DISCOURSES OF NATION AND CULTURAL  
DIFFERENCES: A CASE STUDY OF  
WESTDEUTSCHER RUNDFUNK**

Doktorski rad

Mentorica

Izv. prof. dr. sc. Senka Božić-Vrbančić

Zadar, 2019.

# UNIVERSITY OF ZADAR

## BASIC DOCUMENTATION CARD

### I. Author and study

Name and surname: Iva Krtalić Muiesan

Name of the study programme: Postgraduate doctoral study in Humanities

Mentor: Associate professor Senka Božić-Vrbančić, PhD

Date of the defence: May 8th, 2019

Scientific area and field in which the PhD is obtained: Humanities, Interdisciplinary humanities

### II. Doctoral dissertation

Title: Media discourses of nation and cultural differences: A case study of Westdeutscher Rundfunk

UDC mark: 316.774:654.1>(430)

Number of pages: 311

Number of pictures/graphical representations/tables: 7/0/0

Number of notes: 78

Number of used bibliographic units and sources: 377

Number of appendices: 2

Language of the doctoral dissertation: English

### III. Expert committees

Expert committee for the evaluation of the doctoral dissertation:

1. Associate Professor Tomislav Pletenac, PhD, chair
2. Associate Professor Senka Božić-Vrbančić, PhD, member
3. Assistant Professor Duško Petrović, PhD, member

Expert committee for the defence of the doctoral dissertation:

1. Associate Professor Tomislav Pletenac, PhD, chair
2. Associate Professor Senka Božić-Vrbančić, PhD, member
3. Assistant Professor Duško Petrović, PhD, member

# **SVEUČILIŠTE U ZADRU**

## **TEMELJNA DOKUMENTACIJSKA KARTICA**

### **I. Autor i studij**

Ime i prezime: Iva Krtalić Muiesan

Naziv studijskog programa: Poslijediplomski sveučilišni studij Humanističke znanosti

Mentor/Mentorica: Izv. prof. dr. sc. Senka Božić-Vrbančić

Datum obrane: 8. svibnja 2019.

Znanstveno područje i polje u kojem je postignut doktorat znanosti: Humanističke znanosti,  
Interdisciplinarne humanističke znanosti

### **II. Doktorski rad**

Naslov: Medijski diskursi nacije i kulturne različitosti na primjeru Westdeutscher Rundfunka

UDK oznaka: 316.774:654.1>(430)

Broj stranica: 311

Broj slika/grafičkih prikaza/tablica: 7/0/0

Broj bilježaka: 78

Broj korištenih bibliografskih jedinica i izvora: 377

Broj priloga: 2

Jezik rada: engleski

### **III. Stručna povjerenstva**

Stručno povjerenstvo za ocjenu doktorskog rada:

1. Izv. prof. dr. sc. Tomislav Pletenac, predsjednik
2. Izv. prof. dr. sc. Senka Božić-Vrbančić, članica
3. Doc. dr. sc. Duško Petrović, član

Stručno povjerenstvo za obranu doktorskog rada:

1. Izv. prof. dr. sc. Tomislav Pletenac, predsjednik
2. Izv. prof. dr. sc. Senka Božić-Vrbančić, članica
3. Doc. dr. sc. Duško Petrović, član



## Izjava o akademskoj čestitosti

Ja, **Iva Krtalić Muiesan**, ovime izjavljujem da je moj **doktorski** rad pod naslovom **Media discourses of nation and cultural differences: A case study of Westdeutscher Rundfunk / Medijski diskursi nacije i kulturne različitosti na primjeru Westdeutscher Rundfunka** rezultat mogega vlastitog rada, da se temelji na mojim istraživanjima te da se oslanja na izvore i radove navedene u bilješkama i popisu literature. Ni jedan dio mogega rada nije napisan na nedopušten način, odnosno nije prepisan iz necitiranih radova i ne krši bilo čija autorska prava.

Izjavljujem da ni jedan dio ovoga rada nije iskorišten u kojem drugom radu pri bilo kojoj drugoj visokoškolskoj, znanstvenoj, obrazovnoj ili inoj ustanovi.

Sadržaj mogega rada u potpunosti odgovara sadržaju obranjenoga i nakon obrane uređenoga rada.

Zadar, lipanj 2019.

## Table of contents

Introduction	1
0.1 Media and cultural diversity in Germany: research aim and questions	1
0.2 Research approach, methodology and overview of the thesis	5
0.2.1 Outline of the thesis	8
 Part I	
Chapter 1	12
Nation, difference and diversity: key concepts	12
1.1 The concepts of culture, power, nation and identity	13
1.2 Governmentality and media as spaces of articulation of difference	23
 Chapter 2	
Contestations around identity issues – migration, multiculturalism, integration, assimilation, interculturalism	31
2.1 Migration and multiculturalism	31
2.2 The “multiculturalism backlash”	43
2.3 Looking for alternatives – diversity and super-diversity	49
2.4 Integration	59
2.5 Tolerance	62
 Chapter 3	
Media and multiculturalism	68
3.1 Media and citizenship in multiculturalism	68
3.2 Media texts and national fantasy	76
 Part II	79
Chapter 4	
Migration and cultural difference in Germany	79
4.1 Historical overview of concepts	79
4.2 Media and multiculturalism in Germany	92
4.2.1 Media and multiculturalism in Germany – literature overview	98

Part III	105
Chapter 5	
Funkhaus Europa – transformations of a radio brand	107
5.1. Introduction	107
5.2 Funkhaus Europa – Integration radio	108
5.3 Change of paradigm – from an ethnic to a cosmopolitan station	110
5.4 The <i>Roots</i> project	113
5.5 Funkhaus Europa 2007 – Unity in diversity	117
5.6 Funkhaus Europa 2011 – Global Sounds Radio	121
5.7 Closing remarks	128
Chapter 6	
Radio makers of Funkhaus Europa	131
6.1 Introduction	131
6.2 Yildiz	134
6.3 Amir	140
6.4 Miltiadis	145
6.5 Ioannis	148
6.6 Uwe	151
6.7 Thomas	153
6.8 Closing remarks	159
Chapter 7	
Ideal-type audience – Sami and Carla	162
7.1 Introduction: Funkhaus Europa and imagined ideal listeners	162
7.2 Ideal listeners – Sami and Carla	168
Part IV	180
Chapter 8	
Tolerance Week	183
8.1 Thematic weeks of the German public service media	183
8.2 ARD Tolerance Week	186
8.3 Preparing the ARD Tolerance Week	191

8.4 Patrons and advertising campaign of Tolerance Week	196
Chapter 9	
Conclusion	206
Bibliography	223
Abstract	250
Appendix 1	
Transcripts of interviews with Funkhaus Europa radio makers	255
Appendix 2	
List of figures	309
Curriculum vitae	310

## Introduction

### 0.1 Media and cultural diversity in Germany: research aim and questions

Germany is a country of migration and continues to be so, increasingly becoming a society of diverse ethnic and cultural identities. In institutional politics, or in the media, this reality is, however, often represented in a fragmented, sometimes belated, or even contradictory manner.

This dissertation looks at ways the cultural politics of difference, nation, identity, and citizenship are embedded and articulated in the media. It does so by using the example of a set of programs – a radio station and a media event - by German public service broadcasters specifically dedicated to multicultural life in the country. The thesis identifies and examines core notions of “difference” and the ways these are figured in media discourses about multiculturalism, focusing on concepts such as integration, tolerance, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism. It looks at how the vectors of power and knowledge have intersected in these concepts, and how these have moved and developed over time.

“Securing an independent basic provision with education, information, guidance and entertainment”,<sup>1</sup> is how the German legislation on the media defines the remit of the public service broadcasters. Established after the end of the Second World War, the German public service media were explicitly endowed with the task of contributing to the formation of individual and public opinion, and in this way also of a functioning democratic polity. However, seven decades after their establishment, it is worthwhile looking at how the German public service media cope with a social situation that is quite different from that in the aftermath of the Second World War, when they were founded in the course of the denazification of the country. How do the public service media shape society’s ideas in times of growing cultural diversity within the society? How do they go about creating “public value”

---

<sup>1</sup> The remit of the public service media is regulated by the German State Treaty on Broadcasting Services and Telecommunication Media. The Treaty among the 16 German federal *Länder* concretizes the provision of the German Constitutional Law that guarantees freedom of opinion and freedom of the press as a fundamental right. Staatsvertrag für Rundfunk und Telemedien (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag – RStV), [https://recht.nrw.de/lmi/owa/br\\_bes\\_text?anw\\_nr=2&gld\\_nr=2&ugl\\_nr=2251&bes\\_id=12784&aufgehoben=N&menu=1&sg=0](https://recht.nrw.de/lmi/owa/br_bes_text?anw_nr=2&gld_nr=2&ugl_nr=2251&bes_id=12784&aufgehoben=N&menu=1&sg=0), accessed 17/08/2018

in the context of political controversies over cultural diversity and immigration? What type of “information, education and entertainment” do they offer and what are the processes through which they obtain social significance?

Today, over one fifth of the inhabitants of Germany have a so-called migration background, defined either as having immigrated themselves or being children of at least one parent who has immigrated into the country. In some urban areas, almost half of the inhabitants have a migration biography, with Frankfurt being the first city in Germany whose ethnic German population made up less than half of the number of its inhabitants in 2017.<sup>2</sup> How do the media portray this transformation of the German society? How do they articulate difference? How do they define identity? How do they foster inclusion or exclusion? What do the stations or programs do when they address certain audience segments? What do they do when they report on the majority and the minorities in the country? Who in a media text is “us,” and who is “them”? These are some of the questions that serve as guiding points for analysis.

When the media deal with questions of difference, culture, or belonging, they also create effects on inclusions into and exclusions from the social body and construct imaginaries concerning the terms of citizenship. So, in a multicultural context, their role can become crucial in articulating and co-creating cultural politics of difference. Seeing pictures on the TV screen, hearing words from the radio, or reading a text on the Internet shapes the way we see the physical and social reality around us. Even if media consumption is a complex interaction between production and reception, allowing encoding and decoding of media texts and including the possibility of resistance and subversive readings, the process is not wholly arbitrary. Although multiple interpretations are possible, there are, according to Stuart Hall ([1973] 2007), representational strategies which privilege certain interpretations (“preferred readings”). This is especially relevant in texts concerning ethnic belonging, where there is a series of strategies at work – stereotypes, binary oppositions, erasures, essentializing, and others – that all lead the audience towards a certain reading that upholds the existing power structures (Askew 2002: 5).

---

<sup>2</sup> Premiere in Frankfurt : Mehr als die Hälfte mit ausländischen Wurzeln, 26.06.2017, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  
<http://www.faz.net/aktuell/rhein-main/frankfurt-erstmal-ueber-50-prozent-mit-auslaendischen-wurzeln-15078140.html>, accessed 17/08/2018

In this thesis, the analysis of “preferred readings” will specifically focus on WDR Funkhaus Europa, a radio station established in 1999 by the biggest public service broadcaster in Germany, the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR). The WDR is the largest of the nine regional member broadcasters of the ARD (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*), the German Association of Public Service Broadcasters, and, following the BBC, the second largest public service broadcaster in Europe. Next to its digital channels and online formats, the WDR broadcasts one television and six radio stations linearly, among them an information station, a station targeting young audiences, and a classical culture station. Funkhaus Europa (which in 2017 changed its name to Cosmo) is the smallest of the WDR radio stations. Defined as special-interest radio, it offers a German language program from 6 a.m. to 8 p.m. and continues with programs in six languages of migrant communities in the evening, and further languages during the weekends. In its German-language program, it offers a mix of topics and music that differ from the media or pop-chart mainstream, catering instead to a young, urban audience with an emphasis on multiculturalism and cultural mixing. Established with the explicit purpose of depicting the cultural diversity in the society, after two decades of broadcasting, the station remains the only public service offer in Germany with this specific political task. Its area of broadcasting encompasses the most populous German *Land* of North-Rhine Westphalia, as well as the city areas of Bremen and Berlin.

Funkhaus Europa was born when former information programs for guest workers were unified into one station. Various German public service radio stations had been broadcasting information programs starting from the 1960s, with the purpose of facilitating the integration of guest workers arriving in Germany at the time – similar to today’s media offerings directed at the newly arriving refugees. At the end of the 1990s, WDR Funkhaus Europa was established as a full-time radio station with the main part of the program in German, and with additional shows in the languages of the largest migrant communities, which were now all transferred to this station. Its proclaimed aim was to be an “integration radio station,” and a “contribution of the public broadcasters to the dialogue of cultures”.<sup>3</sup> Its explicit task was to address the then around four million people with a migration background living in North-Rhine Westphalia,<sup>4</sup> recognized as an audience segment to whose specific media needs the public service media had hitherto not catered to. At the time of establishment, three main goals for Funkhaus Europa were named: being the integration radio, the European radio station, and

---

<sup>3</sup> WDR Funkhaus Europa. *Europäische Vielfalt: 24 Stunden täglich*, WDR, Cologne, 2000, 2

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.statistikportal.de/Statistik-Portal/>, accessed 17/05/2016

the world music broadcaster for North-Rhine Westphalia,<sup>5</sup> with the goal of “showing cultural diversity as a chance and a lived normality of the migration society.”<sup>6</sup>

In the course of the next decade and a half, “the spirit” of the station turned from integration towards depicting multicultural social realities and celebrating cultural diversity through music and diverse protagonists, and further to representing the “cosmopolitan feeling” of the cultural mix and hybrid identities that characterize the new German cultural diversity. Today, three factors are named which define the station against the other five WDR radio stations: an intense relationship with cultural diversity, linguistic diversity, and a specific music color. The focus of the German-speaking station has, however, moved away from targeting people of foreign origins as their audience, to one that addresses a larger portion of the German audience, an audience interested in diversity.

One of the main questions of the thesis is how these changes can be interpreted. This thesis argues that even if these station policy changes might at first sight seem small adjustments, they have led to quite fundamental shifts.

The changes have concerned the “handicraft of radio-making,” including a stronger formatting of the shows, new modalities of music selection, a stronger emphasis on Internet and social media content production, and others. But, these tangible changes – affecting the relationship of the radio makers towards multilingualism, the changing program scheme, the choice of terminology to refer to cultural and ethnic diversity in Germany on the air, and many others – also reflect ideological transformations of the station, and, as I argue, of the larger discourse concerning the cultural politics of difference.

On the one hand, such adjustments in media production are consequences of an interplay of factors that influence media work in general, such as financing, dependence on audience ratings, or changes in modalities of media consumption, technological developments, and others. However, there are also factors at play that are unique to this radio station, so that, due to its position within the landscape of German public service radio as the only one of its kind, the developments of its policies can be interpreted as an articulation with public policies concerning notions of “difference” and “diversity” in Germany in general.

---

<sup>5</sup> WDR Funkhaus Europa. Europäische Vielfalt: 24 Stunden täglich, WDR, Cologne, 2000, 5

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.wdr.de/unternehmen/programmprofil/integration/integrationsbeauftragter.jsp>

## 0.2 Research approach, methodology, and overview of the thesis

As already noted, the main question of this thesis is how notions of “difference” and “diversity” have been constructed and reconstructed in contemporary media discourses in Germany, with specific focus on the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa, which was established with the aim of reflecting the cultural diversity in the country. In order to address the complexity of this question, I grounded my interest in the media within theoretical frameworks of “power and knowledge” and “identity and subjectivity.” I regard the contemporary debates in the social sciences and humanities over the concepts of “identity” and “culture” as inseparable (Ahmed 2000; Brah 1996, 2000; Balibar 2004; Gilroy 2004; Laclau 1990, 2007; Stam and Shohat 1994, 2003, 2012). Cultural studies theorists (Avtar Brah 1996, 2000 and Stuart Hall 1992, 1996, among others), argue that concepts of “culture” and “identity” signify a historically variable nexus of social meanings. That is to say that “culture” and “identity” are discursive articulations. According to this view, the fields of “culture” and “identity” are not separate from economic, social, and political issues but, on the contrary, are constructed through social, economic, and political relations (Božić-Vrbančić 2008). Issues related to “media” are central to them both. By asking what role the “media” play in representing cultural diversity in Germany, I am considering “media” not just as a reflection of social issues, but also as a form of social action, as a mechanism that contributes to the formation of identity.

Whereas most of the German-language literature on media and cultural diversity concentrates on analyses of causes and effects of media discourse as a tool of integration (for example, through analyses of reception, analyses of media content, etc.), this thesis methodologically takes a problem-oriented approach. It examines the media programs in an interdisciplinary way within the theoretical framework broadly influenced by discourse theory. The notion of discourse is understood in a Foucauldian way, in that

it refers to groups of statements which structure the way a thing is thought, and the way we act on the basis of that thinking. In other words, discourse is a particular knowledge about the world which shapes how the world is understood and how things are done in it. (Rose 2007: 142)

Discourses are always articulated through a diversity of forms, which means that the meanings of any discursive media text “depend not only on that one text [...] but also on the meanings carried by other images and texts” (Rose 2007: 142). Analytically inspired by this

approach, and through an analysis of the radio station documents and interviews with the makers of Funkhaus Europa, in this thesis I highlight the interplay of different discourses in radio station changes which correlate with the changes in the politics of cultural difference in Germany. In discussing the multicultural nature of Funkhaus Europa, I point to the ways in which certain media, even though designed to display a positive approach to multiculturalism, expose various acts of inclusion and exclusion, as well as contradictions that accompany the negotiations of what constitutes culture, nation, citizenship, identity, or difference in Germany.

According to Foucault, discourses, as specialized forms of knowledge, are powerful and productive; they make subjects and subject positions. As Stuart Hall (1999) notes, there is nothing meaningful outside of discourse, and there are always many different discourses and discursive formations which compete through a struggle with each other. The dominance of particular discourses is always related to the intersection of power/knowledge, and to claims to truth. In line with this approach, I see media discourses as powerful sites where public policies are articulated, and subject-citizens and claims to truth are created. In that context, it is the aim of this thesis to unlock the regimes of truth that construct the examined media texts and documents. I do so by unpacking some of the core concepts of the media discourses on “difference” (among them multiculturalism, integration, tolerance, and cosmopolitanism) and locating the points where they crack and rupture, thus pointing to the very intersections of power and knowledge and the shifting historical conditions that provide “a contingent horizon” for their construction (Torfing 2005: 8). In other words, these media are analyzed as technologies of power (governmentality),<sup>7</sup> as sites where discourses of the German society, nation, and citizenship refract and articulate.

My research was ethnographic. Here it is important to say that my own positions, first as radio editor on the team of WDR Funkhaus Europa and then as Commissioner for the integration and intercultural diversity of WDR, affected my research position and approach. I was involved, or rather immersed on an everyday basis, in what Sara Ahmed (2006, 2007, 2012) calls “diversity work.” I was at the same time an “insider” and an “outsider,” a situation that sometimes made my position very challenging – I had to critically reflect on the media in whose making I was involved.

---

<sup>7</sup> For Foucault governmentality “has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instruments” (2009: 108).

Susan Wright argues that when we do ethnographic research on public policy issues, including media policy, our “field and site are clearly no longer coterminous. Rather than studying up, or down for that matter, [we] can select sites from which to follow a flow of events as they move up and down, back and forth, across this field” (2006: 22), or to put it in Susan Reinhold’s words, we need to “study through”:

First, by following the interacting flow of events through different sites (including localities), the media, national and international fora, one can describe in ethnographic detail how something came about. Second, deeper than the descriptive level, a study of a policy process acts as a window onto changing forms of governance and regimes of power (Wright 2006: 22).

Following this “studying through” approach, in the first phase of research I collected data related to diversity issues (mission statements, policies, speeches, articles, leaflets, official publications, descriptions of different programs and initiatives, brand descriptions, and others). I also conducted many participant observation sessions at various meetings and training events, as well as participating in working groups, especially those where brand transformations or the elaboration of the target audience of the radio station were discussed, in the years 2010-2011. In the second phase, I conducted interviews with Funkhaus Europa radio makers, in order to collect data on the ways people respond to different discourses on diversity and difference. I interviewed six media makers involved with Funkhaus Europa in 2012, at the time the station was going through fundamental changes in its structure and program policy. The interviewees were three freelance authors and reporters, two editors, and the former head of the radio station. Interviews were semi-structured and were designed to invite the interviewees to reflect on their own experience in media program-making. In the third phase, I focused on diversity projects on a wider national scale (such as the Tolerance Week of the Association of the German Public Service Broadcasters in which I participated in 2014), in order to analyze their articulation with programs offered by Funkhaus Europa. My main task in all of these phases was to question “naturalised” assumptions, which often frame programs related to cultural difference, to focus on what Ahmed (2006: 24) calls “a set of practices, techniques and technologies” that shape “diversity world.” That means that my “studying through” ethnography was related to what the anthropologist George Marcus calls “multi-sited ethnography” (Marcus 1995, 2005).

In the formal mode, multi-sited ethnography emerges from the objective following of a known conventional process, or an unconventional process – following a commodity chain/productive process, migration networks, or following a plot/narrative, a metaphor, or circulation of an idea. (Marcus 2005: 12)

Multi-sited ethnography in my research is not related to different geographical locations but to different sites which emerged through my "studying through"-approach while following "diversity issues". Even though at the beginning of my research I specifically focused on diversity issues as they are represented by Funkhaus Europa, "studying through" ethnography, or "multi-sited ethnography" moved my research to different sites, for example, to the analysis of EU policies and their articulation with German policies, or to the analysis of their intersections in the "Tolerance Week". "Tolerance Week" is just one in a series of topical weeks, staged on a yearly basis by the German Association of public service broadcasters (ARD). The weeks involve a focus on various aspects of the chosen topic, presented through films, reportage, interviews, and many other formats in the public service channels. In the framework of the event dedicated to tolerance in November 2014, I worked as coordinator of radio content for WDR, which gave me insight into the workings of the event and an overview of the produced content, as well as allowing me to participate in numerous discussions in lieu of its preparation. In short, it involved "the connections, parallels and constructs of a variety of seemingly incommensurate sites [...] practices and histories" (Ahmed et al. 2006: 23).

I am aware that the way I connect and analyse these incommensurate sites is inscribed by my theoretical approach. Hence, the chapters that follow do not reflect either the media policy of the WDR, or an official policy on diversity of Funkhaus Europa's, but explore instead the discursive space through which these policies operate and are constructed.

### **0.2.1 Outline of the thesis**

The thesis is structured in four parts. In Part I, I offer the theoretical framework that influenced my approach. Chapter 1 elaborates on the key concepts of nation, difference and diversity, while Chapter 2 offers an overview of literature concerning societies characterized by cultural

diversity, including the contestations around terms such as multiculturalism, or the trajectory of integration, tolerance or diversity as terms central in the public and institutional discussion on migration. Chapter 3 looks specifically at the role of media in multiculturalism.

In Part II, I offer the historical background of cultural diversity in Germany and Europe, as well as an overview of the German language literature on media and integration (Chapter 4). In Part III, I focus my analysis on the radio station Funkhaus Europa (Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). Part IV places considerations on radio station policy into a larger context, analyzing a media thematic week dedicated to the topic of tolerance, organized by the German public service broadcasters in 2014 (Chapter 8). The thesis concludes with Chapter 9.

**Chapter 1** considers theoretical approaches to the notions of nation, nation-state, and questions of citizenship in Europe, showing how crucially all of these are shaped by migration, by contact with the Other, and in ways of responding to and “managing” difference within the territorial borders of the “nation-state.” It outlines the key concepts of culture, power, nation, and identity that influenced my analysis, relying strongly on Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of articulation, as well as linking Foucault’s notions of governmentality and technologies of government to the operation of the media discourse.

**Chapter 2** then elaborates on an array of approaches to difference, diversity, multiculturalism, and race, concentrating on authors of the Anglo-Saxon area, situated in the fields of postcolonial studies, cultural studies, and critical migration and diaspora studies. The authors uncover the manifold contestations over these issues of identity, as well as identifying some of the core “nodal points” (Laclau and Mouffe, [1985] 2014) of these discourses, among them the terms multiculturalism, integration, and cosmopolitanism. Here, I draw parallels to the discussion in Germany, that I also see as articulating around these points.

**Chapter 3** explores the role of the media in constructing difference. In particular, it considers those theorists who offer ways in which these constructions can be challenged and radically subverted in media texts and practices, to reverse the positions of the dominant and the subaltern in multicultural situations.

**Chapter 4** more specifically considers issues of cultural diversity and migration in Germany and Europe. It starts with a historical overview of immigration into Germany and the discourse on migration, before continuing to look at the key concepts of these issues made visible in various discourses. In particular, it notes their development and shifts through time, showing

how political approaches to the multicultural situation, including ways of managing contact with and the presence of difference within the nation state in Germany, have been articulated through the media and political discourses. Of particular interest here is the centrality of integration that has crystalized as the practice of choice seeking to stabilize identities in the face of migration flows and the growing cultural diversity in the country. Finally, the chapter looks specifically at the role of media in Germany's multiculturalism and the literature on this topic in the German speaking area, where it detects the same centrality of integration. In a large number of texts on the subject, integration is seen as a goal that can be concretely facilitated by media texts and practices.

In Part III, I focus my analysis on the radio station Funkhaus Europa. I start with an analysis of station policies in **Chapter 5**, as articulated in the changes in the station's brand and self-definition. I show how the paradigm change in the station's policy, from a station dedicated to integration, then a station celebrating diversity to a station that wants to address young cosmopolitans with hybrid identities, articulates the changes in the cultural politics of difference in Germany and Europe in general.

**Chapter 6** looks at how such a discursive shift affects the people producing the content of the radio station in question, and in particular how this shift affects their feelings about their work and about their own social position in a society characterized by migration and diversity. It does so through an analysis of six interviews with the makers of the radio.

**Chapter 7** concentrates on the ideal-type audience of the station, as developed in the elaboration of the station's marketing personas. One of the arguments that runs through all three chapters of Part III is that the paradigm shift from being a station dedicated to multiculturalism to being a station addressing a "cosmopolitan" audience brings a strong strand of depoliticization with it, especially because it relegates the contact with difference from the public to the intimate sphere.

In Part IV, **Chapter 8** places considerations on media policies concerning cultural diversity into a larger context, analyzing a media thematic week dedicated to the topic of tolerance, organized by the German public service broadcasters in 2014. It looks at the operation of tolerance in media texts, which is here also seen as having mainly depoliticizing effects, constructing subjects and fixing their identities as being in need of toleration. Tolerance, seen as a way of securing pluralism, is here shown to operate in a profoundly ideological way in

order to preserve the social relations that define the norm and those citizens who are seen as deviant from the norm.

**The closing chapter** (conclusion) summarizes all these findings and attempts to point out areas that offer questions for further research.

## **Part I**

### **Chapter 1**

#### **Nation, difference, and diversity: key concepts**

Questions of difference and community within the space of the nation-state are one of the central sites of contestation in today's Europe – a perfunctory look at media coverage on immigration, at election campaigns of political parties, and at the rhetoric of the populist right are a clear testimony to that.

Europe has in the last decades witnessed the emergence of new forms of identity and belonging, particularly in the context of the advancing project of European integration after the end of the Cold War, as well as that of growing globalization that includes the rising mobility of people, goods, and financial flows. These new forms are characterized by a continued reshuffling of definitions of political membership, of sovereignty, of center and peripheries, of populations and diasporas, and with these, of the terms of inclusion and exclusion. Material globalization has indeed contributed to a growing integration of communication and information, tourism, financial flows, and mobility. On the other hand, and in contrast to predictions expressed in liberal political programs, this has not led to an abandonment of national borders and ethnic divides. Unless they are “global nomads,” members of the economic elites, or exchange students, migrants have in general not experienced more fluid opportunities for membership in – still mostly nationally defined – communities.

In short, a cultural disintegration of the nation-state has not taken place, and contemporary realities show a rather different picture, including the emergence of nationalism and populism after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and increasingly also in Western Europe. The continuing global inequalities and other existential risks furthering migration flows as well as the social and political exclusions of non-nationals and non-residents in Western countries of immigration are contradicting such programs as for example the “European cosmopolitanism” evoked by Jürgen Habermas (2006, 2007) and by Ulrich Beck, who detects a process of cosmopolitanization of a Europe that retains the national differences going on, a “nationally

rooted cosmopolitanism” (2007: 16). In short, global developments have not dissolved the political nation but have instead gone hand in hand with its continuing redefinition, including questions on how rules of membership are set, how citizenship is constituted and embodied, and how it can be redefined to lead to a more democratic civil participation.

The continuing political and discursive contestations around migration remain a central field where these developments are represented: What constitutes the nation and how is national culture to be defined? Who belongs to it and who does not or cannot belong? Who are we talking about when we say “we”? Is this “we” defined as a national, cultural, institutional community? All these questions have been contested and re-contested throughout Europe in recent decades, with nation-states facing continuous evolutions of their ethnic and cultural make-up. From the movements of economic migration to the Western European states of the 1960s, continuing all the way to the period of the heightened influx of refugees starting in 2015-16, the constructions and reconstructions of the national and cultural “us” and “them” have been a major field of negotiations in the European public. This thesis analyzes how these negotiations are articulated in the media discourse. In this chapter, it offers the outline of the key concepts that influenced my analysis.

### **1.1 The concepts of culture, power, nation, and identity**

Following Michel Foucault, the contestations around nation, identity, belonging, and migration are seen in this thesis as central fields where processes of classification, normalization, and problematization take place. According to Foucault, in modern society, power is exercised simultaneously along two lines: on the one hand based on the public right, that is on the right of sovereignty and its organization through legislation or discourse, “and, on the other hand, by a closely linked grid of disciplinary coercions whose purpose is in fact to assure the cohesion of this same social body” (Foucault 1980: 106). It is at the point in which modern capitalism was constituted in the eighteenth century that Foucault locates the emergence of this new “régime of power [...] exercise[d] *within* the social body, rather than from *above* it” (1980: 39).

This biopower or bio-politics, the “politics of life” that emerged in Foucault’s thought in the 1977-78 lectures, stresses the productive character of power as life-administering. No longer reduced to the sovereign’s “right of death,” it refers to procedures and relations that monitor

and regulate features such as birth rate, illness, fertility, marriage rate, education, mortality rate, and others. This whole realm of life thus becomes the site where political power operates over a population. In this way, bio-politics adds another dimension to the disciplining of the individual body, to its monitoring and optimizing: that of the social regulation or management of the body of the population, which becomes the subject on whom political sovereignty is exercised. Its rise coincides with the birth of liberalism, which

differs from reason of state in that it starts from the assumption that human behavior should be governed, not solely in the interests of strengthening the state, but in the interests of society understood as a realm external to the state. (Rose 2006: 84)

It is a novel dimension that conceptualizes “humans as forming a kind of natural collectivity of living beings” (2006: 84). This population with its own characteristics has “to be understood by means of specific knowledges and to be governed through techniques that are attuned to these emergent understandings” (2006: 84). For example, the development of public health, hygiene, and epidemic control shows how authorities came to see the population as having a dynamic, a reality of its own, and it is from this moment on, that

those who inhabited a territory were no longer understood merely as judicial subjects who must obey the laws issued by a sovereign authority nor as isolated individuals whose conduct was to be shaped and disciplined, but as existing within a dense field of relations between people and people, people and things, people and events. (Rose 2006: 87)

The new issues that the governmental practice started to deal with, such as health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, race, and others, in turn raised new political and economic issues.

Crucial in Foucault’s thought on governmentality is the nature of the mechanisms of disciplinary coercion. They are not products of operations of a sovereign or a dominant group; rather, they have their own discourse which engenders “apparatuses of knowledge (*savoir*) and a multiplicity of new domains of understanding. They are extraordinarily inventive participants in the order of these knowledge-producing apparatuses” (Foucault 1980: 106). The discourses of discipline proliferate, they invade and colonize the area of law, but the code they define is not that of law but that of normalization. This explains “the global functioning of what I would call a *society of normalization*” (Foucault 1980: 107).

Practices of dividing and classifying populations, where individual diversity is categorized into unified groups, such as for example the sane or the mad, are the modes of operation of bio-power. They function through disciplinary discourses of normalization, offering a picture of normality against which “truth” can be judged, or problematization, which in turn defines the norm against the concept of the deviant.

Following this argument, I see the struggles over immigration, cultural identity, and difference as central objects of management in today’s public policies on national and European levels. These constructions circle around questions of what constitutes national or European identity and cultural norms, and set the boundaries separating the national and cultural “we” from the “Other,” with immigration often being “the site of struggle over definitions of class, race and nation” (Fortier 2000: 20). In the national realm, I see the normalizing judgement as enabling the classification of persons as belonging or not belonging to a nation and a culture and enforcing processes of normalization in the drive to harmonize difference. The discourse on cultural difference, on the other hand, is an example where practices of problematization and normalization operate in the production of “truth.” Within the European nation-states, the categories of norm and deviance have acquired new meanings, denoting the positions of majority and minority, as well as the requirements this “truth” poses on the individuals and their bodies, both when pertaining to the majority and to positions that deviate from the norm.

For Foucault, the start of bio-politics as an organizational principle is also part of a larger new “economy of power,” a set of mechanisms that make the effects of power circulate through the entire social body. This relational character of power rejects the notions of power through ideology or repression. Foucault’s investigations into the history of penal right, psychiatric power, and the control of infantile sexuality, uncover that rather than repression, constraint, or a force pushing *onto* the individual, mechanisms of power happen in a capillary form, and power reaching “into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault 1980: 39).

Foucault analyzes this “*how of power*” within two poles: the formal delimitation of power on the one hand and the “effects of truth that this power produces and transmits, and which in their turn reproduce this power” (Foucault 1980: 92-93) on the other hand. Seeing power as the producer of effects or régimes of truth implies that the individual is not the passive receiver on whom power is exercised but is in fact in part constituted as individual through its

operation: he or she is in fact one of the results of power. In Foucault's words, the individual is "an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle" (1980: 98). "Bio-politics" implies this transformation of disciplinary power into bio-power, which functions in two directions: as regulator of social life starting from the individual body and as result, activated from the individual body. Individuals are not exclusively subjects who exercise power or else objects on whom power is exercised, but "always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application" (Foucault 1980: 98).

I see the strong discursive production associated with nation and culture as creating a web of power in Foucauldian terms: it constructs the concept of difference through the practices of problematization, classification, and normalization that operate in the production of "truth," of "common knowledge."

For example, practices of categorization and classifying can be detected at the core of politics of race or ethnic difference. The discourse of difference increasingly permeates a great part of contemporary public rhetoric on immigration and particularly on Islam in Western Europe, normalizing in its course the perception of Islam as the West's Other. Sara Ahmed (2000), for example, traces how practices of normalization and problematization are "making the common" in the Neighbourhood Watch schemes in Great Britain, where

the good citizen is not given any information about how to tell what or who is suspicious in the first place. [...] It is the technique of *common sense* that is produced [...] [that] not only defines what "we" should take for granted (that is, what is normalised and already known as "the given"), but it also involves the normalisation of ways of "sensing" the difference between common and uncommon. [...] Neighbourhood watch is hence about *making* the common: it makes the community. (Ahmed 2000: 29, emphasis in original)

The normalizing judgement can, on the other hand, be detected in the requirements for those outside of the norm to integrate into it and accept a dominant, "host culture." One example of the latter is the political discussion around the concept of "leading culture," *Leitkultur*, in the context of immigration in Germany. The concept of "leading culture" was introduced by the German political scientist Bassam Tibi in 1998, who defines it as follows: "The values of the desirable leading culture must stem from the cultural modernity, and they are: democracy,

laicism, the Enlightenment, human rights and civil society” (Tibi 1998: 154). Since 2000, the concept has been used in the political debate on immigration. The Christian-democratic politician Friedrich Merz introduced the term into the discussion on the planned changes of the immigration law in 2000, formulating the rules for immigration and integration, and against multiculturalism and parallel societies. Merz demanded that “immigrants who want to live here permanently must adjust to a grown, liberal German leading culture” (Eitz 2010, translation from German by the author), a demand that provoked much public controversy at the time.

After an ensuing period of absence from public discussion, the term again surfaced during the debates surrounding the so-called refugee crisis of the year 2015-16 in Germany. In 2017, then interior minister Thomas de Maizi re published a text listing ten aspects of *Leitkultur*, that “go beyond language, constitution and the respect for human rights,” and are “things that hold the Germans together, make them what they are and make them different from others” (de Maizi re 2017). The interior minister starts his list with the words, “We value certain social habits [...] we say our name. We give our hand in greeting” and adds, “We show our face. We are not burka” (de Maizi re 2017).

Like many other contributors to the debate around integration, the minister apparently also starts from the premise that there is cultural distance separating the migrant from the dominant culture. Found in visible signs such as the burka, not giving one’s hand in greeting, or maybe not speaking the German language, such cultural distance can be overcome by adopting common rules of behaviour, such as greeting or showing one’s face in public, and common values such as respect for the Constitution or for human rights. On the other hand, it is also some unnamed essence that holds Germans together, something that goes beyond the visible signs and possibly beyond things that can be learned at all.

While somehow beyond description, culture is still used as a parameter to measure integration, with cultural factors serving to uphold the differentiation between ethnic groups. In light of such narratives, Paul Gilroy points out how in this constellation,

culture is conceived along ethnically absolute lines, not as something intrinsically fluid, changing, unstable, and dynamic, but as a fixed property of social groups rather than a relational field in which they encounter one another and live out social, historical relationships. (1993: 24)

In this way, the “inherent cultural nature” of groups explains their different positions in the social strata, “if not the impossibility of the insertion of minorities into mainstream national cultures” (Gilroy 1987: 61, paraphrased in Fortier 2000: 24). Anne-Marie Fortier also attracts attention to the role ethnicity plays in binding culture and biology. For her, ethnicity becomes the nodal point that mediates culture and race and allows them

to congeal in pseudo-biological underpinnings. As ‘race’ is culturalized, ‘ethnicity’ is essentialized. What stems from this is the notion of an invisible ethnicity as well as the idea that ethnic identification is somewhat intrinsic. (Fortier 2000: 24)

“Nodal point” is a concept derived from the Lacanian notion of *points de capion*, “privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying process” (Božić-Vrbančić 2008: 23). According to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe ([1985] 2014), nodal points emerge through antagonism, and although they create a sense of permanence or fixing, by linking signifiers to signifieds, by quilting the whole chain, they cannot make meaning entirely stable. However, often they appear as something fixed, or as the German minister puts it referring to ethnicity, as something “which makes Germans different from others.”

Inspired by Lacanian psychoanalysis, Slavoj Žižek argues that this identification with ethnicity, or national identity, or in the example quoted above, with “something that makes Germans different from others,” cannot be understood just on the level of discourse but must include the affective dimension.

Starting from the historical developments in post-communist Eastern Europe, in his essay “Enjoy Your Nation as Yourself!” Žižek (1993) points to the questions emerging from the flaring up of nationalism and populist policies in Eastern Europe of the 1990s, going against the grain of the widespread premise in Western Europe that the fall of oppressive regimes would inevitably lead the populations to embrace Western democratic values, the rule of law, ethnic tolerance, and a new unity within the diverse European identity. Žižek sees in the West’s disillusionment with developments, such as the wars in former Yugoslavia and the flaring up of xenophobia and anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, a disappointment in its desire to be admired and find again its lost original experience of “democratic invention.” Instead of seeing in nationalism only a symptom of ideology, Žižek rethinks national identification in psychoanalytical terms, pointing to a level beneath the symbolic one. Whereas the notion of the “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) explains the production of a nation as a process

of self-ordering along an array of symbolic identification points towards an ideal unit envisaged amongst a given group of people, for Žižek the explanation of the nation as a product of discursive practices still leaves out an important, non-discursive level:

A nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialized in a set of social practices and transmitted through national myths that structure those practices. To emphasize in a ‘deconstructionist’ mode that Nation is not biological or transhistorical fact but a contingent discursive construction, an overdetermined result of textual practices, is thus misleading: such an emphasis overlooks the remainder of some real, nondiscursive kernel of enjoyment which must be present for the Nation qua discursive entity-effect to achieve its ontological consistency. (1993: 202)

Žižek points to the “shared relationship toward a Thing, toward Enjoyment incarnated” (1993: 201) that underlies values, myths, and social practices woven into the fantasy of the nation. For Žižek, the Thing is the Lacanian Real – something that resists symbolization but is created by the symbolic. The role of fantasy is crucial here, because it is through fantasy that the world is experienced as a meaningful order, and the way that belonging to a particular group is constructed involves an element of fantasy. In other words, national identity cannot be fully symbolized and it is precisely because of that impossibility that members of a particular group cannot express what it really means to belong to a particular group. Therefore, they usually refer to “something more,” something that defines them. In short, there is a *belief* among the members of a particular group that there is “something more,” some essence within those features that they define as theirs, something that materializes through their discursive practices.

Members of a community who partake in a given way of life “*believe in their Thing*, where this belief has a reflexive structure proper to the intersubjective space: “I believe in the (national) Thing” equals “I believe that others (members of my community) believe in the Thing”. (Žižek 1993: 201-202, emphasis in original)

This belief shared by the members of a group (nation), that there is a set of characteristics and practices – traditions, myths, customs – that make the group what it is, leads to enjoyment (*jouissance*) resulting from the performance of these practices. Therefore, the national cause is “nothing but the way subjects of a given ethnic community organize their enjoyment

through national myths” (Žižek 1993: 202) and a nation exists “only as long as its specific *enjoyment* continues to be materialized in a set of social practices and transmitted through national myths or fantasies that secure these practices” (1993: 202, emphasis in original).

It is therefore not only on the level of differences between social practices that communities are defined against one another, but on the affective level, on the level of fantasy of their particular relationship towards the Nation-Thing: “Our Thing” is ours only; our enjoyment cannot be experienced or learned by non-members. The Thing exists in a paradox of being, on the one hand, inaccessible to Others and on the other, in constant threat by them, keeping the members in a state of awareness – even if this threat to “our way of life” is not a social reality, but played out on the symbolic level.

Here, racism and exclusions are a discursive product of the national fantasy, the fantasy that on the one hand, makes us believe the Other desires to “steal our enjoyment” and on the other hand, we assume an excessive, even perverse and secret enjoyment by the Other. In short, “what really bothers us about the ‘other’ is the peculiar way he organizes his enjoyment, precisely the surplus, the ‘excess’ that pertains to this way: the smell of ‘their’ food, ‘their’ noisy songs and dances, ‘their’ strange manners, ‘their’ attitude to work” (Žižek 1993: 202-203), which explains the sense of panic that occurs when social and physical distance towards the Other diminishes. Our hatred of the Other is a hatred of the Other’s enjoyment, which “would be the most general formula of the modern racism we are witnessing today: a hatred of the particular way the Other enjoys” (1993: 203).

The fantasy of the Other’s enjoyment is at the heart of the construction of cultural difference. It is something that “we” cannot penetrate, and something that in the racist discourse “we” do not want to have in our proximity, since it is seen as insurmountable and a natural cause of our rejection. While on the legislative level discrimination of migrants is rejected in European countries, such as Germany or France today, the discrimination arises from the affective level. It is formulated as a rejection of “cultural difference,” which becomes a key organizing principle of what Étienne Balibar (1991) calls “cultural racism.” It becomes the point around which processes of exclusion happen, and the “way of life” of minorities becomes a “natural” base for antagonism.

Balibar analyzes the development of new discourses of racism in which the new “racist community,” with its catalogue of practices of violence, stereotypical representation, and exclusion of the Other, no longer develops based primarily on a hatred that reflects a pseudo-

biological concept of race; instead, in the era of decolonization and post-colonialism, Balibar locates immigration as the site where this discourse arises, with the “insurmountability of cultural differences” as its dominant theme (Balibar 1991: 20-21). This “differentialist racism” does not postulate a superiority of certain groups, but “‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions” (1991: 21). Culture here takes over the function of nature, in that individual Others are *a priori* locked into a determined category where “individuals are the exclusive heirs and bearers of a single culture, segregate collectivities (the best barrier in this regard still being national frontiers)” (1991: 23). In this new “racism without races,”

(i)t is granted from the outset that races do not constitute isolable biological units and that in reality there are no ‘human races’. It may also be admitted that the behaviour of individuals and their ‘aptitudes’ cannot be explained in terms of their blood or even their genes, but are the result of their belonging to historical ‘cultures’. (1991: 21)

This belonging is essentialistic and immutable; cultural difference cannot be surmounted. Balibar illustrates this “differentialist racism” using the example of current Arabophobia, based on “an image of Islam as a ‘conception of the world’ which is incompatible with Europeaness and an enterprise of universal ideological domination” (1991: 24).

The discourse of cultural difference threatening “our way of life” is becoming mainstreamed in a number of European contexts at the time of writing, especially in the case of the large number of immigrant refugees, seen as carriers of cultural habits incompatible with European (or German) values, such as gender equality or a democratic outlook. In this discourse, racist reactions become “natural,” transforming the theory of races into “‘a theory of ‘race relations’ within society, which naturalizes not racial belonging but racist conduct” (Balibar 1991: 22).

It is precisely within the framework of “cultural racism” that this thesis looks for the operations of normalizing and problematizing in the creation of the “Other.” The articulations of “cultural difference” are analyzed through a set of media broadcasts. The analysis looks specifically at those programs that are regarded as favorable towards cultural contact, looking for their responses to the problematizations of difference. Among others, it strongly draws on the work of Sara Ahmed, who introduces the concept of the “stranger,” and explores the instrumentalization of the stranger in the production of (Western) self and community. In her study “Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality,” Ahmed explores these

instrumentalizations through the prism of feminist and postcolonial theory, and introduces the concept of “stranger fetishism,” where “[t]he alien is not simply the one whom we have failed to identify (‘unidentified flying objects’), but is the one whom we have already identified in the event of being named as alien: the alien recuperates all that is beyond the human into the singularity of a given form” (2000: 2). Investigating various discourses, Ahmed shows how communities need the “close encounter” with strangers/aliens to be able to construct what is beyond the community in order to define the community itself. It is through this “fleshing out the beyond” that the community is given a face and form. “The alien stranger is hence, not beyond human, but a mechanism *for allowing us to face that which we have already designated as the beyond*” (2000: 3, emphasis in original).

Based on her conceptualization of the “stranger” and “stranger fetishism,” Ahmed sees these spaces as unavoidably situated within the historical negotiations of “nation.” She analyzes the necessity of the presence of “strangers” within the nation-space, to facilitate “the demarcation of the national body” (2000: 100). Furthermore, Ahmed points to the multicultural society’s ability to turn ethnic belonging into a consumption good, imbuing Western consumer culture with phantasies of “becoming,” a notion that will be analyzed more deeply in the example of a radio station in Chapter 7, and which involves, according to Ahmed, the construction of assimilable difference which can be put on or taken off. For Ahmed, “passing” is therefore crucial in the national phantasy of multiculturalism, while at the same time “acts of ‘transgression’ implicit in passing do not transcend the systematization of differences into regularities” (2000, 91). On the contrary, passing can serve as a re-organizing principle of racial categories, where the disorganisation of identities

can become a mechanism for the re-organizing of social life through an expansion of the terms of surveillance (how are we to know the other's difference if we cannot see her?). The economy of desire [...] is itself an apparatus of knowledge which already fixes others into a certain place. Such an economy of desire to tell the difference assumes that the difference can be found somewhere on (or in) the bodies of others (on or underneath their skin). (2000: 91)

The categories of difference found on or in bodies exclude any sort of ambiguity or transgression of existing categories. Invoking a parallel (Black passing for White, White passing for White), Ahmed links the processes of stranger-production and stranger fetishism to historical power asymmetries, since the difference between a Black and a White subject passing

for White is not *essential*, but rather “a *structural* difference that demonstrates that passing involves the re-opening or re-staging of a fractured history of identifications that constitutes the limits to a given subject's mobility.” To refuse that difference is to refuse to acknowledge “the constraints which temporarily fix subjects in relations of social antagonism” (2000: 93, emphasis in original).

## 1.2 Governmentality and media as spaces of articulation of difference

In this thesis, I look for the ways that subjects are fixed in relations of antagonism – these include the web of meanings “quilted” around terms such as integration, culture, multiculturalism, and tolerance. Many of these imaginaries are articulated in the media discourse, the main field of exploration of this thesis. Van Dijk argues that the media discourse is one of the most powerful discourses, operating from a position of authority, and notes that “among many other resources that define the power base of a group or institution, *access to or control over* public discourse and communication is an important ‘symbolic’ resource” (Van Dijk 2004: 355, emphasis in original). In Foucauldian terms, this means that the media discourse can be seen as part of modern-day governmentality, as leading to specific modes of individualization, through articulating modes of “conduct,” where “conduct of conducts” represents a simple definition of “governmentality.” In Foucault’s words, governmentality, understood “in the broad sense of techniques and procedures for directing human behavior” (Foucault 1997: 83), encompasses an “ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power” (Foucault 1979: 20, quoted in Rose 2006: 86). In short, governmentality operates to produce a subject.

As has already been stated, Foucault traces the emergence of a novel idea in the mid-eighteenth century, that of a collectivity of living beings, a population with characteristics not the same as those of individuals, a collectivity that had to be understood by specific knowledges and governed according to them (Rose 2006: 84). Since this perspective sees power as operating in terms of specific rationalizations, an analysis here “seeks to identify these different styles of thought, their conditions of formation, the principles and knowledges that they borrow from and generate, the practices that they consist of, how they are carried out, their contestations and alliances with other arts of governing” (Rose 2006: 87).

In other words, governmentality leads to specific modes of individualization, including “becoming a Western-modern subject” (Lorey 2015: 3). While individualization means a separation, “primarily a matter of constituting oneself by way of imaginary relationships, constituting one’s ‘own’ inner being,” at the same time “this interiority and self-reference is not an expression of independence, but rather the crucial element in the pastoral relationship of obedience” (Lorey 2015: 3). Therefore, practices of governing can be seen as leading individuals “to produce relations to self that are then perceived, in the best case, as independent and autonomous” – the “conduct of conducts,” in other words, consists of “influencing the conduct of others through their individualization” (Lorey 2015: 3). The individuals are thus placed at the intersection of being guided to a certain conduct and self-government, between subjugation and self-determination.

At the same time, this intersection is open to counter-conduct, something that becomes an interesting area of study in terms of the topic of this thesis, the media discourse. This thesis approaches the media from the framework of a governmentality analysis and sees them as closely linked to formations of citizenship. This is especially visible in the social position of the public service media, with a remit “to inform, educate and entertain all audiences.” “Financed and controlled by the public, for the public,” the public service broadcasters are even defined as “the cornerstones of democratic societies” by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU).<sup>8</sup>

In an analysis inspired by Foucauldian governmentality, David Nolan (2003, 2004, 2006) looks in particular at the role of the media in contemporary formations of citizenship. Disarticulating existing citizenship and the practices that shape it from critical-normative definitions, in his analysis citizenship is seen as a theoretical ideal, performatively embodied in broadcasting institutions, which enshrine and uphold individuals’ rights as members of civil society. On the other hand, conditions of civic membership are determined by operations of “citizens-forming” institutions (Nolan 2006). Nolan rejects the notion of citizenship as an ideal outside reality; instead he looks at citizenship as embodied in it – as a performative outcome of the field of government, “since it is this field that determines both the extent to which particular subjects are included in and/or excluded from the polity” (Nolan 2006: 231).

---

<sup>8</sup> “What is public service media?”, EBU, <https://www.ebu.ch/about/public-service-media>, accessed 12/November/2018

In discussing public service media in Australia, Nolan analyzes them as technologies of government in relation to the questions of citizenship, technologies that “do indeed perform this role of making available spaces where ideas of collective identity are articulated and deliberated, and in so doing constitute a ‘technology of citizenship’” (Nolan 2006: 227). Therefore, the public service broadcasters are on the one hand positioned as a field of practice (alongside others) and work to performatively define formations of citizenship, and on the other are situated within and governed by a larger field of socio-political relations (Nolan 2006: 227-228). Therefore, citizenship formations are shaped by interactions between different authorities and different ways of defining “the public” and “publics” that the media deploy, with the “importance of such interactions [... being...] that they inform modes of governmental practice (including media practice) that literally serve to “define” formations of citizenship” (2006: 227-228).

Instead of looking for a process in which a state moulds its citizenry through the media and other discourses, a governmentality approach recognizes that citizens exercise governmental power simultaneously to being subject to it, depending upon the social, cultural, and economic resources at their disposal. This mode of analysis finally “suggests that practices of government tend to be informed by (and are themselves governed by reference to) representations of the political community (or public) itself” (Nolan 2006: 233).

The journalistic understanding of “the publics” is that in

which journalism itself bears the responsibility of both shaping and representing, that marks it as a liberal technology that plays a key role in a broader apparatus of government. It must be emphasized, however, that “publics” do not exist simply as objectively identifiable entities but are discursively produced through various forms of quantitative and qualitative knowledge. (Nolan 2003: 1372)

In this sense, “journalism exists in a reciprocally constitutive and dependent relationship with other such agencies” (Nolan 2003: 1372). In conclusion, a governmentality analysis can show how “the material politics of actually existing citizenship can gain visibility, by focusing on how various social practices and institutions contribute to formations of citizenship” (Nolan 2006: 240).

I follow this line of analysis in my elaborations of concrete case studies within the media discourse. I see the media as one of the central spaces of representation in society, in terms of

their role in (co-)defining the power relations as defined by (cultural) difference within a multicultural situation. I also see them as participating in the discursive production of various forms of knowledge and the subjectification of citizens. At the same time, they are also an area where counter-conducts or alternative modes of individualization can be articulated.

I draw in particular on the work of Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, who concentrate on the role of media in multiculturalism and pose questions about the ways the media participate in the construction of cultural identities. Shohat and Stam detect ideological and power structures in a large array of popular culture texts – from Hollywood genre movies to indigenous cinema, from television serials to U.S. coverage of the Gulf Wars, from the Brazilian Tropicalia to rap and hip-hop movements. In their analysis of the overlapping of the beginnings of colonialism, scientific development, and technical progress, they point to the participation of the media – in particular photography and film – in the imperial project, showing how the material from the time “enshrines and naturalizes the hierarchical stratifications inherited from colonialism, rendering them as inevitable and even ‘progressive’” (Stam and Shohat 2012: 61). In other words, this film material introduces the normalized view of the “civilizational” project of European colonialism that continues in the Eurocentric paradigm and justifies the “us vs. them” problematizations to this day – both in the media discourse itself and the individualizations and the social positionings articulated through the media discourse.

Two points are central to the Eurocentric paradigm for Shohat and Stam: firstly, it sanitizes Western history and patronizes the non-West, thinking of itself “in terms of its noblest achievements – science, progress, humanism – but of the non-West in terms of its deficiencies, real or imagined” (Shohat and Stam 1994: 3). Secondly, it naturalizes this stance as “common sense,” rather than a political position. The “ideal portrait” of Eurocentrism shows it as a diffusionist narrative, assuming that Europe generates ideas that spread around the world; as evolutionary, with Europe leading the way for others; as embedded in binary metaphors of center and periphery, order and chaos, self-reflexivity and blindness; as denying the agency of colonized peoples; as implying an inherent drive towards democracy in the West but not elsewhere; as having a monopoly on beauty, artistic modernism, self-critical reflectivity, universal thought, progress (unrelated to the appropriation of wealth from colonized regions), and so on (Stam and Shohat 2012: 65-67).

Eurocentrism, however, is not a synonym for “European,” so that “(i)t is not Eurocentric to love Shakespeare or Proust, but it is Eurocentric to wield these cultural figures as ‘proof’ of

an innate European superiority” (2012: 62). The Eurocentric paradigm instead “refers to western hegemonies rooted in colonialism and imperialism. It refers not to Europe but to a perspective on the relationship between the West and its Others” (Shohat and Stam 2009). The nature of the “Europe” at the heart of this paradigm has changed since the colonial period to include for example (White Anglo-Saxon) North America; therefore, alternative terms such as “Eurotropicalism,” “Westernism,” “Western hegemonism,” and “Occidentalism” could be used as alternatives to Eurocentrism.

Since the power structure described by Shohat and Stam is present as a hidden paradigm not only in colonial film, but also in a large part of today’s media production that implicitly positions the Western subject as dominant, in the reverse argument the media can gain a pivotal role in the decentralizing and dispersing of power, in the rejection of Western and Eurocentric power structures. The media discourse can become a site where counter-conduct or alternative individualizations are articulated, a space where it would be possible to exercise a radical “un-thinking” of Eurocentrism, a deconstruction and destabilization of the “habit of Eurocentrism,” or those “paradigms which simplify and make Europe a singular source of culture” (Shohat and Stam 1994: 1). Shohat and Stam point to the crucial question of the distribution of representational power in the media; however, they see the media as fields of representation that can open up spaces for resisting the Eurocentric discourse. Media can construct identity and a sense of belonging to a national community, but just as “the media can exoticize and otherize cultures, they can also reflect and help catalyze multicultural affiliations and transnational identifications” (Shohat and Stam 2003: 1)

This thesis analyzes a particular radio station and a media event of German public service broadcasters and their effects on multicultural citizenship, explicitly looking for ways these media articulate belonging and citizenship. What kind of individualizations are they in the context of the German multicultural society? What narratives do they uphold? Do they follow dominant scripts, or do they offer modes of alternative or counter self-determination? These are some of the overreaching questions of the thesis.

Whereas a large part of the German-language literature on the topic of media and multiculturalism sees the mass media as a tool, as a means of carrying the message that will lead to harmonious co-existence and social cohesion<sup>9</sup> in the best case, or contribute to social

---

<sup>9</sup> An overview of the German-language literature in the field of media and multiculturalism is offered in Chapter 4.

disintegration in the worst, this thesis aims to expand the discussion towards a discursive analysis, that explicitly treats media as technologies of governing in the Foucauldian sense. The thesis looks at the questions of power implicit in media discourses, at how the audience and the media makers “manipulate [...] (media) technologies to their own cultural, economic, and ideological ends” (Askew 2002: 1). It asks specific questions in terms of power workings within multicultural societies, or a context of majority and minorities, in particular: What kind of “truth” do media discourses under scrutiny construct? And whose interests does that serve in the final consequence? How do the media contribute to the processes of problematization and normalization? How do they work towards “Othering” or towards national and cultural community building? How do these discourses work within and on the concept of difference, on subject and object positionings? Who has access to the media discourse as a member of the audience, as a protagonist or a creator?

I scrutinize two particular media examples. One of them is the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa, that will be introduced in more detail later. At this point, it is important to note that it is at the moment of writing the only public service radio station in Germany dedicated specifically to cultural diversity in the country (under the new name WDR Cosmo). It broadcasts word content and music that differ from the daily potpourri of agency news and reporting of the mainstream media as well as from the choice of chart music, which is dominated by Anglo-Saxon hits. To this extent, I see it as partially offering alternative modes of individualization or embodiment of citizenship in multicultural Germany at the turn of the century. My second example is the thematic week dedicated to tolerance, a media event organized by the Association of German Public Service Broadcasters in 2014.

I do not see these media examples, or media content in general, as reflecting physical or social reality in a straight-forward manner. Instead, I analyze both of these examples as articulations of particular meanings in a particular historical moment in the context of the German multicultural society. I analyze the negotiations of multicultural living as mediated through the “snapshot” of media discourse, caught in a certain historical moment in a media broadcast. I specifically seek for the ways some meanings are included and some excluded from the discourse, as well as how meanings around cultural diversity are fixed in it.

Here, I follow Laclau and Mouffe, who argue that our perception of reality and its objects is mediated through discourse. In their vivid comparison,

(t)he fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to

do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence. (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 94)

Important for my analysis is the assertion that the meanings of social phenomena are not fixed; rather, they are the result of a spectrum of discourses, structuring reality in different ways, so that

(p)eople’s understanding of these aspects [...] is contingent upon the ongoing struggle between discourses, with perceptions of society and identity always open to new representations as meanings are constantly altered and reconfigured through contact with competing discourses. (Rear 2013: 5)

In particular, I analyze how crucial terms of the cultural politics of difference in Germany – among them multiculturalism, integration, tolerance – are configured and reconfigured through competing discourses, as they are articulated in the media. According to Laclau and Mouffe, articulation is “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice,” while a discourse is “the structured totality resulting from this articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 91). Since this structuring of meanings involves exclusion of alternative meanings, “any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre” (Laclau & Mouffe 2014: 98-99).

As was already mentioned, Laclau and Mouffe point to nodal points that organize discourses around a reference point, the “privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of the signifying chain” (2014: 99). As Slavoj Žižek (1989) explains, this does not mean that a nodal point is simply the word that condenses all the meaning of the field it “quilts,” rather, it is “the word which, as a word, on the level of the signifier itself, unifies a given field, constitutes its identity” (Žižek 1989: 95-96). In other words, a nodal point possesses no density of meaning, but is instead an “empty signifier, a pure signifier without the signified” (1989: 97), that only

acquires meaning in its positioning to other signs, and through articulation. For example, Torfing (1999) explains the functioning of the word “nation” as the nodal point quilting the discursive field of “nationalism”: he points out that it is the “aim of a nationalistic movement to hegemonize the content of the empty signifier of ‘the nation’ by attaching it to a transcendental signified, able once and for all to arrest the play of meaning” (1999: 202).

In this sense, the media discourse, including the particular station under scrutiny, WDR Funkhaus Europa, is seen here as organized around nodal points such as multiculturalism and integration, positioned in articulatory relation to other elements within the discourse. I see multiculturalism, diversity, and integration in this particular discourse not as condensing some central meaning of the discourse on difference, but as filled and refilled with different meanings in an attempt to fix them in a certain way. The relationship of these nodal points to other elements in the discourse is not one of straightforward causes and effects, and it is also always contingent. The contingency of articulations always becomes visible in light of newly arising antagonisms, which then lead to new articulations and discourse rearrangements. I show this in examples such as the change in how “enriching difference” was articulated in the picture of the ideal listeners of the radio station Funkhaus Europa. While initially personified by a young Arab man, over the course of years the picture of the young Arab male became a point that “quilting” a whole new discourse arising from the events of the Cologne New Year’s Eve 2015/16 and subsequent media coverage on the cases of sexual violence and predation perpetrated by refugees from the Middle East.<sup>10</sup> It is such rearrangements arising from new antagonisms that I reveal through a scrutiny of programs dedicated to cultural diversity, detected in concepts and narratives that media content is built around, as well as in the changes that have occurred in the past years. In sum, they point to rearrangements in the regimes of truth relating to multiculturalism in a particular social moment.

---

<sup>10</sup> An analysis of the ideal-type audience of Funkhaus Europa is the subject of Chapter 7.

## Chapter 2

### **Contestations around identity issues - migration, multiculturalism, integration, assimilation, interculturalism**

The antagonisms around “cultural difference” influence the ongoing rearrangements in the discourse on multicultural living in many European states of migration, mobilizing the emotions around the contestations of difference, race, and culture. The contingency of any points of reference in the discourse on difference or multicultural living becomes visible in the ongoing struggle over words, over terms with which to describe the social situation characterizing modern European societies characterized by migration and cultural and ethnic diversity. This can be seen very vividly on the trajectory of some of the key terms in the debate in recent years, among them most strikingly multiculturalism, but also integration, or interculturalism, terms that are central to the ways citizens of contemporary Germany subjectify themselves today.

#### **2.1 Migration and multiculturalism**

As has already been stated, over 23 percent, or more than every fifth person living in Germany has a so-called “migration background”<sup>11</sup>. Since this statistical category applies also to people born in Germany to at least one parent of migrant origins, further cultural and ethnic diversification of the population in Germany is set to continue even if physical immigration were to stop completely. So, how does the German “we” constitute itself in light of such social transformation? How are the citizens of Germany, whose political institutions only recently officially confirmed the physical reality that Germany was a “country of immigration”<sup>12</sup>, subjectified today in terms of their cultural and national identity? How does the political

---

<sup>11</sup> Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund I. In absoluten Zahlen, Anteile an der Gesamtbevölkerung in Prozent, 2017, [https://www.bpb.de/wissen/NY3SWU,0,0,Bev%F6lkerung\\_mit\\_Migrationshintergrund\\_I.html](https://www.bpb.de/wissen/NY3SWU,0,0,Bev%F6lkerung_mit_Migrationshintergrund_I.html), accessed 18 Nov. 2018

<sup>12</sup> Until the late 1990s, the official line of the German institutions was that Germany was not a country of permanent immigration.

discourse reconcile its reference point as a nation-state with the changing cultural identities of a large bulk of its citizens? Finally: what versions of citizenship and what narratives of the “good life” in Germany as a country of changing identity are articulated through the media?

The last decades have seen a change of paradigm in the official German politics<sup>13</sup>, from denying the facts of immigration, towards efforts to promote integration, and even pride in the country’s diversity. For example, in 2011, the 50th anniversary of the bilateral contract which started the arrival of foreign workers in Germany from Turkey was a cause for celebration of the success of its largest migrant community, otherwise often perceived as a source of problems and an implied lack of full acculturation. On this occasion however, awards for “successful integration” were handed over, books about businesspeople, physicians, and artists of Turkish origin were published, the media celebrated the “good co-existence.” As is often the case in the rhetoric concerning migration in Western Europe, cultural diversity, when framed positively, is seen in terms of the potential of economic enrichment or of helping to solve the looming demographic crisis. However, even when the discourse of “enrichment” is evoked, ostensibly the nation state remains the “natural” point of departure for celebrating diversity. This in turn leads to continuing struggles over the concepts of cohesion, integration, cultural values, and tolerance in the political, public, and media discourse. Therefore, regardless of the ideological underpinnings of the arguments, the picture of the society continues to be based on prior normativity and assumptions of major and minor elements within it (Stam and Shohat 2012: 119).

This becomes all too visible when large-scale events are perceived as a crisis, such as the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East into Germany in 2015-16. Termed a “refugee crisis” in the media, the events reinforced the sense of institutional inaptness, insecurity, and threat that favored the rise of the xenophobic party Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) and the right-wing populist movement Pegida<sup>14</sup>. Whereas the demand to integrate and become part of the society remains a priority in the

---

<sup>13</sup> Chapter 4 will deal in more detail with the historical transformation of policies concerning immigration and diversity in Germany.

<sup>14</sup> Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (*Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes*), abbreviated Pegida, was established in October 2014, when it staged its first rallies against further immigration in the German East, accusing the authorities of facilitating immigration and a silent Islamization of Germany. Pegida has continued to demonstrate around the country on a regular basis, regularly also provoking counter-demonstrations. Founded as a loose association of right-wing organizations and individual citizens, it has over and over again been accused of colluding with the extreme right.  
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegida>, accessed 03 Jan. 2019

political approach to immigration, the continuing conflicts around the conditions for obtaining – and properly living – German citizenship point to the danger that the “new restrictions and the symbolic effect of debates about which new citizens are deemed worthy or unwelcome may counteract the intention of increasing the naturalization rates of immigrants and hinder their full incorporation into German society” (Schönwälder 2010: 153).

The negotiations around questions of migration and cultural diversity have turned around several crucial terms; multiculturalism is the most prominent example that shows a larger European and Western paradigm change in the discourses around migration and the policy responses to it. It has been used to describe a set of politics regulating diversity, or as a term used to denote a celebration of the cultural mix in the country, and, in a more recent complete semantic turn, as the umbrella term describing everything that went wrong with immigration, in a strong “backlash against multiculturalism” (Fortier 2008; Vertovec 2010; Wessendorf 2010). How are such shifts in public discussion to be analyzed in terms of their operation in governing difference? I see multiculturalism as a textbook example of a “nodal point,” defining and unifying the meaning of the field it “quilts” (Žižek 1989). Without density of meaning in itself, multiculturalism is filled with meaning through articulation, depending on the context, and on its positioning in relation to other signs.

Let me trace its trajectory: In very broad terms, the concept of multiculturalism points to a constellation of the loosening ties between the nation-state and a homogeneous national culture, and a parallelity of various individual cultures (ethnic and other) within the nation-state. Multiculturalism can thus be seen from two perspectives, both as “a feeble acknowledgement of the fact that cultures have lost their moorings in definite places and an attempt to subsume this plurality of cultures within the framework of a national identity” (Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 7).

The concept of multiculturalism emerged in the context of the social and migration movements of the mid-twentieth century and was later theoretically approached in post-colonial theories, against the backdrop of the experience of global migration movements of the post-colonial era. As such, it has not only analytical but also institutional connotations, and continues to be emotionally charged on the level of everyday political debate in a large number of European countries of immigration. Speaking within the British context, Anne-Marie Fortier refers to this proliferation of discussion when she notes that the “sheer volume of debates, consultations, analyses, editorials, and images circulating around multiculturalism

in the British public sphere since the turn of the millenium makes it impossible not to notice how unsettled and unsettling, multicultural Britain is” (Fortier 2008: 2).

In the course of the years and with changing political climates, the term multiculturalism has often been used with manifold, sometimes contradictory meanings, depending on the historical, political and socio-cultural context and purpose. In Fortier’s words,

(s)truggles over exclusion, discrimination, and recognition of people minoritized on the basis of race, ethnicity, and to a lesser extent, gender, sexuality, class, or disability have variously been mobilized in the name of multiculturalism (2008: 1-2)

and its deployment in government strategies and social policies also varies and is always subject to intense debate. Whereas many countries of immigration have operationalized multicultural practices in their normative frameworks as well as on the level of everyday life, and spontaneous forms of multicultural life exist in all of them, the public, media, and political discourses have seen a steady growth of criticism of the concept, so much so that some authors even see symptoms of its “slow death” approaching. All in all, when describing cultural and political dilemmas in heterogeneous societies, even if turning into a problematic category, Stuart Hall notes that multiculturalism “contain[s] the seeds of a major disruption in our normal common sense political assumptions” (Hall 2000: 1) and points out that the multicultural is not a policy decision or a life-style choice, but “an inevitable process of cultural translation” (2000: 6).

The main thoretical approaches to multiculturalism I refer to in this text identify different concepts within this broad area as their focus of analytical interest (diaspora, space, identity, citizenship, power politics, etc.), but they all share an intrinsically political character, in that they all propose alternatives to dominant practices. Most of the analytical approaches referred to in this dissertation stem from the Anglo-Saxon area, and even if some of the social, political, and economic indicators differ, I see strong parallels to the German context on the level of political and public contestations around identity and belonging, as well as their shifts through time.

One of the most interesting of these is the self-image, or the fantasy, that immigration societies develop in terms of their changing ethnic makeup and the ensuing cultural identity – a point of much contestation in the political and media discourse in Germany. Anne-Marie

Fortier analyzes this on the subject of British multiculturalism in her essay “Pride Politics and Multicultural Citizenship” (2005). Starting from the analysis of newspaper coverage during the public outcry and the ensuing debate over the publication of the so-called “Parekh Report,” Fortier uncovers the dominant cultural and political assumptions underlying the seemingly liberal public discourse on multiculturalism in Great Britain and discovers in it patterns of what she brands “multicultural nationalism.”

The claim of the report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (Parekh 2000), published in October 2000, that caused such polemic, was the implication that Britain as well as the dominant understanding of Britishness rest on – systematic and largely unspoken – racial connotations. As is stated in the report,

(w)hiteness nowhere features as an explicit condition of being British, but it is widely understood that Englishness, and therefore by extension Britishness, is racially coded. [...] Race is deeply entwined with political culture and with the idea of nation. (2000: 38)

The Parekh report called for the members of the dominant group to “rethink the national story” and re-evaluate their assumed identities and historical narratives – even if this meant hazarding the consequence of destabilizing them.

The highly emotionalized public response to the Parekh report was marked by declarations of pride in British citizenship, and it is in these publicly displayed emotions that Fortier finds the fantasy of Britain as being a multicultural nation: it encompasses the image of Britain as a culturally mixed community, but based on clear criteria of belonging and entitlement posed by the dominant group. The media retort to the Parekh report was a counter-question: “how can ‘we’ be racist if we’ve always been multicultural?” and the assertion that “we” are proud of “‘our’ *inherent* cultural diversity and recognize that it ‘strengthens’ and ‘enriches’ the nation” (Fortier 2005: 560, emphasis in original). Differing sharply from the rhetoric of “immigration floods” or the national boat being “full,” this discourse circled around the notion of enrichment through diversity, claiming the almost coquettish sounding attribute in the assertion that “Britain is a ‘Mongrel Nation’” (2005: 560).

On the one hand, in the debate ensuing from the publication of the Parekh report, it was repeatedly claimed that Britain was a multicultural society which had disavowed a monoculturalist stance and had decoupled diversity from the images of threat or danger,

turning it into a source of pride. On the other hand, however, the discourse was still based on the dichotomy between “us” and “others” (even if it was a benevolent “us” facing harmless “others”). For Fortier, in this new version of national identity, imagined as one “based on a common hybridity” (2005: 560), Britain is still primarily ethnicized, but re-imagined as a result of a mixing of cultures, “in a typical melting-pot assimilationist stew where differences are dissolved and assimilated into a palatable diversity” (2005: 561).

Again, the contingency of such scripts as those of Britain as being proud of being a “Mongrel Nation” is obvious from a distance of only a few years, with the public discussion turning around, rejecting further immigration and the often-voiced fear of losing the nation’s cultural identity. At the same time, the reactions to the Parekh report show how difficult it is to point to the ethnicization underlying such scripts once they become established as “common sense.” In times of crisis or perceived crisis, such as during the movement of refugees in 2015-16 or the Brexit referendum in 2016, the underlying antagonisms come back with full force. Similar swings can be noted in other countries, for example in Germany, that celebrated migration from Turkey in 2011 on the highest institutional level, before a situation evolved in which public opinion circled around new immigration as a cultural and security threat, or the impossibility of integration of certain ethnic groups, just five years later.

Interestingly, similar contradictions in self-reflection do not disappear from the discourse when multiculturalism is elevated onto the level of state politics, as examples such as Australia show. On the one hand, the nation is institutionally defined as a multicultural mix, on the other, the power to define belonging remains part of the White hegemony, as Ghassan Hage shows in his study of Australian multiculturalism, *White Nation. Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society* (2000). Hage deals with the underlying assumptions at work in both the nationalist and the multiculturalist discourses, seeing them both as based on the same power-relations and on the same centrality of the White Anglo-Celtic individual, who assigns societal positions and entitlements. To denominate this narrative, Hage coins the term “White multiculturalism,” that operates as

an adaptation of the assimilation fantasy of postwar Australia which allows the White subjects to retain their governmental position within the nation. It does so through a process of incorporating Australia’s multicultural reality by constructing it into a reality of tamed ethnicities structured around a primary White culture. (Hage 2000: 209)

Hage finds the roots of what he calls the “White Nation fantasy” in a recurring “discourse of Anglo-decline,” a discourse that “bemoans what it sees as the attack on the core British values of traditional White Australia, in which the figure of the ordinary 'mainstream' Australian, the 'traditional Aussie battler', is perceived as a victim of a conspiracy to change the very nature of the country” (2000: 20). This fantasy thus locates the nationalist subject within nationalist practices, with the nationalist’s meaning being that of a nation-builder, “derived from the task of having to build his or her ideal homely nation, a national domesticator” (2000: 70).

Hage points to the “fantasy” of a nation, on one level functioning as a yearning for an ideal state, or even a yearning for a lived past, one before the country was “flooded” by “migrant waves.” On another level, Hage uses the term fantasy in Lacan’s sense of the ideal image of the self as a “meaningful” subject, of people *inhabiting* “fantasy spaces of which they are a part” (2000: 70).

Hage uses the concept of “White Nation fantasy” in a psychoanalytical sense of idealized nationalists at the center of an idealized national space to draw attention to the similarity between two politically opposite projects: White Racism and White Multiculturalism, which “despite their many differences, [...] [share] a similar fantasy structure. [...] this fantasy structure is, ultimately, a fantasy of White supremacy” (2000: 232). He makes visible the shared assumption of the central position of the White national subject in decreeing the desired ethnic composition of the Australian society in both the racist and the multiculturalist approaches. The two sides differ considerably on the level of everyday politics by demanding that ethnic diversity be or not be tolerated. But, central and common to both is the self-assigned position of the *power* to tolerate or not to tolerate. Ultimately, “the distinction between valuing negatively/valuing positively mystifies the deeper division between holding the power to value (negatively or positively) and not holding it” (2000: 121). In both discourses, the element of power relations means that “White multiculturalism and White racism, each in their own way, work at *containing* the increasingly active role of non-White Australians in the process of governing Australia” (2000: 19, emphasis in original).

Anne-Marie Fortier in turn reveals racism to lie at the core of the paradox of “multiculturalist nationalism” that causes the compulsive public displays of pride in the diverse British nation and where, crucially, pride is not displayed by White but by non-White Britons. Fortier analyzes the example of the testimony of the Olympic medallist Kelly Holmes. It “makes sense” for her to display pride in multicultural Britain only due to the fact that she is not

White, that she is *seen* in the newspaper photograph as Black, as a racialized subject. Therefore, while claiming a post-racial color blindness, it is precisely color that gives sense to her testimony.

Despite her refusal of blackness, Holmes (and others) circulated within an iconography of Britishness that put skin colour at the *forefront* of the meaning of Britishness. The way she and others were taken up by the press was *as* racialized subjects (Fortier 2005: 569, emphasis in original),

who in their testimony refused the historical mechanisms that made their skin color the “other” of the British nation. Minorities continue to be the “others” within the British nation, but they are asked to relinquish their racial categorization (they should, for example, not be “angry black men and women”). For Fortier, “(t)alking the talk of national allegiance and pride makes the ‘other’ one of ‘us’ and the *non-white skin colour is rendered irrelevant*. Their deracination makes them available to adopt ‘the nation’ and available for adoption *by* ‘the nation’” (Fortier 2005: 570, emphasis in original). This makes the demand to deracialize paradoxical, since it is only as racialized subjects that they are asked this, and it is in the action of their own deracialization that they continue to be ascribed to their ethnic “otherness.”

Fortier asks what happens to “national culture” when minority cultures are proclaimed an integral part of the nation or what are the “new economies of exclusion/inclusion and toleration through different acts of interpellating ‘others’ to *be seen* to speak out as proud subjects of multicultural Britain” (Fortier 2005: 562, emphasis in original). Not all multicultural subjects are deemed as having a legitimate right to speak in the name of the nation – this belonging to the nation must first be earned:

one must be *seen* and *heard* to declare her pride in Britishness in order to *achieve* un-marked status. An ‘achievement’ that is endlessly deferred, as the non-white skin is never fully peeled off, in a continuous process of de/re-racialization. [...] Ethnicity here is conceived as foreignness and otherness, but it is also seen as something that one can willingly shed in exchange for legitimate citizenship. (2005: 574, emphasis in original)

Fortier detects this mechanism as especially at work after the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> in the USA and the London bombings of July 2005, when all non-White and Moslem Britons were

requested to publicly proclaim loyalty to British values. It is this possibility of “earning” the right to belonging that is part of cultural politics which assume

that they can transact their ethnicity, where their ethnicity can be shed or exchanged for legitimate citizenship. In order to be welcome in the national fold, they must deracinate themselves, yet they remain, willingly or not, aligned to their ethnic otherness (2005: 571).

Recognizing in multicultural citizenship also a “process of ascription of differential identities, and indeed of differential bodies, to some citizens rather than others within multiculturalist nationalism” (2005: 570), Fortier identifies the ultimate goal as being not to disturb the balance in which the White British subject continues to occupy the decision-taking position. In this sense, the formation of new multicultural subjects involves a

movement between closeness and distance; that is, one which means that the other is now integral to ‘our’ imagined community, while at the same time, their otherness, which is necessary to the project of multiculturalist Britain, keeps them distant and indeterminate. (2005: 572)

A crucial element of “multiculturalist nationalism” is its de-historizing effect, so that in the debate around the Parekh report, Fortier uncovers a “political rhetoric of citizenship that assumes sameness between individuals by denying the socio-political significance of ‘difference’ and evacuating histories of domination, racism and resistance” (2005: 572). Fortier’s analysis uncovers the paradox: The racialized subjects are asked to take off their racial marking, in order to become entitled to belonging. Belonging in turn means ignoring the history of power relations that have brought the racial markings salience and assigned the racialized subjects to the positions of “other” in the first place.

The construction of the image of Britain as a multicultural society, “officially” proud to be a “Mongrel Nation,” is also about “making the common,” making the nation’s historical narrative. In the British case, the claim of modern tolerance and inclusiveness is inextricably linked to a rejection of a historical legacy of imperialism as something which is beyond the boundaries of today’s understanding of the British nation and Britishness.

The claim of modern openness and tolerance is also a way of eradicating shameful histories. The “politics of pride” in response to the Parekh report – which in turn detected the creation of

a racialized British nation in the course of its imperial past as the base for continuing social inequalities and discrimination,

seek to *eradicate shame*: pride in ‘our’ history, in ‘our’ country, in ‘our’ passports, is repeatedly rehearsed by way of *sanitising the attachment to the nation under a veneer of guiltless pride*, one which knows no shame or guilt. (Fortier 2005: 565, emphasis in original)

Refusing shame for itself, the public looks for culprits, the ones “in our midst,” who “are ashamed of us as a nation” – these are to be found predominantly within the liberal Left. On the other side of the political spectrum, there are also culprits who “shame us as a nation”: these are in turn not found in the political far right as a whole, but specifically among *individuals*, for example, in the British National Party or among football hooligans. The rejection of both a generally felt shame and of the accusations of racism in the course of the media debate around the Parekh report was thus the expression of a “sanitized ‘happy’ multiculturalism” requiring the “eradication of unwanted unhappy subjects, including those whose anger might be justified but which can be managed and re-directed away from the nation (the collective self) and on to individualized selves” (2005: 567).

Also turning to the historical roots of today’s racism, Paul Gilroy searches for them in the unprocessed legacy of imperial history and poses the question why Empire and racialized thinking keep defining the essence of postcolonial discourse and public policy in Britain, where “it is homogeneity rather than diversity that provides the new rule” (Gilroy 2004a: 2).

In *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?* (2004), he concentrates on two key points: One is the unbroken power of the notion of “race” and the consistency of racism in postcolonial times. The other is what he terms post-colonial “melancholia,” dead freight weighing on the collective psychological makeup of former imperial masters, even if hollowed out by an actually existing “convivial culture,” that “evasive, multicultural future prefigured everywhere in the ordinary experiences of contact, cooperation and conflict across the supposedly impermeable boundaries of race, culture, identity and ethnicity” (Gilroy 2004a: viii). Exploring in detail the history of imperialism, as well as the intersections of race and nation in British political culture, Gilroy concludes that, contrary to expectations, the “historical anomaly” of “race” is

still somewhere "on hold" and therefore a muted part of the history of our present, [...] most likely to be recovered or remembered in the name of the same racial, ethnic and national absolutes and particularities. (2004a: 15-16)

Gilroy rejects any racialized order as being not caused by "race," but causing this "complex, unstable product" (2004s: 15-16), which "refers primarily to an impersonal, discursive arrangement, the brutal result of the raciological ordering of the world, not its cause" (2004a: 42).

Instead of disappearing, race thinking has proliferated, even if it has changed since the end of the Empire. However, Gilroy points here to the important element of ambivalence surrounding antagonism based on racial thinking, as well as the role of emotions that allows different experiences of social positioning in a situation of diversity:

The simpler *hatreds* forged in more innocent days now coexist with complex, proteophobic, and ambivalent patterns. This change means that blackness can sometimes connote prestige rather than the unadorned inferiority of 'bare life' on the lowest rungs of humanity's ontological ladder. Under these conditions, the boundaries between contending groups must repeatedly be made anew and may only be respected when they have been marked out in warm blood. (2004a: 40)

Gilroy also points to the unstable and shifting nature of these scripts, seeing, for example, patterns of segregation or of framing crime and terrorism as ensuing from difference, as having transferred directly from the colonial situation into the urban metropolis. At the same time, under the banner of "ethical" and "civilizational" force, Britain has incorporated aspects of American nationalism, militarism, and expansionism, which bring back old colonial thinking into play, by defining geopolitical conflicts as a battle between homogeneous civilizations, so that for Gilroy, Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib represent the continuation of divisions at the core of an imperialist mission. Instead of becoming irrelevant, the issue of "race" has again gained relevance for great parts of society, especially since the beginning of the state of emergency caused by the "war on terror," which has strongly reintroduced "cultural difference" as the basis for divisions.

Today's civilisationism shamelessly represents the primary lines of antagonism in global politics as essentially cultural in character. Its figuration of the post-

Cold War world bears the significant imprint of the grand, nineteenth-century racial theory that was formed by the terrifying prospect of racial decline and degeneracy. (2004a: 25)

Gilroy rejects all kinds of pseudo-civilizationism that has become the accepted feature of liberal discourse in the course of peace-making, peace-enforcing, and state-building missions around the world in the past decades, and which continues to draw the boundary between the civilized “us” and those incapable of building a peaceful democratic society based on the rule of law.

As a counter-strategy, necessary in order to end racialized hierarchies and inequalities, Gilroy calls for “historical analyses of racial hierarchy that overflow the fading boundaries of national states” (2004a: 167), analyses that include a categorical rejection of any kind of identity politics aimed at fixing delimited categories imposed on individuals and groups.

Deconstructing racialized difference means questioning the practice of categorizing migrant population and connoting it negatively. At the same time, deconstructing “race” is pivotal also for the liberation of the British of their postcolonial burden – what Gilroy, following social psychology, terms “melancholia,” a collective condition of never having overcome the loss of the Empire. It is in this sense of loss and the pathological incapability of getting over the loss, that Gilroy sees the core of the political and cultural thinking of today’s British society: instead of processing the past, it seeks refuge in creating an artificial ideal state of homogeneous identity.

The inability to process the past means that its patterns translate into a contemporary edition of imperialism. On one level, today’s problems are manipulated by being projected onto migrants: whereas “strangers” cannot be held responsible for their lives, coming to symbolize national decline in the era of de-industrialisation, “perhaps it’s just easier to go along with the traditional script that makes Britain’s perennial, organic crisis primarily intelligible as a matter of race and nation” (Gilroy 2004b: 2). On another level, the symbolic level, the “infra-human body of the would-be immigrant” comes to represent the discomforting ambiguities of the British colonial past. Group identification in today’s Britain converges in

the intrusive presence of the incoming strangers who, trapped inside the local logic of race, nation and ethnic absolutism not only represent that vanished empire but persistently refer consciousness to the unacknowledged pain of its loss and the unsettling shame of its bloody management. (2004b: 3)

## 2.2 The “multiculturalism backlash”

Coming back to the German context, I observe the same intensity of affect in the contestations around belonging. In a similar trajectory to its fate in the British discussion, here the term multiculturalism has also been pronounced dead and buried as a policy approach, so that even as a purely descriptive term, it has become at best problematic in usage. Today, multiculturalism is commonly associated with essentializations of group belongings, unwillingness to integrate, segregationism, ghettoization and the creation of parallel societies.

The concept of multiculturalism reached its political peak in Germany in the early 1990s, in the wake of and as a reaction to a series of murderous neo-Nazi attacks on migrants. It comprised claims of representation and culturally sensitive service provision, “based on a ‘corporatist’ model of ethnic groups” (Vertovec undated). In public policy, this approach has included (and still includes) public recognition, education issues, provisions within law, legal exceptions, as well as protection from discrimination, religious accommodations, and a special emphasis on positive images within the media broadcasters.

Following this era, the concept faced setbacks, leading to public rejections of multicultural policies and claims of their failure in the early 2000s – for example, both German chancellor Angela Merkel in 2010 and British Prime Minister David Cameron in 2011 famously claimed that multiculturalism as a policy had failed. Among the major arguments raised against multicultural policies have been the supposedly low socio-economic indicators concerning educational attainment, higher unemployment rates than in the majority population, and deficits in social mobility measured among the migrants.

A frequent point of criticism is that multiculturalism essentializes, reducing individuals to membership in certain groups based on race, ethnic origin, or religious affiliation, which in turn damages the already disadvantaged members further, leading to the charge that “it is multiculturalism – and not discrimination – that creates separate communities” (Stam and Shohat 2012: 96). Ulrich Beck offers an exemplary argument when he writes that

the principle of multiculturalism refers exclusively to collective categories of difference; it is geared, first, to (more or less) homogeneous groups and, second, locates the latter within the nation-state framework. In this respect, multiculturalism is antagonistic both to transnationalization and to individualization. (Beck 2007: 14)

Stam and Shohat trace a “left-right convergence” between otherwise ideological adversaries over the denunciation of multiculturalism. Notably, a number of feminist authors criticize the concept, claiming that respect of diverse cultural values can also mean condoning patriarchy and frustrating the emancipation of women in the minority groups (see Moller Okin 1999; Shachar 2001, 2007). Another point of criticism by a number of authors is that multiculturalism is an inherently Eurocentric, American, or a capitalist project. The argument ultimately leads to a “split on the left” in a “class or race” discussion, with accusations of valorizing culture over economic struggle (Stam and Shohat 2012: 93-131).

Slavoj Žižek, for example, argues that multiculturalism is not the opposite of neoliberalism but rather “the ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism” (Žižek 1997: 44). In “Multiculturalism, or, The Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism,” Žižek sees multiculturalism as “the attitude which, from a kind of empty global position, treats *each* local culture the way the colonizer treats colonized people – as ‘natives’ whose mores are to be carefully studied and ‘respected’” (1997: 44, emphasis in original). In this view, observing the Other’s identity as “authentic” and self-enclosed, and maintaining a distance to it, is only made possible by the privileged positioning of the multiculturalist as universalist. Therefore, for Žižek, multiculturalism “retains this position as the privileged *empty point of universality* from which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) properly other particular cultures” (1997: 44), so that in this way the multiculturalist respect for the Other’s specificity becomes “the very form of asserting one’s own superiority” (1997, 44). Furthermore, Žižek sees multicultural struggles as effectively upholding the position of capitalism as having no alternative. It is due to its appearance as the universal world system that is “here to stay”, that critical energy has turned from imagining its eventual demise to fighting for cultural differences, which in turn “leave the basic homogeneity of the capitalist world-system intact” (1997: 46).

In sum, the term has been so emptied of meaning that it can prove divisive in any number of dichotomies, so that Shohat and Stam’s list of charges against it is only mildly exaggerated when they sum up that multiculturalism has been

described variously as falsely universalist (the Žižek and Bourdieu/Wacquant charge) or as particularist and anti-French republican ([...] Alain Finkielkraut) or as simultaneously dogmatic and relativist (the U.S. right wing’s contradictory charge) or as relativist and patriarchal (a white feminist charge) or as

dogmatically revolutionary (the right-wing charge) or as neoliberal (Žižek again) or as divisive of the left (the Todd Gitlin charge) or as divisive of the nation (the Schlesinger charge) or as pro-American (as many French intellectuals assume) or anti-American (the U.S. right-wing charge, echoed by French allies such as Finkelkraut). (Stam and Shohat 2012: 131)

The political rhetoric on immigration in Europe reflects the theoretical fuzziness of the term, so that “multiculturalism” continues to fall out of favor in public debate. In Germany, the sociologist Steven Vertovec detects core idioms that accompany this “backlash against multiculturalism”: that it stifles debate, fosters separateness, refuses common values, denies problems, fosters segregation between cultures, and leads to the creation of “parallel societies,” supports reprehensible practices, and even provides a haven for terrorists (Vertovec 2010: 6-10). In Western Europe, where Islam is increasingly presented as incommensurable with Western democratic values, due to a history of sexism and violence, multiculturalism is accused of “pandering to Muslims” (Vertovec undated), as well as creating a context for security concerns due to the growing difference, alienation, and dissatisfaction of immigrant groups. All this leads to a turn in public and media discourse, which “suggests multiculturalism has accentuated/preserved difference” and hindered social cohesion and integration in the name of a ruling “political correctness” (Vertovec undated).

In institutional and public discourse, several responses have been proposed to fill the void, so that multiculturalism has been replaced by new terms, such as interculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Ulrich Beck for example proposes cosmopolitanism as a response to what he terms “global risk society.” For Beck, cosmopolitanism

heightens awareness of the fact that the apparently sharp ethnic boundaries and territorial bonds are becoming blurred and intermingling at both the national and the transnational level. As a result, under conditions of radical global insecurity, all are equal and everyone is different. (2007: 14)

Cosmopolitanism has emerged as an alternative in the discourse on difference on various levels in the European context, also in the media discourse. In Chapter 5, I embark on an analysis of what it means when a radio station dedicated to diversity replaces the term multiculturalism with cosmopolitanism in its brand claim and policy documents. Without going into an extensive discussion at this point, it can be summed up that the celebrations of intercultural contact and dialogue, as well as the individualization of the cosmopolitan citizen

as a mobile, urban, hybrid mix, both contained in the narrative of cosmopolitanism of the particular radio in question, avoid the contestations around antagonisms to diversity or those around identity and nation. Instead of locating them as subjects of negotiation in the public sphere and the official politics, they relegate them to the private sphere of individual citizens.

The ease of mobility of the new urban cosmopolitan is also strongly interlocked with European integration and is one of its tangible results. The opportunities for openness, for mobility, the cosmopolitan experience of the new European citizen, have all led to the optimistic expectation that supranational integration might end antagonisms over difference within the nation-state. Seeing intercultural diversity within the EU as the added value of the European project and fostering opportunities of celebrating on the institutional level has, however, gone hand in hand with the closing-off on the level of the new unity. In this contradiction new ambiguities arise, including those inherent in the very concept of cosmopolitanism.

Ulrich Beck, for example, envisions the new cosmopolitan, cooperative, European citizen as translating between cultures and with multiple memberships – but strongly linked to the effects of (economic and cultural) globalization. For him, new political superstructures such as the European Union provide the framework for the development of a new European citizenship, based on the voluntary redefinition of national sovereignty reflecting the cosmopolitan spirit of member-states. Beck differentiates between two processes: that of a spontaneous cosmopolitanization going on at the quotidian level, and a cosmopolitanism as a political project that needs to be embarked upon by member states in a common political and philosophical endeavor of self-redefinition. The first is an emerging social reality, a cosmopolitanization as an unintended side-effect of globalization,

unfolding powerfully and aggressively beneath the surface, involuntary and unnoticed, behind the facade of existing national spaces, sovereign territories and customs. [...] affecting work situations, individual careers and bodies, even though national flags are still waved and national attitudes, identities and forms of consciousness are even growing stronger. (Beck 2012: 129-130)

Therefore, Beck also envisions transformation towards “cosmopolitan citizens” as a “spontaneous” process, in the space of individual lives and bodies, even if it stands in contradiction to the “national flags” still being waved. He envisions a cosmopolitan Europe that abandons the “either/or logic” of Europeanization or national interests, and does not mean

simply a dissolution of the nation, but rather its interpretation in light of the ideals that Europe stands for. As an alternative to the “American way,” this “European way” “accords priority to the rule of law, political equality, social justice, cosmopolitan integration and solidarity” (2007: 264). For Beck, this European cosmopolitanism presupposes a national Europe and “calls for new concepts of integration and identity that enable and affirm coexistence across borders, without requiring that distinctiveness and difference be sacrificed on the altar of supposed (national) equality” (2007: 14).

This view is in stark contrast to the analysis offered by, for example, Étienne Balibar, who points out that European integration has led to new forms of exclusion. It is not in opposition to the European political project, but stemming from it where Balibar detects the emergence of a new “Euuropean apartheid” (Balibar 2004: 43). For Balibar, it is this new political superstructure that favors the “development of forms of a specifically ‘European’ racism, [...] and] generates discriminations on the basis of national origin by radically separating nationals of member countries from those of nonmember countries” (Balibar 2004: 44). The institution of “European citizenship,” with its formal aspects of rights and obligations of European nationals, has been accompanied by an inequality in political rights between nationals of EU-member states and those who are not EU-nationals, even when they are included in the economic life of the European countries, denoting “the critical nature of the contradiction between the opposite movements of inclusion and exclusion” (2004: x). In short, the process of European integration stumbles on the practical dilemma of simultaneous economic inclusion and political exclusion of non-members, which in turn leads to the question of how belonging (political, social, economic) can be articulated beyond the nation.

Balibar thus deconstructs the premise of European supranational identity as the basis for institutional and political unification – instead, the very attempt of constituting European political, economic, or military power in the age of globalization is complicit in creating national and political conflicts or global economic imbalances, all of which produce cases of violence, insecurity or mass migration, and with it new exclusions at European borders and within them.

In the context of a “recolonization of immigration” in the recent period (2004: 47), Balibar points to the quantitative and qualitative importance of immigrant populations residing in Europe and the metamorphoses they are undergoing in the process of the creation of European citizenship, from which they are excluded: firstly the transformation of denomination from

“foreigners” to “aliens,” secondly the move from protection to discrimination based on European preference, and finally from the discourse of cultural difference to a stigmatization and creation of a “new racism” (2004: 122). Especially in terms of barring their participation in class struggle or in the invention of new forms in transnational social relations to foreigners,

[i]t is clear that the ethnicization of human groups and the correlative representation of unbridgeable “cultural differences” between individuals, maintained against the logic of the work situation itself by the accumulation of discriminatory practices, is much more the doing of the societies of the North that organize the movement of immigrants than that of the immigrants themselves. (2004: 42)

Specifically, the prescription of the Maastricht Treaty that European citizenship automatically be awarded to nationals of member states, excluding non-nationals among the migrants, even when they enjoy residency rights, means that the very construction of the European Union “generates discriminations on the basis of national origin by radically separating nationals of member countries from those of nonmember countries” (2004: 44).

This new institutional exclusion calls for a radical redefinition of European citizenship, the institution of borders, and of political membership. Transnationalizing European citizenship for Balibar means that

unless *jus soli* is generalized and extended in the direction of a veritable *citizenship of residence in Europe*, the addition of the exclusions proper to each of the national citizenships united in the European Union will inevitably produce an explosive effect of apartheid, in flagrant contradiction with the ambition of constituting a democratic model on the continental and world scale. (2004: 43, emphasis in original)

Indeed, the development of a European apartheid “[i]n the long or even the short run, [...] could obstruct or *block* the construction of a democratic European community” (2004: 121, emphasis in original) so that consequently new European citizenship “can only emerge on the condition of being *more democratic* than the traditional constitutions of the ‘national’ states – or it will be deprived of any legitimacy, any capacity to ‘represent’ the populations and solve (or mediate) their social conflicts” (2004: viii-ix, emphasis in original).

### 2.3 Looking for alternatives – diversity and super-diversity

Recent years have shown that discussions around multicultural lives and migration continue to be central sites of struggle in the political debate of European countries of migration. Even before the more recent migration movements from the Middle East, the second decade of the twenty-first century has seen a steady growth of criticism of multiculturalism and skepticism as to the very possibility of a functioning multicultural society. At the same time, the debate is characterized by a vagueness at its center, with the meaning of multiculturalism depending on the context and purpose of those debating it. New political calls in Germany and Great Britain have rejected multiculturalism as a concept and reinforced calls for integration and a sense of common citizenship, going hand in hand with introducing immigration limits or institutional mechanisms to steer the kind of immigration that is (economically) desired. In practical terms, this is reflected in the introduction of integration courses and citizenship tests for new immigrants, a strong emphasis on the importance of language acquisition, as well as in the organization of integration days and summits, such as chancellor Merkel's annual Integration Summit and the Islam conference of the German government, where modalities of common living are discussed on the highest institutional level.<sup>15</sup>

The major turn in public discourses away from multiculturalism has led to diversity and cohesion as concepts that connote the situation in the desired way. In particular, "diversity" has enjoyed increasing popularity in a number of contexts, from the entrepreneurial and business sector, to policy papers and business strategies, as can be seen in German political and business initiatives such as the "Diversity Charta," that promotes the management of diversity as a resource in the world of work, or the campaign "Diversity as a chance" of the German industrial associations.

The latter shows the general trend of diversity being praised more as an economic or business asset than as a political term or even less an emancipatory call. In her investigation of the "run to do diversity" of the institutions of higher education, Sara Ahmed shows that the term has been so wholeheartedly accepted on the level of institutions precisely due to its ambiguity and flexibility. Its adoption leads to "the departure of other (perhaps more critical) terms, including 'equality,' 'equal opportunities,' and 'social justice'" (2012: 1). In other words, she shows

---

<sup>15</sup> Both events will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

how the adoption of the term “diversity” points to a change in the stance of an institution, but also how the adoption of certain words can become a substitution for deeds, how words become alibis for a lack of action. She exposes the non-performativity of terms and statements when produced in institutional frameworks as “the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse *does not produce* ‘the effects that it names’” (2012: 117, emphasis in original). Ahmed not only shows what the term diversity has come to encompass, but also what its usage obscures, namely Whiteness and racism at the heart of the institutions in question, such as the academic ones that she investigates, so that for her, the term actually becomes complicit in the discourse of “overing” racism (2012: 22). By this, she denotes an attitude which closes off the possibility of the continuing existence of racist discrimination and where any mention of inequalities is seen as anachronistic complaining. However, it is precisely due to its relative hollowness that “diversity” can also be “turned around,” filled with different meanings. In other words, under certain conditions, the term can indeed also turn into an action-oriented tool for diversity practitioners, as Ahmed shows in some of the examples investigated.

Cultural diversity, however, represents the status quo of the societies characterized by continuing migration. Both Great Britain and Germany show that the new social make-up, especially in industrial or urban centers, an even more visibly in youth and popular cultures, can no longer be accurately described by existing terms that arise from the division of “us” (the host society, culture, language) and “them” (foreigners, immigrants, other cultures), seen as homogenous social groups.

A sociological perspective makes clear that not only have the conditions of globalization changed the nature of the nation-state, and not only has the social picture been changed by new generations of migrants’ descendants, but the very modalities of immigration into countries of Europe have also changed, making old categories of thinking and analysis obsolete. Vertovec uses the term “super-diversity” to describe a transformation of migration patterns, whose important trait in the past two decades has been its diversification: “not just in terms of bringing more ethnicities and countries of origin, but also with respect to a multiplication of significant variables that affect where, how and with whom people live” (Vertovec 2007: 7). This existing “comprehensive heterogeneity” (Fenzel 2010: 85) concerns differences in ethnicity, language, religion, regional identities, cultural values, and practices, in addition to different social and residence statuses of individuals.

Firstly, quantitative data show that the classical immigrant groups arising from historical conditions, such as the immigration to Great Britain from its former colonies or labor immigration from the countries Germany had bilateral contracts with, such as Turkey, Italy, and the countries of former Yugoslavia, no longer form the largest sections of migrants in urban centers. Rather, the number of countries that migrants come from has grown, so, instead of a few large communities, a very segmented array of small communities from a large number of countries is the more accurate picture of today's ethnic diversity in urban centers such as London or Frankfurt.

Secondly, sociological data point to a diversification within groups, which is not a new phenomenon, but has rarely been researched, as the preferred way of dealing with immigrant communities has been as homogenous ethnic blocks. Over half a century of labor migration into Germany, for example, has seen a strong diversification within national groups as to the geographic region of origin on the sub-state level, as well as religion, or minority and linguistic status in the country of origin. Also, there are factors of diversification concerning the host country, among them social status, educational attainment, date of arrival, and citizenship. Migration channels and immigration statuses are also crucial, so that sometimes "people of differing origins who nevertheless migrated by the same route have more in common than those who share the same nationality" but have different reasons for migrating (Fenzel 2010, 86). A third factor is the temporal one, which after decades of migration has led to new cross-ethnic ties between groups on all levels – from professional to personal ones.

All in all, it becomes obvious that using solely categories such as "foreigner," "national," or "legal" or "illegal alien," or, for example, the race categories such as those in the British Census, cannot depict the existing diversity and its true impact on the cultural and social makeup of a country. Instead,

[s]ocio-cultural axes of differentiation such as country of origin, ethnicity, language and religion are of course significant in conditioning immigrants' identities, patterns of interaction and – often through social networks determined by such axes – their access to jobs, housing, services and more. However, immigrants' channels of migration and the myriad legal statuses which arise from them are often just as, or even more, crucial to: how people group themselves and where people live, how long they can stay, how much autonomy they have (versus control by an employer, for instance), whether their families

can join them, what kind of livelihood they can undertake and maintain, and to what extent they can make use of public services and resources (including schools, health, training, benefits and other ‘recourse to public funds’). (Vertovec 2007: 15)

Immigration statuses bring with them citizenship rights or restrictions of rights, so that they indeed are a crucial factor within the picture of super-diverse societies. When all these are taken into account, it becomes clear that any political plan based on the sole criterion of “nationality” must fall short of the mark in very practical terms.

A large part of discussions on immigration and integration in European societies is based on the implicit premised division based on cultural/national membership, with the autochthonous population in one category and the migrants in the other. These categories are based on formal citizenship or nationality, which in turn places the people with migrant family backgrounds in an ambiguous position moving between the two categories.

In terms of national belonging, the concept of “allegiance” to the host society is often raised as a demand made on long-term migrants. Their loyalty to the values of Western democratic society and cultural norms, their willingness for language acquisition and the acquisition of social norms, and others, are invoked, for example, in debates on citizenship, especially in the discourse rejecting dual citizenship.

However, defining the dichotomy of national belonging contradicts the fact that people are always members of multiple categories: ranging from those pertaining to their family situations, professional environments, interests and hobbies, and many more. Whereas such sub-national memberships are not put into question, the possibility of multiple cultural or even national belonging is often seen as problematic. It is not only in formal citizenship terms that migrants are required to somehow demonstrate their loyalty to the host country by rejecting split identities, feelings of belonging to more than one culture, and sometimes even bilingual children rearing, which in this discourse are all seen as a sign of a lack of willingness to integrate.

Furthermore, multi-ethnic or multicultural belonging is seen as problematic in the migrant group, but not when it refers to members of the majority, where it is complimented as a cosmopolitan attitude and an openness to the world. Whereas transnational practices are deemed the norm and even desirable in the conditions of global economic, professional, and

educational exchange, in the lives of migrants they are often seen as an integration deficit potentially leading to “ghettoization,” even if belonging to a culture other than that of the host country is played out only on the intimate, affective level.

However, as Vertovec points out, “belonging, loyalty and sense of attachment are not parts of a zero-sum game based on a single nation-state or society” (2007: 20). Especially due to very concrete technological advances and the lowering costs of telecommunications, homeland links maintained by migrants have in recent years not diminished but grown to a level unthinkable only two decades ago. The accessibility of satellite TV-channels from the country of origin, low-cost international phone calls and air travel, the Internet, low cost transfers for remittances: all these have led not only to more frequent transnational practices in the lives of migrants, but “have allowed migrants to maintain, as never before, extensive social, economic and political ties with places of origin or fellow members of global diasporas” (2007: 7).

The changing habits concerning transnational practices and the quality of these cross-border connections “need to be considered with regard to changing dynamics of integration, as well” (Vertovec 2007: 7). Instead of drawing simple formulae, as Vertovec points out, the picture of the lives of migrants must be considered in its complexity, so that “the 'more transnational' a person is does not automatically mean the 'less integrated' they are, and the 'less integrated' does not necessarily prompt or strengthen the 'more transnational' patterns of association” (2007: 5). Instead, the new transnational ties facilitate the processes of selective integration in which an immigrant does not identify with one or the other country exclusively but has the possibility to pick and choose the preferred segments from the country of origin or the country of habitation. These can include formal aspects such as the choice of citizenship or real estate ownership, or personal ones, such as the quantity of family contacts and the frequency of visits to the country of origin, the choice of language spoken in the home, allegiance to a sporting team, media and news consumption, and many others.

In view of the transforming nature of super-diversity and the growing complexity of the social lives of migrants, Vertovec launches an appeal for an integration policy that would take into account new factors that stand out in this differentiated picture. Rather than offering prefabricated desired outcomes based on notions of allegiance and integration willingness, the actual situation would be better reflected if multiple category memberships and identities as well as differences in the immigration experiences were considered. This would mean recognizing institutionally “(a) 'the new pluralism' and the inherent multiplicity of identities

among all members of the public, [and] (b) new modes of social and political networking” (Vertovec 1999: 3).

One way of fostering participation, inclusion, and social cohesion is to “bring people together” (Vertovec 2007: 26), a task that can be undertaken by public and voluntary bodies, where again

it appears that much success in building positive relations can arise with the recognition that individuals each belong to multiple group identities at different levels of inclusiveness – that individuals are both members of discrete groups and members of superordinate, cross-cutting or overlapping social formations. (2007: 27)

Instead of trying to obliterate boundaries or differences between groups, “individuals should be made aware of their multiple category memberships under conditions that promote inclusiveness,” but in conditions that do not include competition and power-differences. Instead, “multi-category interactions should also be based as far as possible on considerations of equal status. ‘Contact’ should not place anyone in a subordinate status” (2007: 27).

Vertovec suggests the concept of “networked diversity” as a follow-up to the work of integration commissioners and others involved, consisting in essentially “bringing people together to talk to one another and exploit shared interests to reduce the barriers between them” (Fenzel 2010: 88). In this scheme, the role of public institutions would be not to dictate, but to promote contacts and interaction, which in turn should develop into sustainable social networks transcending ethnic boundaries and legal restrictions (2010: 89).

A part of policy discussion in Great Britain and Germany laments precisely a lack of meaningful or sustained interchange between minority groups and the dominant society, even if it is not often clear what constitutes “meaningful contacts” or how these can be stimulated through the institutions. In view of social realities, Vertovec reverses the question and asks what role “less-than-meaningful” interchanges can play, that is “[m]ight these have some productive impacts on cohesion as well?” (2007: 24). The communication habits here are not reduced to the opposition between the majority and the minorities, but are simply a fact of urban life, in which fleeting and not “meaningful” interchanges are the norm. So,

desirable as these might be toward promoting better relations, ‘sustained encounters’ and ‘deep and meaningful interactions’ are simply not going to occur among most people in British cities today, whether ethnic majority, minority or new immigrant. Apart from a few contexts such as work or school, most urban encounters are fleeting or momentary, although importantly they might be regular (such as greeting or acknowledging neighbours, and purchasing goods). Ephemeral interactions comprise the bulk of social relations in libraries, parks and playgrounds, apartment buildings and housing estates, street markets, shops and shopping centres, hospitals and health clinics, hair salons and other commonplace sites. (2007: 28-29)

Since ephemeral encounters build the largest bulk of exchanges in urban public space (Vertovec, undated), such encounters are also the platform for daily intercultural interaction, or the already discussed “conviviality,” as observed by Paul Gilroy who refers to “processes of cohabitation and interaction that have made multiculturalism an ordinary feature of social life in Britain’s urban areas and in postcolonial cities elsewhere” (Gilroy 2004a: xi).

As such, even random interactions constitute shared meanings and values, and foster cooperation for a collective purpose, where “[p]eople accomplish this by learning, negotiating and reproducing 'overreaching principles for stranger interaction' and basic, albeit unspoken, modes of civility (especially the exercise of common norms of courtesy and consideration)” (Vertovec 2007: 6). The functioning of these fleeting relationships in modern urban areas premises some principles for interaction, among them “civil inattention,” “restrained helpfulness,” and “civility towards diversity” (2007: 30). The latter in particular should be understood rather as indifference than as benevolence towards diversity, and puts into perspective the notion of fixed identities and single belongings, introducing instead

a measure of distance from the pivotal term "identity," which has proved to be such an ambiguous resource in the analysis of race, ethnicity, and politics. The radical openness that brings conviviality alive makes a nonsense of closed, fixed, and reified identity and turns attention toward the always-unpredictable mechanisms of identification. (Gilroy 2004a: xi)

Taking into account the social realities of urban living, including the relativization of single category memberships, the inadequacy of concepts such as “integration” is revealed, one which has dominated the public discussion on immigration in many European countries.

Vertovec introduces instead the notion of “civil-integration,” described as “the acquisition and routinization of everyday practices for getting-on with others in the inherently fleeting encounters that comprise city life” (2007: 4).

These practices can be defined as ground rules for functioning in an urban environment; they include “simple forms of acknowledgement, acts of restricted helpfulness, types of personal consideration, courtesies, and 'indifference to diversity'” (2007: 4). These competences of civility can be learned formally, “but they are probably best inculcated informally through daily practice (since many of the principles described above become routinized into non-conscious acts). The acquisition of these commonplace practices of getting-on with others amounts to a process that we might call everyday ‘*civil-integration*’” (2007: 32-33, emphasis in original).

This type of social cohesion arises spontaneously, born out of the necessities of urban life and its daily interactions, instead of being prescribed top-down, fostered by instilling rules. Indeed, cohesion

cannot be manufactured from the top down, or simply stimulated by putting people into the same places with scripted roles and behaviours. Norms of civility must be enacted in a wide variety of contexts and public spaces, automatically as it were, and this comes through wholly through experience and practice. (2007: 33)

Adding to the existing parameters, the success of well-functioning urban milieus could also be used as a measure of social cohesion by policy makers and the public. Firstly, they show that a lack of “deep and meaningful interaction” between communities does not need to mean poor social cohesion. Vertovec reminds that not only is the urban context known to function without deep and meaningful interactions, but that “indeed, most people seem to be more than satisfied with maintaining cordial but distant relations with their neighbours and particularly with strangers” (2007: 33). Secondly, it means that immigrants might be better integrated than often assumed, that is, when their integration is not measured solely by the usual parameters of language mastery, regular jobs, education levels, and such (2007: 4).

Acknowledging the meaning of ephemeral urban encounters as a solid basis for the functioning of a “super-diverse” social situation, means rejecting claims of “immigrant enclaves” or “ghettos” often cited as a result of an unwillingness to integrate and even as a by-

product of multiculturalism. Instead, these encounters not only comprise the bulk of all urban encounters, but they also evolve on a wide number of axes: not just between minorities and the majority, but also between minority members, within minority groups, between earlier and newer immigrants, and so on. As such, it is indispensable that “social scientific theory and public policy development should consider everyday kinds of constructive social interaction in a variety of spaces” (2007: 8).

Similarly, Mark Terkessidis (2010) also concentrates on urban life to illustrate the existence of new networks not based on national models, and leaving behind the notion of a “leading culture” that excludes a large proportion of the population. He describes the transformation from the *polis* to the *parapolis* (2010: 11): the latter is “used” by a multitude of different individuals who live in it, even if only temporarily, and who often have transnational ties and lead parts of their lives in other places. However, whereas the *parapolis* is a living organism, the picture of a network of links that cross each other at multiple points (or even isolate themselves consciously in ghettos), the institutions continue to treat the society as divided into two groups, with one part of it having to be guided towards dominant standards. Terkessidis offers a solution in the concept of “inter-culture,” seen as a radical opening and reform of institutions, “which will have to change, in order to do justice to the increasing diversity. This transformation has become a task of surviving” (2010: 8, translation from German by the author). The concept does not put the responsibility on the migrants, but on the entire society which must transform in order to create a “freedom from barriers,” the possibility for all citizens to use institutions, and to take part in the social development. In other words, the aim is not to recognize ethnic groups, but “to create a space of possibilities free of barriers for individuals who potentially feel they belong to certain groups or are assigned to them” (2010: 119, translation from German by the author).

It is therefore in the space of inter-human contact as a response to pragmatic needs of securing the existence and spontaneous solutions to the problems of everyday life, especially in the urban space, that these authors see intercultural life unfolding without the affective pressure of defining such terms as identity or difference. This is visible in Gilroy’s “convivial culture” as well as in his recognition of the fulfillment of the multicultural project in its informal manifestations. Gilroy points to a multiculturalism that is alive and functioning well in the “cohabitation and interaction” characterizing British and other cities of migration (Gilroy 2004a: xi), showing that, with its ability to constantly redefine modes of everyday life and popular culture, this “conviviality” has become a planetary phenomenon in which

racial difference is not feared. Exposure to it is not ethnic jeopardy but rather an unremarkable principle of metropolitan life. Race is essentially insignificant, at least when compared either to the hazards involved in urban survival or to the desperate pleasures of the postcolonial city: 'sex and drugs and on the dole'. (2004a: 105)

It is here, in this cosmopolitan "conviviality," that Gilroy sees a possibility to build an alternative model of British identity, and here he finds the site of a new planetary humanism, one which understanding is distilled from the historical experience of oppression and suffering.

I detect this conviviality to be an exposure to difference and the celebration of the mixing of the metropolitan life as the imaginary space in which the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa moves. While the reality of unproblematic multicultural living in everyday life is both something that is experienced by anybody inhabiting cities strongly shaped by migration, such as those of the German West, and something that can be celebrated for its many cultural expressions, this observation does not solve the antagonisms surrounding the strong contestations over identity or belonging on other levels. Whereas civil-integration is a joyful everyday reality to anybody living in a multicultural society, with its myriad daily occurrences of inter-cultural contact in spite of insufficient language knowledge or differing cultural modes, social cohesion is a necessity on many more levels than the everyday.

Indeed, while this existing conviviality blatantly contradicts the contestations over belonging or identity, I see in the sole concentration on conviviality an attempt to create a "safe space" where inequalities are blurred out. This however means that it can easily slip into an attitude of what Sara Ahmed calls "overing racism." In the analysis of the brand change of WDR Funkhaus Europa in Chapter 5, I show what effects this can have when practiced within the media discourse, or in concrete terms, how attempting to capture this "feeling of life" in its brand Global Sounds Radio, the radio station in question avoids addressing antagonisms surrounding intercultural living on other levels.

## 2.4 Integration

In Germany, as elsewhere in the European countries of immigration, contemporaneously with the rejection of multiculturalism, there has been a turn in the public discourse towards social cohesion and integration. As already mentioned, this has gone hand in hand with enshrining common citizenship and unity in diversity, guided by common European democratic values, such as tolerance, gender equality, and freedom of expression, as political and social ideals. The introduction of integration courses and other institutional measures has been paired with demands to pledge loyalty to the “host country” and reject cultural particularity.

Elevated into the highest ideal leading to a new, inclusive commonality enriched by diversity, integration has become a very prominent “technology of citizenship” in the sense used by Barbara Cruikshank (1999), as representing the power exercised “in the material, learned, and habitual ways we embody citizenship” (1999: 124), which will be the subject of more detailed analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.

Integration has emerged most recently as a response to the high immigration rates of refugees, but it has a long tradition as a central technology of government not only in individual states, but in the whole European Union. For example, in its conclusions of June 2014, the Council of the European Union agreed on supporting the member states “with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals” (Council of the European Union 2014: 1). It also recognized “that diversity is an enriching and permanent feature of European societies” and calls for a “holistic approach to integration” (2014: 3). In 2004, European governments discussed common basic principles concerning integration policies, listing eleven principles of integration, among them principles stating that “integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation,” that employment is a key part and central to the social participation of immigrants, and that basic knowledge of the host society’s language is indispensable to integration (2004). The principles stress the importance of education, access to institutions, as well as “frequent interaction between immigrants and Member States citizens” as fundamental mechanisms for integration.

The Council document also states the usefulness of successful integration for the host society, since

[w]ell managed migration as well as effective and balanced integration policies contribute towards achieving the goals of the Europe 2020 growth strategy,

given the demographic shrinking in Member States and the shortages in certain sectors of the European labour market. (2014: 2)

As a strategy that will contribute to economic growth and alleviate the shortages in the labor market, immigration and integration are here framed as a biopolitical project, in the Foucauldian sense. Well-managed immigration is seen as a recipe for curing the demographic decline of Europe, while at the same time the conflicts around questions of culture and identity associated with immigration are not mentioned at all.

In Germany, integration has also become a central term in institutional discourse, rising to become the nodal point that influences all social practices around questions of diversity in the country: from education, through to policies towards non-nationals, immigration policies, and others. For example, the government document “National Action Plan for Integration” starts with the sentence: “The integration of people with a migration background in Germany is a key task of the federal government” (Die Bundesregierung 2012: 1, translation from German by the author). The German Office for Migration and Refugees defines integration as a long-term process of inclusion of all the people who live in the country “legally.” Whereas it offers equal participation in all social areas to immigrants, it also obliges them to learn the German language and respect the German Constitution.<sup>16</sup>

However, what connotations, or what kind of knowledge or “truth,” does the concept of integration actually carry? In what way does it subjectify the citizens? At the core of the demand for integration is the implied division between the “host” and “visiting” populations, with the further implication being that these two are incompatible at the outset of contact and can only be made to cohabit if the effort of integration is undertaken. Even if it is often stressed that it is two sides that take part in the integration process, it is usually the immigrants who are explicitly called upon to actively contribute to their own successful introduction into the society. The dominant picture

is one in which integration is strongly linked to obligations on the part of the migrants and adjustment to mainstream culture and values. The latter is not merely related to a wish for uniformity but also seen as a precondition to

---

<sup>16</sup>

[http://www.bamf.de/DE/Service/Left/Glossary/\\_function/glossar.html?nn=1363008&lv2=1364178&lv3=1504494](http://www.bamf.de/DE/Service/Left/Glossary/_function/glossar.html?nn=1363008&lv2=1364178&lv3=1504494)

improved opportunities – and yet, adjustment is the demand of the time.  
(Schönwälder 2010: 156)

In a Foucauldian sense, I see the demand to integrate as a mechanism of self-disciplining. When the descendants of migrants, in the second and third generations are also called upon to integrate, it becomes obvious that at the core of this demand there are no measurable parameters that are often cited as indicators of successful integration, such as employment rates, or figures denoting educational success or the housing situation. Instead, integration refers here to a fuzzy set of “values” that characterize the “host” nation, so that, carried to its logical conclusion, a demand to integrate posed on second generation migrants is actually a demand to assimilate. At the same time, this demand contains the implicit impossibility to really complete this process. As long as the migrant looks different, has a different name, or ostentatiously practices a different religion from what is understood to be the norm of the host nation, he or she, even if officially a national, will always be marked as outside of the nation. For Étienne Balibar, the very demand to integrate is also the proof of continuing structural inequalities, since

[n]o theoretical discourse on the dignity of all cultures will really compensate for the fact that, for a ‘Black’ in Britain or a ‘Beur’ in France, the assimilation demanded of them before they can become ‘integrated’ into the society in which they already live (and which will always be suspected of being superficial, imperfect or simulated) is presented as progress, as an emancipation, a conceding of rights. (1991: 25)

To summarize, calls for integration rest on unequal social positions of the “host” or “majority” society on the one side, and the immigrant on the other, and postulate an incompatibility that needs to be surmounted, or even erased.

Here, “cultural difference” takes the discursive position that nature (genes, blood) had in the framework of “scientific racism,” as observed by Balibar, who identifies the emergence of the already discussed “neo-racism” within the discourse of immigration, with its catalogue of practices of violence, stereotypical representation, and exclusion of the Other, based on the assumption of the insurmountability and harmfulness of cultural difference within the nation space.

The problem with cultural difference as the obstacle to cohesion is that at the same time as it leads to discriminations, the problematization of cultural difference is seen as very different from race hatred. It is instead seen as the “normal,” even “rational” response to social conflict – which in turn makes the problematization and management of cultural difference an effective governmental mode. In the words of Balibar, in the context of capitalist production of choice, excess, and promised enjoyment (and ultimately the incomplete subject), the discourse of insurmountable cultural difference is being normalized, mainstreamed. It serves as an explanation of racist reactions as “natural” so that “the *return of the biological theme* is permitted and with it the elaboration of new variants of the biological ‘myth’ within the framework of a cultural racism” (Balibar 1991: 26, emphasis in original).

## 2.5 Tolerance

The point where cultural difference becomes salient, the famous “tolerance threshold,” that becomes the line separating cohesion from difference that cannot be assimilated, thus becomes the frontier between welcoming and exclusion.

In the German discussion, tolerance is firmly placed in the realm of political bargaining, as a “rational” response to the dilemma of aversion, with the metaphor of the threshold designating the liminal space in which rejection, even aversion, is acknowledged. As a way of dealing with difference, tolerance offers both a way in which to ethically whitewash those who reject others, and a possibility of finding a way for non-antagonistic coexistence with what is seen as reified difference – but difference that society cannot get rid of. However, as a way of responding to the encounter with difference, tolerance is interlocked with the distribution of social positions within a society, and at the same time, it secures the stability of those social positions. In other words, tolerance can operate only in a power imbalance, with the dominant position having the power over those who are objects of toleration, since subaltern subjects can never be the ones to decide to tolerate or not to tolerate the dominant ones.

In the discussion of the term, which I will elaborate on further in Chapter 8, tolerance is seen as a viable way of managing diversity, even a rational way of handling one’s own rejection of or aversion to difference – which in certain conditions is seen a legitimate response to difference. Jürgen Habermas (2003), for example, sees toleration as possible only if both parties involved – the tolerator and the tolerated – base their rejection “on a *cognitive conflict*

*between beliefs and attitudes that persists for good reasons*” (Habermas 2003: 3, emphasis in original). Rejection can of course also be unreasonable, for example, if somebody rejects people of a different skin color, which for Habermas is not an ethical judgement and can thus not be countered with calls for tolerance. In this case, “the appropriate answer is a critique of prejudices and the combating of discrimination, in other words the fight for equal rights, and not ‘more tolerance’” (2003: 3). Therefore, tolerance is offered as a practice of solving the insecurities surrounding civic living with irresolvable difference. In countries of immigration, these ethical insecurities, often conceptualized in terms of religion or cultural diversity, turn around the question of how and to what extent those pertaining to the majority should tolerate those that deviate, or at what point they should impose normative rules.

In Germany, the practice historically hails from the realm of religious toleration, and it continues to be contested in the space where religious and cultural difference intersect with questions of institutional regulations. Two examples from the German context can illustrate this: the row over whether public schools should allow teachers to wear the Islamic veil and the row over whether public schools can display Christian symbols, such as the crucifix on the wall. In both cases the state was called upon to resolve ethical questions through judiciary institutions, when the citizens were not able to determine the extent of toleration that was necessary or institutionally prescribed.<sup>17</sup> However, even if in both cases the state was called upon to impose tolerance as a practice of dealing with difference, they started from two very different social positions: in the crucifix row, the parents invoked the constitutionally guaranteed principle of neutrality in education against the wish of the schools to display Christian symbols as an expression of adherence to the majoritarian Christian affiliation. The

---

<sup>17</sup> The so-called Bavarian crucifix row, which focused on the question of whether the crucifix could hang on the walls of public schools, was resolved in 1995 when the Constitutional Court ruled that Christian symbols on the walls violated the prescribed religious neutrality of the German school system. However, regardless of this state intervention, crosses continue to be displayed on the walls of Bavarian schools and taking them down remains rare. In the few cases in which parents have demanded that the schools do so, there has ensued fierce public debate. The judicial row over the headscarf goes back to the case of Fereshta Ludin, a teacher seeking employment in the state school system of Baden-Württemberg, who refused to take off her headscarf during classes. The school authorities at the time characterized the veil as a visible symbol of “cultural disintegration.” In contrast to the Bavarian crucifix row, here it was an (immigrant) minority acting incompatibly with state neutrality in religious questions. Numerous controversial discussions ensued, among them the discord within the feminist discourse around whether the Islamic headscarf was a symbol of oppression or if seeing it as such was a Eurocentric relegation of the Muslim woman to a mere passive object. The case made its way through the German judiciary and was heard before the Constitutional Court in 2003. The Court relegated the decision in individual cases to the *Länder*, which are in charge of education under the German federal system. The decision was revised in 2015 in a ruling that defined the religious neutrality of the state not as a tool of distancing it from the church, but as an “open and all-encompassing stance that promotes freedom of belief for all religions in the same measure” (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2015). In this sense, “an overall ban on wearing the Islamic scarf for teachers in public schools is not compatible with the Constitution” (2015), as the Court ruled.

second case, and one which led to much more public controversy, was one in which the majority defended the guaranteed religious neutrality from presumably the invasive symbolism of a minority, representing religious deviance from the Christian norm.

So, in a sense, both these cases are examples of the failure of rational consideration as a mode of settling ethical questions in civic living, such as that proposed by Habermas. In both cases it was ultimately the state that, through its judiciary organs, had to intervene and impose the practice of tolerating irreconcilable difference, when this was not practiced by the citizens. But, whereas in the “Christianity row” the debate turned around institutional responses to the rules of the political community, in the “veil row” it was about dealing with difference which was not part of “our” culture or tradition. The row over the Islamic veil was crucially also a debate about the role of Islam in shaping the modern identity of Germany as a country of immigration, as well as the question of where the “tolerance threshold” for visible religious practice could be set.

Habermas (2003), however, sees tolerance as a pragmatic response when there is mutual recognition and mutual acceptance of divergent worldviews, a way of allowing the co-existence of religions and democracy in a pluralistic environment and opening the way to “reconciliation between multiculturalism and equality” (2003: 1). He also postulates the highest form of tolerance, respect for difference, as the mode for coexistence in a multicultural society. However, as he points out, acceptance is not enough, “toleration – as regards equal respect for everybody – means the willingness to neutralize the practical impact of a cognitive dissonance *that nevertheless in its own domain demands that we resolve it*” (2003, 12, emphasis in original).

In this way, the “cognitive dissonance” produced by an encounter with difference stays in place and toleration is the answer for dealing with this in order to continue the “co-existence of different life forms as equals” which “also requires the integration of citizens – and the mutual recognition of their sub-cultural memberships – within the framework of a common political culture” (2003: 10-11). For Habermas, the citizens can maintain their “cultural idiosyncrasy” if they understand themselves “as citizens of the same political community” (2003: 10-11). And, in the reciprocal recognition of the rules of behavior, Habermas finds the solution to the paradox of tolerance:

Each act of toleration must circumscribe a characteristic of what we must accept and thus simultaneously draw a line for what cannot be tolerated. There can be no inclusion without exclusion. (2003: 5)

As long as this line is drawn unilaterally, in an authoritarian manner, toleration remains stigmatized for arbitrariness. “Only with a *universally convincing* delineation of the borderline – which requires that all those involved *reciprocally* take the perspectives of the others – can toleration blunt the thorn of intolerance” (2003: 5, emphasis in original).

However, if we look at the position of Islam in Western immigration societies, the problem with it lies precisely in the imputation that it is inherently incapable of recognizing the rules of the (democratic) political community. It is discussed as incompatible not only with Western societies but also with the rules of living in the Western societies as crucially characterized by diversity. Wendy Brown, who explores tolerance primarily as a technology of government, also reflects upon the position of Islam in the growing Islamophobia characterizing the public discussion in the West, and observes firstly that there has been something of a global renaissance in “tolerance talk” in the last decades,

as multiculturalism became a central problematic of liberal democratic citizenship; as Third World immigration threatened the ethnicized identities of Europe, North America, and Australia; [...] and as Islamic religious identity intensified and expanded into a transnational political force. (Brown 2008: 2)

Crucial for Brown is the constructed opposition between a cosmopolitan West and the fundamentalist Other, so that tolerance here becomes a demarcating line and at the same time part of the “civilizational project” of the West. Wendy Brown argues that tolerance is “an instrument of liberal governance and a discourse of power that legitimizes white Western supremacy and state violence” (2014: 9-10), exploring in particular how tolerance as a discourse of power has depoliticizing effects. She points out that even though tolerance has a different meaning in different contexts, it is mostly associated with “multicultural justice and civic peace” and has an “impressive range of potential objects, including cultures, races, ethnicities, sexualities, ideologies, lifestyle and fashion choices, political positions, religions, and even regimes” (Brown 2008: 3). However, it is always also about objection, aversion, error, deviation, and falsehood; therefore, for Brown, it cannot give a positive notion of difference (2008: 67). Instead, Brown sees the operation of tolerating as the opposite of

incorporating; it is about producing the norm and deviance as a practice of normalization, and about securing the supremacy and hegemony of Western liberalism.

I will turn again to the concept of tolerance through the analysis of a media event staged by the German Association of Public Service Broadcasters in 2014. Suffice it to say at this point that one of the major questions in the discussions of tolerance in preparation of the event, that I took part in, was the question of the limits of tolerance: Where does tolerance stop? Where does it reach the famous “threshold” that cannot be crossed? The conception of tolerance as a frontier, a corrective offered in good will, can be seen, for example, in the debates surrounding such seminal events as those on New Year’s Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne<sup>18</sup>, involving sexual harassment of women gathered to celebrate in the center of the city by a large number of migrant men. The case led to a public debate intertwining a number of discourses: from a critique of patriarchy, to religious, cultural, and gender contestations, and others, most of them invoking a “red line” where “tolerance stops.” For example, the German feminist author Alice Schwarzer offered an exemplary warning in a text on the Cologne events of a decades-long “naive import of male violence, sexism and antisemitism,” asserting that

these young men are the sad product of a failed, or insufficiently wanted integration. They are a product of a false tolerance, in which almost everybody – the people, the media, the churches and the politics – put into question our democracy, our state of law, our equality. They even let them be stepped upon in favor of ‘other traditions’, or an ominous ‘freedom of religion’. We have let parallel worlds arise in their name, instead of insisting on integration.  
(Schwarzer 2016, translation from German by the author)

To me, the fact that the discourse on integration is interlocked with the discourse on tolerance when dealing with cultural difference points in a striking manner to the disciplining character of integration. Integration starts as a straightforward relation of minorities “adjusting.” This adjustment reinstates the dominant discourse, constituting the national and cultural “us” and “them,” with “us” being at home here, belonging. However, this presents a dilemma – the cultural difference, locked in with ethnicity, cannot be stripped off at the end of the day, so there can actually never be an end to integration efforts. Therefore, since difference will

---

<sup>18</sup> On New Year’s Eve 2015/2016, there were numerous sexual assaults on women by groups of men from north African and Arab regions, in the area of the Cologne railway station and the main square around the Cologne cathedral. The police were later accused of not having the situation under control and having tried to downplay the events in their initial press reports. The events led to a major discussion and public backlash against refugee immigration and the media, both in Germany and internationally.

always exist, only tolerance (on the part of the dominant social position) can provide a way towards co-existence. And, tolerance is intrinsically always present in the closed circle of living with difference that cannot be adjusted. When, however, events such as the one in Cologne prove the point of cultural incompatibility, epitomized in the sexism and disrespect for women on the part of the Arab men involved (and implicitly presuming Arab men in general), tolerance has reached its limit, it stops.

I therefore see integration as an empty signifier because it rests on a contradiction: It is presented as a set of quantifiable and controllable parameters, such as language proficiency, employment, housing statistics, and others, to be checked off on a list measuring integration success. But, not only is social integration hardly quantifiable, the state of full unobjectionability can never be reached. It becomes the point which temporarily fixes meanings and changes the discourse in question: the education system, the immigration legislature, diversity policies in business, as well as gender roles and class relations. When combined with tolerance, its character as a technology of governing is revealed even more strongly, because a call to integrate becomes a rejection of difference, or a call for only that variant of difference that unfolds under the threshold of the tolerable, of the “rational rejection.” At the same time, it is probably precisely the emptiness at the core of the concept of integration that turns it into a strong way of self-disciplining subject-citizens in a multicultural situation.

## Chapter 3

### Media and multiculturalism

#### 3.1 Media and citizenship in multiculturalism

A large part of the politics of difference is articulated through the media discourse, which I see as a crucial space for articulating social power and applying technologies of government. Indeed, a large body of literature as well as political institutions emphasize the role of the media as “tools” of integration. This interlocking of discourses will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 4, but it is important to say at the outset that the view of media as integration tools resonates well with the official politics in Germany and that it indeed explicitly forms the base of media policies of public service programming in this area.

The work of the media in this view is usually broken down into several rather straight-forward steps that should be undertaken in order to achieve integrative effects on the audiences. Firstly, they should offer the migrants information that will help them get to know and understand not only the facts useful for getting started in Germany, but also the dominant cultural norms, the rules of behavior, the goals they should strive for. The second step consists of putting role-models, people of migrant backgrounds, on the screen, to serve as a projection of what successful integration can look like and to show it as an achievable goal. Also, content that celebrates the contributions of migrants and rejects discrimination should be presented in the mainstream media, for example, through stories of refugees who have become successful citizens. The described steps are often cited in policy recommendations for successful integrative programming.

The implication from the governmental point of view is that the passage of migrants and the majority from a position of antagonism towards one of successful co-existence, can be facilitated by media pictures. There is an assumption at work here that by adjusting very concrete switching points concerning media texts – such as the quantity and quality of representing migrants on the screens, avoiding discriminatory reporting, recruiting migrants into media professions, and others – the desired effects on the audience will be achieved.

For example, during the influx of refugees in 2015/16 several public service broadcasters in Germany initiated offers directed at refugees, offering them orientation help, explaining core “values” and “norms” for living in Germany, and encouraging their language acquisition<sup>19</sup>. Even if these examples were very straightforward in their governmental, even biopolitical, intention of citizen-making, I see other media dedicated more generally to diversity as functioning in this sense, if without explicit didactic intentions. I see my central object of analysis, the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa, also as an attempt to respond to social antagonisms of diversity and to contribute to its management, but with scenarios that offer an alternative to the dominant ones.

The rationale for establishing this station, as well as its changing strategies – from integration, through multiculturalism, towards cosmopolitanism, that will be discussed in the course of the thesis – make visible the role the media are assigned in the project of citizen-making. For example, Chouliaraki (2015) points out that like any discourse, the mass media are also a site of power, with their multiple technologies and strategies of management, and a site of resistance. It is on the “mundane, on the non-political, yet the intensely politicised [basis], which the media operate most significantly,” filtering and framing realities, producing references for the conduct of everyday life and the production of common sense (Chouliaraki 2015: 276). Or in other words, “there is a *politics of truth* at play in every mediated debate which is central in the constitution of the debate as a public sphere” (2015: 257, emphasis in original). Therefore, investigating media discourse offers insight into

the mundane business of governing everyday economic and social life, in the shaping of governable domains and governable persons, in the new forms of power, authority, and subjectivity being formed within these mundane practices (Rose 2006: 11)

since like every such practice it “involves authorities, aspirations, programmatic thinking, the invention or redeployment of techniques and technologies” (2006: 101).

A large body of literature in the field of media anthropology explores media discourses, technologies, and texts in terms of their role in representing cultures, in community and in identity formation, with the creation of difference, and with subject and object positionings. Seeing media as pertaining to and inseparable from contexts of social power, helps to identify

---

<sup>19</sup> The refugee programs will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

dominant messages, selective perception, or unintended identifications. Within the multicultural context, questions can be posed in terms of what the effects of media technologies are on human life, primarily in creating the sense of national community with other members of the audience, or in the processes of “Othering.”

These are investigated through a large spectrum of media production (editorial work, media policy documents, journalistic prioritization and categorization, etc.), through reception habits (observing audiences in their media consumption and reactions to media texts), to the interaction of people with media technologies – all these showing implicit power relations underlining media discourses. Also, a central question when discussing media discourse is the question of its power, starting from the “cultural industry” model as proposed by the Frankfurt School theorists. In a broadly negative view of media effects, this “hypodermic-needle” approach sees the audience as passive recipients, as objects onto whom political and cultural formulae are superimposed through media messages. Here, the mass media can “impede the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves” (Theodor Adorno, quoted in Askew 2002: 4). In a more positive, but deeply ideological turn, the American mass communications theory, for example, also concerned itself with “media effects” on society and treated these as measurable in empirical studies.

Stuart Hall, on the other hand, investigates the power of media, but rejects such simplistic cause-and-effect approaches as the mass communications research, shifting the attention to the questions of how this power is spread within the discourse. The audience here is not factored out of the processes of exercising power, but rather recognized as an active side of media communication. The functioning of media discourse is seen as a complex interaction between sending and receiving, or rather production and consumption, which underlies the active roles of both sides – and the systemically inherent distortion of the media message. The encoding and decoding (Stuart Hall [1973] 2007) of media texts includes the possibility of resistance and subversive readings: the “lack of fit” between the two sides of the exchange, between the moment of production (encoding) and consumption (decoding), which is built into the system. But, although in this sense multiple interpretations are possible, the outcome of the process is not entirely open-ended, as Hall points to numerous representational strategies which privilege certain interpretations, or “preferred readings.” This is especially relevant in media texts concerning difference (ethnic, cultural, racial, etc.), which use a number of strategies, among them stereotyping, essentializing, binary oppositions, erasures,

and others to lead the audience in the direction of a reading that upholds existing power structures (Askew 2002: 5).

However, rather than being a straightforward producer of identities, individuals, or realities, it should be emphasized that media discourse as such is productive of power and thus also carries possibilities of resistance. Interpreting the media discourse as a tool of a dominant force, while being an oversimplification, tends to imply an ideology or a repressive force aimed at the population or parts of it. Media discourse instead offers material for an “*ascending* analysis of power” (Foucault 1980: 99, emphasis in original), that starts at the basic levels of procedures and techniques of power and shows how more general interests engage with these procedures “that are at once both relatively autonomous of power and act as its infinitesimal elements” (1980: 99). The freedom implicit in the relational functioning of power in a discourse means its inherent instability and the unpredictability of its outcome, because in every discourse “there are always also movements in the opposite direction, whereby strategies which co-ordinate relations of power produce new effects and advance into hitherto unaffected domains” (1980: 199-200).

The media are also a site where alternative images can be circulated, and multiple points of resistance can lead to broader alternative strategies. For example, Shohat and Stam propose using media texts as a field of resistance to dominant narratives in what they call “artistic jujitsu,” which overturns asymmetries in representational power within the media discourse.

In their analysis of a broad range of fiction genres, their narrative structures and processes of production, Shohat and Stam encounter asymmetries in representational power on many levels: in the argument of universal appeal used when casting White protagonists in a blockbuster film; in the representation of dominant groups as naturally diverse, and subaltern groups as homogenous; in various “mediations,” such as narrative structure, cinematic style, framing, lighting, the relations of foreground and background, as well as in relations concerning the economics of media and film production (1994: 208).

However, countering negative stereotyping in media texts and images by positive examples is not enough to alter these asymmetries. On the one hand, texts and images follow from tropes which stereotype, generalize, essentialize. On the other hand, images and texts stabilize the discourse, making it a closed circle. Therefore, an analysis of media discourse entails both identifying power relations and structures that lead to it, as well as the ways in which the discourse supports the existing structures or attempts to subvert it and offer a resistant

discourse. Shohat and Stam offer here a methodological approach that instead of “images” speaks of “discourses,” calling attention to all the cultural voices involved in a text, thus bringing out “the voices that remain latent or displaced” (1994: 214). It is also an approach that allows not only the “pseudo-polyphonic” discourse of TV commercials (1994: 215), but a hearing of conflicting and competing voices, a “multivocality,” “an approach that would strive to cultivate and even heighten cultural difference while abolishing socially-generated inequalities” (1994: 215).

One way of countering asymmetries is gaining control of media technologies and, in the terminology of Shohat and Stam, performing “artistic jujitsu,” stealing “elements of the dominant culture and redeploy[ing] them in the interests of oppositional praxis” (1994: 328). Such is the approach that characterizes parodies of Hollywood genre films, and also, for example, those employed by artists in the project *Laughing in a foreign language* (2008), who use humor, or more precisely its untranslatability, as a vehicle of cultural relativism, aimed at combating Western ethnocentrism. It is precisely in seeing humor as a form of cultural insider-knowledge (Critchley 2008: 17), insisting on its untranslatibility that “might endow native speakers with a sense of their cultural distinctiveness or even superiority” (2008: 17), that exposes the “xenophobic flipside of a belief in the untranslatability and exclusivity of humour” (2008: 18). Challenging the notion of borders between humor(s), the artists use strategies such as “defamiliarizing and accentuating preexisting materials” (Shohat and Stam 1994: 331-332), rechanneling “energies in new directions, generating a space of negotiation outside of the binaries of domination and subordination, in ways that convey specific cultural and even autobiographical inflections” (1994: 331-332). This way, “artistic jujitsu” consists of “multiple strategies, for infiltrating the dominant, transforming the dominant, kidnapping the dominant, creating alternatives to the dominant, even ignoring the dominant” (1994: 332).

Another field where resistance can arise is within the audience, viewed as active participants in the discourse, whose final interpretation of media content is open-ended. The audience can commit reception acts which counter or ignore the dominant message, even if unintentionally, as Ien Ang showed in her analysis of reception habits of the soap opera *Dallas* among Dutch audiences (Ang 1991).

In an example of a similar approach, Lila Abu-Lughod analyzes the reception of Egyptian soap operas, and their role in the internal cultural politics of the government-controlled media, which “articulate contested visions of modernity” (Abu-Lughod 2002, 377), visions which are

both elitist and nationalist. She analyzes the receptions of one serial about recent Egyptian history (*Hilmyya Nights*), which is interpreted as a product of a “socially concerned and politically conscious group of culture-industry professionals,” who have “constructed as their object ‘a public’ in need of enlightenment” (2002: 384). While illustrating “the faith that mass media have powerful effects,” this “discourse of protection” (2002: 384) is subverted by the reception habits, especially the selective viewing by the very objects of the intended message: the subaltern working women of Upper Nile villages, who choose to ignore the didactic intention interwoven in the story and instead admire a character intended to serve as a negative warning. Therefore, even if television plays a central role in their lives, “this public subverts and eludes them [the messages], not because they are traditional and ignorant of the modern, [...] but because the ways they are positioned within modernity are at odds with the visions these urban middle-class professionals promote” (2002: 377).

In the post-colonial era, new fields of contestation, new relations of majority and minority, as well as new inequalities in representation arise as a result of migration movements. Even though not all immigration countries have a colonial history, the situation is still shaped by “a diffuse colonial context [...] and just as important, the discourses about it” are shaped by it as well (Shohat and Stam 2009). However, the dualisms of the colonizer/colonized, the First/Third World no longer hold up, with the main issue being that “the nation-state, once the primary unit of analysis, has given way to analytical categories both smaller and larger than the nation” (Stam 2003: 34), and thus to “images of interdependency,” “identity as an endlessly recombinant play of constructed differences,” “metaphors of fluidity and crossing,” and “mutual shaping and indigenization” (2003: 34-35) that all lead to a new aesthetics:

The segregated space of the *Algerie Francaise* of the Pontecorvo film<sup>20</sup> has become the miscegenated space of contemporary France and the miscegenated aesthetics – at once North African, French, and Afro-American, of *beur* cinema, the films made by Maghrebians in France. The brutal borderlines of colonial Algeria have been replaced by the more subtle borderlines separating the urban metropolises of France from the *banlieu*. (2003: 34)

In *Race in Translation. Culture Wars around the Postcolonial Atlantic*, Shohat and Stam paint a large and elaborate portrait of issues of racial politics and cultural movements around the Red, Black, and White Atlantic, to portray not only a range of cultural policies and ideas in the

---

<sup>20</sup> *The Battle of Algiers*. Directed by Gillo Pontecorvo, 1966

parallel histories of their development, but also the vital mutual fertilizing in transnational exchange, emphasizing the intellectual and creative influences they have had on each other. The authors trace transnational movements of ideas and debates across cultural and national borders, viewing cultures as heteroglossic, and not hermetically sealed from one another, so that their project is “to offer a multi-perspectival approach, a kind of a ‘Cubist’ re-reading of the multi-directional travel of aesthetic ideas” (Shohat and Stam 2009). They create a

historicized, poly-chronotopic and relational approach by seeing the culture wars against the broader backdrop of the history of an Atlantic World shaped by the violent “encounter” between Europe and indigenous America, by the exploitation and transplanting of African labor, and by the evolving attempts to go beyond “master-race democracy” to full, participatory, polyphonic equality. (Shohat and Stam 2009)

Against this backdrop, translation becomes a key concept, both literal and “as a trope to evoke all the fluidities and transformations and indigenizations that occur when ideas *‘fora de lugar’* cross borders and travel from one place to another” (Santos 2012: 33).

Shohat and Stam propose a “radical multiculturalism” to theoretically tackle this new constellation. It is a multiculturalism that moves further from both the descriptive and the politically normative approach and comprises a critique of inherent power structures, because a multiculturalism

without the critique of Eurocentrism runs the risk of being merely accretive – a shopping mall boutique summa of the world's cultures – while the critique of Eurocentrism without multiculturalism runs the risk of simply inverting existing hierarchies rather than profoundly rethinking and unsettling them. (Shohat and Stam 1994: 359)

In the understanding of multiculturalism which comprises a critique of power relations, difference is not celebrated for its own sake, but its meaning lies in “recognizing discrepancies in historical experience” (Stam 2012: 104). In terms of race, this means that, even though there is consensus about race as being socially constructed, “race as a social construct and racism as a social practice shape the contemporary world by skewing the distribution of power and resources” (2012: 103).

A radically multicultural approach to filmmaking presents a viable tool of resistance to Eurocentric discourse in the arts and the media, arising simultaneously with the “seismic shift” in scholarship, brought about by post-colonial studies. This “broad decolonization of knowledge and academic culture” (Stam and Shohat 2012: 61) is defined as a critique of political-economic conditions and ways of thinking that Empire instilled, but which continue to persist after the formal end of colonialism. In this way, this academic shift addresses a large field, going beyond the former axes of discussion around empire and nation, but includes multiplied axes “to include race, gender, class, region, religion, sexuality, and ethnicity” (2012: 85).

Going beyond binarisms of race or majority/minority relations, in a “relational approach” (Shohat and Stam 1994: 228), it is necessary to acknowledge the interdependency, the multidimensionality of the multicultural society. In it,

the self is inevitably syncretic, especially when a preexisting cultural polyphony is amplified by the media. This syncretism is first of all linguistic [...] Cultural syncretism takes place both at the margins and between the margins and a changing mainstream, resulting in a conflictual yet creative intermingling of cultures. (1994: 237)

The authors challenge linear historiographic periodizations as well as the notion of separate community narratives, concluding that it is an illusion that communities and societies can exist autonomously, the world being characterized by a “densely woven web of connectedness, within a complex and multivalent relationality” (Shohat 2003: 1). At the core of this relationality is the dynamism of identity formation: here, identities are seen as socially constructed

markers of history, social location, and positionality, lenses through which to view the world. Rather than ethno-characterological essences, identities are chronotopic positionings within social space and historical time, the place from which one speaks and experiences the world. (Stam 2012: 100)

The political valence of multiculturalism therefore “depends on who is seeking multicultural representation, from what social position, in response to what hegemonies, in relation to which disciplines and institutions, as part of what political project, using what means, toward what end, deploying what discourses, and so forth” (Shohat 2003: 6). The media can play a

role in the project, if they are understood as a “radical critique of power relations, turning [...] into a rallying cry for a more substantive and reciprocal intercommunalism” (2003: 7).

### 3.2 Media texts and national fantasy

Funkhaus Europa can, in this context, be viewed as an institutional attempt to respond to the crises and antagonisms arising from growing diversity in the country, as an attempt to create an alternative strategy for reflecting this diversity and giving it a public space. The station has continued to adjust and respond to the constant repositionings in the social and political discourses on difference, in relation to concepts such as integration, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism, and constantly fine-tuning the definition of its target audience.

How can the re-positioning of Funkhaus Europa from being an “ethnic” or “multicultural” to a “cosmopolitan” radio station be read in this context? In reading this re-positioning, I was inspired by Lauren Berlant’s analysis of mass mediated texts as showing the underlying national fantasy. By examining various mass mediated narratives which represent the state of political hegemony and examining technologies of citizenship that create national subjects, she shows these texts to be “the definitional field of citizenship – denoting simple identifications by a national identity category, a reflexive operation of agency and criticism, or a mode of social membership” (Berlant 1997: 31). Here, Berlant demystifies the modes of operation of nation, citizenship and public culture, showing the importance of affect and of fantasy in the operation of nation building. Berlant points out how we inhabit the political space of the nation “which is not merely juridical, territorial (*jus soli*), genetic (*jus sanguinis*), linguistic, or experiential, but some tangled cluster of these. I call this space the ‘National Symbolic’” (Berlant 1991: 4-5). Whereas legal regulations dominate citizenship by constructing technical definitions of rights, duties, and obligations, “the National Symbolic also aims to link regulation to desire, harnessing affect to political life through the production of ‘national fantasy’” (1991: 5).

In her analysis of the rise of the Reaganite right in the U.S., Lauren Berlant shows how intimate, familial politics entered the public sphere and started defining what citizenship and nation in America stood for. She introduces the notion of the “intimate public sphere,” which “renders citizenship a condition of social membership produced by personal acts and values, especially originating or directed towards the family sphere” (Berlant 1997: 5), as well as the

figure of the “infantile citizen,” one who “figures a space of possibility that transcends the fractures and hierarchies of national life” (1997: 27) and whose faith in the nation is based in the belief of the state’s commitment to representing the best interest of the ordinary citizens (1997: 27-28). Berlant argues that the “patriotic view of national identity, which seeks to use identifications with the ideal nation to trump or subsume all other notions of personhood” often makes use of subaltern bodies and identities “which bear the burden of representing *desire for the nation*” (1997: 27; emphasis in the original). The latter point and the notion of “infantile citizenship” inspired my analysis of Funkhaus Europa’s ideal target-audience in Chapter 7, where I show how placing citizenship in the sphere of private choice and the intimate life changes the ways national identity is imagined in the media.

Berlant explores a large array of media texts, among them various media narratives of the pilgrimage to Washington, a symbolic image as a place central to the nation, a “place of national *mediation*,” that becomes “a test of citizenship competence” (1997: 25). Using film narratives of *Mr. Smith goes to Washington*, directed by Frank Capra, and an episode of *The Simpsons*, “Mr. Lisa Goes to Washington,” Berlant concentrates on this particular national plot, in which the patriotic view of national identity, which seeks to use identification with the ideal nation, clashes with a view in which citizenship talk concerns unequal conditions of economic, social, and political struggle. At the same time, even if specific interest groups are consolidated against others, all involved in this “production of mass nationality” (1997: 31) claim that it is serving citizens and bringing a democratic sphere about that is their main concern. The pilgrimage-to-Washington narratives are based on the idea that contact with the monumental nation can turn the citizen's infantilized feelings of rage or opposition into adult subjectivity, ready to disengage from any past trauma and face the present (1997: 33).

Especially relevant for my analysis of how WDR Funkhaus Europa creates ideal citizens and the narrative of the “good life” in cultural diversity is Berlant’s insight of how creating the images of mass nationality is about creating “norms of proper national subjectivity and concepts of social membership” rather than a political public sphere (1997: 35). The iconicity of mass society also happens through the “commodity culture’s marketing of normal personhood as something [...] in the range of what is typical in public yet is personally unique” (1997: 36). At the same time, she shows how subaltern personhood allows for no personal uniqueness, no institutions for the unmarked status. Instead, the subaltern body allows stories of the “inclusion” of minoritized citizenship “in the self-justifying mirror of the

official national narrative while being expatriated from citizenship's promise of quotidian practical intimacy" (1997: 36).

Combining Berlant's argument that the national fantasy is crucially formed by representations of public culture, and that citizenship depends upon these, with a governmentality approach, means that "it must always be remembered that such representations are both provisional and contingent upon the power relations that support them, and that they are necessarily partial" (Nolan 2006: 230). The "publics" of representative democracy are always "performative" entities, so a "way of representing the people constructs the people" (Warner 1990: xi, quoted in Nolan 2006: 230). The question this opens for the analysis of WDR Funkhaus Europa centers on what the politics that the positioning as a "cosmopolitan" broadcaster emerged through, as well as whose interests are served by such a definition (Nolan & Radywyl 2004: 50), something that I elaborate on in Chapter 5.

Recalling again Shohat and Stam's call for a redistribution of representational power and an "artistic jujitsu" in media production, the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa can be seen as a field of resistance to dominant narratives concerning multiculturalism. Instead of accentuating the problems of diversity, the station attempts to create a new space in which this new social diversity, the existing "convivial culture," as described by Gilroy, can be constituted as a living discourse. Avoiding the banalizations, essentializations and divisions common to many media responses to socially traumatic moments, I show how WDR Funkhaus Europa attempts to create a new space of representation and offer a new picture of a German and European cosmopolitan citizen. This ideal citizen should be open to everything, mobile, interested in diversity, a well-travelled cosmopolitan, and at home in the multicultural everyday of West European urban life, ready to embrace all sorts of unthreatening and consumable difference. At the same time, he or she should feel a citizen of Germany, and adhere to the values promoted as European, such as non-violence, gender equality, freedom of expression, and others. As a "technology of citizenship," this station has aimed at creating a new audience segment, at representing the new ideal of the culturally mixed German citizen, but in this, to a certain extent it also engenders transformations in the polity (Nolan 2006). It subjectifies a new audience that can avoid the traumatic point that opens up through the questions discussed above. As a technology of citizenship, the station has not only provided expressions of difference, but has tried to "facilitate expressions of unity and provide opportunities for the development of chains of equivalence" (Nolan 2006: 226), deliberating upon who the "we" of the contemporary German citizenship could be.

## Part II

### Chapter 4

#### Migration and cultural difference in Germany

##### 4.1 Historical overview of concepts

The efforts in creating a multicultural society in Germany have not been successful: “that approach has failed, absolutely failed,” said the German chancellor Angela Merkel in November 2010 at a rally of the youth organization of the Christian Democratic Union in Potsdam (Siebold 2010). She also offered her vision of “co-existence” within the ethnically mixed German society: the immigrants must learn German in order to raise their chances in the labor market, forced marriages are unacceptable, crimes must be speedily tried, and there must be no neighborhoods that the police dare not enter.

In the same year, the social democratic politician Thilo Sarrazin published the inflammatory book *Germany Is Doing Away with Itself* (*Deutschland schafft sich ab*), promoting the thesis that, due to the low birthrates of ethnic Germans, Germany was “becoming smaller and more stupid,” whereas the “social pressure of uncontrolled migration is being kept secret out of political correctness” (Sarrazin 2010b, translation from German by the author). The author claimed that Muslim migrants were reluctant to integrate, dependent on social aid, that they did not care about the scholastic success of their children and tended to create parallel societies (Sarrazin 2010c). With almost a million and a half copies sold, the book became one of the most successful works of political non-fiction in Germany.

Five years later, Germany found itself as the main destination for immigrants arriving from the war zones of the Middle East. Chancellor Merkel’s now famous sentence, “Germany is a strong country – we will manage” from August 2015<sup>21</sup>, meant that from September that year, Germany factually ceased applying the Dublin regulations. Until then, these had determined that the EU Member State through which an asylum seeker first entered the EU, was responsible for processing their asylum application. In practical terms, abandoning the

---

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-31-pk-merkel.html>, accessed 01 Sept /2018

application of the Dublin regulations meant that Germany stopped deportations of new arrivals to other EU countries. By the end of the year, the number of asylum seekers in Germany coming from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries, amounted to over a million people. Nevertheless, this move led to an unprecedented wave of solidarity in the German civil society, and manifestations of “welcome culture” (*Willkommenskultur*) around the country. Since then, the institutional response has been “complemented by NGOs, grass roots initiatives as well as the general public, with ongoing voluntary engagement at all levels of society.”<sup>22</sup>

Not much later, however, in the midst of growing institutional struggle to cope with the situation, the public mood soured, and criticism of the government’s immigration policy mounted, accompanied by vocal attacks against the media, often accused of reporting too favorably of Merkel and the refugee situation. The right-wing upstart, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), had by then entered several regional parliaments and, in the 2017 general elections, for the first time also the national parliament, the Bundestag, with 12.6 percent of the overall vote. So, in only four years since its founding, the AfD had transformed from a party worried about the future of the euro-zone to a robustly anti-immigration and Islamophobic party, shaping its political platform around the rejection of Merkel’s open-door policies towards refugees and, related to this, a strong criticism of the media, characterized as the “lying press.”

The very speed of radical changes and force of public reactions showed how central to the German political and public discourse the struggle with the topic of immigration is. The developments since 2015 also show how central the perception of the media as an actor in this struggle is, a perception echoed in a large part of the German language literature on the topic.

The German Federal Statistical Office counted 19.3 million people, or 23.6 percent, with a so-called “migration background” or “migration biography”<sup>23</sup> in 2017.<sup>24</sup> Roughly half of these, around 9.4 million, were foreign nationals. Starting from the early 1960s, Germany has

---

<sup>22</sup> [http://www.unhcr.org/dach/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2017/11/Factsheet\\_Germany\\_Q4.pdf](http://www.unhcr.org/dach/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2017/11/Factsheet_Germany_Q4.pdf)

<sup>23</sup> The population group with a migration background consists of all persons who have immigrated into the territory of today’s Federal Republic of Germany since 1949, of all foreigners born in Germany, and all persons born in Germany who have at least one parent who immigrated into the country after 1949 or was born as a foreigner in Germany. Persons of “migration backgrounds” do not have to have immigrants themselves, indeed every third person with a migration biography has been living in Germany since birth. <https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/MigrationIntegration/Methods/MigrationBackground.html>

<sup>24</sup> [https://www.bpb.de/wissen/NY3SWU,0,0,Bev%F6lkerung\\_mit\\_Migrationshintergrund\\_I.html](https://www.bpb.de/wissen/NY3SWU,0,0,Bev%F6lkerung_mit_Migrationshintergrund_I.html), accessed 29 Nov 2018

continued to receive immigrants, but even after more than half a century of continuing immigration there is no clear-cut institutional or ideological stance towards Germany being an immigration society. Also, the effects this development has on the definitions of national culture or identity are often not represented institutionally, including the fact that there is no clear vision of the future of the German (diverse) “we,” so that

while the facts of past immigration and the resultant plurality of backgrounds and experiences in the German population are now accepted, this is not accompanied by a generally positive approach to cultural diversity and public representation of minorities as groups. Germany's life as a self-conscious country of immigration begins in a climate unfavourable to an active promotion of minority rights and identities. (Schönwälder 2010: 153)

Public policies concerning ethnic diversity instead continue to be characterized by controversy, including statements on the failure of the multicultural approach, such as that made by chancellor Merkel in 2010.

Whereas in the past decades the parliamentary parties have differed in their opinion on immigration, they have all gradually accepted the fact that Germany is a country of immigration. The discussion on the level of political institutions and mainstream parties today circles mostly around questions of who is responsible for securing the successful integration of immigrants, how to organize and improve it, and what constitutes it in the first place. Only in individual cases does the discussion move towards questions of how the new German national identity could or should be redefined in the public discourse, in light of the fact that it is a country whose culture(s) can no longer be defined in national terms.

Normative steps, such as adjusting the Law on citizenship in 2000 and passing the Law on immigration<sup>25</sup> in 2005, marked the formal end of the earlier policies aimed at stopping immigration all together. These policies began with the oil crisis of 1973, which led Germany to stop further arrival of so-called “guest-workers” (*Gastarbeiter*) and to offer financial incentives for the return of workers into their countries of origin. This turned Germany into a country where permanent immigration from outside of the EU was *de facto* legally not

---

<sup>25</sup> The full name of the German immigration act is “Law on administrating and limiting immigration and regulating the residence and integration of the citizens of the European union and foreign nationals” (*Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern*), which points to its regulatory and limiting nature.

possible, with the exception of immigration in the context of protection under the Geneva convention. Since the early 2000s and the passing of the Law on immigration, the official politics have shifted emphasis from stopping immigration to heightening social cohesion, with strong demands directed at migrants to integrate.

At the same time, a problem-oriented examination of the concepts of integration, assimilation, cosmopolitanism, interculturalism, and multiculturalism is largely lacking, and the positions of the majority society and the immigrants (and their descendants), those of “host” and “guests,” remain critically mostly unexamined, even if on the level of the public and media discourses a positive approach to cultural diversity in the context of “enriching” the German society has entered the mainstream. In this context, migrants are increasingly seen as bringing the potential for economic growth, as a way of stopping the downward demographic development and on a more abstract level, as contributing through expressions such as music, food, and cultural traditions, of making the host culture more heterogeneous and thus somehow “richer.”<sup>26</sup>

The year 1955 marked the first step in a process that aimed at leading Germany to become a country of cultural and ethnic diversity. It was the year in which the Federal Republic of Germany signed its first bilateral recruitment contract with the aim of bringing *Gastarbeiter*, guest workers, to the country, in order to fill labor force shortages in the industrial and agricultural sectors. Following the first contract with Italy, seven further contracts were signed with South European and North African countries, the last with former Yugoslavia in 1968.

Ever since the guest-worker scheme, the majority of the legislative acts and political decisions concerning immigration have been guided by economic concerns – both in the negative sense, seeing immigration as a hazard for the labor market and the social systems, and in the positive sense, seeing it as a way out of labor shortages in specific sectors.

The first such decision came in 1973, when the influx of immigrants was stopped (*Anwerbestopp*) amidst the global oil crisis and fears of an economic slow-down. Since this did not factually stop immigration, in 1983/84 a controversial Law on return assistance (*Rückkehrhilfegesetz*) introduced financial stimuli for the return of workers to their countries of origin, in order to lower the pressure on the labor market. The 1980s and a part of the

---

<sup>26</sup> The discourse of “enrichment” through palatable diversity will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 7.

1990s were characterized by narratives of work market saturation and fears of rising unemployment. The media coverage can be summarized around the metaphor of a “full boat,” giving the impression of a growing number of people applying for political asylum and raising the pressure on the social state. The period will also be remembered for a series of deadly racist attacks on immigrants in the cities of Rostock, Solingen, Mölln, and others. In 1992, the regulations for asylum application were tightened through a constitutional change, resulting in a drop-off in the number of applications (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2018). The same fears of rising unemployment, wage dumping, and social insecurity years later defined the German response to EU-enlargement, leading to the imposition of transitional periods for issuing work permits for nationals of new EU-member states in 2004 and 2007 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2013).

Following the *Gastarbeiter*-era, the first perspective change on immigration, in which it was again regarded as a desirable and controllable economic factor, appeared in the IT-Green Card schemes of the years 2000 to 2004 that aimed at recruiting computer experts. Several years later, during the early 2010s, the federal government led campaigns with the purpose of facilitating the employment of a foreign, highly-qualified work force by German enterprises (SWR 2011). In fact, every shortage of professionals in a specific sector has at some point led to the idea of recruiting foreign workers, so that in 2018, for example, the federal health minister floated the idea of recruiting foreign workers for medical and home care professions to fend off the shortage of professionals in those areas (Zeit Online 2018).

The current immigration policies at the time of writing cover two areas: As a signatory of the Geneva convention and a major host country for newcomers from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries, Germany continues its engagement in refugee protection, both as a receiving country for refugees and as a European and global broker on refugee policies (UNHCR 2017). On the other hand, the immigration of non-EU citizens into the country is based on the assumption that immigration can be used and steered as an instrument of economic growth.

Similar to other European countries of immigration, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Germany has witnessed a contradiction between the social realities and the official politics accompanying them. In light of the influx of refugees that started in 2015, it is clear that Germany remains a country of continuing immigration. The more interesting statistical figure in this context, however, is that every third child born in Germany has at least one

parent with a migration background (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2018), meaning that the ratio of people with migration backgrounds will continue to grow even if further immigration were to stop entirely. However, this is not accompanied by a political or ideological willingness to re-define the terms of citizenship or cultural identity, even if the society has been deeply shaped by migration and cultural diversity for several generations already.

The social transformations in the course of ongoing immigration have seen such developments as multilingualism, religious diversity, cultural heterogeneity, and transnational practices entering the German social sphere. The education system, especially in its view of language acquisition needs, illustrates the response of the institutions to these transformations. For example, Terkessidis (2010) warns that, far from any effort at de-ethnicizing the education system, it still treats persons with migration backgrounds as a separate part of society who need to be brought closer to the dominant standards through added compensatory efforts of the society, outside the “normal workings” of a kindergarten, school, or other institutions (2010: 47) rather than as an integral part of their work. For example, calls for learning German are often paired with language proficiency tests to detect and solve problems in the pre-school age, rather than embracing children’s multilingualism as a normal practice in a multicultural society.

The central institutional and political response to the cultural transformation in Germany remains the objective of integration. Indeed, as has already been noted, integration is named the “key task of the federal government” regarding immigration (Die Bundesregierung 2012: 1). Although almost unquestioned in the public debate as the only viable objective of the policy measures on immigration and diversity, the very term “integration,” however, remains not clearly defined and thus suitable for being filled and re-filled with all sorts of meanings, depending on the context.

Several critical points can be raised concerning the demands for integration in general and in the German context in particular. One of them is the question of what exactly migrants are meant to integrate into. The concept of integrations rests on the premise of a relatively homogenous, or at least definable, host culture, implicitly contained within the nation-state, into which one can integrate. When examined as to its contents, the “host culture” is usually defined in terms of historical continuity (which, however, does not allow for the dynamic leading to the present culturally diverse society), in connection with the German language, or

as based on “European” and “universal” principles of democratic rule (which again says nothing about the specificity of a “German host culture”). A further question would be why the demand for integration is placed on the migrants and their descendants, even if a large majority of them are born and raised in the society that they are then supposed to integrate into.

And finally, integration is usually not understood as a process concerning the whole immigration society, a process in which *all citizens* – the new migrants, ethnic Germans, and others already living in Germany – actively look for modes of common living and social cohesion. Instead, in the best case, it is seen as an effort to be undertaken by the migrants and the host *institutions* but leaving out the changes that the society *as a whole* undergoes through migration, or what its citizens can undertake in this context. This “common effort,” however, also rests on a picture of a social division between the two groups – the hosts and the migrants – and their gradual coming together. In the worst, but not uncommon, case, it is a demand posed solely on the migrants. Here, the “willingness to integrate” is postulated as the basis necessary for co-existence. It is understood as a process of acquiring cultural literacy, with the final question being where this process ends in the individual case, and where assimilation starts.

The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees narrows the term integration down on its web-page as follows:

Integration is a long-term process. Its aim is to include into the society all people who live in Germany permanently and legally. An encompassing and equal participation in all social areas should be made possible for immigrants. They are on the other hand obliged to learn German, to acquaint themselves with, to respect and to follow the Constitution and the laws. (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2007)

When used as a positive attribute, a well-integrated person is one recognized as successfully introduced into and functioning within the norms of the society. On the negative side of the discussion, there is talk of “integration-refusers,” “insufficient integration efforts,” and “processes of disintegration.” The success of a person’s or a group’s integration is perceived as measurable along a scale of quantifiable parameters, a combination of cultural, social, and economic factors. If unsatisfactory, these can threaten the overall socio-economic picture of the country, which in turn results in negative public responses to the statistics on under-the-

average education levels or migrants' participation in the labor market. A further recommendation listed in the National Action Plan, is social contact and exchange (including the warning against creating minority enclaves and "parallel societies," a warning against groupism and segregation) as well as a call to accept the values of German democracy and culture (Bundesregierung 2011).

Especially since the comparative European study of scholastic success PISA of 2000, that showed migration origins to be an obstacle to scholastic success in Germany (Verbeet 2010), learning the German language has become a crucial demand directed at migrants. Proficiency in German language occupies a central position in the institutional and political discussion, almost as a demand dictated by common sense: nobody in their right mind can disagree that language knowledge is indispensable for education, a career, and getting on in the society. For example, the Web-page of the German Office for Migration and Refugees states that,

If you live in Germany, you should try to learn German as quickly as possible. It is important to do so to meet new people, to make yourself understood in everyday life, and find work. There are many different opportunities to learn German. (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016)

However, burdened with symbolic connotations as a carrier of some essence of national culture, the language of the host society, especially as mother-tongue, remains a strong biopolitical factor in immigration societies. While language proficiency is offered as a fool-proof way of securing economic and social participation, at the same time lacking language sufficiency can function as a marker leading to social exclusion.

Language knowledge is expected in pre-school children in several, but not all, German *Länder*, and a considerable part of the examination for enrolment into primary school is dedicated to language skills – albeit not as an exclusion criterion but rather as a "diagnostic tool," used to assess if compensatory measures should be organized. A positive attitude towards multilingual education is gradually becoming consensual in the institutions of education, even though doubts about this approach continue to be voiced regularly on various levels. In some contexts, multilingualism is cited as a potential impediment for acquiring the proper language skills of the host society, leading, for example, to periodical calls to prescribe speaking German during school breaks, even if these are mostly met with ridicule and dismissal. Gradually, the view that multilingualism does not affect the acquisition of German in a negative way is gaining prominence in the institutional approach. It is framed positively,

especially as a factor in raising competitive advantage in conditions of globalization. A positive approach to multilingual living in the context of mobility in the globalized economy, however, remains paired with continuing problematizations around the assessment of the German language proficiency of migrants. There are numerous institutional publications, quantitative studies, and papers within educational sciences that deal with the levels of language proficiency and questions surrounding it, most of them typically reflecting the matter in terms of efficiency. Quotes from one publication, “Language integration of migrants” (Haug 2008), that analyzes the language proficiency levels of children, may serve as a typical example:

Knowledge of the language of the receiving country is indispensable for the integration of migrants. Knowledge of German is therefore a central aspect and can be considered a measure of integration of migrants in the receiving society. Besides knowledge of German, the knowledge of a language or languages of the country of origin is to be taken into account. Although the role of multilingualism in integration is discussed with some controversy, its importance for the everyday life is uncontested.

[...]

In general, the language levels of migrant children can be judged as problematic. Language tests in pre-school age show up deficits in oral linguistic skills, understanding and vocabulary. (Haug 2008: 5, translation from German by the author)

The centrality of language in national self-understanding raises important implications in its development, which has seen language becoming probably the most important parameter of both the willingness of migrants to integrate and the readiness of the state to facilitate integration. Núria Garcia (2014), for example, investigates the link between language regimes and citizenship in Germany, seeing both as objects of governance. The politicization of the language issue is traced through the changing attitudes and official politics towards language-of-origin courses, leading to the conclusion that “the debate around the recognition of multilingualism, [...] is linked to the larger debate on citizenship polarizing politics on the national level since the 1980s” (Garcia 2014: 5). The polarization around issues related to language and identity remains strong, together with the self-understanding of Germany as

mono-cultural and mono-lingual, so that language remains a “field of negotiation of differences and their political regulation” (Tietze, quoted in Garcia 2014: 18).

Focusing on the question of “Why language?”, Elana Shohamy (2009) also warns that “ideologies and beliefs about languages” are deeply rooted in all sorts of biographical and educational contexts, making language a sphere heavy with symbolic and ideological superstructure (Shohamy 2009: 46). In nation-states, language has become “the major definer of national identity” so that the knowledge and use of the hegemonic language “serve as primary symbols of belonging, loyalty, patriotism and inclusion and can therefore be used legitimately as criteria for classifying people” (2009: 46). In this context, policies aimed at fostering, measuring, and using language knowledge as a criterion for citizenship rights can be seen as veritable technologies of government. They are arbitrary but not naive, serving instead as “unrealistic mechanisms for control, categorization, gate-keeping and classification of human beings and denial of basic human and personal rights” that go together with membership in the society, such as education or social security (2009: 55).

In sum, language proficiency in immigration societies today has become both the demand and the offer to belong that the “host” society extends to the migrants through its institutions. At the same time, language remains one of the strongest benchmarks of social exclusion, and one of the easiest to apply, since nobody can “become” a native speaker, and deviance from perfection as personified by a native speaker quickly becomes a marker of difference.

In general, integration can be interpreted as a crucial, even if not clearly defined, condition for citizenship and nationality rights. In the political discourse, it is very often presented through the metaphor of a “two-way street,” with both the migrant and the institutions of the host country obliged to “put in an effort” of adjustment. But while the metaphor uses a non-hierarchical picture of a two-way street, integration actually rests on the picture of a “visitor” and a “host”, the latter representing the cultural norm that migrants need to actively try to fit into. The political slogan of “demanding and promoting” (*fordern and fördern*) that has accompanied the integration debate, points to the focus of the official politics “on the individual who is offered help but is in turn constantly required to prove his or her willingness to co-operate and achieve the necessary preconditions” (Schönwälder 2010, 155). Far from being a value-neutral term,

there are all sorts of unpronounced perceptions behind [it] concerning what it means to be “German,” how people should behave at “our” place and what they

should not do, who fulfills the requirements and who has deficits, whom the institutions are made for and who is here actually just as a visitor. (Terkessidis 2010: 7, translation from German by the author)

Furthermore, within the narrative of integration, an unpronounced hierarchization takes place among immigrant groups, so that those who are “culturally marked,” for example through public displays of religiosity, such as the wearing of the Islamic veil, are seen as less compatible with the host culture. In this sense,

integration and equal opportunities are not promised to everyone: only some groups of immigrants are to be integrated, and the opportunities granted may not be equal. Furthermore, there is an emphasis on cultural and identificational assimilation, and themes like sanctions, pressure and selection are constantly reiterated. (Schönwälder 2010: 154)

The demand to comply with the Constitution can be read in a similar way: instead of being a catalogue of citizens’ rights and obligations, the Constitution in the integration discourse symbolizes a kind of “cultural manual,” which contains a cultural code. What actually makes up this cultural norm is not explicitly defined, but it is bundled within the fuzzy complex of ideas around Western liberal democracy, secularism, individual self-determination, gender equality, and others.

At the same time, the very fact that the demand to integrate implies there is a defined national culture to integrate into means that it does not correspond to social realities, which are defined by transnational practices and multiple memberships – very strongly, but not exclusively among the migrants, and especially among the young and within popular cultures. Therefore, the demand to integrate in essence remains

a negative diagnosis. There are problems, and they are caused by deficits of certain persons, who belong to certain groups. The starting point is always the society as it should be, not the society as it is. (Terkessidis 2010: 9, translation from German by the author)

In sum, Terkessidis criticizes the concept of integration as “upholding the distance between the majority and the immigrants” (2010: 9) rather than diminishing it.

The question is, therefore, if in this situation, integration can be made the condition for full citizenship. For Stuart Hall, the universalistic language of citizenship – even though historically, from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution onwards, it was often denied to groups such as Black slaves and women –

is transformed in the light of the proliferation of cultural difference, [and therefore] the idea cannot and does not deserve to survive in the transformed conditions of late-modernity in which it is required to become substantively operable. (Hall 2007: 42)

In other words, the rights of citizenship and the incommensurabilities of cultural difference need to be “respected and [...] one not made a condition of the other” (2007: 42).

Regardless of the above considerations, integration is generally not put into question as the key concept of the German debate on immigration or diversity. In contrast, the term multiculturalism has experienced a rather brutal death in the German debate, reflecting a Europe-wide backlash, discussed previously in Chapter 2. Widespread critique of multiculturalism includes its supposed promotion of the withdrawal and segregation of minority cultures, an indifference to the lack of integration, and an oppressive political correctness. Its connotations include an antagonistic stance towards the majority, and in the extreme case, even the infliction of cultural norms of the Other on the majority (Vertovec 2007, 2010). Whereas this criticism is not unique to the German context, the wholeheartedness of support that chancellor Merkel’s statement on the failure of the multicultural approach received could be interpreted as a sign of a high degree of unease about the idea of a profound transformation of the national model – even if the media and the institutions continue to propagate a more inclusive approach.

Parallel to a growing rejection of the term “multiculturalism,” calls for strengthening social cohesion and a sense of common citizenship are getting stronger. On the level of federal politics, in 2006, chancellor Angela Merkel initiated the National Integration Summit, which has since invited associations, the media, and community representatives to discuss questions of integration and diversity, resulting in the development of a National Action Plan on Integration. The Ministry of the Interior in turn has since 2006 been organizing an annual

Islam Conference in order to uphold the dialogue between state institutions and the Muslim communities.

New terms such as “diversity” are being embraced in the context of “enrichment” and a more general discourse on globalization. The term is increasingly finding its way into institutional statements and political programs, such as the already mentioned “Diversity Charta” (*Charta der Vielfalt*) of the German industrial association, the government campaign “Diversity as Chance” (*Vielfalt als Chance*), and many others. It is seen as taking place in a broad spectrum of areas: from business venues (the introduction of diversity managers in companies), through cultural aspects (intercultural dialogue in local initiatives, celebrations of immigrants’ traditions in educational institutions), to institutional efforts (recruiting multi-ethnic staff into public administration).

Similarly, the concept of “cosmopolitanism,” that has been spreading in the media discourse, emphasizes diversity as a positive asset and celebrates the mobility of the globalized nomad, but often neutralizes difference to a decorative element. The cosmopolitan citizen’s experience of transnationality, be it due to migration or to travel, “enriches” the country, contributing to its multivocality, a “unity in diversity.” Ghassan Hage, however, points out that the discourse of enrichment not only places the majority culture as dominant, but it also assigns it a different role. Whereas the dominant culture “merely and unquestionably *exists*, migrant cultures exist *for* the latter. Their value, or the viability of their preservation [...], lies in their function as enriching cultures” (Hage 2000: 121, emphasis in original).

Therefore, while on the one hand the concepts of cosmopolitanism and diversity imply the rejection of claims to ethnic or cultural purity as anachronistic, and greet cultural diversity, they do so without challenging the framework of the nation-state as the primary field in which this transformation is taking place. Both cosmopolitanism and diversity see difference as an object of governmentality, of management, upholding the discourse of difference as enriching the host culture by added value, something that can be consumed and absorbed, without challenging the status quo of the social positions.

In a very broad conclusion, it can be said that the institutional politics concerning the changing face of the German society, including such fundamental transformations as the rise of multilingualism, transnational practices, hybridizations in the popular cultures, and others, have not developed as an active effort, but rather as a reaction to developments taking place in the course of immigration. They remain mostly concerned with practical questions; however,

even when they view cultural diversity as a positive development, they rarely abandon nation-state as their discursive framework. How these considerations have been articulated through media discourses, how difference and belonging have been constructed and re-constructed within these discourses, and how the key points in the discourses have changed in the course of time, will all be the subject of analysis in the following chapters.

## 4.2 Media and multiculturalism in Germany

The media discourses have gone hand in hand with these developments, with both the public service broadcasters and the commercial media often championing a sympathetic and inclusive attitude to cultural diversity within the country, largely within the discourse of enrichment. Furthermore, the media, especially the public service broadcasters, have increasingly been assigned the role of “tools” and “facilitators” of integration.

This emphasis on the media as instruments of social cohesion can be read in a number of strategic papers and policy documents on various institutional levels. On the level of the federal government, this can be observed in the conclusions of the “Media and Integration” working group, as part of the National Integration Plan<sup>27</sup>, which includes demands for the media to “reflect cultural diversity as normality in their outputs and show the opportunities of an immigration society,” demands for the broadcasters to recruit and qualify media professionals with migration backgrounds, and demands to secure specific media offers for migrant target groups (2007: 157-158, translation from German by the author).

Also, the number of round tables on the topic of media, integration, and diversity policies has grown significantly in recent years, with several broadcasters introducing the topic of the “integrative role of the media” into their program documents, for example, in the context of the European year of intercultural dialogue 2008. The members of the German Association of public service broadcasters, ARD, produced the position paper “Integration and cultural diversity – A cross-section task of the ARD” (*Integration und kulturelle Vielfalt – Querschnittsaufgabe der ARD*), which emphasizes the aim of reflecting the composition of the German society in media content and personnel. It cites as its guiding principle the need to show

---

<sup>27</sup> The National Integration Plan was the precursor to the later National Action Plan on Integration.

the realities of immigration society in all programs, especially the mass-attractive ones, where the ARD presents the everyday life of people from immigrant families as part of social normality and strives to authentically show the chances of a culturally diverse society, without negating its problems and risks. (ARD 2007: 472, translation from German by the author)

The biggest broadcaster within the ARD, the West German public broadcaster, WDR, cites in its statute that it “must promote international understanding, European integration, and coexistence without discrimination” (WDR 2008: 18, translation from German by the author) and its programs should show “the cultural diversity of the broadcasting area, the process of European integration, and the interests of the population, including those of the people with migration backgrounds living in the broadcasting area” (2008: 7, translation from German by the author).

In short, on numerous levels, the media have been explicitly called upon to take part in shaping the public discussion on immigration and integration and mobilized as active tools in managing diversity and difference. Although, for example, the ARD paper states that it does not primarily understand integration as a task for a specific target group and instead needs to “reflect the demographic, ethnic and cultural transformation of our society and with it our audience and the changes of its horizon of experience and expectation,” (ARD 2007: 474, translation from German by the author), it can be noted that both the political and the media-political discussion circle around the position, role, and potential of the media with the aim of integration.

A striking recent example of this approach was provided during the influx of refugees into Germany starting from the autumn of 2015. Both the public and the commercial media in Germany reacted very quickly to the development. The commercial broadcaster n-tv started a video format in Arabic, *Marhaba - Arriving in Germany* (*Marhaba - Ankommen in Deutschland*) in September 2015, as “the first program in Germany addressing specifically the refugees and immigrants from the Middle East, in Arabic.”<sup>28</sup> In the weekly format, the German anchor Constantin Schreiber explained, in fluent Arabic, the basics of life in Germany. As presented on the Web site of the program, Schreiber “explains our country and us, the Germans, and gives practical information about life in Germany” (translation from German by the author). Several public service broadcasters followed suit, offering practical

---

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.n-tv.de/marhaba/>

tips on life in Germany in Arabic, translating their online news bulletins into English and Arabic, and offering episodes of a popular children's TV-programs in Arabic, Kurdish, and Dari.<sup>29</sup>

In January 2016, the WDR started a multilingual Web program WDRforyou, which in the next two years turned into the largest public service program offered to refugees, newcomers, and other interested audiences, with almost 380.000 subscribers<sup>30</sup>. As a WDR radio editor at the time, I was part of a small team that during a period of around three weeks in October 2015 researched the information needs and wishes of the refugees as well as their technical possibilities for receiving programs, especially in the big refugee centers. Based on conversations with refugees, social workers, and volunteers, several meetings of a group of TV and radio editors were held to discuss what a future WDR offering for refugees should look like.

From these meetings it became obvious that both the program makers and the management of the broadcaster saw their role as social actors. They saw themselves in a position where they needed to take on part of the responsibility of ensuring the refugee influx into the society ran smoothly – on the one side for the refugees themselves, who needed to be informed and helped to find their way quickly, and on the other side for the receiving society, by making the expected social and cultural friction less sharp. The term integration was mentioned frequently: the declared aim of offering the refugees media content was to facilitate their integration and to make this wave of immigration and integration smoother and easier than was the case for the first generation of “guest workers” in the 1960s. Language acquisition was often cited as an important aim, so that a balance was to be struck between offering the refugees formats in the languages they understood, and getting them to learn German as quickly as possible, to facilitate their integration.

In this context, the question of money was raised, or rather the question of how to justify spending the fees of the German subscribers for programs in foreign languages. One of the managers involved said in an interview that

there are also critics who ask why we finance such shows with subscribers' fees.  
[...] But most of the refugees will stay here, we have to be pragmatic. We must

---

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.wdrmaus.de/sachgeschichten/maus-international/>

<sup>30</sup> WDR – figures from March 2018

all contribute to this integration to function well. (Srikiow 2015: 46, translation from German by the author)

It was often stressed in the meetings that in this way, the WDR was cultivating a future audience segment, people who would, when they set foot into the society proper, remain loyal to the public service media. For example, when discussing the choice of languages in which to offer these programs, the languages of the Balkans were rejected because refugees from the Balkan countries were not granted legal stay in Germany<sup>31</sup>, which meant they could not be considered a future audience segment.

Entering the dynamics of governmentality, the media here took upon themselves the role of making new citizens, offering them “cultural translation” for everyday life but also guidelines on the national culture. This “citizen-making” can be seen, for example, in the list of topics of the first episodes of *Marhaba*, containing such titles as “This is how the Germans think,” “The Constitution and the Sharia,” “Women in Germany,” “Love and sex in Germany,” “The role of religion,” and “Eating and drinking.”<sup>32</sup> In the words of the show’s host,

[t]he intense reporting might lead to the impression that we have started a full program in Arabic. This is definitely not our intention. Just the opposite, it is important that the refugees learn German, but we want to give them orientation help. (Srikiow 2015: 46, translation from German by the author)

A large part of the literature and research in this area also discusses the “integrative function” of the media. Even if a simple relation of cause and consequence is not presumed, there is a general assumption that representing migrants as a normal part of society can lead to lowering prejudice and diminishing social distance. On the other hand, the media are seen as a tool for reaching out to the migrant communities, preventing their separation from the majoritarian discourses. Citing the tasks for the public media as listed by the German Constitutional Court in 1961, Siepmann (2006) states that

television professionals are not only observers and reporters of the active and passive integration processes; they are also mobilizers, that is, they are both the

---

<sup>31</sup> In the autumn of 2015, the German federal parliament voted the Balkan countries as safe countries of origins, thus precluding the possibility of political asylum for refugees from those countries.  
<http://www.bamf.de/DE/Migration/AsylFluechtlinge/Asylverfahren/BesondereVerfahren/SichereHerkunftsliste/C3%A4nder/sichere-herkunftsliste/C3%A4nder-node.html>

<sup>32</sup> <http://www.n-tv.de/marhaba/>

medium and the factor of intercultural social convergence. (Siepmann 2006: 8, translation from German by the author)

Siepmann regards the media co-responsible for the “success or failure of cohabitation in the conditions of globalization” (2006: 8, translation from German by the author).

The terminology includes “effect,” “intention,” and “function” in integrative processes, or the stated aims of “diminishing social distance” and facilitating “cohesion,” which all point to the constellation in which the majority performs integrative actions on subjects, who in turn form communities on the margins or outside the majoritarian discourse. Also, the negative potential of the media as contributing to segregation through spreading stereotypes or tendentious reporting is assumed. The media are called upon to use their positive potential in working towards “successful cohabitation” and “social convergence.” In their strategic papers, the public broadcasters pledge to work towards pro-active mainstreaming of diversity and examine every piece of content along the criterion if it reflects reality or is undifferentiated and tendentious.<sup>33</sup> Parallel to these elaborations, changes in the media discourse in the past years can indeed be noticed: from the growing number of “ethnic” protagonists to a generally more relaxed attitude towards showing the existing diversity on-screen and on the air.

Next to the questions of content, the question of personnel is raised, with the aim of reflecting the culturally diverse population in the make-up of the newsroom. There are no diversity quotas or percentage targets in the German media. Instead, several broadcasters have introduced individual projects such as workshops or seminars with the aim of opening up editorial offices to people with migration backgrounds. The non-binding objective of recruiting people of migration backgrounds or promoting their employment, such as the one that has been articulated in the ARD paper on integration, is generally greeted as a way to reflect the audience make-up more realistically.

The number of people with migration backgrounds working in journalism in Germany cannot be exactly deciphered; however, it is clear from partial studies that it by far underscores the overall percentage of people with migration backgrounds living in Germany. In 2006, the

---

<sup>33</sup> In its “Diversity Toolkit for Factual Programs in Public Service Television,” the Intercultural and Diversity Group of the European Broadcasting Union offers public broadcast program makers guidelines that can be applied in the everyday newsroom work, such as: Who is talking and who is being addressed? Is the author conscious of the power of images, words, music? Are the interlocutors chosen for the relevance to the story or because they will draw attention? Is the whole spectrum of opinion within the minority community represented or is the community treated as a homogenous unity? Are the minority representatives in the piece for authentic reasons? Does the piece reflect stereotypes?

Federal Work Agency, for example, listed between two and three percent of registered journalists in the country as having a migration biography (MMB 2007). It is difficult to pinpoint the figures firstly because of the methods of data collection, with statistics often based only on citizenship data, and secondly for reasons of data protection, with disclosure of cultural origins possible only as voluntarily given information. Also, where they exist, partial figures concerning individual broadcasters or print media say little about the status, functions, or employment levels of the people involved: Are they employed editors or free-lance journalists? Are they part of the management structures? Do they work in the mainstream or in niche media? Are they seen on-screen and heard on the air? And crucially: Are they encouraged to work mostly on “migration topics” or are even limited to those?

The objective of recruiting more journalists of diverse cultural origins into the media arises against the backdrop of the assumption that they will automatically bring new points-of-view into the reporting and the choice of topics, perspectives that might be blind spots of journalists and editors of German origins. In this sense, people of migration backgrounds are somehow – when actively encouraged to enter the newsrooms – seen as embodying added value in media work. Through their own biographies and experiences, they represent that part of the society that needs to be targeted by media offers. They are seen as “gate openers” into the migrant communities, until then unreached by the mainstream media, and they are expected to bring in original topics and themes into the newsrooms, topics that stem from their lives as “culturally diverse” citizens.

Assuming, however, as diversity management strategies in various businesses seem to, that diversity amongst personnel will automatically lead to diversity in the product, leaves aside the particular characteristic of media products as creators of social discourse – one that is not shared by a car or a telecom package for example. It also neglects some of the specifics of the media work on the day-to-day level, including the hierarchizations of newsrooms and the question of who decides on what is newsworthy or who is allowed to air opinion and commentary. In other words, a more diverse newsroom does not automatically lead to better programming in terms of cultural and other diversity, unless there is a willingness to question the existing hierarchies and modes of participation in the content production, the adopted standards and habits, or communication cultures within the broadcasters.

#### 4.2.1 Media and multiculturalism in Germany – literature overview

The largest part of German language theoretical literature on the media in the context of a culturally mixed society also concentrates on the subject of integration. Many authors consider the effects of media texts and the patterns of their usage in social processes, often posing the question of how these can be steered to achieve the desired results of integration. To name just a few authors, Geissler and Pöttker (2006) see the model of “intercultural media integration” through practices of production, content, and usage, as a middle road between segregation and assimilation, whereas Weber-Menges (2005) interrogates modes of “reporting on foreigners” as a factor in social integration (translations from German by the author).

Although the presumed importance of the media in social integration has turned into a well-worn truism in the public debate, individual authors do pose the question of what is understood under the term integration, how it can be “measured,” and why it is premised as the desirable outcome of social processes in the first place, “a question that needs answering before any scientific questions can be posed on how certain patterns of media usage serve or do not serve integration” (Müller 2008: 61, translation from German by the author). Trebbe warns that the integrative function of the mass media

(1) is one of the constructs that are most difficult to operationalize and empirically interrogate and as such (2) it is one of the empirically least proven hypotheses on the effects of the mass media. (2009: 109, translation from German by the author)

Regardless of the “construct” of the integrative function of the media, lamented by Trebbe, there is a large body of German-language literature that has formulated research questions concerning media production and usage in relation to their effects on integration and social cohesion. Among the literature, there are concrete analyses of normative demands in journalistic work contained in the German Press Code, such as the effects of the warning against discrimination in media texts. Also, numerous content analyses interrogate the modes of representing migrants in the mainstream media, asking questions such as: Do the media ignore the migrants, contort their image, uphold stereotypes, or essentialize minorities? Do they strengthen or weaken the existing prejudice? How do processes of discrimination function and do the media contribute to ending them? There is also a large body of literature on patterns of media usage among the migrant population. In the same argumentative line, these studies aim at reaching conclusions about the adjustments in the media production that

could lead to more desired results and ask what can be done in order to contribute to the social inclusion of the migrants and their stronger acceptance in the society.

Various studies note a certain negative tendency and problematization of migrants in their representation as criminals or felons, as competition or a threat to the majority, as well as their frequent positioning in a passive role in reporting (Namin 2009; Fick 2009). Trebbe (2009) lists the main processes that lead to a negative picture of the migrant in the German media: overrepresentation (for example, in reports on social problems or crime, and in reports on “undesired” ethnic communities), marginalization (minority members are not protagonists of media reports and they do not get a say), stereotyping (Italians and the mafia, Turks as kebab vendors, the relations of men and women in the Turkish family). and framing (Islam as a threat) (2009: 79-93). Trebbe’s analysis of the representations of the Turkish minority in TV-programs points to a double marginalization: “in the sense of a discrepancy between a ‘TV-world’ and their ‘real everyday world’ and in the sense of insufficient representation by means of political and social spokespersons in the mass-mediated public” (2009: 242, translation from German by the author).

Ruhrmann and Sommer (2005) summarize the last twenty years of media representations of migrants and conclude that the mass media

by no means – as is often presumed – simply reflect the reality of migrants in Germany or the world as it really is. Instead, the media select certain events, accentuate and valorize them according to formal and content criteria. (2005: 127, translation from German by the author)

In journalistic practice, this means that the media prefer negative reporting, and that reporting on migrants, especially in conflict situations and crises, can strengthen prejudice. The authors show, for example, how reporting on crime rates among the migrants doubled in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century. They also emphasize the passive role of migrants in the media, “which underscores their lack of political influence” (2005: 127, translation from German by the author).

Researching the representations of ethnic minorities in Switzerland and Germany, Bonfadelli (2007) also points to a marginalization of minority protagonists, rare and negative reporting, and the representation of foreigners as passive rather than active subjects in everyday situations, while also documenting stereotypical representation, mostly concerning Islam.

Ruhrmann, Sommer and Uhlemann (2006) deal with the changed political context after the attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 and the influence on the negative attitudes in reports on migrants, posing the question of how far the frame of the war on terrorism has been transferred to the picture of Muslim immigrants in Germany. These authors also document a thematic shift from “classical” migration topics to sensationalism, terrorism, and crime.

A study by the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR) in 2004, on the other hand, found that migration topics were not limited to problem areas in TV programs. The topic of “integration” was most present in the daily regional programs, and for the authors of the study “this result is especially important knowing that these [...] are among the most watched programs of the WDR” and thus thematically nearest to the everyday lives of the audience in the region (Krüger and Simon 2005: 113, translation from German by the author).

In line with a view of media effects as being the result of certain conscious changes in media content, underlining the bulk of considerations of media policies in Germany, individual studies have also undertaken the task of measuring the effects of media reporting on migrants and the majority. Several authors have assessed the effects of negative reporting and the spreading of stereotypes as leading to discriminatory practices and segregation. For example, Ruhrmann and Sommer (2005) discern two main areas of prejudice in the reporting on migrants: firstly, migrants are shown as different, as not belonging, if their origins lie in non-West European cultures. Secondly, they are often valued negatively, both in their political activity and in their behavior in the labor market, so that “prejudice represented through decades of reporting can lead to migrants being discriminated against in their everyday lives and at work” (2005: 124, translation from German by the author).

For Ruhrmann (2009), reporting on migrants even influences the picture migrants have of themselves and their own position in the German society. Especially if negative, “migrants feel that their relationship with the majority society is damaged and count with reprisals due to negative reporting” (2009: 8, translation from German by the author). Geissler and Weber-Menges (2009) report that Turkish respondents in particular, strongly criticized the German mass media, whereas the German resettlers of Russian origins felt an assimilative pressure through media content, with both groups feeling that “a stronger participation of migrants in media production was an important demand for stopping the dominance of negative pictures in the media representations of migrants” (2009: 42, translation from German by the author). One WDR study from 2006, which analyzed the reception of television programs among

young people of Turkish origins, showed that in the conditions of a changed social climate, the respondents more strongly connected with the Turkish culture, although almost all of the respondents were born in Germany. They objected to both the factual and the fiction television programs as reproducing stereotypes and clichés about Turks, which in turn led to a “defiantly proud attitude about their identity, signaling a distance from the German society: ‘I am a Turk’” (Hammeran 2006: 4, translation from German by the author).

Another area of research, studies of media usage patterns, also premises a certain media functionality in social processes, with the primary goal being to gain a comprehensive insight into the media consumption behavior of immigrants and their descendants. Regardless of the results of the studies, several aspects are visible in the method, firstly that even second and third generation migrants are treated as a group separate from the majority, as seen in the implicit expectation that their media usage is different from that of the majority. Another drawback of such studies, as cited by several authors, is that they treat migrants as a homogenous group, not sufficiently differentiating according to origins or to socio-economic criteria. Moreover, there is an implicit problematization of the transnational media consumption of immigrants, with the unspoken question being that if there is a “media parallel society” in Germany, then how can this pattern be broken?

The first comprehensive study on the federal level was conducted by the two German public service broadcasters, the ARD and the ZDF, in 2007. It surveyed five ethnic communities (former USSR, Turkey, Poland, former Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece) and explicitly set itself the goal of looking at the differences between migrants and Germans in terms of media usage, that is, of finding out if there is indeed a “parallel society” in terms of media consumption. The main conclusion of the study was that a migration background does not mean that the respondents live in a mediatic parallel universe, but that they primarily use media offerings in German, combined with those in the languages of origin. The study concluded that it is the combination of the two, and not a complete assimilation of the German media culture, that characterizes the lived reality of the largest part of the audience with migrant origins (ZDF 2007). The follow-up study “Migrants and the media,” conducted in 2011, confirmed that, as with the majority audience, television continues to be the most important medium for the minorities who also consume TV-shows from the countries of origin on a daily basis. The study concluded that factors of age, educational level, and social context are at least as important as ethnic origins in terms of media usage (ARD and ZDF 2011).

One of the notable aspects of these studies is the treatment of foreign language media consumption as a big unknown – both in terms of the mother-tongue programs in Germany and satellite or Internet-broadcast programs from the countries of origin. Zöllner (2008), for example, studies ethnic media in Germany and asks what tasks these media must fulfill, what integration goals they follow, and what the consequences are for intercultural communication. In a part of the research on mother-tongue media consumption, there is an undercurrent of worry that transnational or multilingual media usage could potentially lead to social segregation or insufficient social belonging, or even subvert the dominant media messages. A withdrawal to a niche outside of the influence of the mass media message is implied, which goes counter to the goal of social cohesion. The ARD/ZDF surveys indeed showed that media in the language of origins contributed to identity formation, with most respondents claiming the media were used in family contexts and the usage was more emotionally marked.

Moser (2007) focuses on the influence of media on the concepts of identity and the move towards hybrid identities, as well as the question of what that means for people with migration biographies. He points to a changed context of migration in advanced globalization and asks for diasporas to be understood as imaginary groups upheld also through media communication. This in turn means that the “ideology of quick integration” cannot be the response to the complex migrations of the present. Bonfadelli also writes about a “globalized community of young migrant media users” (2009: 63, translation from German by the author) and demonstrates multifarious influences of the media on migrants at the intersection between integration, links to the diaspora communities, and the demands for those two cultures to connect. He also introduces the concept of hybrid identity into the search for new perspectives of integration, a concept that

integrates “here” and “there” in the construction of identities, [...] that accepts that integration is not a process of a fundamental identity change, [...] and unlike conservative approaches, needs to be interpreted as a positive resource of positions and attitudes in the multicultural society. (2009: 64, translation from German by the author)

In conclusion, it can be said that public policies on media in Germany are based on the idea that difference is an object of governance in the culturally diverse society. Furthermore, the media are explicitly called upon by the political institutions to actively take part in this governance of difference. In the German language discussion, the media are seen as tools that

can contribute to social cohesion: this functions through helping the migrants' integration into the society by offering them information, by putting protagonists onto the screen that migrants can relate to, and by offering role-models and models of successful co-existence to the audience. On the other hand, models that reject discrimination and celebrate the contributions of migrants to society are often presented as the mainstream – which seems to imply that the German majority needs to be led to an acceptance of the diverse society and that this passage needs to be facilitated by positive media pictures.

In conclusion, on the level of the official politics, the media are considered to be actors of social transformation that must work towards the goal of social cohesion through integration. They are called upon by the institutions to accept this role and act upon what is presented as their social responsibility. The implicit assumption is that there is a cause-and-consequence relation between media texts and social effects. On the other hand, the media develop new imaginaries that they project to the audience. In the following analysis, I will attempt to show specific media offerings, what kind of régimes of truth are articulated through these, and how they correlate with the public policies. The analysis will concentrate on selected cases in order to examine the questions of power implicit in these discourses, particularly in how they work on subject and object positionings.

Media representations carry assumptions about social relationships, so that every text makes implicit factual claims, offering “a mediated version of an already textualized and ‘discursivized’ socioideological world” (Shohat and Stam 1994: 179-180), with all the subjects of the discourse immersed in historical and sociological contexts. Viewing media artifacts not as neutral windows on reality, but as representations, does not, however, mean that they have no real effects, but rather that “truth” in the media should not be searched for through questions of their realism, but those of representation and dissemination (1994: 179).

Here, the question arises concerning the ways in which media texts participate in the construction of cultural identities, in creating the sense of belonging to a national community, in leading to “preferred readings” (Hall [1973] 2007), and in establishing the picture of the national and cultural Other. In short, the analysis will look at how the media participate in the creation of the national fantasy, and what kind of a national fantasy it is.

The analysis will attempt to show how the régimes of truth about citizenship as created by the media go hand in hand with the adjustment in public policies concerning Germany as a society of many cultures. In particular, the analysis is concerned with those media narratives that left

behind the concept of multiculturalism and adopted concepts such as cosmopolitanism or unity in diversity as key concepts in the discourse on German citizenship. Some of the principal questions will be: How do the media interpret these public policies concerning cultural difference? What effects do these policies and their mediatic representations exercise on the relations of power in the society? How do the media operate in terms of normalization – how do they establish the mainstream, the norm, and belonging? What feelings are mobilized in media representations? In short, the analysis will concentrate on the question of how media discourse, through its practices of categorizing and prioritizing, as well as the way topics are dealt with, functions in the relations of social power in the culturally diverse society, that is, what its effect on the categories defined by cultural difference are.

### Part III

This part of the thesis concentrates on the concepts of “difference” and the cultural politics of difference, through a case study of a radio station dedicated to cultural diversity in Germany.

The radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa<sup>34</sup> was established in 1999 by the biggest German public service broadcaster, the Westdeutscher Rundfunk. It was brought to life with the idea of reflecting and addressing multicultural living in the German *Land* of North-Rhine Westphalia. Since its establishment, it has undergone several deep-reaching changes in the definition of its goals and purpose. In these, I see articulations of larger political changes concerning questions of “difference” and “identity” in Germany, while they also point me to changing fantasies underlying the conceptions of how citizenship in the new, culturally diverse Germany is to be embodied.

The self-definition and self-image of the station, as well as the content and the target audience – or the ways the radio makers define it – have changed in the course of the two decades since the station’s establishment. Considering that at the moment of writing, WDR Funkhaus Europa is the only public service station in Germany that is explicitly dedicated to cultural diversity, it is a suitable case for analysis as an ensemble of considerations on the politics of diversity in general as well as on the operation of the media within the discourse of ethnic and cultural diversity in the country. And it is precisely due to the fact that the station has addressed a comparably small fragment of the overall audience outside the media mainstream, that the very way it approaches the plurality of ethnic origins in the country says something about the dominant narrative of nation and citizenship. In other words, being a special interest station with a narrowly focused mission, makes it particularly interesting for this analysis, since it is precisely such “projects then [that] frequently mirror the dominant ethnic project” (Smaill 2002: 394).

In this light, I examine how the transformation of the self-understanding of the station, especially its move from multiculturalism towards cosmopolitanism, reflects the changes in the imaginaries around the concepts of cultural diversity – both the imaginary of the nation

---

<sup>34</sup> On January 1st, 2017, the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa changed its name to WDR Cosmo. The material analyzed for this paper, however, all stems from before the name change, and therefore I will refer to the station as Funkhaus Europa.

and the imaginary of Germany as a place of many cultures, and how these relate to the articulations of such imaginaries on the European level. In particular, I also look for the emotions involved in these changing imaginaries, both in the emotions projected onto the radio audience and the emotions of the radio makers involved.

I draw on the work of Ann-Marie Fortier and other authors concerning the role of emotions, especially pride and a “good feeling” in establishing the multicultural as an apolitical discourse within the nation. I see this station, as all media, as a technology of citizenship, one that addresses a defined audience segment, which at the same time, it produces as a body of subject-citizens. I look at the ways the audience is produced as clues to the expectations imposed on subject-citizens concerning the ways they are expected to embody citizenship within the context of the management of diversity in the country. My reading of the radio transformations does not, however, aim at finding some “master plan” guiding the changes of media policies or the management of diversity in general in the country. Rather, I am interested in how various actors in the discourse – the media makers, the management of the broadcaster, the policy makers, and the audience addressed (and among them particularly the minoritized subjects) – experience the feelings and opinions that are sent through radio waves of this particular station concerning their citizenship, or as Gail Lewis puts it, “I am suggesting, [...] that there is a whole range of experiences, feelings, and opinions that policy frameworks simultaneously produce and occlude for those who are positioned as ‘immigrant’” (2005: 538).

I undertake ethnographic work in three large sites that relate to the radio station. In Chapter 5, I look for the transformations of the brand definition of this station – as articulated in the media policy documents, in the advertising for the station, on its Web page, and in official interviews and correspondence around the station. In Chapter 6, I analyze six interviews with media makers, conducted during the period of the latest brand change from multiculturalism to cosmopolitanism. Here, I look for the emotional effects these changes have on the media makers, especially on those who are not ethnic Germans. I look at how the changes and the work in the radio affect how they feel about belonging or not belonging to the society and to the media mainstream. And finally, in Chapter 7 I analyze the elaboration of the ideal-type audience of WDR Funkhaus Europa at the time. I look at the ideal-type listener of the station as an expression of desired citizenship spawning from a certain national fantasy, a fantasy of the “good life” in the ethnically and culturally diverse Germany.

## Chapter 5

### Funkhaus Europa – transformations of a radio brand

#### 5.1. Introduction

We are *the* international radio station in Germany. We have a unique mix of global pop and voices from the whole world. We deliver the soundtrack of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. We are Global Sounds Radio:

the Web page of the German public radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa promises those who decide to tune in all this and no less than “the best sounds of the world” (translation from German by the author.)<sup>35</sup>

Funkhaus Europa (later broadcasting under the name Cosmo) is one of the six radio stations produced by the largest German public service broadcaster, West German TV and radio – Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR). The radio station goes on air every morning at 6 o'clock from its studios in Cologne. Starting from the late afternoon it broadcasts programs in Turkish, Italian, the languages of former Yugoslavia, Polish, Russian, and Arabic, expanding by more languages during the weekend evenings. The daily German-language program presents a mix of music pieces from the dance halls and clubs around the world, including songs in languages not often heard in mainstream pop charts, otherwise dominated by English-language hits. Its German-language word content caters to a target audience recruited among “young cosmopolitans” and the “urban mixture” of the German multicultural society, according to the station’s policy documents. The term “multicultural” is, however, avoided both on air and in the written descriptions of the station. Instead, the station outlook is referred to as “cosmopolitan” and “international,” encompassing in this way both the immigrants’ migration experience and their diverse ethnic origins, as well as those of their descendants in Germany, and the interest in foreign cultures among the members of the majority population. These two are, however, not seen separately but addressed as a whole, a “unity-in-diversity” of a culturally mixed and internationally mobile young portion of the German society.

---

<sup>35</sup> [http://www1.wdr.de/radio/funkhauseuropa/ueber-uns/ueber\\_uns100.html](http://www1.wdr.de/radio/funkhauseuropa/ueber-uns/ueber_uns100.html), accessed 1 May 2016, translation from German by the author

## 5.2 Funkhaus Europa – Integration radio

Since the early 1960s, information bulletins in languages of the largest immigrant communities of the time – Turkish, the languages of former Yugoslavia, Italian, Spanish, Greek, and so on – were aired by various German public service broadcasters, among them the WDR. In 1999, Funkhaus Europa was established by uniting all the foreign language shows and adding to them a German language newsroom, thus creating a 24-hour daily station with its own frequency.

At the time of its establishment, WDR Funkhaus Europa was endowed with the mission to be the “integration radio” of the largest German *Land*, North-Rhine-Westphalia, and the *Land* of Bremen, where it cooperated with its partner radio station, Radio Bremen.<sup>36</sup> Its explicit task was spelled out as being an “integrative offer for listeners of foreign origin and interested Germans living in North Rhine-Westphalia” (translation from German by the author).<sup>37</sup> At the time, it was broadcasting in 15 languages and German as the *lingua franca* of all, leaving behind the “ethnic” label of the individual foreign-language stations, to become a “multicultural” or “integration” station.

The spread of new media technologies, such as satellite television and the Internet, gradually led to considerations concerning the need for continuing the production of foreign-language programs as pure vehicles of information for migrant communities. In Funkhaus Europa discussions, the emphasis of the program content gradually moved to the existing multicultural life in Germany – including the realities of second and third generations of people with immigrant origins, and the new hybrid and mixed identities. In a further metamorphosis, the station then accentuated its “internationality,” “urban mix,” and “cosmopolitanism,” with the focus on the cheerful internationally mixed society. The station today explicitly addresses not only the descendants of immigrants but also the German majority, or at least that part of it that has international experiences and interests.

Within only a few years, the station thus moved from the task of integrating migrants, through depicting the existing multicultural realities, to addressing young, urban cosmopolitans, regardless of their ethnic origins, and specifically including the German majority into the

---

<sup>36</sup> Starting from January 2009, Funkhaus Europa was also awarded the frequency of Radio Multikulti, a station also dedicated to diversity that broadcast from Berlin from 1994 to 2008, when it was closed down.

<sup>37</sup> [http://www.ard.de/home/intern/fakten/abc-der-ard/Funkhaus\\_Europa/458652/index.html](http://www.ard.de/home/intern/fakten/abc-der-ard/Funkhaus_Europa/458652/index.html), accessed 1 May 2016

social mix it catered to. By addressing changing subject positions – from the migrant in need of information and positioned outside the media mainstream, through to the modern young cosmopolitan – the station makes decisions that concern the nature of citizenship and national identity. As such, it also functions as a political technology, in the sense discussed in Chapter 1, in which it was shown how the public service media provide spaces for the articulation of “ideas of collective identity” (Nolan 2006: 227).

Michel Foucault characterizes technologies of the self as “ways in which human beings come to understand and act upon themselves within certain regimes of authority and knowledge, and by means of certain techniques directed to self-improvement” (1980: 90). These technologies of the self encompass claims of self-knowledge and the exercise of power that is self-directed. Barbara Cruikshank addresses the question of how modern liberal democracies produce the “citizen-subject” through “technologies of citizenship” by leading them to self-government. She points out how “individual subjects are transformed into citizens by [...] technologies of citizenship: discourses, programmes and other tactics aimed at making individuals [...] capable of self-government” (1999: 1) through the multitude of learned and habitual ways that citizenship is embodied (1999: 124). In other words, the “citizen-subject” is “an effect and an instrument of political power” (1999: 5), both a product of domination and subjection, of agency and subjectivity. To paraphrase Foucault, the subjects are “conducted to conduct” themselves, so that technologies of citizenship “however well intentioned, [are] modes of constituting and regulating citizens: that is, strategies for governing the very subjects whose problems they seek to redress” (Cruikshank 1999: 2). Or put differently, power produces that which it seems to act upon, for example immigrants.

So, how can the repositioning of the station Funkhaus Europa be read in terms of the changing ways in which citizenship is to be embodied in the context of Germany? How do these relate to the contestations of identity and difference, of the nation and belonging? Through which politics did these changes emerge and what and whose interests are served by them? Whereas technologies of citizenship are often perceived as private and not connected to the realm of the political, in reality, they present a mode of regulation of citizens, such as, for example, when claims are made on the individuals in the name of personal wellbeing or, in the case of multicultural societies, of integration. Encouragement for the citizens to govern themselves (through self-regulation) often means encouragement for them to actively work on their own functioning within the diverse democratic structures, by becoming “happy, active and participatory” citizen-subjects (Cruikshank 1999: 101). Looking at a media broadcast as more

than a technology of production and consumption of content, means that audiences often adopt certain technologies of the self that on the one hand respond to and on the other provoke certain media tactics (Flew 1995: 50, quoted in Nolan and Radywyl 2004: 45), for example, the encouragement of the audience to participate in managing diversity in a desired way. In this chapter, I show how the radio station Funkhaus Europa has taken up and represented the changing nature of the concepts of diversity and cosmopolitanism in Germany, and how it has contributed to shaping this change. In other words, I ask in what kind of dialogue the politics of cultural difference and this radio station are.

The analysis will sketch the varying pictures of the nation, through the ways acceptable and desirable kinds of multicultural mixing are imagined and conveyed through this radio station. Here I find it especially interesting to address the question of what it means when a radio station dedicated to diversity – as a very small but focused resonance box – rejects the concept of multiculturalism, insisting instead on cosmopolitanism. What does the centrality of the concept of “unity-in-diversity” (on the national and the European level), that I show to lie underneath this move, mean for the political salience of difference? Is it a concept that leads to social equality in a diverse society or one that enables a de-politicization and exclusion of subjects from a political discourse, akin to what Ghassan Hage refers to as “multiculturalism without migrants” (1997)? In short, I ask what imaginary of the nation and diversity the radio station offers, as well as the ways citizenship is to be embodied in a diverse society, and what politics this supports.

### **5.3 Change of paradigm - from an ethnic to a cosmopolitan radio station**

The WDR Funkhaus Europa radio station has repositioned, or attempted to reposition, itself in the media landscape on several levels, the first being the insistence on larger inclusiveness. In the practical editorial work this initially meant that all items that were to go on air were examined through the question of whether they would potentially interest listeners regardless of their ethnicity instead of catering only to one group, while excluding others. Another level was the gradual transformation of the music program, from a focus on “world music,” through to the concept of “world-wide music,” and later, “global pop” labels. Earlier traditional music and chart hits from around the world were replaced by a focus on urban sounds and music resulting from stylistic mixing. On a third level, the German language content no longer caters to the interests of individual ethnic communities. This is partly due to the demographic

development, with the community association representatives being no longer wholly representative of either the younger generations of migrants or the descendants of the first generation of migrants. It is also partly a consequence of program planning and the expressed desire not to exclude parts of the audience by focusing on topics that could appear too narrow.

Furthermore, the position of the foreign-language programs, which have to a much larger extent retained their connection to the interests and demands of their specific audiences, has been a point of contestation through several program scheme changes. For example, in the program grid reform that took effect in 2013, the weekend bilingual Turkish/German and Italian/German programs were cancelled. In a further reform in 2016, all the foreign language programs were shortened to half-hour shows and moved to a time slot beginning at 8 p.m., arguably colliding with primetime television. Also, they were aired online-first, which made them more available to audiences, but also made live broadcasting and interaction with the audience impossible.

Such decisions led to protests by foreign-language journalists working for the station as well as by migrant associations. A general sentiment was discernible in these debates, one that the foreign language programs, that were the reason for the establishment of WDR Funkhaus Europa in the first place, were now seen as an obstacle to higher audience ratings. At the same time, a high audience response to the announced changes, including protests from migrant associations, was taken as proof that these programs still had a faithful audience, not necessarily identical to the audience of the German language program. In general, the atmosphere in the radio station was one of division: the German language newsroom saw their foreign-language colleagues making a more old-fashioned program, dedicated to community topics and addressing an older generation than the desired modern urban mix, and the latter saw the former as lacking in real content and attempting to squeeze the foreign languages out.

Finally, these paradigm changes can be seen in the choice of personnel for the station and the requirements they need to fulfill. For example, former station director Thomas, in an interview in 2012, stressed that the radio makers needed to have an “origin that can be heard.” This could be fulfilled by a foreign name, a foreign language greeting spoken on air, or someone having another worldview, “completely different from the German mainstream.”<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> Interview, 3 Sept. 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author. A more elaborate analysis of this and other interviews with the Funkhaus Europa radio makers is the subject of Chapter 6.

In the early days of the station, journalists of foreign origins, many of them migrants themselves, were on the air both on the foreign and the German language programs, which often meant hearing foreign accents or less than perfect German on air. This somewhat changed with the move of the station brand towards cosmopolitanism. The new German society, as will be shown through an analysis of the station documents, was seen as ethnically and culturally mixed, with hybrid identities characterizing the second and third generations of immigrant descendants. In a practical sense, this meant that it was not necessary for the radio makers to know the language of their parents or that their German sounded as if it was native – it was important that their cosmopolitanism or openness to the world was visible through *what*, not *how* they said it.

As will be discernible from an analysis of interviews with the radio makers in Chapter 6, several journalists working for WDR Funkhaus Europa described this as a loss of their journalistic voice. While the journalists of diverse ethnic origins working for the station at the time of its establishment felt it gave them a voice and a space in the German media regardless of their “foreignness,” they saw the step towards cosmopolitanism and hybridity as “smoothing out difference” and felt they were being “squeezed out again.” Interestingly, a further reform in 2016 again described foreign accents as welcome in the on-the-air content, as a recognizable auditive sign of diversity.

All these transformations – as articulated in the radio station documents, marketing material, special projects, and also as witnessed in the everyday work of the editorial team – offer insight into the changing nature of the politics of cultural difference in Germany, especially the changes in the management of difference in the public sphere. At the same time, the way that the station has positioned itself shows how it has been attempting to create its own audience, and how it has been working on the identity formation of the ideal new German citizen.

WDR Funkhaus Europa started from the position of an “ethnic radio station,” one whose concern was to help the emancipation of minorities by facilitating their integration and removing discrimination against them in media content. This often meant simply representing their realities or making them protagonists of on-air content. Seen from another perspective, in this, the station accepted the problematization of diversity and difference as outside the social norm and worked within that framework with clear political aims of emancipation. Through its metamorphosis, it started creating its own audience, “citizen-subjects” who live in a world that

imagines itself as having overcome the problems of the past. In the new narrative, the mixing and diversity, is the norm – at least as far as this radio station is concerned. Institutional barriers, structural inequalities, and manifestations of racism are left out of this picture and the political intent is largely cancelled. In this new “cosmopolitan normality,” there is no need for emancipation of the minoritized subject – the aim is rather to present this picture as social normality of modern life in Germany.

A diversity of commodified ethnicities is celebrated as something that can be consumed, as Ann-Marie Fortier (2005) analyzes in her study of the public manifestations of happy multiculturalism in Great Britain in the early 2000s, and which was elaborated on in more detail in Chapter 2. Especially in the media, she notes a highly emotionalized debate, abounding with public declarations of pride in British citizenship. In it, Fortier detects a new imaginary of Britain as a nation “enriched” and “strengthened” by its diversity (2005: 560), reimagined as a nation defined by a “common hybridity,” as a product of a mixing of cultures. The border of cultural difference is felt, however, not as a threat of the dangerous proximity of difference, but in a pleasurable, happy way – diversity can be consumed and celebrated even without the physical presence of migrants themselves. In this way, the exhibitions of national diversity in the media, which show it as “no longer a source of concern or shame, but rather of pride” (2005: 560), in Fortier’s view actually serve to strengthen the national hegemony and self-love.

In other words, robbing the discourse of diversity of its political substance and establishing it as a matter of aesthetics, of celebration and emotion, permits the return of national self-love as played out in the picture of “unity-in-diversity,” which in turn fails to disturb the existing distribution of social positions of those who are and those who are not permitted into the nation. Furthermore, the *status quo* sets in not only on the cultural level but also on the level of class, since the appreciation of desirable diversity is a domain of the educated cosmopolitan, not the working-class (even if the actual physical vicinity and contact of different ethnicities is more probable).

#### **5.4 The *Roots* project**

At the time when Funkhaus Europa was still branded an “integration radio,” it positioned itself as an actor within the German media landscape that worked on the emancipation of

minoritized subjects, including bringing the minorities into the media discourse. One example of this positioning was the project *Roots*, which the radio station started in 2006. In the context of the project around one hundred secondary school students were invited to research their family histories and write them down. All the students were migrants to Germany or children of migrants, and all were students of the so-called *Hauptschule*, a secondary school type that prepares students with average or below-average grades for vocational training.

Upon the successful closure of the project, the TV-report *Roots – the story of your family* (*Roots – Die Geschichte deiner Familie*)<sup>39</sup> was broadcast. In the program report, Jona, director of Funkhaus Europa at the time, describes the project as follows: “We were consciously looking for people at the *Hauptschule*, which is usually mentioned in the context of problems, language problems, ‘no future’ and so on. However, those are young people with potential, and their identity, their origin is part of it” (translation from German by the author). At another point, Jona says,

When we are talking about immigration and integration, it is important to understand these as chances as well. One chance is to realize what potential these people that come to us have, and this holds true for their children and grandchildren as well. *Roots* is great, because we say to them: what you bring with you is great, your languages, your culture, what created your roots, and that is for all of us a very important contribution, for our society, for the future of our society. (translation from German by the author)

Yildiz, one of the initiators of the program and editor at Funkhaus Europa, stresses the emancipatory effect of looking into one’s past:

The moment I ask where I come from, where my parents and grandparents came from, I learn something about myself, about history. It is a new self-assurance when you know that your parents and grandparents have done something important. They migrated, they moved in order to lead a different, better life; they were far-sighted. These are not only sad stories, they are also nice stories. (translation from German by the author)

---

<sup>39</sup> *Roots: Die Geschichte deiner Familie*. Ravi Karmalkar, WDR, 2007. DVD.

Armin Laschet, at the time regional integration minister and patron of the project, also stresses the “self-awareness” that this immersion into the “roots,” as “a completely new idea,” brings.




Fig. 1 - *Roots – The story of your family / Roots – Die Geschichte deiner Familie*, Funkhaus Europa project, 2006

In all statements, the emancipatory motif is implied. The participants of the project were deliberately chosen from the *Hauptschule* – the branch of the German secondary school system with the lowest educational levels and often considered the natural gravitation point for the children of migrants. There are several premises that seem to inform this approach: young migrants are to be found in the *Hauptschule* rather than in the higher school forms of *Realschule* or *Gymnasium*, since they are bound to come from families with non-academic backgrounds. The teenagers in question involved in the program suffered from low self-esteem and had a low esteem of their ancestors.

The presupposed low esteem for themselves and their ancestors seems to imply their (self-) positioning on the periphery of society, their deviance from the norm, their “Otherness,” and

their place on the lower positions of social power, due also to their low educational status. The interesting aspect is not so much that they were in this situation, but that this self-positioning was taken as a given; it was not a question but a premise that they saw themselves on the low end of the social scale, outside of the norm. Interestingly, however, none of the participants in the project appear in the television report – they were not asked their opinion about it or how they defined their own identity. However, since the teenagers in question were regarded as suffering from lack of clarity in regard to their identity, speaking about the history that brought about their personal situation, that of the migration of their parents or themselves, was understood as having an emancipatory impact. It helped define their identity, in which being a descendent of migrants is not negative any more but a product of a sage decision by their parents who were “far-sighted.”

The discourse of “enrichment” permeates the attitude of the speakers in the TV program: Yildiz, herself a daughter of Turkish immigrants, takes a semantical position on the side of the students and speaks about “my story,” “my history,” “self-confidence,” and brings the decision to emigrate to the affective level (“your parents and grand-parents did something important,” “they were far-sighted”). Jona speaks of “us” and “them” (“our society,” “you bring your culture to our society,” “they have potential”), and in terms of a cost-benefit analysis (“that is for all of us an important contribution, for our society”). This attitude towards immigration and cultural diversity in the country is very clearly positive, it leads to pro-active promotion of the presence of “diverse” protagonists in the media discourse. It also sees diversity as “enrichment” of the host society – as “potential” or an “important contribution.” The past of every migrant defines the present of that person’s position as a member of the minority, but this admission of pre-acculturation can be turned – through an emancipatory impulse – into a source of pride and personal strength. Whereas the position that sees immigration and the resulting diversity as enriching is generally part of the liberal political attitude towards migration, the critical point about it is that it rests on a hierarchy of majoritized and minoritized cultures and subjects. As has already been mentioned, Ghassan Hage sees the discourse of enrichment not only as placing the majority culture in the position of the dominant culture but assigns it a different quality from the migrant cultures, whose value is not intrinsic but lies in their ability to enrich (2000: 121). In the context of the *Roots* project, the enrichment can only take place if (young/infantile) migrants start to fulfill their potential, so whereas the enrichment through diversity is not as yet realized, it is the emancipatory goal, shared both by those who feel “inside” the migration story, such as Yildiz, and those seeing its potential from the “outside.”

### 5.5 Funkhaus Europa 2007 – Unity in diversity

The further evolution of Funkhaus Europa at the time, from an explicitly integrative, emancipatory radio station, towards a station more oriented to celebrating existing diversity, stemmed directly from this discourse of diversity as “enriching” a society, as giving it “added value.” While retaining its explicitly positive stance towards migration, the station at the time moved away from directly addressing minorities and being their political mouthpiece, and approached the narrative of “unity in diversity” in the social picture of modern Germany. In this, it emphasized the affective content, concentrating on transporting the “good emotions” resulting from mixing and hybridity to its audience.

A television program celebrating Funkhaus Europa<sup>40</sup> retells the story of the station, describing it as the “integration radio for the people of North Rhine-Westphalia, Bremen and Lower Saxony, who now originate from the whole world,” stressing that the station “grasps the development of the population as an opportunity” (translation from German by the author). The report shows the daily work of the editorial team and in the studios, journalists recording their material in the city, listeners saying what they think about Funkhaus Europa.

In the program, the team is shown as something resembling a group of friends, in almost family-like situations, embracing each other, discussing passionately, laughing a lot. The team is shown as very diverse in its ethnic origins – Italians, Greeks, Turks, and Germans are shown as part of this newsroom. Their relationships are shown to be those of friendship rather than as professional relationships – they are emotional, even physical in their dealings with each other. The diversity of the crew is stressed as central not only to the work, but also to the atmosphere, which is characterized by actions considered in Germany to be “Southern”: emotionality, physical contact in communication, loud speaking, passionate discussion, loud laughing.

The brand claim of the radio station at the time of filming was “Without borders” (*Grenzenlos*), which was later replaced with “Global Sounds Radio.” Jona, who was station director at the time, stresses in the TV-report that

the fact that people are on-air here with a light accent, where one is aware that

---

<sup>40</sup> *5 Jahre Funkhaus Europa*. Ravi Karmalkar, WDR, 2007. DVD.

this person is of another origin, this leads to an especially high authenticity with our audience. If you want to put it in journalistic terms, it often brings another point-of-view into the reporting. Sometimes we do it differently on purpose and send a Turkish reporter into a Croatian pub or a German reporter into a Turkish coffee house, because when you are not so near the culture, you notice new and different things. (translation from German by the author)



Fig. 2 – *10 Years Boundless Radio – 10 Jahre grenzenlos Radio* – Funkhaus Europa brochure 2009

The cultural difference, the diversity, the multitude of voices and points of view is stressed as an asset, as added value, differentiating WDR Funkhaus Europa from the mainstream reporting.

But, what does it mean when diversity is established as “added value,” as more than the sum of the parts that make it up? How does diversity become an ideal cultural surplus? I see this

frame of cultural diversity as added value as tapping into the discourse on “European added value.” Starting from the field of macroeconomic policies, European added value was born from the idea that a networking of European economies would further the economic well-being of all members, being “the value resulting from an EU intervention which is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by member states alone” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2013: 6).

The concept translated into the area of culture, a development similar to the one within national borders, when the idea of diversity as a factor that can contribute to economic enrichment and demographic development moves to the field of celebrating cultural and social unity in diversity. On the level of European unification, there are numerous evocations of “common values,” a “common cultural heritage,” and a common feeling of “Europeanness” beyond the national roots in the EU documents and policy papers. The European culture as a surplus is presented as more than the sum of European national parts, where differences between the nation states are not erased, but elevated into a value in themselves, making Europe culturally desirable.

The European “culture of cultures” is also a political project, similar to nation building. It involves imagining European culture as “surplus value” that cannot be broken down into its constitutive parts but must be grasped as an abstract “more” that makes Europe such a special place. “The message now conveyed in European Union reports and policy statements is that ‘we’ Europeans, with our shared historical roots and common heritage, belong to the unified ‘European culture area’” (Shore 2001: 114). However, as Shore points out, conceived this way, the concept does less to celebrate the existing difference or multicultural society and more to promote the idea of Europe’s overreaching unity, invariably also comprising the marginalization and exclusion of “those ‘non-European’ peoples and cultures that fall outside the European Union’s somewhat selective and essentialist conception of Europe’s cultural heritage” (2001: 117). Since identity-building also functions through how one is different from others, forging a common European identity, within a diverse, but externally closed cultural picture, it cannot avoid the dualism of “us” and those outside it.

Cultural “added value,” or surplus through diversity, is essential to WDR Funkhaus Europa’s picture of its audience and its place in society. In the report on Funkhaus Europa the narrator stresses that the radio is successful, since every fifth migrant in North Rhine-Westphalia listens to it. This is followed by a sequence of a taxi-driver saying, “The reporting shows the

conflicts in the multicultural society too, but also how pleasing and exciting the contact of cultures can be.” The narrator concludes that, “From the taxi-driver to the PhD-student, Funkhaus Europa is heard by all classes and ethnicities” (translation from German by the author). A short survey-sequence with people of different origins follows, saying what they like about the program, most of them stressing the “good feeling” it gives them.

The affective side of multiculturalism is also stressed in the reporting on music, the aspect most easily consumed via radio waves. Two video commercials from the time illustrate this, the first one shown in movie theater previews.<sup>41</sup> The commercial focuses on a bi-national couple of presenters (blond young woman, young man of Turkish origins) dancing, followed by sequences of people of various origins, skin colors, and professions in their everyday situations in visually recognizable settings of the towns of Western Germany, also dancing to Funkhaus Europa music.



Fig. 3 – Scene from the Funkhaus Europa commercial, 2003

A further program presentation clip, produced several years later, also uses music, this time featuring members of the editorial team, presenters, and journalists lip-synching a pop hit and

<sup>41</sup> *Kinospot Funkhaus Europa*. WDR, 2003. DVD.

dancing around the building. In both clips, the song played is an English-language pop hit, so that English here turns from being the one linguistic signifier of cultural assimilation, into a unifier of diverse cultures. English can be lip-synched by all, unified in music and rhythm. The narrator says, “North Rhine-Westphalia – united in the groove, a dance, a party, no problem” (translation from German by the author).

The emotion, the “groove,” not only overcomes the lines dividing cultures, but it also bridges the class divide between the PhD student and the taxi-driver, the German and the migrant, in the happy multicultural mixture that makes the modern German (European) society so desirable. As Ann-Marie Fortier points out, the political discourses and public debates and representations of multiculturalism always “draw out the register of intimacy – the register of physical, cognitive, and emotional closeness” (2008: 8), making them about the management of physical, cultural, emotive proximities, about multicultural intimacies. These are, however, employed in citizenship-making, since the language of multiculturalism “is always filtered through an ethos of intimacy and closeness that prescribes for *everyone* [...] the criteria for responsible ‘caring’ citizenship which establish the limits of a ‘civil’ nation” (Fortier 2008: 8, emphasis in original). As Lauren Berlant maintains, the issues of multiculturalism become less about respect for identity and more about identification with a nation, making it a policy that “turns the nation into a privatized state of feeling” (Berlant 1997: 11). Multicultural politics become invested in cultivating feelings for the nation: in all of Europe, strategies for fostering social cohesion are about engineering modes of living together, using languages of intimacy, closeness, and feelings “as a panacea to social conflict” (Fortier 2008: 8). It is this “good feeling” of “no problem” of diversity that is the added value of a young, mixed, apolitical audience that Funkhaus Europa celebrates in its commercials.

## 5.6 Funkhaus Europa 2011 – Global Sounds Radio

Like the other stations of the WDR, Funkhaus Europa underwent a brand essence-finding process in 2011, with the purpose of re-positioning the station. A guiding frame of “Vicinity” (*Nähe*) acted as a unifying brand essence for all the WDR channels. From the larger considerations of repositioning for all the radio stations, an external agency derived the brand essence for Funkhaus Europa: Global Sounds Radio. As Thomas, the station director at the time, formulated,

In defining our present location we have tried to use and define as far as possible the development which we have been aiming towards for a while now, from the image of a supposed “foreigners’ radio” or a well-meant “integration radio” towards a modern radio program around concepts such as diversity, openness to the world, internationality and – in the best sense – multiculturalism. (translation from German by the author)<sup>42</sup>

Visible here is the negative connotation associated with a “foreigners’ radio” or “integration radio” and the ambivalence towards the concept of multiculturalism, which must be used “in the best sense,” or replaced. Elaborated on in more detail,

the concept of “Sounds” reflects here both the central role of our unmistakable music color, and the equally valuable significance of intercultural origins, languages, and all the atmosphere elements that make out a radio station. With our focus on the ‘global,’ we leave the old self-imposed limits of the migrant flows of the guest-worker-era or the political construct of “Europe” behind us. The world is growing together (not only Europe), the transformations of the future are global (not only European), immigrants from all the continents (not only the Mediterranean area) live in the new German society – and we are part and spearhead of this development. (translation from German by the author)<sup>43</sup>

The agency working out the brand essence for Funkhaus Europa listed the assets of the station, among them the “hearable origins” of the radio makers or the music diversity, as well as reporting with sensitivity and understanding on the topics. The agency also analyzed the deficits, among them the image of a multicultural radio station, which it rated as anachronistic, and proposed to aim for another, more urban, international, young, and cosmopolitan image. The resulting brand grid of the agency described the station as vibrant and passionate, enriching and stylish, near to its audience and a station that puts emotions in the center of media making. The brand-guide grid was then used by editors and management to check the station decisions during daily work, and a big print out of it hung for a while in the newsroom of WDR Funkhaus Europa. The new brand essence permeated the wording of Funkhaus Europa’s self-presentation, as expressed in its flyers and Web page, and the audio-packaging of the station. The jingles and trailers for the station now included phrases such as,

---

<sup>42</sup> E-Mail from Thomas to Funkhaus Europa staff, 06/06/2011.

<sup>43</sup> E-Mail from Thomas to Funkhaus Europa staff, 06/06/2011.

“We are you,” “We speak your languages,” “We put accents,” and “We are Global Pop.



Fig. 4 – *Global Sounds Radio* – Funkhaus Europa Brochure

On the Funkhaus Europa Web page, the new brand essence of Global Sounds Radio was also presented, broken down into several headings under the “Who we are section”:

### *Global Sounds Radio*

We are *the* cosmopolitan, international radio station in Germany. With our mixture of Global pop and voices from around the world, we are part of the cosmopolitan, urban feeling of life. We deliver the vibrant soundtrack of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### *We are you*

Some people talk about each other, some talk past each other. We talk to each other – because together we are really good. Funkhaus Europa is the Global Sounds Radio for people from almost 200 nations and ethnicities who live in North-Rhine Westphalia, Bremen, and Berlin. From Dortmund to Bremerhaven, from Lisbon to Kiev, from Mumbai to Buenos Aires: we offer a platform for global living and see Germany through the eyes of the world. As a mirror of

colorful society, we take a stance and stand by it.

*We are the world*

Some people never risk a peek over the garden fence, others like it national. Then there are those who want to cross all borders. We network these people open to the world, regardless of whether they come from Germany or someplace else – because Funkhaus Europa is a global homeland feeling with news, everyday life, and trends from the metropolises of the world. We offer service, background, and talk. Produced and presented by an international team with a hearable origin. This makes us multi-voiced and rich in perspectives. Whoever listens to us does not miss anything, and always knows the talk of the town.

*We are Global Pop*

Some love the homeland sounds, others only chart hits. The musical pulse of the world(s) beats in Funkhaus Europa – because we open horizons and make the world dance. Modern styles and urban experiments meet well-known genres and old traditions and mix into the Soundtrack 21. During the day with well-chosen Global Pop, at night and during the weekends with a unique offering for the curious and the advanced. We not only know the best artists in the world, we bring them to you live.

*We put accents*

Some like it German, others want to understand more. That is what Funkhaus Europa is there for – because we speak your language(s) and have fun with contrasts. During the day, we broadcast our world-moving program in German for all. In the evening and on the weekends, you receive a cosmopolitan feeling of life in 14 further languages, that otherwise no one can offer you: with the newest stories from the global village and the best music of the planet. We love the European idea and we are enthusiastically underway in the whole world. (translation from German by the author)<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup> Funkhaus Europa - Wir über uns, [http://www.funkhauseuropa.de/kontakt/ueber\\_uns.phtml](http://www.funkhauseuropa.de/kontakt/ueber_uns.phtml). Accessed 1 July 2012.

Several elements come to the fore when comparing the understanding of the role of WDR Funkhaus Europa as illustrated in its 2007 *Roots* project and the 2012 presentation of the station's Global Sounds Radio brand.




Fig. 5 – *The Sound of the World – Der Sound der Welt* – screenshot of the Funkhaus Europa web page

One is the treatment of German and foreign languages. In 2007 the languages of the immigrant communities were, in official terminology, referred to as “mother-tongues,” which was a deliberate way of avoiding the term “foreign.” As can be noticed in the quotes in the *Roots* report, there is still a divide between “us” and “them” when referring to the majority and the immigrant groups, even if “they” are seen as a source of “potential” (even if not yet realized), and a “chance,” in the context of “enrichment.”

In the new wording, the division between “us” and “them” is erased. However, any other reference to national belonging is blurred as well, with the accent on the all-encompassing “we” of cosmopolitan, international living, where no past, no origin is mentioned, since it is not seen as important. In this way, languages are neither foreign, nor mother-tongues, they are simply “your language(s),” stressing the character of the society as an ethnic mix, with the offspring of migrant generations already being “mixed” one step further, so that they are even

more than bilingual.

So, “we” is in no opposition to any group: “we” is “all,” the “vibrant” ethnic and cultural mix living in “metropolises” and “urban” areas, with cities stylized into sites where people embodying cultural diversity live side by side and this is seen as added value. These new Germans of mixed origins are dancing in clubs to international music, using the best of their parents’ origins, mixing among each other, speaking several languages.

The German language is mentioned twice in the self-presentation, once in a negative context (“Some like it German, others want to understand more”), and once in the role of the *lingua franca* of the new German ethnically mixed society (“During the day we broadcast our world-moving program in German for all”). German should somehow not be in the foreground; it is either equated to narrow-mindedness and provinciality of spirit, or simply understood as a useful tool that opens the door of a program “for all.”

The foreign-language program time slot started at 6 p.m. at the time of this reform. Continuing through the next few years, these programs were subject to program-policy debate around the question of whether descendants of migrants still needed these programs as a source of information. In the new wording, the programs are deliberately not linked to “communities,” a term that carries negative connotations of segregation in a scheme that insists on the all-encompassing unity, the cosmopolitan mix and creolization.

The implied critique that foreign-language programs are bad for audience ratings since they make the German speaking listeners turn to another station when programs in other languages start, was, in 2012, used as basis for a new weekend program schedule, which moved all the foreign-language programs from the afternoon to the evening. In the wording, however, this critique was circumvented so that these multilingual programs were described as bringing a “cosmopolitan feeling of life,” “stories from the global village,” and music styles encompassing the planet. In this brand presentation, it is not for community news that one chooses to tune into Funkhaus Europa, but for a “cosmopolitan feeling of life,” one in which one’s foreign origin is celebrated as the mainstream of the new German society.

Whereas in the earlier stages of foreign-language programming the aspect of connecting to the country of origin was accentuated, it is now erased: origin or homeland are not mentioned. Homeland (*Heimat*) appears in other contexts: as an equivalent of German provincialism (“Some love the homeland sounds”), or as being at home in the cities of the world, not tied to

the anachronistic concept of ethnic origin (“We network these people open to the world, regardless of whether they come from Germany or someplace else – because Funkhaus Europa is a global homeland feeling with news, everyday life, and the ‘scene’ from the metropolises of the world”). So, there is not the one homeland, with its anachronistic connotations of the past, roots, sentimentality, family structures, ties to one fixed geography. Instead of the connotations of limiting confines and pre-acculturation, “we” all are open, we are at home globally, in the world. We are mobile, not tied to a geographic point or one particular language; our society is mixed, international, hybrid, and we like it that way.

The concept of “diversity” is not even mentioned any more. The society is no longer seen as a sum of different constitutive elements, a site neither of contact of cultures, like in the previous view of Funkhaus Europa, nor of antagonism. Here, actors do not occupy power positions, do not struggle for dominance, or find themselves in the center or in the periphery. Instead, Germany is seen as a new society, a “unity-in-diversity” characterized by a celebration of its own internationality taking place in a perpetual present tense. Its international mix is frozen in the *status quo*, severed from its history of economic migration, political struggles over restrictions, and control of immigration as well as questions of citizenship.

In the *Roots* project of 2007, the discovering, defining, the naming of origins, the history, and the memory, were crucial to identity formation and strongly linked to “a new self-confidence.” It implicitly admitted the relations of dominance and minority, a situation where self-confidence must be hard won. In the new picture, the self-confidence of the actors is taken for granted, it is affirmative: “we” are proud to be international, to be cosmopolitan. Diversity here is the initial position that is taken for granted and does not need to be named.

The accentuated present of the new brand denies and erases histories on different levels, first of all the personal ones. The new message is that it does not matter anymore where one comes from. The past, the origins, the family, the mother-tongue, they do not define a person. Now the personal assets are language(s), openness, a feeling of global belonging, and an ease of moving in the world. The new citizen is the global nomad, who leaves weights of the past behind and will participate in the new globalized economy with all its opportunities. Former station director Thomas describes the audience of the program as the “folk” that one sees around big German cities, that did not exist a decade or two ago. According to him, it is a folk characterized by the fact that they have several worlds within them and there is a growing

number of people who have that.<sup>45</sup> Thomas explicitly cites migrants, but also ethnic Germans, who are connected with the world through social media and travel, but concedes that this more international and cosmopolitan world is to be found “in the enlightened class.”

The Global Sounds Radio positioning leaves legislative, administrative, and political histories behind – both the history of immigration into Germany and the political discourse around it. The economic histories leading to migration, the power positions this entailed, and those involved in the history of political migration, are all made obsolete.

### 5.7 Closing remarks

Funkhaus Europa has moved away from the “ethnic multiculturalism” of its starting years – through a phase of being “integration radio” towards a “cosmopolitan” Global Sounds Radio. At the time of writing, it is the station’s aim to celebrate existing diversity, recognizing the multiple identities of the descendants of migrants as well as the existing reality of an ethnically mixed society. The question that I pose here is how this reflects the adjustments within discourses on multiculturalism, or what the positioning as a “cosmopolitan” broadcaster can say about the politics through which it emerged and the interests that are served by it.

Funkhaus Europa can be analyzed in terms of its role in defining the (new) German citizenship as well as its imagined audience. Even if it is dedicated to reflecting the plurality of cultures in the country, and it addresses a relatively narrow fragment of the overall audience, the very way plurality is approached says something about the dominant understanding of nation and citizenship rights, and of social relations of power. The station’s policy transformations indeed point to a changing nature of the social discourse on difference and the self-positioning of the station as a technology of citizenship.

So, what has factually changed in the discourse on multiculturalism in Germany since the establishment of this radio station? Immigration still (and again) is one of the most virulent topics of political discussion in Germany, especially since the refugee movements of 2015 and 2016 and the ensuing problematizations of the topic. The celebration of cultural diversity and migration have become, if not a minority position, then certainly one that seems reserved for liberal circles. Therefore, it can be asked how the station, that has turned to

---

<sup>45</sup> Interview with Thomas, 03 September 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author.

cosmopolitanism as its reference frame, relates to its earlier political and emancipatory impulse in this new context. Are the young migrants at the *Hauptschule* from the *Roots* project now at more prestigious schools? Or rather, who is the urban, cosmopolitan, international audience that WDR Funkhaus Europa is now aiming at?

Crucially, the station has rejected the terminology and the concepts of difference, and partly multiculturalism, and exchanged them for cosmopolitanism and internationality. The ethnic elements involved in the concept of difference are made harmless, they are aestheticized, commodified, and made consumable for the mainstream non-ethnic audience, whose inclusion into the station is in turn continually demanded. To put it in the words of bell hooks, “within commodity culture, ethnicity becomes spice, seasoning that can liven up the dull dish that is mainstream white culture” (1992: 21). Enjoying multiculturalism here means enjoying the enrichment of the culture of the modern cosmopolitan, through contributions that can be consumed in the form of music, food, or travel.

This way of interacting with difference does not refer to the recent migrant, who does not fit into the class category of the urban nomad, or include the claims for political emancipation of minoritized subjects. To paraphrase Ann-Marie Fortier, multiculturalism has become part of the neoliberal economy that commodifies diversity as a valuable asset that deserves proper management and attention. It contains both the expanding (global) and the contracting (national) poles of the multicultural. However, multiculturalism still remains an “introspective process aimed at strengthening a nation (or a conglomerate of nations, such as the EU) in its struggles against perceived world forces that produce internal diversification” (Fortier 2008: 14).

I argue that, while the radio station has changed its paradigm from being an integration station, to a multicultural, and finally to a cosmopolitan station, it has continued to define and celebrate its understanding of diversity, while at the same time not threatening the reference frame of the official politics, that of the nation state. Framing the existing multi-ethnic and multicultural situation within the discourse of cosmopolitanism allows for a celebration of a multiculturalism that poses no political claims, offering instead a consumable, enriching diversity. It works on social cohesion in that it encompasses all of society, including both its majority and the minoritized subjects. But at the same time, this universalist, inclusive discourse of internationalism closes off the histories of inequalities that have led to the minoritization of subjects in the first place. Through this, this paradigm change enables the

society to indulge in national self-love as one that is capable of embracing difference and making it a part of its social body.

Crucially, treating ethnic diversity as understood by the globally mobile trendsetter turns the discourse of cultural difference into a question of social class, since multiculturalism here “enriches” the new social type, defined as a well-educated, urban listener open to the world and moving freely in it. A new picture of the nation is offered, as an affective field where diversity of a certain kind is welcome, while at the same time the *status quo* of social positions in and outside the nation remains undisturbed. However, this static picture does not reflect the factual situation in the society, which is characterized by friction between the positions of dominance of the national cultural model and the minorities. I see the Funkhaus Europa station as trying to avoid the usual responses of mainstream media and its contestations around social and cultural diversity by creating its own audience, one subjectified as tolerant, cosmopolitan, and open. However, relying on Laclau and Mouffe ([1985] 2014), I also see the efforts of the station as thwarted by the one characteristic of discursive struggle: the contingency of the meaning it produces. As was highlighted in Chapter 1, in the mediation of social phenomena through discourse, meanings are not fixed, but continuously reconstructed and reconfigured within the struggle of competing discourses. At the time when it seemed that the frictions of multicultural coexistence could be overcome, a new movement of migration started. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Syria and other countries to Europe in 2015 and 2016 reignited antagonisms around immigration in the public debate in Germany. While favoring the rise of populist movements and right-wing political rhetoric, within the media it also led to a return to the integration intention in creating media content.<sup>46</sup> What this showed was not only that struggles for identity formation continually open new breakages in the contestation of the society and citizenry, but also how fragile and contingent any imaginaries of the nation that rely on static relations really are.

---

<sup>46</sup> For example, Funkhaus Europa introduced a daily Arabic program in 2016 with the explicit purpose of offering newcomers information and support.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Radio makers of Funkhaus Europa**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

The following chapter presents an analysis of six interviews conducted with protagonists of the Funkhaus Europa radio station, linked to its work on different levels – from employed editors, through free-lance authors and presenters, to the former head of the radio station.

The interviews search for answers to the question of how the creators of multicultural programs react to the public politics of difference. They also examine how they see their role and the role of minorities in the context of media representation. The analysis explicitly looks for emotions and affective states displayed by the media makers and puts these in correlation with the positions of the interviewees in the narratives of the nation or diversity in Germany.

For example, Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, as has already been mentioned earlier, detect in a series of texts from popular culture implicit ideologies and power structures, pointing especially in their writing to the implicit Eurocentric paradigm. For them, the media gain a central role in the possibility to decentralize power, to refuse the Western or Eurocentric structures. As sites of representation in multiculturalism, the media can construct identity and the feeling of belonging (to a national or cultural community, for example), but they can also construct alternative affiliations, those beyond (national) community, allowing for transnational belonging.

The Funkhaus Europa radio station broadcasts a daily German language program and several evening formats in the languages of migrant communities in Germany, so that the reporters, the presenters, and the editors making the programs are of various origins. Also, in the German language program, there is the standing requirement of finding protagonists who reflect the multi-ethnic make-up of the society, the “new normal” of the German society. They appear as interview guests, respondents in polls, or they give statements in reports. The makers of Funkhaus Europa are encouraged to inform the audience of the “migration background” of protagonists if it cannot be heard in their accent, in order to emphasize the “international” and “cosmopolitan” make-up and outlook of the station.

There is an explicit desire on the part of the station management that the presenters in the German language program are of an origin other than German. Whereas it is a requirement that they speak an accent-free German, it is desirable that they feature a non-German, foreign-sounding name, and display a “cosmopolitan flavor” on the air. In particular, this can be achieved by greeting the audience in a foreign language before going back to German (“*Dobro jutro*” or “*Günaydın*” are common greetings in the prime time morning show). They are also encouraged to include a “colorful” anecdote illustrating their intercultural life and relations, and so on.

Since its establishment in 1999, which brought together all the foreign-language shows for guest workers and added a daily German language program to make it a full-time WDR station, Funkhaus Europa has undergone several transformations in its self-definition. These point to changes in its journalistic aims, and, as has been analyzed in the previous chapter, these in turn point to their ideological underpinnings. These go hand in hand with the creation of public policies dealing with the questions of national identity in the German immigration society, partly responding to and partly participating in the management of cultural and national difference.

The radio station that originated from the specific radio programs for the so-called “guest-workers” in Germany, went on to become a station for ethnic minorities and migrant communities, and then to one understood as a tool in the integration of immigrants. This function of the radio station continues to be emphasized in many of the broadcaster’s policy papers, in particular, concerning the media offerings for new refugees arriving in Germany. And finally, the station moved to a self-definition as a cosmopolitan radio, dedicated to celebrating the “urban mixture,” international flair, and everyday hybrid and transcultural practices of the new German society, especially in its articulations in the modern popular culture.

These transformations have run through various strata of meaning, touching on questions ranging from the practicalities of everyday editorial work to those concerning political positionings on the nature of multiculturalism and diversity themselves. Such transformations are not unique to Funkhaus Europa, and as in transformations of media channels in general, they have happened as a gradual process. The peaks of these changes have, however, been marked by the articulation of station goals and strategies in the official station policies, such as the elaboration of new brand strategies or the new target audience. These documents in turn

have marked points of breakage with the old and those departing in new directions, both in practical, and in ideological terms, and are thus suitable for analysis.

Among the questions posed time and again in the discussions within the editorial team, with and within the management, and finally articulated through several station reforms, are these: What audience does this radio address? Who are they today, how “ethnic” or “mixed” are they actually? How old are they and how old do we want them to be? How do our audiences see themselves in terms of belonging and identity? Do they listen to the station from the position of a minority or that of the majority? What do they consider familiar, and what is foreign or Other to them? How does the station, through its content, categorize different identities and project this categorization on the audience? Should the emphasis be on the ethnic communities with their concerns, or on a German audience interested in and attracted by diversity? How can diversity be “heard and felt” on the air? What segment is defined as the target-audience and catered to? How big should it be in order to justify the existence of the station, and, related to this, how far should the station emphasize its unique selling points or rather move into the mainstream to cater to disparate expectations? What exactly is the unique selling point of the station today as opposed to the time of its establishment? Does strengthening the unique selling point further the profile of the station or rather stand in the way of higher ratings? In other words, how is the tension between particularity and broad appeal to be resolved?

It was the aim of the interviews with the radio makers, that are the subject of analysis in this chapter, to solicit opinions of those involved in producing the program of the station. They were asked to express their opinions on where the station should go, how they imagined their audience, how they viewed the German multicultural society, and where they saw their own position and role within that society. The interviews were conducted with persons who not only had varying degrees of formal bonds with the station, as full-time employees or free-lance authors, but also varying levels of affective affiliation to it, depending on their position, length of time they had been part of the team, and their ethnic origins. Among the interviewees were two editors who were among the founding members of WDR Funkhaus Europa, as well as the head of the station at the time, during whose tenure the brand of the station was changed from multiculturalism to cosmopolitanism.

It was also an explicit aim of the interviews to solicit emotional responses concerning the interviewees’ own cultural identity as well as their self-identification with the changes in the editorial direction of the station. Treated broadly as personal narratives, the interviews shed

light on the mechanisms of identity formation in the modern multicultural situation in Germany, and possibly identified if new subject positions are in the making. At the same time, the interviews also identified strategies for questioning these positions and resisting them through alternative discourses.

## 6.2 Yildiz

Yildiz<sup>47</sup> is an employed editor and one of the founding members of the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa. She is Turkish-born, but has spent most of her life in Germany, where she first worked in social work, before becoming a free-lance journalist and then editor. In earlier years, she was politically active in anti-racism NGOs and is familiar both with initiatives concerning multiculturalism in Germany and with the Turkish political spectrum of the time. At the time of the interview, she was in charge of public relations for Funkhaus Europa and had more contact with the management than with the everyday running of the station. In the interview, she was asked about the transformations the station had gone through since its establishment, particularly her interpretation of these changes and her feelings about them. It also included questions about her biography and experiences as a journalist in the past twenty years.

Now in her mid-fifties, Yildiz is a member of the first generation of descendants of the former *Gastarbeiter*, “guest workers”, in Germany. Through Yildiz’s story, it emerges that being a daughter of Turkish migrants in Germany continues to be crucial for her identity-building, although in professional terms she has never wanted to be reduced to “niche-journalism.” In her interview, she clearly divides the German society into two parts: the socially dominant, German majority, and the minorities of various ethnic origins. The separation line between the two is not impermeable, but the division does intersect cultural, economic, professional, and many other strata. Yildiz sees herself as ethnicized somewhat against her will, with her origin strongly influencing her career, above all by placing her in a position outside of the social mainstream, and in need of fighting for a place in it. For her, both the story of her own professional path and the stories of other migrant-descended professionals, are stories of emancipation. This is also visible in the *Roots* project<sup>48</sup> that she supervised for Funkhaus

---

<sup>47</sup> Interview with Yildiz, July 12<sup>th</sup>, 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author.

<sup>48</sup> The *Roots* program is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

Europa in the mid-2000s, in which young people of various ethnic origins were encouraged to look for the stories of their families, and thus attempt to decipher their cultural identities.

For Yildiz, what defines the group she places herself in, outside of the majority, is less a physical experience of migration, and more a “special experience” of people like her, with the “connecting link [...] that in their generation or in some other generation Germany is somehow not their homeland.” Even though not all migrants identify themselves with all the other migrants, “still, something ties you to the others,” something Yildiz defines as a “break.”

You have this break already through the fact that a part of your family in the first, second generation, does not live where you live. So, you have this break anyway. You have it inside, in the fact that you have another language that is important to you. I don't mean a break in the negative sense; but not everything is smooth, not everything went in a linear manner. (this and all subsequent quotes in this chapter were translated by the author).

Before becoming an editor, Yildiz was a free-lance journalist and during that time in her early career, she deliberately avoided the so-called “foreigners’ topics,” not wanting to be put in a narrowly defined thematic corner. However, she often found herself working in this area anyway. While Yildiz claims that she never experienced straightforward discrimination as a free-lance journalist, she was often confronted with the well-intentioned statement that “you can't hear that you are not from here.” Her Turkish origin, however, became a topic when the “game” was about getting an editor's employment position, where

you think or notice that the people cannot abstract from the fact that you have this origin. It is always a topic. Funny, but I experienced that rather as an editor, that somebody says, yes, you don't look like it at all, or they ask you totally personal questions, if my mother does this or that, or my father, or that they ask you biographical details.

In Yildiz's experience, the interpretation of her identity as linked to her social position was most obvious when an entitlement was at stake, in her case an employment contract with the WDR. She recounts an experience she had in a flat share with “a bunch of enlightened alternative left-wing people,” when she got her first short-term contract with the WDR.

So we raised a toast to that in this group of seven or eight people, and you could really tell how hard they took it, how they really had to swallow, because that was too much. As a Turkish woman, you can maybe become a manager at McDonald's or even a free-lance journalist, but an employed editor with the WDR, this is really too much. You know, there you can tell that even with these alternative guys, because it touches on their own dreams, the racism comes up. When you do something that is attractive to them too.

When Yildiz started working for Funkhaus Europa at the time the station was founded, it was a novelty for her to find a public service offering that explicitly put the experience of being a migrant or descendent of migrants to Germany, at its center. Although both the political discourse and the station policy and brand have since that time gradually changed, it is her opinion that the need for dealing with that experience has not diminished since the station was established. This is how she describes the initial sense of novelty this approach gave her:

In the beginning, I was always totally touched by the fact that as a matter of course in these German-speaking surroundings, I was informed about the world and still had another approach to the country of my origin. Thematically, I learned a lot about other countries and in this music program it was a matter of course that a Turkish song would be played. This sounds totally banal, but that was it. For me, it closed a gap, it was not this only German or only ethnic thing any more, but there was something that actually reflected what you have in yourself. I thought this was really good and, in the beginning and since then, I found that the station lived from the experience of the people who worked there. It was not the knowledge of the news agencies or of the newspapers, but you had in this newsroom a lived life.

It was only with the founding of Funkhaus Europa that the dichotomy of either being an "ethnic" or a "normal" journalist stopped existing. It was also a space where the "migrants' Germany" crossed the boundary to the "Germans' Germany," with a Turkish song played on a German-language station. In this professional context, Yildiz could unite both sides of her experience, without needing to factor out one part of it – here she could bring in her "lived life." In the following quote she brings out the whole emotional content of this experience, as well as the sheer novelty of being able to professionally process the multicultural situation she

lived in. It also points to the affective content within the group of radio makers that initially gathered around the project:

Many discussions, many pieces developed from this [experience of migration], they arose from this story. This did me well, it was a sort of [...] well, healing would be too much of a word, but a consolation or a growing together of something. I can work normally, on all topics, but I can also tie my origins into it without losing myself in it or glamorizing it or romanticizing it or something. This closed some sort of a gap and I am totally thankful for it. Now I notice that [...] at some point I have become indifferent, the stories do not have to arise from my story. So, my journalistic ambition or my biography is not coupled with my origin, there is no sense of mission, I realized that. But, at a certain time, Funkhaus Europa was totally important, it was a valuation or an upgrading, that I could get rid of these stories within a group and also in exchange with the Germans, that you did not just tell them, but you processed them journalistically. This was totally important.

For Yildiz and most of the editors in Funkhaus Europa at the time of the establishment of the station, it was a first encounter with a German medium that was made by people like her for people like her – who clearly defined themselves as outside the dominant majority. It was not just a radio station for immigrants, such as the information programs for guest-workers in the 1960s, but a station for their descendants, in German, and with a view of their bi-cultural allegiances. It offered them the possibility of making decisions on how this experience would be interpreted and represented, and this differed from the media mainstream. Working for Funkhaus Europa “closed a circle in the emotional sense.”

In terms of career development, however, in hindsight Yildiz thinks that it was not a good step, “because one is not really taken seriously.” In Yildiz’s experience of contact with editors from other WDR departments, Funkhaus Europa is either not taken very seriously, or even openly disliked:

Why is that so? Well, it is just the normal racism. You feel better than the minority, of course. But, I think many would be surprised if they saw the journalistic potential that is there in Funkhaus Europa. I think, many are surprised, many colleagues think that here some highly paid dimwits run around, who have this job, only because they have the right origin. Because they fill a

quota. [...] I mean, many people want to do journalism and the resources are limited so this is also about competition and I believe racism is not far away here. If you think that way anyway. Journalists are no different there than other people. If it is about your job then, oh well [...].

In her answers, Yildiz draws a line in all areas that separates the majority, to which she refers to in the third person plural (“they”), from the immigrants, who do not belong to the majority. They are used to their “uncomfortable positions” of not belonging, but when they move to occupy the more comfortable ones, such as good professional positions, the German majority attempts to redistribute the resources to its advantage again. She sees this as happening in Funkhaus Europa at the time of the interview, where a change of rhetoric from “cultural difference” to “cosmopolitanism” is for her a front for a continuing power struggle.

I believe, that for many, if you belong to the main group, to the majority here, and you have to work with people who have another ethnic origin, that in the long run it cannot be endured not to belong. You have to retreat to a more comfortable position and deal with it. Because, this is an uncomfortable position, it is uncomfortable. As an immigrant you get used to it, but why should somebody do it who is actually part of the majority? In the end, I think, this is all about the distribution of resources and leading positions and qualifications and when you say, we do not care, or this is not important any more, either on the side of the broadcaster or on the side of the audience, then you do not have to take care about winning some representative of an ethnic minority as a listener or as an employee, because that is indifferent. The point is, you are cosmopolitan, right?

Being in charge of station PR and therefore also involved in the re-branding of Funkhaus Europa in collaboration with an external agency, Yildiz points to an underlying power struggle. She sees here an attempt by the dominant German group to close all spaces of difference and possibly resistance within the discourse of this medium. In particular, the inversion of the concept of “inclusiveness” from its anti-discriminatory context into a demand for a homogeneously “colorful” German society, is seen as serving the goals of the dominant group. Yildiz interprets this as by not being excluded any more, the dominant group has regained control over the representation of difference and belonging.

I believe that those who belong to the main ethnic group, in this case the Germans, I believe that they find it difficult to repeatedly have to associate with ethnic groups, without being a part of it themselves. I believe [...] this is about power relations and that defining how a station will be directed is not in the power of the ethnic groups but with the main group, the Germans. [...] I mean, they are again a part of it, they are cosmopolitan. They are not simply Germans, they are cosmopolitan. All the other people are cosmopolitan, we are all cosmopolitan, we can take each other's hands and dance a round dance. Through this we are all again the same, so to speak. They no longer have to occupy themselves with the realities of these ethnic groups. Because simply, because you annul something in this way.

Yildiz sees in this a retreat away from political commitment – since everybody is cosmopolitan, reflecting on difference is not necessary or desired. Assuming a position of difference and then applying it in the media work is not an issue – freed from political considerations the work becomes much more comfortable.

It becomes a self-service shop. You do not have to occupy yourself with the reality any more or with the difference, or what makes up those ethnic minorities, because you say: we are all the same, I am as much a cosmopolitan as you are. [...] They [the Germans] want to feel better. [...] And they create the same level with the ethnic groups, because they say: you are nothing special, I am exactly like you, look at me, because I am a cosmopolitan. [...] That is, I believe, the point, and that they do not separate anymore, so that you never get to asking about the question of power, because you have put this lid on it, you know.

For Yildiz, the struggle for dominance in Germany, in particular in her work environment, has not stopped or lost its valence in the last decades. Whereas on an abstract level and the level of political rhetoric the majority is committed to respecting diversity, the parallel political demands on migrants and their descendants to integrate point in another direction. In a professional environment, when it comes to the distribution of material resources and status, the origin can become a criterion for exclusion. In this way, the move from being “ethnic,” “minority,” or “multicultural” to “cosmopolitan” is for Yildiz a tactic in a struggle for resources, because

the German colleagues cannot stand this discrepancy. Because in that moment, you are also the Turk, the Italian, the Serb, or the Croat. Then they prefer being a cosmopolitan. [...] I mean, hey, this is my origin and I would find it strange to say, I am cosmopolitan. Frankly, I think it is a bit silly.

Yildiz believes that a move towards cosmopolitanism is a move into the mainstream, since no other broadcaster would actually refuse the label of being cosmopolitan. Choosing personnel without regard of their cultural competences, under the aegis of inclusiveness, reducing their difference to a foreign name, takes the station away from the realities of the society. For Yildiz, having “your finger on the pulse” would mean making people who share the experience of migration and/or have bi-national identities work as editors.

That is the opposite concept to the cosmopolitan concept, which can practically be done by anybody. Such a program, I believe, they don’t do it anymore, because they would not be able to. You cannot do this with a completely linear biography. If the majority in the editorial staff consists of such people, then you cannot do such a program, how would you do it? It needs to arise from you or from your experiences in the community in which you move.

### 6.3 Amir

Amir<sup>49</sup> is a regular free-lance author, who started working as a journalist for the Bosnian-language program of Funkhaus Europa, and later for the German-language program. He then moved to Sarajevo, from where he continued to contribute to the station program, and then back to Cologne. Amir is also a book author and, in the interview, he deliberately stressed that he does not want to define himself as a journalist in the classical sense, but as an author, somebody who, when working for the radio, “creates stories through sounds.”

Amir sees a new multicultural society in Germany emerging, a generation for whom the ethnic mixture is the normal state – at the time of the interview in his late-thirties, he sees himself as part of this new society. Amir came to Germany as a teenager in the early 1990s, as a refugee from the war in Bosnia, and is now a German national. At the time of the interview he was preparing to move with his family to Sarajevo, but said that although he was leaving, he was

---

<sup>49</sup> Interview with Amir, July 19<sup>th</sup>, 2012, Cologne, translation from Bosnian by the author.

taking his German passport with him and intending to return to Germany when his eldest child started school. He stressed that he felt “totally like a part of this society” – but for him, it is a society of diversity. To illustrate this, he recounted an anecdote about becoming a fan of the German national teams. As a university student, Amir trained a junior basketball team with players of different origins.

And one year, there were the world championships in basketball, I don't know where. Until then, I never was a fan of Germany and then suddenly I realized it was practically those kids of mine playing, that they are my kids, my world that is suddenly playing for Germany. So, I became a Germany fan, also of the German football team. Now, I don't know how plausible that is, but [...] I think that some part, I will say it again, it is not a part of the mainstream audience, but that part [chancellor Angela] Merkel talks about when she is talking about foreigners, but that is how it is, it is part of some popular consciousness, which I live as a personal experience. So, working as a journalist I really found many [...] well, never an Italian actually [...] but many Turks who are fans of the German team. And that is something that has changed with me and I have a feeling that it has changed in Germany in the past fifteen years.

Amir insists on being a part of this new consciousness emerging in Germany – he sees its diversity as normality and imagines the audience for the content he creates for the radio as living that normality. Whereas at the beginning of his work for Funkhaus Europa he was working for a “typical foreign audience, migrants with a sensitivity for migrant themes,” this has changed. Now Amir feels he is addressing not only a portion of the audience interested in diversity, one that has traveled, seen remote parts of the world, and is interested in “some sort of extravagant immigrants,” but “a whole younger generation, people for whom it is something normal. I mean, that their parents are from another country, that they have the experience of other languages, and so on.”

This normality is, however, a normality only for a portion of the society, one which stands in opposition to the dominant discourse of German politics, public institutions, and the media. Amir recounts an episode concerning 1LIVE, the WDR radio station specifically targeting a young audience. 1LIVE once dedicated a whole day to Turkish listeners, concentrating on only two topics: kebabs and belly dance. Amir ascribes this folklorization to the makeup of the editorial team of 1LIVE, where very few journalists and no employed editors of foreign origin

work, and “there is no presenter whose name ends in *-ić*.” For Amir, the dominant discourse on the existing multicultural situation, that continues to operate with categories such as “foreigners” and “immigrants,” is refusing to acknowledge realities.

So, no matter how many so-called multicultural characters you find on the street, for whom it is the most normal thing, you will not find this picture in the public institutions, the same thing in politics, the same in the media. In the mainstream media, it is still not present. Milto [a journalist colleague] and I always joke, when we watch RTL [German commercial TV-broadcaster], we say, hey, did you see when they did that poll on the street, a foreigner walked behind the guy they were interviewing, and the camera sort of turned, it moved just a little, you know, but not quite, [laughs], not yet. [...] There is some sort of mainstream fetishization of anything multicultural, but it has still not become part of the structure, so, as I said, in the institutions, in the politics, in our WDR, when we look at the structure of the whole radio, there are still no foreigners in key places.

For Amir, the two poles – the “street” and the “establishment” – not only occupy different positions within the society, but actually interpret the picture of the society in completely opposing ways, with the “establishment” having a blind spot where multicultural life should be. Amir does not place himself in either of the two positions he makes out: neither in “the street” nor in the dominant discourse. Whereas he can participate in both of these discourses, he places himself deliberately outside them, in a third position, that of an “observer.” He describes himself as someone who can on the one hand guard the distance towards the world he sees and processes in his creative work, and on the other, owing to his origins, feel near his interviewees, who are outside the mainstream. He claims he can elicit more honest responses, awaken feelings of solidarity, and even build coalitions with the “multicultural characters” he interviews. Somewhat like Yildiz in her interview, Amir also claims to possess a sort of hidden cultural capital due to his “different experience.”

When I do a poll, as a Bosnian, I will communicate differently with that great colorfulness on the street, than, say, a guy from 1LIVE, your average middle-class German, who spends his summer in Mallorca and does not have so many scars on his body and soul like me. I don’t hide that experience, so, when, with that experience, I talk to the people, then I get different information, different sound bites. I think that is the difference. So, when I as a Bosnian interview a

Turk, he will give me a completely different statement than to an 1LIVE boy who has come to do something interesting about kebabs or belly dance. I think it is qualitative, not good or bad, but concerning the content, those are two different worlds.

In Amir's narrative, this "different experience" turns into a secret code of understanding, with Amir switching codes in his everyday life, between that of what is desired by the mainstream, and that of subversive solidarity with his ethnicized co-citizens.

Still, Amir's stance is somewhat ambiguous, as several times during the interview he insists on a third position – an observer from the margins. He uses his own belonging to the "ethnics" to solicit material for his authorial work, which he then addresses to a group he makes out as emerging: a new generation marked by the experience of diversity.

Amir's picture is not characterized by open struggles for dominance or by divisions between the ethnic communities, which were present in the narratives of an older generation of immigrants in Germany. Whereas for Amir the society is willing to share on the superficial level, in private, the majority is suffering the fear of losing positions of power. Similarly to Yildiz when she talks about entitlements, Amir also thinks that when "multicultural Germany" starts to claim a redistribution of the resources, it will lead to "a conflict that is coming," when the foreigners "who slowly somehow, purely statistically, are grabbing towards the middle classes, when they start to take positions away within the middle classes, there will be real conflicts." Amir sees this fear smouldering under the surface of civility, which comes to the fore in times when populism peaks, for example, with Thilo Sarrazin's bestseller from 2010, *Germany is doing away with itself*<sup>50</sup>, championing the thesis that Muslim immigrants, unwilling to integrate, are doing away with the German welfare state. Amir sees this conflict flaring up in his everyday work. He claims to know exactly whom to approach to get a racist statement against the Muslims.

I look for the middle-class, you know, not completely young, let's say, around fifty years old, [...] you know, nice jackets, *missus* and mister, always a couple, because the man always likes to prove himself in front of the woman, so you always catch them in couples. That is where the "regulars' table"<sup>51</sup> starts, it is

---

<sup>50</sup> Sarrazin, Thilo: *Deutschland schafft sich ab*, 2010.

<sup>51</sup> Amir uses the German word *Stammtisch*, regulars' table, which usually refers to a certain low-level right-wing populist discussion.

here in the middle class that I find most animosities, and articulated ones. So, what the garbage man will spit out, but will not know how to explain, this guy has instead read Sarrazin, you understand, and he will explain it well to you. They buy Sarrazin's book to keep them safe, so that they feel better, so that they feel better [laughs].

Doing a street poll, Amir deliberately solicits racist statements against Islam. As a foreigner (and a Muslim), with subversive intentions, he consciously "manipulates" his poll in order to get the desired sound bite. As opposed to his unknowing respondents, Amir has the capacity to switch codes, due to his "difference," a defining factor of his identity and his work. When asked to illustrate how this "difference" is expressed in his radio work, Amir recounts an anecdote about a live report from a lottery kiosk he once did for Funkhaus Europa and then for WDR5, the WDR information program targeting a well-informed, culturally-oriented, and politically interested audience.

You know, it was a zoo, I am the zoo for them, the way I was doing that thing. Because German radio, the German WDR5 still has a sacral aura, [...] like, it is very serious. [...] Once I am reporting from a lottery shop, there is something like 30 million in the game, and I am reporting. People are buying their lottery tickets, the guy who owns the shop is English, there is an Albanian there, a Gypsy, a Roma, and I am reporting live for Funkhaus Europa, and what we do is something like a multicultural circus. So, this Roma will leave Germany if he wins, this Englishman I don't know what, crazy stuff. And then I start my report for WDR5, a totally different atmosphere, so, when I talk about the Roma, nobody is laughing. First of all, nobody finds it funny that a Roma wants to leave Germany if he wins the lottery [laughs]. I find it totally funny, so then I sort of bla-bla-bla, and they pose a completely serious question. I mean, zero humor, zero. [...] I went there to tell about the atmosphere, you understand, and they want information. So, maybe the difference is, if it is humor, I don't know. Maybe the difference is in the distance. Maybe when you are Funkhaus Europa you are telling the story from the inside, otherwise you are telling it literally from above, although the society is not so, but you are still telling it from above. [...] All of them are like that.

The way Amir recounts this anecdote also has subversive traits: the high-brow, “sacral” WDR5 program looks ridiculous. The protagonists – Amir, the English owner of the kiosk, the Albanian, the Roma, but also the editors of Funkhaus Europa and the audience – are all in the know, united in a “multicultural circus.” For Amir, that is his “habitat,” in which he forms his identity in the mutual understanding with others who share a particular experience of difference. It is also there where he draws material for his work, aimed at an audience that belongs to the same club. The presenter, the editors, and the audience of WDR5 are, on the other hand, simply not let in on the joke. In this narrative, the shared joke is a secret code, the unspoken declaration of solidarity, which unites the “multicultural circus” and excludes the Germans: those who would otherwise do the economic and political excluding, or excluding, from the media discourse, those who look on this “zoo” from above.

#### 6.4 Miltiadis

Miltiadis, a German radio and print media journalist of Greek origins, is a long-term, regular freelance contributor to Funkhaus Europa and, at the time of the interview, a presenter of the Funkhaus Europa bilingual Greek-German program Radiopolis, that was later, in 2016, taken off the air.<sup>52</sup> At the beginning of his journalistic career, Miltiadis worked for a computer magazine and sporadically sold pieces to the radio or to regional papers. He tried to get a more regular engagement as a radio presenter or to enter public service broadcasting through a voluntary training year, but failed. He reports on having found himself in “this multicultural niche” by chance, when asked by an acquaintance to do a Greek press review for Funkhaus Europa.

When I reflect upon it now, it is natural that it did not work through the normal channels, that it worked through a contact and it worked through a specific demand, that I specifically could fulfill, which is these multicultural topics, although I did not intend it that way.

Miltiadis has contributed regularly to Funkhaus Europa and occasionally to other public service media or regional newspapers. In his case, his Greek origin was an entrance ticket to Funkhaus Europa; however, whereas this fact has the advantage of “qualifying” him for

---

<sup>52</sup> Interview with Miltiadis, July 19<sup>th</sup>, 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author.

reports on topics concerning Greece, it is also a handicap when trying to sell “normal,” mainstream themes. But, more than that, Miltiadis analyzes the situation in economic terms, self-critically speaking of “riding the Greek ticket,” especially during the Greek debt crisis.

Somehow I can say, I am a little lazy and I know when I am, so to speak, riding the Greek ticket, somehow within these limits I can more easily bring it [pieces on the Euro crisis] when it suddenly boils over and the interest is there, than when in general I give it a try in an economics magazine, a newspaper, feature pages, whatever, to establish myself in a sea of other authors. [...] I have already worked for other channels, I have done features for WDR5 that had nothing to do with migration, I have already done reports about minimal pay or something for WDR2,<sup>53</sup> that had nothing to do with migration, but they ask me rarely, yes, they contract me more for these topics. I mean, WDR2 has already asked me to do something about Greece around the European soccer championship game, they didn't ask me to do something on von der Leyen [Ursula von der Leyen, at the time of the interview was the Federal Labor Minister], although I had already done something about that. They could have also said, he has already done something about that topic, but instead there are others that can do it.

Whereas Miltiadis reports on general difficulties in placing mainstream topics in the mainstream media, he takes a sober view of the advantages and disadvantages of an ethnic origin, which in his experience can be both an impediment and a bonus.

On the other hand, Miltiadis also reports on difficulties in placing themes on migration, multiculturalism, and diversity in the mainstream media. He is the author of articles and a book on questions concerning immigration and is active in NGO work for refugees in Germany, which makes him sensitized to such topics. Therefore, this is the area where his main journalistic interests lie:

And I mean, of course, in the nineties I noticed the themes, it was always this “the boat is full”-discussion, the foreigners' discussion was going on in the media without the migrants themselves getting to say something. In that sense I naturally found it important to change that. Naturally I myself had an interest in

---

working on such topics and publishing, in order to create this visibility and make other points of view present in the reporting.

Putting the system into question or challenging it through creating visibility for other points of view is something that is important to Miltiadis in his authorial work, but he is unsure as to what extent an “ethnic” journalist is permitted to do so in mainstream media. The boundaries here are often set by small editorial interventions with the aim of creating “more digestible” reports, which can sometimes also mean moderating negative information on ethnic protagonists.

A limit is, so to speak, always there, how much self-confidence is possible there, how much putting into question of the system is possible, because at the back of your head, there is of course always, the listeners or the majority of the listeners could feel provoked, right? This piece I did yesterday for WDR5, they cut out one part about this [name of a refugee threatened by repatriation], and the part is where she says [...] she is not making an effort to get her passport. She says, why should I help the foreigners’ office to repatriate me, right? And that’s what they cut out. [...] OK, this will lead to somebody saying, right, that can’t be tolerated, she must make an effort and so on, right? [...] Where I would say, it is a form of resistance and that’s what it is, most of the people prevent their repatriation for a while, because they don’t present their passport. And such a message is by all means a provocation. How far can you report on that and not present it simply, that is how it is, right. I don’t mean to value something as bad, but there is always a little bit of a limit there.

A further problem in “ethnic” journalists reporting on “ethnic” topics is a practice of self-censorship in order to make their reporting on provocative topics less irritating. Miltiadis recounts an episode of trying to sell a story about a particularly brazen petty criminal fighting his pending repatriation from Germany to a regional newspaper, and failing:

I find it is an interesting topic, but it didn’t come through, with anybody, because that is like you said, the good foreigners. There I did not censor, just the opposite, I offered it uncensored and that does not work.

This need for presenting the “good foreigners” and not irritating or provoking the audience in the mainstream context also points to tacit hierarchies in the discourse, to unpronounced limits

of tolerance that are set by the majority. In the end, what is presented is not unadulterated realistic reports, but an effort is taken not to cross this limit – a mechanism “ethnic” journalists are complicit in. For Miltiadis, starting to work for Funkhaus Europa also meant giving the protagonists of migration a voice, emancipating them from being objects that others speak of. He imagines the audience of this station as being able to move back the limits of tolerance, as being “somewhat critical, alternative, or migrants on the educated side, who have a certain openness to the world and interest in topics.”

In Miltiadis’ answers it is visible that for him, journalistic work is political work, and it is this emancipatory, political component that he sees as slowly disappearing from the program selection of Funkhaus Europa, which now mostly “avoids problem themes.” It creates a sense of frustration for him not to be able to place such topics in a program that for him should specialize in them, especially in light of the difficulties of making them visible in the mainstream discourse. For Miltiadis, multiculturalism is by definition a field of political and ideological contestation, that cannot be reduced to lifestyle stories or light music, which he sees in the move towards “cosmopolitan multiculturalism,” that for him is “everything but multiculturalism.”

## 6.5 Ioannis

Ioannis is a free-lance journalist, born and raised in Germany as the son of Greek migrants.<sup>54</sup> He has been working for the German-speaking program of Funkhaus Europa for years and was also one of the two presenters and authors, together with Miltiadis, on the bilingual Greek-German show Radiopolis.

A radio station that used to be Ioannis’ regular employer for many years, Funkhaus Europa was at the time of the interview turning into a more sporadic and irregular source of income, and although he worked for other WDR channels and authored a regular series in another station, he saw few chances of ever becoming a mainstream journalist. Ioannis speaks of himself as somebody with a “crooked nose,” meaning visibly foreign – if not physically then certainly concerning his attitude – thus placing himself unequivocally outside the social mainstream. Feeling like a part of an unwelcome minority, especially in the media, he admits

---

<sup>54</sup> Interview with Ioannis July 20<sup>th</sup>, 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author.

to having assumed a consciously more offensive stance towards the dominant discourse in the past few years. His attitude is a mixture of bitterness and bellicosity; his language is relatively aggressive and he labels the Germans derogatively as “Hans Fritz Potato” or “Lieschen Müller.” In particular, German reporting on the Greek debt crisis, which he sees as one-sided, has made him re-examine his allegiances and gradually “take the Greek side”:

It is the quintessence, so to speak, of the German position in the whole crisis, you have to save, you need to. I have often thought I should change profession, or I already have changed it, because I do not report objectively any more – I ascribe values, opinion, I often reflect that gesture, oh, we know all that already. And insofar, it is not actually why I took up this profession.

A strong bitterness transpires also when Ioannis speaks of the transformation of Funkhaus Europa from a mouthpiece of ethnic minorities, with connotations of “the ghetto” and subversion of the dominant discourse, to what he sees as a docile and inoffensive music station. He questions the station’s aim of inclusiveness, especially the demand of the editorial staff to make all the details of his radio pieces accessible to the entire audience. Ioannis compares this to a chase for the lowest common denominator, describing it as “social democracy for the daft.” He is particularly embittered by the German editors telling him how to work, whom he sees as generally not qualified for editing programs dedicated to diversity. For him, the Greek-German bilingual show, which was still on the air at the time of the interview, is a refuge where he and his colleagues conduct “partisan combat.”

I don’t do it only for the Greeks, I do it for the people who know Greece a little better and who maybe can enjoy a joke I make and say: there, he’s hit it right again. Whereas the normal German Hans Fritz Potato stands there and says: I don’t get it. It gets on my nerves anyway, that I often have to deal with people who often say, it can’t be understood. Whereas I think, yes, *you* don’t understand it, but there are enough other people who get it, who get it at once.

In terms of the German-language program, Ioannis is very critical of its turn away from multiculturalism towards cosmopolitanism, comparing the new direction to a program of *Schlager* music “for urban wannabe-nomads.”

The problem is, you cannot make such a radio without the emancipatory impulse. If you do that, only to give the *boom-shakala*-faction something to

teeter to, somebody will come and make this program better. [...] I cannot believe that you simply throw away a part of your audience and say: the other part is much more important. That is probably so only in the heads of the people who read the media analyses. [...] In ten years, you will have Turkish, Greek, Spanish, channels in Germany, just like in other countries. [...] You don't get the crooked nose off your face. And now to pretend that all the crooked noses would not interest us any more, you can do that, but there is always the question if that will pay off.

He sees the radio as getting too "polished" for a non-existent urban, music-loving audience, rather than allowing it to be more challenging, have more "edge," even if it might mean not reaching higher ratings. He laments the loss of emancipatory intention and thinks the station should cultivate a position on the margins of the media mainstream, "in the ghetto." Even if it would mean alienating a part of the audience, the station should position itself politically so as to subvert the mainstream:

It should be a radio station actually from the ghetto for the ghetto, which then has a certain specific charm. [...] this program has no goal. Instead the *boom-shakala*-faction comes and wants to tell me how great it is. I don't need that. [...] That is posing and I don't like posing. Some people want to float with the tide, that's OK, but at least let the crooked noses be protagonists. And it gets so on my nerves. But that was a birth defect of Funkhaus Europa, that they didn't say consequently, not everybody who has a Belgian shepherd dog is automatically multicultural. [...] If you have super-stylish music, like say Funkhaus Europa, then you cannot have Lieschen Müller there. It got systematically boiled down, always down, down, down.

Similarly to Yildiz and Amir, Ioannis also sees the migrant-descended population of Germany as sharing a common code, allowing it to understand certain things that "Lieschen Müller" or "Fritz Potato" cannot. Ioannis sees an aesthetization behind the strategy of cosmopolitanism in the station, that for him is a far cry from the political position as a space for subversion and the alternative discourse he wishes. He sees this as an attempt at elevating ratings by eradicating "edge" in the radio and making it compatible to a larger audience, "polishing it." Avoiding "wog-topics" and the "crooked noses" is seen as representing diversity without its protagonists controlling the process, without having a real voice in the discourse. In the final consequence,

Ioannis predicts the station will lose the main argument for its existence and be forced into a competition with private special interest channels.

## 6.6 Uwe

In his late fifties, Uwe Meyer was at the time of the interview the most senior member of the Funkhaus Europa editorial team, who joined the station at its beginnings, in 1999.<sup>55</sup> At the time, he was one of only a few German editors in Funkhaus Europa, with the initial team consisting mostly of editors from the foreign-language programs of WDR. The reasons that in 1999 made him join a completely new special-interest radio station as a journalist from a local studio of the WDR were mostly practical: at the time he aimed at a more stable employment position and wanted to enter a full-time radio station, rather than continue supplying short news pieces for the WDR news desk, which was his main task in the local studio. He sees the strength of the first years of the station mostly in “depicting diversity” on the European level.

The approach was this balancing act that is actually still there, between the topics of the migrants, [...] and the European level. To get this perspective that all is interdependent, [...] and that you report about that and reflect it onto what is going on in Germany, that we actually always had a European perspective, we compared. So, compare developments in different countries and look for commonalities and where the differences are too. And that was actually also a very analytical approach and at that time the other stations did not work that way. Today it is mainstream, for example, the “correspondents’ chains,”<sup>56</sup> but at the time it was something completely new in Funkhaus Europa, or that through a press review you look into other countries, [...] say, look into Croatia or into Turkey, get a look into the media of the other country. But also to get, for example, the Dutch view and also just document diversity.

At the time, Uwe had a clear picture of whom the station should reach, people from “the Turkish truck driver with lots of time on his hands” to “a Greek doctor,” but not

---

<sup>55</sup> Interview with Uwe, July 25<sup>th</sup>, 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author.

<sup>56</sup> *Korrikette* – literally: a correspondents’ chain, a series of two or three short pieces on the same topic by correspondents from different countries.

the intellectuals or the students for whom we are maybe broadcasting today. But at that time, I took it seriously and thought, well, we also have to do topics that concern ordinary people. But, experience has shown that the listening habits of migrants do not greatly differ from those of the Germans, that it is rather a question of social conditions, of qualifications, of living standards. And today we have to see that we have not reached many of those people whom we wanted to reach.

Uwe thinks that the station has failed to address the second and third generations of migrants in Germany, which was the expressed aim of the station reform at the time of the interview and which he put down to the station's distance from the concerns of the ethnic communities, to which it had catered in previous years. Uwe thinks the station has lost the one feature that made it most attractive to the migrants and their descendants: people today in their thirties to fifties, for whom "a completely different approach" than the editorial policy pursued at the moment would be needed.

But what we haven't managed to do is to stay with the migrants. [...] I can imagine that the migrants don't even know why they should tune in to us during the day, we do not deliver the information that they maybe need reliably.

Differing from his colleagues interviewed earlier, Uwe does not display an emotional response concerning questions of multiculturalism or difference. His interests in the topics concerning immigration are journalistic and have more to do with his wish for objective reporting than with questions of identity or belonging. His political stance on diversity in Germany is positioned on the German left-wing, where he sees questions of inequalities based on ethnicity as subordinate to those of socio-economic inequalities. In other words, for Uwe, concerns over the labor market, trade union politics, or the future of the social state have priority over questions of identity. Indeed, "migrant stories" were not the crucial reason for Uwe to join Funkhaus Europa, they were only

partly very interesting, but they alone would not have been sufficient for me, because I think, what makes a station is always the music and a certain openness to the world and to see how all is interdependent, right? So, at that time, it was 1999-2000, Germany was not doing so well – we had the costs of reunification, Germany was at the time the sick man of Europe according to *The Economist*, then it was always pretty helpful to look, yes, why the others are doing better,

or are they really doing better. And also, this checking of facts, where does Germany stand, Germany also with its immigration policy, this disastrous story with the postcard campaign against dual citizenship<sup>57</sup>, and all that. Of course, these were highly political topics and at that time they were not so present in other stations.

Uwe sets forth his arguments from a firmly German position, even if one which displays tolerance of and interest in the multicultural society. The dissatisfaction with the direction the Funkhaus Europa radio station is taking, that he expresses in the interview, is based less on ideological reflections than on what he sees as betraying professional standards. Uwe is concerned about a general lowering of journalistic and editorial criteria, which he thinks leads to a lack of accountability for the audience. He calls the new direction the station has taken “a flight into non-committal.” He criticizes the fact that when stories go on air, this happens mostly as a reaction to immediate news relevance, instead of the team creating and setting the topics they want to broadcast, independently of other media. Furthermore, he thinks that Funkhaus Europa has “tired” of dealing with topics concerning migration. According to him, for a while now, Funkhaus Europa has been “a radio that always turns itself around” and generally always reports “the same topic.” But, for Uwe, the current efforts to do the opposite have

failed even more, I believe. Saying, it is all normal, there is all this diversity, this international thing, this global thing, to think that the people will see themselves in it, I believe it is more difficult. It is also more arbitrary, we are not reliable any more, we are not close to the migrants’ associations or to those who say, we are active. [...] It is always as sporadic as the mainstream media do it, we almost don’t differ from them at all. I believe it is a huge problem.

## 6.7 Thomas

Thomas was station director of WDR Funkhaus Europa from 2009 to 2018. Before that, he held different positions within the WDR and left the station for another management position

---

<sup>57</sup> Reference to the election campaign by the Christian-democratic candidate and later prime minister of the *Land* Hesse, Roland Koch. In the 1999 elections, he campaigned under the slogan “Yes to integration. No to dual nationality,” with the aim of creating popular dissent over the idea of dual citizenship. The campaign raised much controversy and was described as xenophobic by its opponents.

within the broadcaster.<sup>58</sup> During Thomas's tenure in Funkhaus Europa, the re-branding process of the station was initiated, which resulted in the brand Global Sounds Radio. At the time of the interview, the station was preparing to continue the process, in order to translate the new brand in a more focused manner into the program content.

In the interview, Thomas depicts his understanding of what audience segment he would like the station to address, talks about the position of the station within the WDR structures, and illustrates his understanding of the development of a new, ethnically mixed German society as well as his understanding of how the ethnic minorities should be represented through the Funkhaus Europa radio station. When asked about his feelings about the station he was appointed to lead three years before, and with which he had had almost no previous contact, he expresses enthusiasm, calling it a "challenge".

Hey, where can you do something like this? A station with this perspective, with this music mix, and with this, on the one hand most profoundly public-service [...] mission behind it, and at the same time it is really modern and forward going and when I look at our Facebook page and I see the comments, how enthusiastic people are, or the e-mails, I think it's super.

When talking about the station, he uses terms such as "modern," "urban," "perspective," "forward-looking." These categories are different from those more frequently used in discussions of migration or the multi-ethnic society in Germany, such as "community," "ethnic," "minority," and "multiculturalism," carrying connotations of old-fashioned and overcome left-wing policies. This negative association is also present in the terminology used in the brand positioning strategy of Funkhaus Europa from 2011, which juxtaposes "cosmopolitanism" and "provinciality," "homeland sounds" and the "pulse of the world."<sup>59</sup>

Thomas wants the station to address a new generation of migrant descendants, an urban German society with multiple inter-cultural contacts, a synthesis of "colorfulness." In his interview, however, he places himself outside of this generation, as an observer of a new "folk" on the streets of German urban areas, a deliberately self-conscious "bio-German,"<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>58</sup> Interview with Thomas, September 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author.

<sup>59</sup> The brand positioning as Global Sounds Radio was discussed in Chapter 5.

<sup>60</sup> "Bio-German" (*Bio-Deutsch*) is used as a self-ironic term, to denote German citizens without a migration background.

Yes, it is the folk, that I see time and again when I am on my way in cities like Cologne or somewhere, a folk that I did not detect like that ten, twenty years ago. [...] One has several worlds in oneself and it is getting to be more people who live here, who have that. And it is not such a small childhood like mine was, but a broader one, in a positive and a negative sense, because it can also mean difficulties. And on the one side it comes together with, in quotation marks, perfectly normal bio-Germans, but who now also have a new horizon, because they travel abroad, because they network around the world through Facebook. The world is, at least in the enlightened classes, getting more international, more cosmopolitan, more tolerant too. So, that is the folk that I imagine, but I know that it is only a part of the society.

Following its new strategy, Funkhaus Europa does not address concerns of individual ethnic communities, but the segment of the society that consists of the immigrant-descendent population, and the enlightened, tolerant, and open part of the “bio-German” population. These two groups form the cosmopolitan audience interested in contact, sharing, mixing. Some carry “several worlds” in themselves, the others get to know the world(s) through travel, music, food, Facebook friendships. Belonging to an ethnic group is no longer a distinctive feature for a radio station like Funkhaus Europa; instead, the interested audience is united in a cosmopolitan openness that puts both the German and the ethnic audience on the same level.

In terms of the “worlds” existing within Germany, reporting on them is still a unique selling point of the station, but should be treated as “salt in the soup” rather than as the main ingredient. For Thomas, highest attention must be paid to not excluding a major portion of the audience, which does not belong to the ethnic community a report is about. This “major portion” is implicitly German. The rhetoric of inclusion through over-reaching content “interesting to everybody” is a fundamental part of Thomas’s elaborations on the station. He explains various station decisions with this wish not to alienate parts of the audience. Among them was the 2013 program schedule reform, which moved all the foreign language programs to a later time slot. Thomas explains that with this reform, “ethnic multiculturalism” has not been swept from the station, but is “only sorted differently,” starting later in the evening.

And the other side is that, when you have a part which should be over-reaching, I mean multi-ethnic, so to speak, then you have to, in my opinion, you have to do it according to criteria that enable this over-reaching approach, so that really

different ethnicities, including the German listeners, stay with such a diverse station. For this reason, we have undertaken a stronger separation. Within the German language shows we do not go so profoundly into individual ethnicities any more, which is interesting only for one ethnicity, or, let's call it mother-tongue, whatever, but it is interesting for everyone.

Thomas explains the wish for “over-reaching,” “inclusive,” and “accessible” content with practical concerns with “how radio works,” and refuses to see such station decisions through a political prism. Speaking of Germans as one among “different ethnicities,” he annexes the term from the context of the anti-discrimination struggle and implies that German listeners might be in danger of exclusion through reports that do not concern and thus cannot interest them. The following are two examples:

When it is only the necessities of this one individual community, then I would say, hmm, do we really have to do that in the German language program? I would say that many things that come from the communities, that you can replenish them, and they are topics that have an overreaching interest, then we must protect ourselves a little from ourselves, so that we do not throw the baby out with the bath water, so that you don't say, we don't do any community stories. That would be completely wrong, then the salt would be missing from this soup. But you always have to see if the topic is really reaching out of the community.

[...]

Those are just things that don't come from profound questions; they are simply mechanisms of how radio works or does not work. With the ethnic direction, it is simply so that in the moment when you go strongly in this one direction, you exclude everyone else. Here you have to make a clear decision. [...] If you say there should be an overreaching element, that addresses everybody together, including, when I speak of the ethnicities, I always mean including the German-speaking one, then you have to do it according to certain rules of radio-making. And then it is not a political argument, but simply how to interest people for a common topic.

The question remains as to whether or not the demand for including a potentially larger audience leads to the danger of submitting a special-interest radio station like Funkhaus Europa to media market models, otherwise applicable only to mass attractive media. Thomas rejects this assessment, conscious of the fact that the station can only reach a limited “interested” audience. When asked about how Funkhaus Europa differs from other public service broadcasters, he names several factors, first and strongest among them being the music, which fills two thirds of the daily broadcasting time. Thomas says he is proud of having a broad diversity in the musical program, a “cultural good” which “opens up worlds in a light way.” Another factor are the topics, community stories, and others that do not play a role in the mainstream programs. On the one hand, these topics are processed through a “special perspective” of the program makers, in which “certain influences come through,” on the other, the protagonists should reflect the diversity of the society.

When we do a street poll on any topic, something that has nothing to do with diversity, with us it must be the goal, right, to reflect everything. Those are small efforts, whereby a part of it, for example, the protagonists but also the presenters, is just a reflex to the situation that this comes too short in the other stations. So if everybody else did it, if they really reflected a cross section of the society, then that part would be a little overcome here, right. But I don’t hope or fear that that will happen so fast, even if one or the other makes it, a presenter with a migration background.

The makers - editors, presenters, and authors – are a “central message” of this radio station for Thomas. He is very much in favor of recruiting journalists with migration backgrounds but it is ambiguous as to what role such people should have on the editorial staff or at the microphone, how far and through what audio means they should be heard on the air as “diverse.”

We do our best there, but we are by far not perfect in all areas, sometimes it is too normal for me, if you like, too interchangeable with WDR2 or 1LIVE, or whatever station. On the other hand, you cannot make it into a dogma. It is a difficult question.

It must be noted that the recruitment criteria for the presenters have been subject to debate within the editorial staff, and in the interview, Thomas offers some insight into what he understands as elements that make out the “diversity” of a certain person into a factor in the

station. For Thomas, the diversity should go as far as being “salt in the soup” that gives a certain hue to the station, a touch that makes it different from the all too “normal” mainstream stations. This color can be achieved by such details as greeting the listeners in a language different from German, or even be contained in a foreign name, which awakens associations, thus permeating the station through something of a journalistic osmosis.

In the ideal case, on the one hand, it is simply the name-dropping, that somebody simply through his or her name embodies, that they somehow have an added value. Or it is the small linguistic things, that a presenter simply lets flow in, something that goes on rather nonchalantly. This way you have already covered this part. The second part is for me in the ideal case that you really have a completely different perspective, like I, for example, cannot have at all, because I don't have parents who have immigrated and no family feasts that are completely different from the German mainstream, and that this is conveyed in the station and in some cases it works really well, that we let such small things flow in, or that the radio makers that we have bring topics from the communities, but those that are overreachingly interesting. And the third thing is this really cosmopolitan part, that we have a really broad perspective, that we have tolerance in the sense that there are so many different great things in the world and also in our country, because the world lives here, that we manage that, which is almost the most difficult part sometimes. I also see, it is a sobering experience that I have for instance made, I see how migrants' groups see each other among themselves, that is not at all with this starry-eyed, bourgeois German worldview, like, we all like each other.

In the interview, Thomas places himself completely outside the diversity he wants the station to depict, irrevocably in the German mainstream (no family feasts, no immigrant parents, a small childhood, a starry-eyed bourgeois German worldview). The audience might share this identity but has acquired a cosmopolitan worldview. It is interested in the world and its diversity as expressed in international music, sound bites of foreign languages, names that awaken associations of foreign lands, and extravagant family feasts. The depiction of difference here is limited to superficial markers and consumable expressions such as music, which make participation in this new, more colorful, but ultimately homogeneous, society easy. The station or the audience do not want to deal with problems such as in-fighting between the migrant groups, or consider relations of social and economic inequality, histories

of migration, or group belonging. At the same time, Thomas is aware that this is but a small portion of an audience and thus ultimately a utopian vision of an island of bliss in the sea of social problems, when he says that

a part of the society is that far. Not everybody is, and in that part that is, not everybody is interested in constantly being confronted with a radio station that is basically circling around diversity, with such a music style and such an attitude. But a part of it is in any case. And this is an attempt to, well, build a campfire, create a public, present a certain broader perspective on the world. But, I am at the same time constantly conscious that precisely in terms of our main topic, diversity, or integration if you like, well coexistence, that it is precisely those who would need it most, those of German nationality or those not of German nationality, we do not reach those people with our content, because we are actually too complicated, too intellectual, too demanding, whatever. So, we do not reach into the problem milieus, either in the, if you like, right-wing German problem milieus, or in the uneducated, Arabs living in Cologne, or [...], we don't reach them with our content.

Considering a possible political role for the station, Thomas is here speaking from the German dominant social position. A political impulse here is not an emancipatory one, but an educational one, contributing to the integration of the problematic immigrants or opening the eyes of the right-wing milieus. The emancipatory element is not present here because the position of power in the discourse is never abandoned. This leads to dealing with multicultural life on the level of music, a name, a sound, without going into the salience that difference carries as an identity-formation factor in the modern German society.

## **6.8 Closing remarks**

The six interviews conducted with people associated with the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa give insight into a range of opinions about how diversity should and can be addressed in the media, in particular through a radio station. However, my analysis of the interviews also shows that underneath the professional discussion, there are whole world-views on relations, forces, and inequalities in the German society. A hope concerning these interviews was therefore that an analysis of them would offer insights not only into the work of a radio station

dedicated to diversity but also into the changing nature of the discourse on the politics of difference in the German mainstream.

Four of the six interviewees, who are themselves representatives of the diversity the station is dedicated to, link their work life to their identity and display emotionally charged responses. In general, a high degree of dissatisfaction with the transformation of the station from one being dedicated to “ethnic multiculturalism” and run by people of various ethnic origins to a station that defines itself as “cosmopolitan” and insists on inclusiveness of a broader audience, was visible. The interviewees described this process as “polishing down,” “searching for the lowest common denominator,” or blunting sharper contours and edges both in the music selection and the word content of the station. Demands of the management of the station, including inclusiveness, overreaching appeal, or accessibility, are applied as benchmarks. Whereas they are handled as requirements for a more professional station, on another level they actually bring about political changes to the station. The respondents see the reluctance to assess the relations of inequality in the society as ultimately leading to a picture of an audience that is out of touch with reality. It must however be noted that all the interviewees belong to the “old generation” of the station, who joined WDR Funkhaus Europa before the re-branding of the station took place.

What transpires in all the interviews is that the respondents separate strongly between the “foreigners” and the Germans in their narratives, both those who are themselves of foreign origins, those who came to multicultural politics in the politically charged atmosphere this topic carried in the early 1990s in Germany, and those such as Thomas, who came into contact with it late. A number of the respondents (Yildiz, Miltiadis, Ioannis) see themselves as ethnicized in their everyday and professional lives. They perceive themselves as belonging to a minority and having to fight for positions in the social middle, often in antagonism to the dominant majority, and all see a conflict when it comes to a redistribution of economic resources, or even more, that of positions within the establishment, such as through an employment position in the public service media.

For all four of them, both their dilemmas concerning work and their personal experiences are accompanied by emotions concerning belonging. Being a part of a minority is also a crucial factor in their identity formation. At the same time, this belonging, that some describe as a “special experience,” becomes a unifying factor not only for a specific community, but for all the people of non-German origins in Germany. This special experience is described by Yildiz

as a “break” in personal history, Amir talks about a common understanding among members of the minorities and code-switching when speaking with members of the majority. Both these and the narratives of Ioannis and Miltiadis point to a perceived division in social positions, including economic and political entitlements, but also to different codes, to two divided discourses, to positions of being “inside” (as in Amir’s reporting “from the inside”) or “outside” and “above.” Seen in this light, the move towards what is labelled as cosmopolitanism, as much as it is unobjectionable on the professional level, is interpreted – or rather felt – by these media makers as a breach into the “inside,” and an attempt to take away the voice of the minority, their control of how this belonging should be interpreted and articulated in the station.

They also feel that on the practical level of radio work, that their “experience” of being a migrant or migrant-descended is not valued as an asset in itself anymore; the “difference” is played out on the superficial level of a name, a musical style, a foreign greeting. They note that the immigrant associations are not automatically protagonists of the content as before, community stories must have an over-reaching appeal. A homogenizing discourse is introduced, about a new, multicultural urban class, that includes both the Germans and the migrants. The synthesis and the sharing are emphasized, but the accent on urbanity and a cosmopolitan feeling points towards this synthesis being played out within a certain social class. The rhetoric of particularity or identity building through ethnic belonging or cultural background is implicitly denounced as anachronistic and segregating. The multicultural experience is interpreted anew. But, whereas on the level of station strategy this is coded as modern and future-oriented, on the level of personal feelings of the radio makers, this reinterpretation is seen as a dispossession of their own experience. They see the new catch-phrases of cosmopolitanism, unity in diversity, mixture, synthesis, and above all “inclusiveness” for the German majority, as having their control over the representation of multiculturalism taken away.

## Chapter 7

### Ideal-type audience – Sami and Carla

#### 7.1 Introduction: Funkhaus Europa and imagined ideal listeners

Within the process of re-branding WDR Funkhaus Europa from an integration station to a cosmopolitan radio, a great deal of thought was given to defining its target audience. One tool of narrowing down the core audience segment in order to strengthen the content profile of the station was the elaboration of its ideal-type listeners, its marketing personas. Starting from more general categories of media user types, developed by the WDR media research unit, an imaginary couple was created specifically for Funkhaus Europa: Carla, a teacher in her late thirties, and her partner Sami. Carla and Sami were given fictitious lives: places of work, apartment, cultural interests, and political views. Their circle of friends, or love of music, were imagined, provided with concrete detail, and elaborated in a paper that was handed out to the radio makers – and this paper will serve as basis for the following analysis.

Sami's and Carla's characteristics served as a grid, enabling the examination of all editorial decisions against the backdrop of the question: Would this piece of radio content interest a listener resembling Carla and Sami in their tastes and lifestyle? The description of Sami and Carla was supposed to function as a touchstone for editorial work, a template for creating radio content fitting within the overall idea of the station, as it was defined at the time. The idea behind the process was to give the team of editors and journalists an orientation tool in order to produce stringent, well-defined content with a strong and recognizable profile. The ideal-type listeners Carla and Sami were abandoned as a working tool several years later, when the station underwent further adjustments, redefining its audience as somewhat younger, digitally savvy, and characterized by a more explicitly cosmopolitan outlook.

Even if these two personas were used as a working tool for a limited period of time only, their descriptions can be analyzed in light of the ways they represented an important media policy shift, implemented in this particular station. In this chapter, I examine the creation of Sami and Carla as ideal-type core audience at the time when the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa was undergoing a brand reform from a multicultural to a more cosmopolitan, more specifically “urban” station. As shown in Chapter 4, this policy shift in turn reflects larger shifts in the

public and media discourse concerning the nature of multicultural life, and of German citizenship today, and those within European concepts, in particular that of “unity in diversity.”

The content of a media channel is not a random collection of items, but in the ideal case follows a clear strategic line, having a strong sense of what kind of “feeling” it incorporates and projects. It is a selection of items that in the best case fit this overall picture: films, reportage, interviews, or radio pieces are as equally a part of it as the choice of the music played and the presenters’ choice of words, his or her attitude, and the way they address the audience. Through all these the channel constructs life-style fantasies for its real-life audience. It offers the individuals listening to or watching a program a fantasy of intimate connection with their individual reality. In other words, what is offered to the audience is a life-world branded as desirable, and those who follow the program accept this. Stuart Hall remarks that the mass media have

progressively *colonized* the cultural and ideological sphere. As social groups and classes live [...] increasingly fragmented and sectionally differentiated lives, the mass media are more and more responsible (a) for providing the basis on which groups construct an ‘image’ of the lives, meanings, practices, and values of *other* groups and classes; (b) for providing the images, representations, and ideas around which the social totality, composed of all the separate and fragmented pieces, can be coherently grasped as a ‘*whole*.’ (Hall 1977: 340, emphasis in original)

On a broader level, through this operation, the media also play a role in the discourse of the nation and national culture. Being explicitly dedicated to culturally diverse living in Germany, WDR Funkhaus Europa offers its listeners ways of consuming cultural difference, and thus partakes in creating a narrative in the economy of Otherness in Germany. As such, it plays a “role in providing arenas for articulating (or masking) national diversity” (Spitulnik 1993: 306), by negotiating and representing cultural identity “in various subtle ways” (1993: 305).

In this chapter, I explore the complex articulation that produced Sami and Carla as ideal citizens through its policy branded as cosmopolitanism, which at the same time was being produced by these characters. As already stated in the analysis of the station brand as cosmopolitan radio in Chapter 5, this radio station can, as can all media, be analyzed as a technology of citizenship. As any media channel, WDR Funkhaus Europa operates by

addressing a defined audience segment, that at the same time it produces as a body of subject-citizens. So, as ideal listeners of a station dedicated to cultural diversity, the way Sami and Carla are imagined says a lot about the ways cultural diversity, and more generally the national identity of Germany as a place of many cultures, are imagined and projected onto the audience at a specific point in time.

I therefore see Carla and Sami not only as ideal-type listeners but also as ideal subject-citizens in the narrative of a modern, mixed, and tolerant society. At the time Carla and Sami were used in the programming work of Funkhaus Europa, their imaginary projected a picture of how a life within the cultural diversity of Germany could be led, and how it should be led in order for it to be the “good life.” I see Sami and Carla as agents in what Lauren Berlant theorizes as a “national fantasy,” elaborated in Chapter 2: in a civil life characterized by discontinuity, they provide for the audience “protocols that at once make legible and ‘manage’ the complexities of the public sphere, sometimes to provide politically invested ‘materials’ on behalf of (a) version of national identity” (Berlant 1989: 16). In other words, the national, ideological fantasy, that makes the wholeness of reality look natural, is the base on which an imaginary framework is created through different discourses, a framework through which the subject interprets the symbolic order, the reality.

I pose the question of what constitutes this particular national fantasy that is the base for the discourse that spawns Sami and Carla in this media channel. In other words, what do the ways this ideal couple is imagined, and the characteristics and opinions attributed to them, show about the ways multicultural living and proximity to ethnic difference is imagined in modern Germany? I also ask: What do the variations in imagining desirable multicultural contact convey about the ways the nation is imagined through time? What do they say about the desirable or permissible ways to embody citizenship in (a multicultural) Germany today? And, what desire or picture of the “good life” does the fictional portrait of Carla and Sami project, that incorporates innocuous diversity in a modern and tolerant Germany?

Especially as vessels for offering affect and fantasy to the audience, I see Sami and Carla as giving expression to one particular version of the concepts of nation and citizenship in modern Germany and show that this particular version is based on a neo-liberal ideological fantasy of the globalized, cosmopolitan citizen. In it, the condition of the citizen is normalized as mobile, ready for any change, and above all self-supporting. It is also cut off from the historical continuum that has led to the present condition. The fantasy conceals both the past fissures and

conflicts, and the present lack of the public sphere, a space in which the terms of citizenships could be discussed and negotiated. Instead, these terms are embodied in private practices, in the sphere of the subjects' intimate lives.

So, what does this particular imaginary of Carla and Sami tell us about the current imaginaries of the nation and the ways citizenship is to be embodied in these imaginaries in Germany? In analyzing Sami and Carla's relationship to the national imaginaries I will rely on the work of Lauren Berlant and her writing on the conflation of the intimate and the public, the politics of sentimentality, as well as on intimate and infantile citizenship and the (neo-liberal, national) fantasies of the good life. I also draw on the work of Anne-Marie Fortier and Sara Ahmed regarding proximity, stranger fetishism, and passing. Even if in certain contexts, for example, in the media, imaginaries such as that of Sami's and Carla's lives are presented as alternative to the norm (as binational or multicultural relationships often are), I will attempt to show how they are commodified in the models of the ideal life.

Also, I will point to the contingency of such imaginary scripts of ideal-types by illustrating the paradigm change that the figure of the young North-African male of Arab origins has undergone in Germany in the period since the creation of Carla and Sami. Due to debates on heightening security measures in the wake of the terrorist threat in Europe and particularly events such as that of New Year's Eve 2015/16 in Cologne, when a group of men of North African origins sexually molested numerous women, the image of the North African young male went from being an exotic and attractive "stranger" to the personification of danger and sexual predation. This transformation points to the practices of categorization and problematization at the heart of the discourse on immigration in Europe, especially accompanying the debate concerning the immigration of Muslims.

However, the transitory character of Sami and Carla as a working tool was explicitly stated very soon after their elaboration, even before the picture of Sami could have become unviable in the editorial work. In the course of editorial work, the focus on the pair as ideal-type listeners was gradually relaxed, and finally completely abandoned. The newly focused ideal-type listeners were imagined as younger and more technology-oriented, active in social media and more mobile, as visible in the catchphrase "the rolling suitcase generation" that was used informally among the radio makers to describe their imagined audience after the era of Sami and Carla. The picture of Sami and Carla, however, represented the imagined listeners at an important moment concerning the policy changes underlying this radio station. It was the shift

from it being described as a multicultural station to one celebrating cosmopolitanism. In this way, studying Sami and Carla provides insight into how the embodiment of citizenship that could represent this cosmopolitan feeling was narrated. I shall therefore first look at the more general question of how and why an ideal-type audience is created for a media channel in the first place.

A great deal of literature on the media deals with the relationship and interaction between media texts and audiences. The analyses cover a large spectrum of theoretical approaches, ranging from top-down approaches that theorize media audiences as passive recipients, manipulated by dominant media messages, to those that examine the oppositionality or multi-vocality of audience responses to the media. They ask questions on how media texts construct realities and how they can be subverted, and analyze the interplay of mediations between media and culture. A number of authors apply the analysis of media discourses in multicultural contexts or media discourses of race and ethnicity (Saha, 2018; Barker 2001; Shohat and Stam 1994, 2002, 2003; Abu-Lughod 2002; Askew 2002; Ginsburg 2002). However, how does a marketing persona, the ideal-type listener, or rather the ideal-type citizen, work in this process?

It is worthwhile to pose the question of how a target group for a certain media channel is created in the first place and why. What is the purpose of simmering a broad target group, such as “young trendsetters” or “culturally interested listeners,” down to a set of concrete characteristics that can then be pinned onto an ideal-type couple? What is actually being done when radio makers imagine their listeners and endow this couple with names and backgrounds?

In glossaries of media terminology, target audience is defined as “the specific group in society for which the media product is designed, and to which a media product should appeal,”<sup>61</sup> and which “may be defined in demographic or psychographic terms, or a combination of both.”<sup>62</sup> In a media glossary of the German public service broadcasters, target audience is defined as a “localization of a basic population (for example, the inhabitants of Germany) to a certain group of persons according to socio-demographic, psychographic or consumption-relevant characteristics” (NDRmedia 2018) All the above definitions point to the roots of the term in the area of marketing, of product placement. The elaborations of target groups, especially the

---

<sup>61</sup> <http://www.nzqa.govt.nz/qualifications-standards/qualifications/ncea/subjects/media-studies/glossary/>

<sup>62</sup> <https://www.mediafederation.org.au/component/cobalt/item/688-target-audience?Itemid=131>

very specific categorizations such as those of concrete marketing personas, show that a media channel is developed as a product, intended for a specific portion of a population that is estimated to be attracted to certain traits of it. Indeed, target audience groups for media broadcasters are often worked out by marketing agencies specializing in the collection of demographic and other social data, with their analysis and the categorization of the population based on criteria such as gender, age, income group, consumption behavior, and others. Thus, the audiences are sorted by their demographic details, psychological profiles, behavioral patterns, and lifestyles.

First, a general target group is defined, which is then narrowed down, fleshed out with specific characteristics, in order to produce the perfect fit for a specific channel – or rather a perfect fit for what a specific channel wishes to become. The process of defining the ideal-type listener of WDR Funkhaus Europa in 2010 parted from broader categories used in the public service media, which placed this station among those appealing to trendsetters and listeners interested in culture. Narrowed down to fit Funkhaus Europa, Sami and Carla and their “life world” were created by the media research department and with partial involvement of the editors working for the station itself.

Marketing personas are created based on a template, which is used to flesh them out: they are given names and imagined as people with concrete characteristics. Their hair color, age, and gender are specified. The books they read are listed, along with their interests in music, favorite sports, favorite TV-shows, the places they have traveled to, and the place where they live. Their apartment, their tastes, their favorite meals, all these are described and illustrated by generic photos from photo agency collections. These all aim at creating multi-dimensional characters, so that the details of their imagined lives can be more easily visualized and “felt” by the content makers addressing audiences that resemble the marketing personas in their tastes. For example, if a media outlet has marketing personas who are a married couple in their early forties, home-owners living in the suburbs, parents of two children, and owners of two cars, the offering aimed at a target audience they represent might choose to broadcast topics on education policies or car insurance and play an occasional pop song from the 1990s.

These topics and music would, on the other hand, fall out of the grid created by the picture of Sami and Carla, even if it is accepted that the audience of Funkhaus Europa might be married, have children, or be home-owners. While working with ideal-type listeners or viewers, media makers are “completely conscious of the fact that the spectrum of the potential audience is

naturally much larger,” as pointed out by the head of station of Funkhaus Europa at the time. “At the same time, an orientation of the station on such tangible individuals, brings it more structure, recognizability, and reliability, so that even those people who are not exactly like Carla and Sami are provided with an easier access to listening” (translation from German by the author).<sup>63</sup>

The concrete work procedure suggested at the time in Funkhaus Europa was to re-examine all content, “a topic or a piece of music or even the way that hosts and reporters address the audience” against the question of whether “it could interest people like Carla and Sami or if they would appreciate it.”<sup>64</sup> At the same time, this did not mean that something could not be broadcast if the answer to the question was “no” or “maybe,” but it meant that this should be “not the rule, but the exception.”<sup>65</sup> The ideal-type listeners are therefore explicitly *not* intended to be measured against reality but rather to be used as a tool in the production of a media channel that *in sum* would appeal to the target group – the sum of whose ideal and salient characteristics they embody.

So, what were Carla and Sami like, what narrative of citizenship in modern Germany and Europe did they tell? And on a further level: what kind of national fantasy spawned them?

## 7.2 Ideal listeners – Sami and Carla

The printout of the results of the working group that created Sami and Carla in 2010 (WDR 2010)<sup>66</sup> opens with a picture of a couple, man and woman, pictured from behind, sitting and embracing, a picture that is found on all the pages listing their characteristics. Their faces are never shown.

The pages are organized under headings, among them “personal data,” “political views,” “interests and hobbies,” “work,” and so on. Sample photographs loosely connected to the heading are strewn around the listed bullet points, such as pictures of a living room, of book covers, music CDs, various dishes, magazines, and so on.

---

<sup>63</sup> E-mail by Thomas to the Funkhaus Europa editorial team 27/10/2010.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> All references to Sami and Carla are from the print-out “Zielhörer für Funkhaus Europa”, HA KomForS/Medienforschung, 2010.

Sami is described as a German national with a migration background, although only identified as from “North Africa or Asia Minor.” He is 34 years old, has a high-school diploma and works as a freelance Web graphics designer. Carla is 37 years old, she is German with distant South-European roots, and holds a university degree in humanities. She works as a teacher of French and German. Sami and Carla share a four-room rental flat in one of the urban centers of the Ruhr Area. They have no children, “but are not averse to the idea of having them,” they have no pets, “but are not animal haters” (translation from German by the author). Their combined net income is around € 3,000 a month.

Their furniture comes from Ikea, the flat is decorated with holiday souvenirs, inherited pieces, and bits and bobs from the flea market. In their free-time, they like going to the cinema and the theater, and they travel. Carla practices yoga and pilates and collects picture books of travel destinations, whereas Sami plays football and likes going to concerts. Sami is also interested in technology and in politics, although he is not politically active himself. Carla likes traveling, she has *Wanderlust*, is less interested in politics and her views lean somewhat to the left of the political spectrum. Both have artistic interests and both like music, mostly Cuban rhythms and “other international sounds.” Carla watches American TV series (of the time), such as “Grey’s Anatomy” or “Sex and the City,” Sami is more the Internet and entertainment electronics type. He reads sports magazines, manuals on Web design, and crime novels, Carla prefers women’s magazines, self-help books, and novels by Elizabeth George. Both read a regional daily newspaper.

In terms of their values and points of view, Sami is very highly motivated in his work. He sometimes indulges himself with a product – consumption goods in general are important to him. He supports gender equality and concentrates on what he is good at, such as handicraft and technical work. He is ecologically conscious, but no activist. Carla in turn is highly motivated in her work, although a little less than Sami. As opposed to her partner, she is critical of consumerism and is very ecologically conscious. She finds the house chores a nuisance and wants division of chores at home.

Sami aspires to personal success and feels cosmopolitan. His grandparents were religious Muslims, but he was raised in “a very reduced sense of Islam.” Today, he keeps a certain distance towards it, and stands for tolerance and equality of cultures. Carla is strongly in favor of gender equality and is not religious. The keywords describing Sami’s values and attitudes are “success” and “openness to the world,” whereas for Carla they are “justice” and

“dedication.”

Their food tastes differ slightly: Sami likes eating, especially meat, but rarely cooks. Carla likes French, Asian, and crossover cuisine, as well as vegetarian dishes. They go on vacations three times a year, including one holiday each without their partner. They take short trips to European cities, and a long summer vacation, usually in the South of Europe.

The couple’s political and cultural viewpoints are listed under the heading “Cultural relations.” Sami has great sympathies towards Germany, a country he fully considers his home. He also feels European and wishes for “more Europe.” Carla is instead rather critical and dissatisfied with Germany. In terms of Europe, her attitude swings between criticism and disinterest. Both have a big and multicultural circle of friends and are interested in and open towards other cultures.

The type-casting of Sami and Carla can raise several questions, among them: What does it uncover about the politics of difference as seen through the eyes of the media makers of this particular station? More broadly, what does this ideal couple say about the narrative of national identity and that of difference in Germany today? How is citizenship imagined in the discourse of this station? What would be the conditions for obtaining it? And finally, what picture of the good life in a multicultural situation is constructed here?

Carla is an ethnic German, but with some mixed blood in the third generation. It is, however, not the blood of the Other of German immigration history – Turkish or East-European – but of a culture ranking high in terms of perceived cultural prestige: her grandmother was French. As opposed to Carla, who can see her French component as “added value” to being a full German citizen, even in economic terms, since she earns her living as a teacher of French, Sami is not “biologically” or “historically” a national. As a direct descendent of migrants, he has acquired German citizenship at a later point. Therefore, he is statistically still listed as somebody with a “migration background.” He is probably also marked as a foreigner through his physical appearance. In the context of the German discourse on immigration, the legislative framework and the statistical method that marks second and third generation migrants as people with a “migration background,” Sami not only cannot fully be seen as a German, but also cannot fully live his personal patriotism towards that country.

Instead, he transcends his patriotism towards Germany into one towards Europe. Sami is imagined as feeling something akin to “constitutional patriotism” (*Verfassungspatriotismus*),

an attachment to the values of liberal democracy transcending the attachment to the national, or in the sense elaborated by Jürgen Habermas, as an expression of a “post-national identity of the constitutional state” in a culturally and politically “westernized” Germany (Habermas, 1987: 169, translation from German by the author). In short, Sami is attached to the narrative of Europe as a multinational, democratic cultural space, and Germany as a part of it. This attachment to democratic supranational values, however, conceals the situation in which an attachment to national values on his behalf – as a visible minority and a second generation migrant – would not be fully possible in Germany.

In this, Carla has a completely different starting position – her citizenship was not acquired, it has not been given as a “gift” by the receiving country, her full national belonging is not questioned in any way. As opposed to Sami, she is somewhat critical towards both Germany and Europe. Born into both Germany and Europe, she is entitled to a critical attitude. She can question the validity of the norms and values defining her citizenship, without risking that her loyalty as a citizen could be put into question. In a certain sense, she is entitled to a more reflecting, a more intellectual and differentiated approach, to the question of what constitutes her citizenship and what constitutes her national identity, than the migrant, who is expected in the first step towards belonging to accept all these wholesale, when given to him. Sami’s over-identification can also be read as gratitude: he has been let in to participate in the imaginary of Europe as the home of the “good life” and he does so with conviction.

At the same time, through this gratitude, Sami projects to the Western community the affirmation of its self-worth. As Sara Ahmed points out in her study *Strange Encounters. Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality*, which has been discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, it is the figure of the “stranger” that must be instrumentalized in order for the production of the (Western) self and community to function. Regardless of whether the proximity of strangers is deemed threatening, as in monoculturalist politics, or welcomed, as in multicultural openness, for Ahmed, the very

definition of the nation as a space, body, or house *requires the proximity of 'strangers' within that space.* [...] The proximity of strangers within the nation space – that is, the proximity of that which cannot be assimilated into a national body – is a mechanism for the demarcation of the national body, a way of defining borders within it, rather than just between it and an imagined and exterior other. (Ahmed 2000: 100, emphasis in original)

At the same time, the stranger is de-historicized: by being identified in advance as one who comprises all that is “beyond,” the “stranger” is static, pre-existing and lacking in agency, with agency at the same time being strengthened on the side of the (Western) community. This stranger fetishism “*invests the figure of a stranger with a life of its own insofar as it cuts ‘the stranger’ off from the histories of its determination*” (Ahmed 2000: 5, emphasis in original). In other words, multiculturalism can function in reasserting the value of cultural hegemony, where the (White) elite premises that difference must be reconciled within a common culture, and excludes differences that can challenge the values that culture is predicated upon. At the same time, the framework that has defined Western (or European) values is seen as “neutral and universal” (Ahmed 2000: 110).

So, how to read the physical proximity of a “natural” national citizen, Carla, to a stranger, Sami, in this case? How is their conceptualization situated within the negotiation of “nation”?

The example of the couple’s religious affiliations can provide interesting analysis here. Carla is not a believer. It is not explicitly stated what her religion is, but the very omission shows that she is implicitly a Christian. Her secular stance is a product of her culture, of the privatization of Christian religious practice, so that her religious belonging or non-belonging is a matter of individual decision. Her religious background is therefore “neutral” in the sense theorized by Wendy Brown in her writings on Western secularism. Brown observes “the tacit universalization and generalization of Christianity tendered by this model of secularism” as casting religions (in the European case this refers particularly to Islam) as “insufficiently privatized (and) improperly tamed – excessive, possibly dangerous and certainly pre-modern” (Brown 2012: 5).

Sami’s relationship to his religious roots needs more explanation in the marketing persona description, in order to be seen as unproblematic. His description includes the explicit statement that his relationship to the “Islam of his grandparents” is “very distant,” generationally speaking twice-removed. Sami has embraced secular containment, “a sign of the modern” (Brown, 2012: 5). Sami is not only “liberated” of his religious roots, he has symbolically cut off ties with his family history.

Reading the description of the couple, we learn nothing of whether Sami’s or Carla’s relatives play any part in the life of the couple, and get no inkling of their family histories at all. We also know nothing about whether Sami’s ancestors migrated to Germany for political or economic reasons, as refugees or as “guest-workers.” Both Carla and Sami are characters

detached not only from family histories, but also from economic or national histories, and from the history of the South-North migration. They embody the conditions of their citizenship on a social, political, and economic *tabula rasa*, in the space of private, intimate encounter. So, even if, as every encounter, it is happening in a concrete historical, political, social, and economic setting, not free of friction, this encounter of the “natural” with the naturalized citizen, is smooth, it is – happy.

Anne-Marie Fortier observes that the agenda of emotions has come to dominate the multicultural debate in general. “The feeling states of multiculturalism are organized around an *economy* of feelings: the production, circulation, and distribution of legitimate feelings for and within the nation” (2008: 102, emphasis in original). For Fortier, the media are crucial in circulating sentiments, feelings, especially through their highly personalized approaches: through stories about people or by developing very concretely defined target audiences. Their images highlight “the currency of feelings and their differential value within the wider economic structure of feelings that delineates the codes of conduct of good multicultural citizenry” (2008: 102).

So, what do the mass media do when they imagine their ideal listeners as citizens in the zone of their privacy, in their intimate lives? The intimate sphere is the sphere of sensation, of feeling. The process of using someone like Sami and Carla in making a radio station involves much less the question, “What do I know about my audience?” and much more often, “What *feels* right for this radio?” What is the *feeling* that the editors have about the *lifestyle* they should project? Difference is here physical and sensual, it is something that can be tasted and consumed, it can be worn, felt, heard, and experienced, it characterizes a lifestyle. The encounter with difference is not a matter of political negotiation taking place in the public sphere, but is something played out in intimacy, on the level of affect, sensation. In this economy of feelings, however, as Fortier points out, the burden of labor falls on the minoritized position, often required to make the majoritized subject feel better (2008: 102).

Within the relationship of Sami and Carla, Sami remains the minoritized subject; he is the less “adult” of the two. He is not only biologically younger, he also earns less and possesses a lower educational degree than his partner, who is older and more intellectual. Furthermore, their citizenship is not realized to the same level of fullness. Carla is ethnically and culturally German, which gives her license to be critical of Germany. Sami is somebody who has acquired German citizenship, so that his situation is more precarious.

Always visibly foreign in the public space, Sami symbolizes difference and is “always auditioning for citizenship and social membership” (Berlant 2010). But he also symbolizes the outreach towards forms of difference that can be consumed and incorporated into the life of the couple, that can feed the fantasy of becoming Other, “a fantasy that is increasingly offered to the Western subject” (Ahmed 2000: 119). Sara Ahmed analyzes how the Western multicultural society turns ethnic belonging into a consumption good, a “spice or taste that can be consumed, that can be incorporated in the life world of the one who moves between (eating) places” (2000: 117-118), where difference becomes valued

insofar as it can be incorporated into, not only the nation space, but also the individual body [...]. By implication, *differences that cannot be assimilated into the nation or body through the process of consumption have no value*. (2000: 117-118, emphasis in original)

The Western consumer culture in particular is imbued with fantasies of “becoming” or “becoming like” a stranger, fantasies “in which the Western self ceases to define itself *against* the bodies of strangers” (Ahmed 2000: 119, emphasis in original).

This fantasy not only releases the Western subject from responsibility in the political sphere, it also “confirm[s] his agency, his ability to be transformed by the proximity of strangers, *and to render his transformation a gift to those strangers through which he alone can become*” (2000: 124-125, emphasis in original). For Ahmed, only through the construction of *assimilable* difference do multicultural spaces become inhabited, “difference becomes a style that the white nation and body can put on and take off” (2000: 133). Consumption, becoming, and passing are thus techniques based on the access to knowledges embedded in privilege “which give the dominant subject the ability to move and in which ‘the stranger’ is assumed to be *knowable, seeable and hence be-able*” (Ahmed 2000: 133, emphasis in original).

But, what does this fantasy do to the position of Sami? In Ahmed’s analysis, the fantasies of “becoming” “reconstitute rather than transgress the integrity of the Western subject who becomes” (2000: 119). In this case, they constitute Sami as a Western subject, someone who can enjoy difference – but only on the condition that he has previously let go of his own cultural difference, or that specific difference that *cannot* be assimilated into the nation. He can only enjoy the Other if he *is* no longer the Other. But is this ever possible for Sami to do?

Just how fragile and how contingent on social and political power relations the scripts

surrounding Sami really are, can be seen if we look at the picture of Sami and Carla from the perspective of several years later. In 2010, Sami was narrated as a young male of North-African origins, remotely but not threateningly Muslim, a descendent of migrants, with Carla slightly older than him. From the perspective of only several years later, such a script seems rather surreal: not only did the discourses in all of Europe concerning immigration undergo changes in light of the refugee influx from the Middle East, but a completely new discourse developed specifically around the immigration of young men from the Middle East and North Africa in particular.

Against the background of the increasingly Islamophobic discourse colored by feelings of insecurity and the fear surrounding the terrorist attacks committed in Europe, the events of New Year's Eve 2015/16 in Cologne marked a paradigm change in Germany. The events concerned acts of sexual predation and theft committed against women by a number of young men of North African origins during the celebrations in the center of the city. In the new narrative after these events, young men from the Middle East and North Africa started figuring as embodiments of sexual predation, a picture soon spreading to the majority of the refugee population in Germany, imagined mostly as young men with too much time and pent-up sexual energy on their hands.<sup>67</sup> This in turn led to items on rape or attempted rape committed by refugee men occupying prominent places in the German media.<sup>68</sup> In general, the role of the media – as platforms spreading this narrative as well as objects of criticism for not reporting enough on the “true danger” of immigration – was crucial in this paradigm change.

An example can be cited to illustrate the change in the tone and impact of media texts just a few years after Sami and Carla – the documentary film for young audiences *Malvina, Diaa and love* (*Malvina, Diaa und die Liebe*) in 2017.<sup>69</sup> The film follows the love relationship between a teenage German girl, Malvina, and her boyfriend Diaa, who came to Germany as a refugee from Syria. Shown on the TV channel KiKa for children and young audiences, the

---

<sup>67</sup> During the New Year's celebrations in Cologne a year later, the men of “Southern appearance” were preemptively controlled. Even if this procedure led to sporadic accusations of racial profiling, the police got a strong show of support from large parts of the media and the public – this also shows to what degree the imaginary changed in its affective content within the course of only one year. It also indicates a new hierarchizing within the social power positions – not only between the ethnic Germans and the migrants, but also among different groups of immigrants, with especially Muslim and specifically Arab men becoming high on the scale of “undesired” immigrants.

<sup>68</sup> One indicator of the depth of change in the public discourse is the decision of the German Press Council in 2017 to change its guideline on reporting crime. Under the pressure of public debate, in which the media were accused of hiding facts on the propensity to crime by Muslims and refugees, the Council changed the older recommendation that the ethnic origin of the perpetrator only be named if in “justified relation to the crime” to a guideline that recommended the ethnic origin be named “in cases of justifiable public interest.”

<sup>69</sup> <https://www.kika.de/schau-in-meine-welt/sendungen/sendung103934.html>

film sparked outrage on the populist right and in the far-right Internet forums, with representatives of the Alternative for Germany party claiming it “indoctrinated” German teenage girls and promoted subordination of German women to Muslim partners. The broadcaster found itself in the midst of public controversy, forcing the management to issue statements on the intentions of the film and appear in a panel talk with a representative of the Alternative for Germany to discuss its impact.<sup>70</sup>

In the case of Malvina and Diaa, it was precisely the fact that their encounter was played out in the intimate space of their love relationship, that it struck the central core of the narrative of physical and moral danger to the White, German/European woman/girl that had developed in the space of only a few years. So, whereas at the time of Sami and Carla’s creation the picture of a young Arab man and a German woman was a slightly exotic, attractive image, only several years later, a person like Sami would be at least tainted by connotations of sexual predation, lack of control of his urges, being a violent, feared, and dangerous Other, and not to be trusted when he proclaims distance to religion or support for gender equality.

This dramatic transformation makes evident just how fragile scripts on the encounter of ethnic difference are in the ongoing struggle between competing interpretations of social reality. Or in other words: in her analysis of the “Politics of Good Feeling” (2008), Sara Ahmed talks about “unhappy racism” turning to “multicultural happiness” in what she calls “the affirmative turn” in the British discourse on multiculturalism. Events such as the Cologne New Year’s Eve in turn show how quickly “multicultural happiness” can turn into exclusion of one particular group from the happy picture, how quickly happiness can turn into fear and rejection.

The transformation of the imaginary around the “Arab man” in German media (reflecting a trend in the European media in general), lays bare the discursive nature of the construction of the meaning of the person “Arab man” within the media. It shows how aspects of the social world are contingent on discourses competing for the definition of what is “true.”

For Foucault, the most powerful discourses, and media discourse is one of the powerful discourses, “in terms of the productiveness of their social effects, depend on assumptions and claims that their knowledge is true. The particular grounds on which truth is claimed – and

---

<sup>70</sup> <https://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/Malvina-Diaa-und-der-Shitstorm,kika150.html>  
<https://uebermedien.de/24344/malvina-diaa-und-der-hass/>

these shift historically – constitute what Foucault called a regime of truth” (Rose 2002: 138). These regimes of truth are constructed through a network of disciplinary practices, that were discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. It is through the practice of classification that individual diversity is categorized into uniformed groups, through the practices of normalization that offer the picture of the norm against which “truth” is measured, and finally through the practices of problematizations that define the norm in comparison to the deviant. The practices of categorization are at the core of the discourse on racial and ethnic diversity, including the creation of the norm and the demand to integrate into the majority or “leading culture.” The discourse of problematization, on the other hand, permeates the rhetoric on immigration and particularly the immigration of Muslims and refugees into Europe.<sup>71</sup> The picture of Sami, as well as the picture of the Syrian teenager Diaa, are neither arbitrary nor do they originate outside the discourse on immigration in general. Rather, they are products of processes of categorization and problematization inherent in the construction of “claims to truth” and originating at the very “intersection of power/knowledge” (Rose 2002: 138).

So, how would the marketing personas of a radio station dedicated to cultural diversity be defined today, if the tool were used again in the editorial work? Would the picture be “naturally” adjusted to the discursive turn, just by what “feels” right or less right? Or would this particular media channel stick to a counter-discourse? And finally, to what degree – if at all – can media texts “disagree” with the mainstream media discourse (even if this disagreement is born as a reaction to it) or even completely disengage from it and the accompanying problematizations?

If we follow Lauren Berlant, a national fantasy is crucial for the political legitimacy of the nation, not only as evidence of its Utopian promise, but also as a record of the “discontinuous, contradictory, ambiguous, and simply confusing elements of civil life,” mostly to help citizens manage the complexities of the public sphere, or “sometimes to provide politically invested ‘materials’ on behalf of one or another version of national identity” (Berlant 1989:16). Whereas the paper on Sami and Carla reconstitutes Sami as a “collective subject or citizen,” translating him “into a realm of ideality and wholeness” provided by the national identity (1989:19), with the national identity being idealized as a multicultural society in this specific case, the new narrative of sexual predation de-constitutes Sami as a citizen, excluding him from the new national fantasy.

---

<sup>71</sup> For a more detailed discussion see Chapter 1.

In 2010, however, the image of Sami and Carla as lovers did not stand in opposition to the mainstream discourse but personified the logic of enriching and happy diversity. Sami has fulfilled the first condition of belonging and let go of histories – religious affiliations, the history of South-North migration, the economic imbalances that bring people like him to Europe. All the sharp edges are smoothed out and Europe can be embraced as a space of belonging, on the basis of shared values. The second condition for harmonious blending is that the encounter with difference is contained in the intimate space of the private life of a couple, where difference can be consumed and celebrated in bite-sized manifestations. There is, however, no development towards something that could outgrow the sum of the offered parts, since the couple are cut off not only from the past, but also from the future. They live in the present tense only.

With foreign elements not intruding or disrupting but instead being taken into their intimate lives through consumption – through travel, food, or music – there is no option or space for the unintended or the unexpected. Excluding any risk of precariousness, however, works only on the condition that Sami and Carla embrace the political and also the economic setup of the “good life” in diversity: not only with a multicultural circle of friends, respect for equality of the sexes, and with a general love of European values, but also through their modes of consumption – with Ikea furniture, vacations in the South, and the dishes they dine on.

Ready to “let the past go and, with amnesiac confidence, face the prospect of the present” (Berlant 1997: 33), Sami and Carla are modern-day personifications of Lauren Berlant’s “infantile citizens,” a notion discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Berlant shows how in the setting of a late capitalist withdrawing state, which she sees in the U.S. of the late twentieth century, familial politics start to define what citizenship is. Citizenship is privatized, with the sphere of private life turning into the core concept of politics, played out in the “intimate public sphere.” At the same time, the real public sphere, a common public culture, where questions of the community are discussed and negotiated, is dissolved. Even in situations where the national space is separated by economic, social, or ethnic divisions, the narrative of what constitutes the nation depends on “personal acts and identities performed in the intimate domain of the quotidian” (1997: 4), with citizenship turned into a “category of feeling, irrelevant to the practices of hegemony or sociality in everyday life” (1997: 11).

Sami and Carla are imagined as a private, closed system, in the permanent present tense. They share the same space of dwelling and have physical contact, but no dynamic or aspiration for

the future is hinted at. They are described statically, caught in a snapshot. They are not only unlikely to change anything in the public sphere, but this snapshot does not allow turning multicultural life into a topic of contestation or even discussion. Imagining the multicultural encounter in this way closes the space for discussing the political or social change that such a life brings – the intimate public sphere is not the public sphere where such change can be negotiated. Instead, in the intimate public sphere, questions and anxieties about the changing nature of the nation-state and about the terms of citizenship are contained within a limited field, and pacified.

So, what do the mass media do when they imagine the multicultural encounter in this way? When all the editorial decisions are examined against the grid of this imaginary, it leads the discourse on the multicultural citizenship in a certain direction. In the words of Berlant, “the fetal / infantile person is a *stand-in* for a complicated and contradictory set of anxieties and desires about national identity” (1997: 6, emphasis in original). Citizenship is as a matter of fact apolitical, acted out by non-citizens, within the intimate space of their relationship. At the center of the discourse on national identity, it contains the potential of change within its limits, closing off the possibility of placing it within the public sphere. Sami and Carla are personifications of the process that Berlant refers to when she points out how today,

(d)ownsizing citizenship to a mode of voluntarism and privacy has radically changed the ways national identity is imagined, experienced, and governed in political and mass-media public spheres and in everyday life. (1997: 5)

In this sense, the picture of Sami and Carla, within a radio station aiming at a cosmopolitan feeling of life, corresponds with the wider neo-liberal policies that aim to produce, and normalize, the conditions in which citizens are de-politicized, mobile, open, well-educated, and ready to accept all changes, regardless of the traumas of the past. It creates a fantasy of cosmopolitan belonging that, however, clashes with the real conditions of belonging, which are marked by economic insecurity, structural inequalities, and even racism, and which are crucially contingent on the discursive (power) struggle around social scripts.

## Part IV

This part of the dissertation focuses on the term tolerance and its representations and articulations in the media, and looks at how these articulations relate to discourses of diversity, citizenship, and identity in Germany. Moving within theoretical frameworks of the post-Foucauldian governmentality approach, the analysis in the following chapter concentrates on one specific case: a thematic week in 2014 organized by the Association of German Public Service Broadcasters, the ARD, dedicated to the topic of tolerance.

Why analyze this particular media event? As opposed to radio stations such as WDR Funkhaus Europa, dedicated specifically to cultural diversity, integration, and cosmopolitanism, that was the focus of analysis in Part II of this dissertation, this media event was part of the media mainstream. Being an event aiming at the largest possible audience, not a niche, offers insights into the dominant perspective on modes of living with diversity at a particular point in time. Next to integration, tolerance has become one of the central terms in the discussions on ways of dealing with or responding to cultural diversity in Germany and in Europe, prominent as a way of establishing good multicultural co-existence. Also, it is also a term that has gone in and out of the discourse of difference: following its heyday in the 1980s, when many NGOs and projects dedicated to diversity in Germany contained the word in their name, it somewhat faded from public statements concerning modes of living with difference. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has experienced a revival, but in a different sense: its reappearance in public discussion has gone hand-in-hand with the growing problematizations around migration and particularly around Islam, which has become almost synonymous with “intolerance” in the public debate in Europe, and is seen as a religion and worldview that oppresses women and rejects people of other faiths. Here, tolerance has increasingly grown into a discursive demarcation line distinguishing the West from the “intolerant others.”

The following chapter analyzes the operation of tolerance as a technology of government, as well as the ways this was relayed through media content within the ARD Tolerance Week.<sup>72</sup> Several questions are asked in this context, among them: How was the concept of tolerance treated in the media programs during the ARD thematic week? How was tolerance discussed

---

<sup>72</sup> Media channels as technologies of government were discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

by the participating media makers and how was it filled with meanings? Was it stretched to encompass unexpected fields? Was the term explored and questioned in the discussions, or did the media makers look solely for ways to translate it into media programs? How did they do this? In what areas of life, in what contexts was tolerance depicted? Which individuals, behaviors, practices, or groups were seen as in need of tolerance? Who was awarded the role of tolerator? What assumptions lay under these articulations? And finally, what kind of social and national fantasy did tolerance convey?

I analyze tolerance under the premise that media policies affect the lives and livelihoods of citizens. As Chris Shore and Susan Wright (1997) point out, public policies, as well as media, actively constitute social reality, "they give shape and meaning to what we call reality and are often designed not so much to generate public support, but to construct what they propose, in order to bear on the governance of the social" (Božić-Vrbančić 2010: 91). For Shore and Wright, it is, therefore, important to analyze "naturalized" assumptions that often frame public policy or media content, or to put it in Ahmed's words, to examine „what programmes actually set out to do“ (2004).

In addition to this, and mostly inspired by the work of Wendy Brown (2008, 2014), tolerance is in this analysis explored as a discourse of depoliticization. In her debate with the German philosopher Rainer Forst, published in the book *The Power of Tolerance* (2014), Wendy Brown argues that tolerance is a discourse of power and that it has depoliticizing effects. It re-marginalizes its objects (ethnicities, sexualities, disabilities, cultures), the objects "that it pretends to absorb, equalize, or emancipate" (Brown and Forst 2014: 18). Tolerance today is taught as a way to negotiate the encounters with others. Wendy Brown sees its main purpose, however, in governing, in constituting subjects.

Within this theoretical horizon, I begin the analysis with the concept of tolerance as the topic of a thematic week presented by German public service broadcasters. I continue by considering the choice of persons from public life to be the patrons of the ARD Tolerance Week and conclude with an analysis of the advertising campaign that accompanied the thematic week in November 2014. The material is analyzed in terms of the role and effects of tolerance in subject construction and the creation of an economy of belonging, specifically within the framework of the politics of difference in Germany. In other words, rather than discussing the concept of tolerance as such, I look at the effects of this term in the German multicultural situation, of how it articulates with the neoliberal systems (Brown 2008, 2012,

2014), as well as to what ideal it aims in subject-citizens and subjectification. In short, the analysis will look for the effects of tolerance as a practice that creates certain subject positions.

Again, I approach the analysis of the ARD thematic week both as an insider and an outside observer. As WDR coordinator for the radio content during the ARD thematic week, I took part in the preparatory meetings, had an insight into the broadcasters' radio planning, and discussed the topic and ways of presenting the thematic week through the media with many colleagues. Together with a colleague, I also developed a comedy series on the topic of tolerance for the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa. Therefore, by "studying through" (Wright and Reinhold 2011) this media event, by analyzing what was said at the meetings, what was written in the press material, what particular programs were to be produced and producing content for the subject myself, I was following "a metaphor, or circulation of an idea" (Marcus 2005: 12), in this case the path and effects of "tolerance."

## Chapter 8

### Tolerance Week

#### 8.1 Thematic weeks of the German public service media

In April 2006, the German Association of Public Service Broadcasters, the ARD, launched its biggest media event produced by all its members thus far: the first ARD thematic week. Under the title “Living, what else?”, all the TV, radio, and other channels of the ARD took part in the event dedicated to the topic of cancer. All in all, the ARD channels produced 265 hours of broadcasting (Staschen 2006: 303), dedicated to a large array of topics around cancer, an illness that affects 420,000 German citizens a year. In the multitude of items, including feature films, documentaries, reportage, and an opening ceremony with 300 guests hosted by star tenor José Carreras, the aim was to treat the topic in its many facets and in a manner that was “complex, serious and reliable. Above all stood the main goal of the ARD thematic week: To take cancer out of the taboo zone and make clear that the diagnosis means above all one thing: ‘Living, what else?’” (Staschen 2006: 303).

The first ARD thematic week was deemed a large success: it presented an innovative way of cooperation among all the members of the public service broadcasters’ Association, as well as bringing the many channels into a novel and successful large-scale cross-media project. However, except for the content reasons, the main motivation for organizing such an event had to do with the need to emphasize the necessity for the existence of a big and expensive public-service media machinery. It was the proclaimed aim of the thematic week to point out the public value that the PSBs bring to the society in an environment that at the time was presenting them with the challenge of digital transformation as well as with the need to justify their existence in the face of rising popular and political pressure – pressure that would grow steadily in the following years. The strategy group of the ARD that came up with the proposal of the thematic week also pointed to the “difficulty of making the legitimization of the ARD clear to the citizens who pay their license fee. Why is it important to have public service media? What is the use of them for the people? What do they get for their money, for their license fee?” (Staschen, 2006: 302).

A singular model among the European public service media, the ARD consists of nine regional broadcasters, each with its own various radio, TV, and digital channels. All the broadcasters, among them the West German WDR as the biggest, broadcast their own regional channels and contribute to the ARD TV-channel, known as the 1<sup>st</sup> German TV channel, that broadcasts to the whole country. The system also includes a TV channel for German speaking countries, 3sat, the German-French channel ARTE, the children's channel KiKa, and the youth multimedia platform Funk, along with 64 regional radio stations and the three stations of the German-wide radio Deutschlandfunk. The sheer quantity of the broadcasts, and the costs this entails, have in recent years led to growing pressure, especially, but not exclusively, from the populist right, calling for the abolishment of the license fees for public service broadcasting and a re-examination of the system as a whole. As a consequence, the need to point to the public value and the social importance of these media has become paramount for the broadcasters and was one of the motives for starting the thematic weeks. With them, the broadcasters wanted to offer "something socially relevant, that does not obey the laws of the market, but the necessities of a transparent democratic society" (Staschen 2006: 302).

Since 2006, the ARD thematic weeks have been organized once a year. They are coordinated centrally, by one of the nine regional members of the ARD, with all the broadcasters dedicating a good portion of their programming to the given topic, through their TV, radio, and digital channels. The ways in which the given topic is articulated in media formats can vary widely, but it usually includes interviews with experts or with people affected in some way by the topic, as well as reportage and documentary formats, fiction films, and many other forms. Some of the broadcasters reach into cross-media fields, social media, or approach the audience using various interactive formats, complemented by events such as concerts or public discussions. The thematic weeks are always branded by jingles, image films, and other audio and visual layout packages produced especially for the event.

One of the ARD broadcasters is responsible for the overall coordination of the thematic week as well as for originating the topic itself, which usually arises as a result of exchanges with relevant social institutions and groups such as political initiatives, religious institutions, and civil society. On the organizational level, there is a coordinator for the TV, radio, and the Internet in each of the regional broadcasters, who is in charge of coordinating the programming in their sector. This coordinator of each of the sections informs all the program makers involved, makes sure the deadlines are met, and so on. Further down the

organizational ladder, there is an editor appointed for each newsroom or subsection who then coordinates the output of their department.

The thematic week starts with a kick-off meeting of all the broadcasters at the beginning of the year. The coordinators in the TV, radio, and Internet departments of all the broadcasters, the agency in charge of public relations of the thematic week, the marketing experts, and all those involved in the central planning, take part in this meeting. During the meeting, the representatives of the broadcasters are offered a program of lectures, discussions, and workshops concerning various facets of the overall topic. Speakers from very different areas, among them academics and lecturers, representatives of NGOs and various initiatives, activists, media makers, business leaders, and others, offer their expertise on the subject, thus introducing various perspectives on the topic. The aim of the program is to inform the editors present, offer new perspectives on the topic, and inspire participants to the innovative possibilities of presenting the topic through their media channels. During the two-day event, deadlines are agreed upon and contacts exchanged. The exchange among the broadcasters continues throughout the year through regular e-mail updates and telephone conferences. The work culminates when the actual thematic week takes place through the media channels, usually in October or November of each year.

The tradition that started in 2006 has continued throughout the years, and like the topic of cancer, the topics addressed have continued to deal with existential questions that address everyone and position the broadcasters as providing strong public value. In 2007, the thematic week was dedicated to children, under the title “Children are the future,” and in 2008, “More time for living” addressed demographic change. “It is a matter of pride!” concentrated on citizens’ volunteerism in 2009, whereas “Food is life” dealt with nutrition in 2010, looking at an array of subjects, from the methods of producing food, cultural identity as transported through different dishes, through to topics of environment, trade, economics, and health in relation to nutritional habits. “The mobile human” concentrated on mobility in 2011, and “Living with death” on the topic of death and dying in 2012. In the following year, the topic was “Happiness,” and in 2014 “Tolerance,” a topic that will be central to the analysis in this chapter. Next came the week dedicated to “*Heimat*,” a German noun signifying home, homeland, or country of origin, as well as, in a figurative sense, the feeling of being at home. In 2016, the topic was “The future of work,” and in 2017 it was faith, under the heading

“What do you believe in?” In 2018, the title of the thematic week was “Is this fair?”, dedicated to the topic of “justice and social equality.”<sup>73</sup>

## 8.2 ARD Tolerance Week

The week dedicated to tolerance was coordinated by the Bavarian broadcaster Bayerischer Rundfunk (BR) and it took place from November 15<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> 2014. All in all, over 500 hours of radio and TV programming were produced and broadcast during Tolerance Week, as well as an online package and several accompanying projects. The radio channels of the ARD broadcast over a thousand pieces, amounting to 275 hours of programming. The television channels dedicated 255 programming hours to the topic of tolerance, reaching 32.50 million viewers (Egger 2015: 136). The palette of formats included fiction films, documentaries, reports, interviews with experts and with members of minorities, talk shows, correspondents’ reports, interactive tools, such as “tolerance self-tests,” and so on. There were call-in shows, and online and social media content. A poetry slam “#freedomofspeech – The Tolerance Slam” (*#Redefreiheit – Der Toleranz-Slam*) was organized in Munich, and a school week on tolerance took place in an array of primary schools.

So, how was the topic of tolerance presented in the context of such a large media event by the public service broadcasters? Or rather, how was tolerance understood and articulated in the media content? And, how did this media discourse articulate public policies concerning dealing with difference?

Throughout the first decade of the ARD thematic weeks, one can easily observe that all of the topics treated were “big questions”: they were multi-faceted enough to offer an array of perspectives, questions, and protagonists to fill many formats and programs for a whole week. No thematic week dealt with trivial topics; rather, they addressed the very core of human existence: four out of ten topics contained the words “life” or “living,” and one included the noun “human” in their title. Covering illness, the feeling of happiness, citizenship, dealing with death, eating, aging, work, justice, and religion and faith, all the topics were “organised around the management of life” (Foucault 1998: 139). They addressed the conduct of life, the questions of how citizens are to live in specific fragmented life spaces, and how the

---

<sup>73</sup> [https://www.dwdl.de/nachrichten/66534/ardthemenwoche\\_widmet\\_sich\\_2018\\_der\\_gerechtigkeit/](https://www.dwdl.de/nachrichten/66534/ardthemenwoche_widmet_sich_2018_der_gerechtigkeit/)

phenomena “characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, birthrate, life expectancy, race [...]” (Foucault 1998: 317) are rationalized and managed. All of the ARD topics also worked on creating a feeling of belonging to a population, while being constructed around the questions of how “we” live, eat, believe, where “we” feel at home. At the same time, the public service broadcasters positioned themselves as a reliable partner in mediating the given existentially important topics – as the service, contributors, and added value providers to citizens as part of the community:

The ARD is valuable for all. Only the ARD can report comprehensively and profoundly and show complex topics in a professional manner. “You are in good hands here”; this is the feeling the broadcasters want to create in their audience. (Staschen 2006: 303)

Tolerance can also be counted into the “big questions” and is also a way of conducting life with others. It addresses the population, the citizens, and rationalizes or discusses specific conduct – the way in which citizens can deal with objects of tolerance, or rather, deal with difference. And again, the public service broadcasters took upon themselves the role of an authority in these questions, the role of producing an authoritative discourse on the subject. Indeed, an ARD survey on the perception of tolerance and tolerance deficits in the society, published a day before Tolerance Week, showed a “high positioning of the media, especially the public service broadcasters, in mediating tolerance” and “the social need for this topic to be dealt with comprehensively and in various journalistic dimensions” (Egger 2015: 144).

So, the first question that can be asked here is: why tolerance? Why was this term chosen as “big” enough or crucial enough in the social discussion to justify one whole media week dedicated to it?

As in the institutional discourse of the European Union, in Germany tolerance is generally lauded as a noble virtue, the desired way of conduct when in contact with difference – religious, cultural, ethnic, and other. In the German context, the centrality of tolerance is a value initiated from the field of religion, with associations dedicated to tolerance often originating with the big Christian churches. Today, numerous NGOs dedicate their work to promoting tolerance in the culturally diverse society, and the discussion on tolerance is lively in institutions and in the educational system, mostly in relation to inclusion policies. A perfunctory Google Scholar search for papers by authors writing in German and dealing with tolerance shows titles such as “Promoting tolerance in public education,” “Teaching tolerance

in education,” “Tolerance in a post-liberal era,” “Tolerance through education,” “Tolerance and the minority religious groups,” and so on<sup>74</sup>, all situating tolerance in the realm of the political and the collective. In the public debate in Germany, tolerance is generally discussed in the context of democratic order and rules of citizenship and it is regarded as a value distinguishing citizens of a developed democracy. Indeed, the ARD survey showed that almost 90 percent of respondents considered themselves to be tolerant (Egger 2015: 138). Therefore, tolerance is “a central term of a democratic, open society,” as ARD program director Volker Herres stated in the press booklet accompanying Tolerance Week (Bayerischer Rundfunk 2014: 5).

So, what role do the media play, when they put tolerance at the center of their interest? How is the choice of this topic by public service broadcasters to be understood? Indeed, how do the public service media place themselves in the biopolitical sphere when they dedicate big media events to such topics as life, death, or faith? What can be said of the role of the media week in the multicultural context? And what does all that say about processes of normalization and problematization at work within the society and in relation to the cultural politics of difference in Germany?

In the preparatory ARD meetings and discussions, tolerance was understood as an essential part of the civilized interaction of citizens in a liberal democracy. It emerged as a way of “managing” the contact with difference, invoked and applied in encountering a whole range of experiences – from managing the innocuous difference of opinion on the personal level to the moments when solutions for coexistence with categorized and unwanted difference are needed. The picture of a tolerant society went hand in hand with that of a cosmopolitan society open to the world, so that tolerance in this context was understood as one of the pillars of “our way of life.” At the same time, tolerance was kept as a very broad term, one open to be filled with concrete cases and examples in its media articulations during the ARD week – ranging from such everyday exercises as dealing with loud children playing to such politically charged topics as migration or freedom of expression. Tolerance was described as an atmosphere, an attitude, a “climate,” that could be sought, found, and exercised consciously, or even learned – on the one hand, it was understood as a precondition for the coexistence of citizens within a democratic setting, and on the other, as a consequence of it, an achievement in the development of civil society.

---

<sup>74</sup> All the titles mentioned were translated by the author.



Fig. 6 – ARD Tolerance Week – ARD Themenwoche Toleranz – screenshot of the web page

In this context, the media undertook the role of instructing, showing tolerance to be the “rational,” “civilized” way of responding to people or phenomena deemed outside the social norm, while at the same time in individual media examples showing that even tolerance has and should have its limits.<sup>75</sup> Not only in the media channels, a school week on tolerance (*Aktion Schulstunde*) was organized parallel to the media week. All over Germany, primary school children and their teachers were invited to “deal with the different facets of tolerance,” because “children who learn early to be tolerant will profit not only in school, but in all life situations.”<sup>76</sup> The proclaimed objective of the school week was to offer tolerance as the response of choice in cases of contact with difference, as stated in the accompanying text:

The world is colorful. Somebody who is strange or foreign today, will be familiar tomorrow and maybe even the best person in your life. Everybody should take everybody the way they are – that is tolerance! If everybody lived that way, life would be much easier. (translation from German by the author)<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup> One such example was the feature film *The end of patience* (*Das Ende der Geduld*), based on the true story of Kirsten Heisig, a Juvenile Court judge, impotent in the face of rising juvenile delinquency and institutional obstacles in tackling the situation in a problematic Berlin neighbourhood.

<sup>76</sup> <https://www.rbb-online.de/schulstunde-toleranz/>, translation from German by the author.

<sup>77</sup> <https://www.rbb-online.de/schulstunde-toleranz/>

The fuzziness of the term tolerance that appears here, taking it to denote a way “everybody” should live their lives, to make it “easier” for everyone, in a sort of colorful unity-in-diversity, was present in the discussions of the media makers as well. These were often struggling to find novel ways of “translating” the term into media content and avoid the clichés of multicultural or multi-religious coexistence. This is illustrated by Joachim Knuth, the then chairman of the ARD radio commission, who wrote in the press booklet,

The radio stations of the ARD dedicate themselves to the whole conceptual width of tolerance. Its concrete application can be somewhat treacherous at times. Not everybody understands the same thing about tolerance, so contradiction, paradoxes, or even conflicts can ensue. For example, reporters of the young radio stations of the ARD will conduct self-tests on tolerance in everyday life. What happens when somebody eats a kebab early in the morning on the commuter train? Or when somebody uses a wheelchair and needs help to overcome stairs? (Bayerischer Rundfunk 2014: 5, translation from German by the author)

For media channels, this breadth of the term made tolerance a “grateful” subject, since the categories invoked when applying tolerance – disability, migration, sexual orientation – could be shown as images; it was possible to illustrate what the encounter with tolerance looked and felt like, and how it could be shaped and organized. Within the ARD Tolerance Week, this included pieces on topics such as same-sex partners with children, Syrian refugees living in a town infamous for neo-Nazi attacks, the everyday life of a young man with Asperger syndrome, and the life of an ex-prisoner after his release.

When all these media examples are considered, the general idea of ARD Tolerance Week and the individual projects involved, such as the school week, becomes clearer: to promote understanding and social cohesion, and not deepen social divisions. However, the media examples expose marginalized groups, such as migrants, refugees, people with disabilities, same-sex partners and others, as being outside the norm. So, on the one hand, it was the underlying aim of the thematic week to show tolerance to be the “right” response to difference, to that which is outside the norm, while on the other, the media makers were actively encouraged to engage in “controversial discussions about particularly disputed individual topics” (Bayerischer Rundfunk 2014: 26). An excerpt from the press booklet for Tolerance Week illustrates this approach:

How do the young people learn to appreciate tolerance as a fundamental characteristic of a living democracy? How does an open and tolerant attitude towards other cultures and lifestyles, and social attitudes to norms and regulations, manifest itself? How can tolerance be actively lived in the professional and private life, and not just suffered passively? [...] Where is the border between tolerance and acceptance? How to define the limits of tolerance? (Bayerischer Rundfunk 2014: 26, translation from German by the author)

Therefore, while tolerance is seen as a “fundamental characteristic of a living democracy,” reflecting a long liberal tradition when taught or shown to be the “desired” response to difference, at the same time, the operation of tolerance creates subjects and defines their conduct in diversity. In her book *Regulating Aversion. Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire* (2008), Wendy Brown analyzes tolerance as a tool of governmentality that influences the “conduct of life,” and analyzes its effects in the neoliberal system as those of not only responding to deviance, but also producing the norm and deviance in the first place. That is, she sees in tolerance the practices of problematization and normalization, as well as that of creating saturated minority identities (homosexuals, foreigners, Muslims).

### **8.3 Preparing the ARD Tolerance Week**

The kick-off meeting of the ARD thematic week on tolerance, that took place in March 2014 in Munich, endeavored to not only kick start the organizational machinery of the ARD, but also to offer the media makers inspiration on ways of approaching the topic, and finding new ways of representing it in their programs.

During the two-day meeting, tolerance was detected in very different social spheres, and filled with different meanings. These concerned migration and cultural diversity, the rights of homosexuals and people with disabilities, child poverty, tolerance in Christianity, ethnic comedy, (in)tolerance on the Internet, and even diversity management strategies in business. Since it was a meeting of media makers, the principal questions circled around questions of how to represent and show tolerance in the programs during the thematic week. The question was not “what is tolerance?”, but rather where to look for stories involving tolerance or intolerance, and how to put these on the screen and on the air.

The meeting offered a rich program with speakers from very different fields: among them representatives of the Christian churches, anti-racism activists, homosexual visibility campaigners, and others. In other words, there were both “experts” on various facets of the topic, and representatives of minorities, or potential “objects of toleration.” For example, a panel entitled “Sometimes only humor can help – on dealing with intolerance” included an Iranian-born film director, a book author who suffers from multiple sclerosis, and a Turkish-born stand-up comedian. People in this panel represented or articulated difference through their persons: through their bodies with a handicap, or through their origins. They also presented themselves as persons articulating certain histories of problematization to the majority, the mainstream, the norm. They were explicitly asked about their experience of differing from the majority, and seemed to accept this role, telling anecdotes and stories, some of them funny, and some sad.

In this panel, and in many others during the two-day meeting, the discussion of the media makers circled around the struggle for recognition and against discrimination – sometimes humorously, sometimes politically. There was talk of “us” having to be tolerant towards those who are different from us, but it was not discussed how “we” was defined, or how it came about that “we” get to decide whom to tolerate and whom not to tolerate. It was not discussed what constitutes difference, or where the threshold for difference is situated. Does illness count, or does it count only when it causes a visible handicap? Does a foreign origin count as difference in itself, or does it constitute difference only when the person in question uses and articulates it, such as the comedian of Turkish origins? Does homosexuality constitute difference as such, or only when it is expressed in public, when it is visible?

The participants on the panel on humor were speaking under the premise that their identities were marked, even saturated by difference. So, even if the operation of tolerating these identities is not the exclusive way of problematizing the categories of “migrant,” “person with disability,” or “homosexual,” tolerance does stabilize their belonging to these groups, outside the norm, saturating their identities by this one “deviant” characteristic. The Muslims become defined by their religion, the homosexuals by their sexuality, the handicapped by their disability. On the other hand, the operation of tolerance also defines the norm as something universal and neutral. In the words of Wendy Brown, this

quality of saturation results from the normative regime and not from some quality inherent in the identities or practices. However, in aligning itself with

universality and relative neutrality, the unmarked-because-hegemonic identity also associates tolerance with this standing and, conversely, associates objects of tolerance with particularity and partiality. (Brown 2008: 186)

In this framework, tolerance is not only a way of dealing with deviation from the norm, but also an operation constructing the norm and the ideal citizen, by marking subjects who are to be tolerated as those outside the norm. Thus, it deals with the question of how difference can be governed or managed, without overcoming the category of difference, which, through the very operation of tolerance, remains immutable.

Rainer Forst, who debates with Brown on the “power of tolerance,” does not challenge this reifying of belonging and difference, but proposes to negotiate it through rational discourse. Arguing in the tradition of communicative rationality theory, Forst sees tolerance as a way of dealing with difference that does not erase difference or question the processes of problematization and normalization in the establishment of deviance and norm. While one is called upon to question the reasons for rejecting difference (or defining it in the first place), one is not expected to abandon these reasons for the sake of non-antagonistic coexistence with what constitutes difference. In order for tolerance to move from affirming the status quo of power imbalances, Forst breaks tolerance down into hierarchical stages—moving from a “permission” to a “respect conception.” This conceptualization comprises a paradox: here, emancipation “can [...] at the same time mean to fight for and to fight against toleration – that is, to fight for and against certain forms of recognition” (Forst 2007: 216). Thus, there is a right and a false recognition – recognition as an individual or a group with equal rights, or recognition from a higher power position – in short, tolerance is in its core paradoxical, since it can simultaneously lead to emancipation and to a reification of marginalized identities. For Forst, toleration is thus “a *normatively dependent concept*, one that is in need of other, independent normative resources in order to gain a certain content and substance – and in order to be something good at all” (2007: 217, emphasis in original).

Both the view that there are different levels to tolerance that can be exercised actively, and the view that tolerance needs to stop somewhere, point to the assumption of tolerance as being based on *rational* reasoning. That is, the act of tolerating comprises a rejection of the Other, and the rational decision not to discriminate is a consequence of this aversion. However, this decision does not have political effects, leading to a peaceful coexistence with something one is averse to, and does not lead to the equality of the tolerated object. So, while personal

tolerance for Wendy Brown refers to “a willingness to abide the offensive or disturbing predilections and tastes of others” (2008: 13) and cannot be criticized, tolerance as governmentality is related to the “enactment of social, political, religious and cultural norms” (2008: 13). At the same time, it turns political action into a “therapeutic project,” and justice is turned into a matter of respect and sensitivity.

Significantly, one of the main questions posed during the discussions of the media makers in Munich was also where the limits of tolerance are, where “we” should “rationally” stop our tolerance. Where should we stand when faced with those who refuse tolerance, or attack our tolerance? Where do we draw the line where our tolerance must stop in order to protect the groundwork of our social order, including our tolerance? Ulrich Wilhelm, director general of the Bavarian broadcaster BR, also invokes the limits of tolerance in his contribution to the press booklet for Tolerance Week:

With our ARD thematic week [...] we want to take you on an exploration tour, from the questions of everyday coexistence to the limits of our tolerance – there, where the human and democratic quality of our society is defined. (Bayerischer Rundfunk, 2014: 5, translation from German by the author)

Here, the knowledge of how to tolerate and the willingness to use tolerance as the right response to aversion becomes the “human and democratic quality,” the line dividing “our society” from others. In the discussions in Munich, one line where tolerance reached its limits was detected when dealing with the extreme right, another when dealing with Islamist fundamentalists, both seen as embodying non-tolerant political positions and a propensity to violence. Indeed, the lack in tolerance has, in recent years, become a recurring motif of media discourse when showing the incompatibility of Islam with the European mode of life, contrasting the cosmopolitan and open West to the fundamentalist Other. For Wendy Brown, tolerance here

emerges as part of a civilizational discourse that identifies both tolerance and the tolerable with the West, marking nonliberal societies and practices as candidates for an intolerable barbarism [...] with tolerance in and as a civilizational discourse distinguishing Occident from Orient, liberal from nonliberal regimes, “free” from “unfree” peoples. (2008: 6)

In the context of the “civilizational discourse” of the West, and in line with the subject-making operation of this media discourse, tolerance becomes something that can be taught, and something that can be learned by those citizens not “naturally” versed in living in a pluralist society, for example, migrants from patriarchal societies. Under the premise that migrants do learn this fundamental virtue of living in the West, multiculturalism can in consequence be associated with positive values, “articulated through a conservative discourse of tolerance and an economic discourse of comparative advantage” (Nolan & Radywyl 2004: 58).

To illustrate this, I invoke an older media example, not pertaining to Tolerance Week, to show how this discourse was articulated in a time when Islam and Muslims were perceived in a more benevolent light in the German media, and the overcoming of cultural differences was seen as almost just a step away: the WDR documentary TV series *The Özdags (Die Özdags)*. Broadcast starting from January 2007, the series follows the everyday lives of the Özdags, a family of Turkish origins living in Cologne. It was the first documentary soap in German public service TV dealing with a family of migrants, the real-life Özdags, owners of a famous, fine oriental bakery in a mostly Turkish-populated neighborhood of Cologne. The series shows the everyday business and private life of the family: the devout Muslim parents, Hasan and Aliye, and their more secular children, the daughters Selda, Zülya, and Hülya, the sons Uzay, Nebil, Aydın, and Servet. Hasan, the first-generation immigrant from Turkey, is a strict father, but lenient with his daughters. The children call him a “family dictator” but love and respect him at the same time. In the individual episodes, the series strives to show the changes in cultural attitudes of the younger members of the Özdag family. For example, one daughter marries an African American and the rest of the family must come to terms with him not being a Muslim. In one episode, one of the sons rejects a half-serious proposal to marry a girl from Turkey, asking what he would do with a woman who does not speak German. In another instance, one of the daughters complains that her child is not learning “proper German” in kindergarten because of all the migrant children there. In one episode, one of the sons is revealed as a lover of German *Schlager* music, which prompts his brother to tell him he is “more German than the Germans!” As the magazine *Der Spiegel* asked in one review, “[a]re the telegenic, eloquent Özdags, who all have an education and an income, maybe cast too much like a picture book family, some sort of multicultural propagandists of the public service broadcasters?” (Luley 2008, translation from German by the author).

The WDR accompanied the broadcast with a TV-report in one of its local news programs: “The strong daughters of Hasan Özdag”<sup>78</sup> concentrates on the relationship of the three daughters to their more conservative parents. The report has the girls talking about how they disagree with their father’s commanding style but still respect him for what he has done for them and built in Germany. The report ends with the scene of a same-sex couple, regulars at the Özdag bakery, entering the shop and talking to one of the Özdag sons. He in turn explains how the bakery is expanding its assortment into making figurines of couples for same-sex wedding cakes. The author concludes: “[t]he three daughters are emancipated and strong [...] It has been a long way, but it has paid off: for our palate, for their business, and for the life in Germany” (translation from German by the author).

Therefore, the second generation of migrants has embraced progressive German and European tolerance, rejected racism and homophobia, become economically successful, and are “building something in Germany.” They are indeed displaying cosmopolitan tolerance where it is not explicitly demanded of the Germans (same-sex marriage), and “enriching” the German society to the point where this enrichment can be consumed through the smell and taste of their fine oriental bakery. But, who is this “multicultural propaganda” (Luley 2008) of diversity as enriching and harmonious actually directed at? On the one hand, it is the German audience, those willing to “taste” the difference in the form of oriental sweets, and at the same time rest reassured that the contact with difference will bring no friction as far as common values are concerned. On the other, it is also an educational example for the migrants themselves, showing them that tolerance towards Others (African Americans, homosexuals) is a prerequisite for belonging, a sign of true integration. Here, tolerance sets in motion processes that create subjects as liberal, through their changing attitudes, their speech, their behavior.

#### **8.4 Patrons and advertising campaign of Tolerance Week**

Every ARD thematic week has had one or more patrons, public faces chosen to carry the message of the thematic week to the audiences. These faces of the ARD weeks need to embody in one way or another the given topic, either through their public statements, their publicized attitudes, or their work. These are always personalities of German public life, from

---

<sup>78</sup> *Die starken Töchter von Hasan Özdag*, Jürgen Kura, WDR, 2009., <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IMI-gJcSRGQ&t=1s>, accessed 12 Nov. 2018

the arts, sports, and show business and have in the past included athletes, actors, a celebrity chef, a classical violinist, and others. The patrons appear in the TV trailers or as interview partners in the programs and generally represent the thematic week in the public.

Three patrons were chosen to represent Tolerance Week: Anna Schaffelhuber, a German Paralympic skier and gold medalist; Pinar Atalay, a TV presenter of Turkish origins; and Jan Delay, a hip-hop musician. How is the choice of the patrons of Thematic Week to be understood? Of course, there are practical concerns in the choice of personalities to represent a media project, the first one being their availability for interviews and appearances during the week in question. But, also, they have to embody or represent the topic in some way. Therefore, the three faces of Tolerance Week were chosen because in one way or another, they were considered to stand for the topic of tolerance.

Jan Delay was chosen for his work because of what he publicly stands for: a diverse, tolerant society, as exemplified through the attitude of openness and the cultural diversity characterizing the German hip-hop music scene. In the cases of Anna Schaffelhuber and Pinar Atalay, the choice as patrons was made for different reasons. These two represent tolerance not primarily in their attitude or statements, they were not chosen for what they thought or said, but for being who, or rather, *how* they are. Anna Schaffelhuber has used a wheelchair since birth and Pinar Atalay is the daughter of Turkish immigrants in Germany. So, both of them – regardless of their attitudes or even of what they would say during Tolerance Week – represent groups in the society that are seen as in need of toleration. They represent this through their bodies and biographies: one of them has a physical disability, the other has Turkish origins and a Turkish name. At the same time, they are also high achievers: one has won Olympic gold medals, the other has made it into the elite team of anchors for a central news program in German public TV, so she occupies a place of “objective authority” for the TV audience. In both cases, it is implicit that these achievements are special, that they are more than the achievements of other people, because they have achieved these high goals in spite of their “handicaps” – physical or social.

Through the choice of its public faces, the thematic week set the goal of promoting tolerance in the society. At the same time, from the very start it moved within fields where processes of problematization and normalization are at work. The choice of patrons said that there are problematic fields in the first place, there are differences that are considered as alterity, “invariably marked as undesirable and marginal, as liminal civil subjects or even liminal

humans” (Brown 2008: 28). By promoting them in a positive way, they were made into objects of tolerance, with those called upon to tolerate, “asked to repress or override their prejudices in the name of civility, peace or progress” (2008: 28).

Physically the two public faces of Tolerance Week – Anna and Pinar – are the material of abjection and resentment. Their bodies, each for different reasons, are associated with exclusion. Whereas the representation of the body of a person with a handicap has become normalized to signal difference, the question is never posed as to why such a body is considered problematic in the first place. In Pinar’s case, however, the representation is not visual, but the presumption of her difference is implicit, as expressed in her name and our knowledge of her background in light of the history of Turkish immigration into Germany.

At the same time, Jan’s position is associated with strength – he belongs to a group that can experience aversion, but that has chosen toleration. In his statement in the press booklet, he does not place tolerance in the political realm, but links it to an emotion, one that is warm and bright, a love that unites all mankind in equal measure. The statement reads almost as one of his song’s lyrics:

Love is the most important thing in life. Every human must give and receive love to survive. The only problem: everybody chooses to love and receive love from different people and things. In order to let all these different “loves” coexist, some smart guy at some point invented tolerance. Because of tolerance there is no “right” or “wrong” love, but only – love. Tolerance lets love live. So, everybody can live his loves and love his life. When there is no tolerance, love gets unplugged. And then it gets dark and cold... (Bayerischer Rundfunk, 2014: 8, translation from German by the author)

In short, through the choice of the three public faces of Tolerance Week, tolerance does not respond to, but rather produces troubling subject positions. Similarly, the advertising campaign for Tolerance Week worked with social groups in presumed need of tolerance. It consisted of four images that formed the basis for the TV and radio trailers broadcast during the thematic week, that were displayed as posters throughout the country.

Each poster showed a photograph of a person or two persons, accompanied by a pair of semantically opposed words and a question mark. One showed a Black man’s face, accompanied by the words: “Burden or enrichment?” (*Belastung oder Bereicherung?*). The

next one showed two young men holding hands and one kissing the other on the forehead, accompanied by the words: “Normal or not normal?” (*Normal oder nicht normal?*). The third showed a little girl screaming, accompanied by the question: “Pain in the neck or the future?” (*Nervensäge oder Zukunft?*), and the fourth poster showed a man in a wheelchair and the question: “Outsider or friend?” (*Außenseiter oder Freund?* all translations by the author). So, while the media makers were urged not to limit the representation of the topic to the usual “problem fields” such as immigration, sexual orientation, minorities, and others, but to look for new topics instead, it was exactly in these fields, in the framework of presumed latent negativity, that the advertising images were located.

All four images showed people of marked identities, ranging from “Black” to “homosexual,” from “disabled” to “obstinate child,” and thus all of them deviated from the norm. The question mark indicated that one part of the dichotomy (burden, outsider, pain in the neck, not normal) presented the audience with the attitude of the “prejudiced viewer,” with the other part supposed to refute this attitude (enrichment, friend, future, normal) through the decision to tolerate. So, while these marked subjects were objects of tolerance, individuals that carried the group identity, members of the dominant group were asked to tolerate

subjects carrying [...] ascriptive identities [...] that harbour orders of belief, practices or desire [that are] cast as significant enough to provoke the rejection or hostility that makes tolerance necessary. (Brown 2008: 44-45)

The campaign led to a strong public backlash: minority groups and several politicians criticized it, and it also met with criticism from the public. The debate continued in Internet forums, with a part of the discussion criticizing the posters, and a part saying the debate itself showed how necessary it was to talk about tolerance in the society. Parodies of the poster campaign circulated on the Internet, with the questions from the campaign, such as “Normal or not normal?” or “Burden or enrichment?” accompanying pictures of politicians or music stars.



Fig. 7 – Posters of the ARD Tolerance Week

The main criticism from minority representation groups was that such a campaign would not foster a real debate on tolerance, and instead of putting “the human at the center and asking for unconditional respect [... the campaign...] does not ask about the human but about his utility,” as Ulrich Schneider, head of the Parity Welfare Association, put it (translation from German by the author). Also, the public service broadcasters were criticized for neglecting their legal mandate and “putting the existence of minorities in question” (Ehrenberg 2014, translation from German by the author). The ARD produced counter-arguments saying that the campaign fulfilled its purpose, which was also “to provoke”, since

it is not about presenting backward ideas, but rather, on the contrary, it is about giving an impulse for reflection about one’s own attitudes and prejudice. Are we, as a society, really as tolerant as we want to be? The question marks on the posters show that we are only posing questions that are already being discussed in society.” (Ehrenberg 2014, translation from German by the author)

Therefore, the first question that arises from the campaign was who it actually disturbed or provoked. Obviously, it was directed not at minority groups but at the dominant position, the position that is called upon to do the tolerating. However, while the posters acknowledged the

existence of prejudice, they actually re-marked already marked subjects. Here tolerance works, as Brown argues,

as a disciplinary strategy of liberal individualism to that extent that it tacitly schematizes the social order into the tolerated, who are individuated through their deviance from social norms and whose truth is expressed in this individuation, and those doing the tolerating, who are less individuated by these norms.” (Brown 2008: 44)

Whereas the campaign started from the premise that prejudice exists, it presented the existence of prejudice as natural. By its question mark behind every dichotomy (friend/outsider, normal/not normal, etc.), it not only showed the mechanisms of exclusion at work but led to the question of whether a campaign that operated from such a starting position could demand social equality at all. In spite of the presumed intention, the posters reinforced the ascribed belonging to marginalized groups, they enhanced the Otherness of tolerated subjects by constructing them as the product of a group identity. On the one hand, the posters essentialized their identities as cultural (as certain practices), but on the other hand, they reinscribed the marginalization of the already marginal by reifying and opposing their difference to “the normal” or “the neutral” (2008: 45). According to Brown, this is one of the ways in which contemporary tolerance takes shape as a normative discourse: it reinforces rather than attenuating the effects of stratification and inequality.

As has already been discussed, Laclau and Mouffe show how subjects are placed into certain subject positions through the institution of the media (or the educational system, the family, etc.). They are ascribed positions in many contingent, sometimes competing discourses, in the midst of attempts to stabilize them and “arrest the flow of differences” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014: 98), with identity arising from identification with certain subject positions. These “nodal points,” or empty signifiers, only gain meaning through chains of equivalence that establish identity relationally. In this way, the ad campaign could be seen as fixing the subject positions of the tolerated. Its message rested upon certain chains of equivalence that arose through the gaze of the audience, whereas at the same time, the campaign articulated these identifications anew. In other words, the operation of tolerance can be seen here as not leading to change, bringing neither solutions nor antagonisms, but continuing to produce positions within society.

Tolerance in the modern Western society has become a fundamental value, something of a right. Being a part of education or an accepted common value, propagated by state institutions,

the educational system, or the church, it operates in the processes of normalization. At the same time, it does not prevent that exclusion and marginalization happening in the name of tolerance. Through its essentialization of the cultures of others, it continues the process of the culturalization of politics, paired with an emphasis on individual freedom, thus actually blocking re-negotiations of the politics of difference in the public sphere. Wendy Brown also sees the operation of tolerance as having depoliticizing effects, which by neutralizing conflict, relegates the struggle for equality to the private sphere and away from institutional responsibility. Tolerance, for Brown, regulates the presence of the Other, or put differently, as a mode of late modern governmentality, tolerance

iterates the normalcy of the powerful and the deviance of the marginal that responds to, links, and tames both unruly domestic identities or affinities and nonliberal transnational forces that tacitly or explicitly challenge the universal standing of liberal precepts. (2008: 8)

Furthermore, tolerance removes the politics included in the positioning of subjects from its historical context of power struggle, so that for example, when people are urged to tolerate another person's race, ethnicity, or culture, they are asked to tolerate "difference" as such, instead of unmasking that the difference in question, or

the identities through which their differences are negotiated, have been socially and historically constituted and are themselves the effect of power and hegemonic norms, or even of certain discourses about race, ethnicity, sexuality, and culture. (Brown 2008: 16)

As articulated in the advertising posters and through the faces of the thematic week as well, tolerance casts culturally produced differences as given, as matters of nature rather than as sites of inequality and domination. Indeed, by producing difference as a criterion for tolerating, it firstly produces difference as a criterion of exclusion. For example, disabled people are seen as dependent and then regarded as "Other" and punished by being excluded from ordinary life, even if the oppression and inequality of disabled people is not caused by their bodily impairments as such, but by the social arrangements, which allow those impairments to become disabilities (Evans 2005).

It is interesting to note that an obstinate child was presented in one of the posters, since children in general are not seen as objects of toleration. How exactly did the child deviate

from the norm? Where was this girl's difference? Was it because she was loud, disturbing the social order, or because she was occupying public space, while not under the control of adults? Or because as a loud girl, it hinted at a future in which she would be a "loud woman"? Was the undisciplined child escaping the position of a passive object of discipline, disturbing the ideal imagined space within which fragmented bodies function?

The picture of the Black man with the question "Burden or enrichment?" also represented the migrant as one who is firstly to be excluded and then tolerated. The word "burden" plays on the recurring theme of political debates on immigration, where migrants are seen as a burden on the social system or on communal life. Through the black face, the chain of meaning between Otherness ("black cannot be German"), through to migration and the debates on immigration policies, is made. Implicitly, this is a case where the majority can exclude or tolerate – even if the word "enrichment" would not normally imply that there is toleration, but rather enthusiastic acceptance at play.

At the same time however, tolerating a migrant is different from tolerating a person with a handicap or who is homosexual, since there is an important demand posed on the migrant, namely the demand to integrate. The migrant is the only one of these three marked identities who can actually change towards the normative standard, through processes of integration or assimilation, theoretically ending the need to be tolerated at some point. At the beginning of the process, however, there is no perspective of ending tolerance (which remains part of a static relationship), since the demand to integrate runs counter to the implied immutability of cultural difference. As Gail Lewis explains, in the struggle to define the parameters of inclusion or exclusion from the nation, two strands of liberal ideology are in tension. On the one hand, it is the tolerance of a certain degree of diversity, and on the other, a tendency to impose a hegemonic normalizing regime which subordinates and disciplines minorities. Of course, the very notion of tolerance is constitutive of an imaginary in which the social comprises a network of hierarchically organized social differences that mark the boundaries between majority/normative/tolerator and minority/deviant/tolerated (Lewis 2005: 540).

In this sense, and regardless of the degree of assimilation, the black skin of the man in the poster remains a marker of difference, with all the assumptions linked through this chain of equivalence. Tolerance here remains, in the Words of Gail Lewis,

a central capillary in a network of power/knowledge underwriting strategies for the governance and representation of heterogeneous populations. One

significant social figure articulating this space of tolerance, governance and representation is that of 'the immigrant', for it is in the immigrant that we have distilled the question as to how much difference can be respected and tolerated and to what extent must this figure be subject to practices of assimilation (2005: 540).

In short: when so-called normal people are urged to tolerate the disabled, when White people are urged to tolerate persons of color, when heterosexuals are urged to tolerate homosexuals, powers that produce these differences, that mark them as significant and organize them as sites of inequality, exclusion, deviance, or marginalization, are ideologically vanquished.

In this way, tolerance actually substitutes for equal rights. Furthermore, this substitution is masked by the expectation that tolerance be performed by individual citizens rather than by the state, so that it “substitutes emotional and personal vocabularies for political ones in formulating solutions to political problems” (Brown 2008: 16). In the words of Wendy Brown,

When the ideal or practice of tolerance is substituted for justice and equality, when sensitivity to or even respect for the other is substituted for justice for the other, when historically induced suffering is reduced to difference or to a medium of offense, when suffering as such is reduced to a problem of personal feeling, then the field of political battle and political transformation is replaced with an agenda of behavioural, attitudinal and emotional practices. While such practices often have their value, they reduce political action and justice projects to sensitivity training, or what Richard Rorty has called an ‘improvement in manners’. A justice project is replaced with a therapeutic or behavioral one. (2008: 16)

The emotionalization of the debate on multiculturalism, the transference of the political public sphere into the sphere of the affective and the intimate, are central phenomena of ongoing depoliticization, as analyzed in the previous chapters. This has large consequences for the concept of citizenship. On the one hand, the state does not do the tolerating, but is the source of the calls for tolerance. At the same time, through the discourse of tolerance and through essentializing differences, the existing inequalities are legitimated. The citizens are called upon to practice tolerance, and in this call they are presented with the normality of saturated group identities marked as deviant, and the normality of their exclusion.

To conclude, the posters, as well as the choice of patrons, illustrate well the new economy of belonging propagated by liberal states. It is an economy that functions as a form of depoliticization and opens the space for the ideal citizen – the one who occupies a privileged position to tolerate; the one who should not condemn. Like other cultural and media programs and initiatives that celebrate tolerance, public service broadcasters' Tolerance Week contributed to this economy by dislocating subjects of tolerance from their original spaces and from the historical problems associated with their construction.

Tolerance was shown in the thematic week to work as a viable supplement for equality, as is the case in the liberal societies that understand themselves as suffused with difference and not only sameness. By converting the effects of inequality into a matter of different practices and beliefs, this discourse masks the working of inequality and hegemonic culture as that which produces the differences it seeks to protect. Whereas in the past, tolerance was used as an alternative to violent exclusion, today it has turned into a generalized language of anti-prejudice, promising a vision of the good society, yet to come. It marks the subjects of tolerance as deviant and marginalized, refusing to take into account the historical and political phenomena, and the powers that have produced the subjects of tolerance in the first place. In other words, it covers over the workings of power and the importance of history in producing the differences called race, sexuality, disability, and others.

## Chapter 9

### Conclusion

Germany today is not only a country receiving (and sending) ongoing migration, it is a country deeply characterized by a diversity of ethnic origins, cultural practices, linguistic habits, and transcultural allegiances in most areas of social life – in short, it is a multicultural society. Almost one quarter of the inhabitants of Germany have a so-called “migration background,” denoting that they either immigrated themselves, or are descendants of at least one parent who has immigrated into Germany. Statistically, every third child in Germany has a so-called migration background at birth, because at least one of the child’s parents are migrants, so that around one third of the people with a “migration background” today have not actually migrated themselves (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2018) – this portion of the population is likely to increase. In several larger cities of west Germany, already over half the young population have a migration background. The life-worlds defined by influences from migration, multilingual upbringing, and intercultural contact in everyday life make up the myriad of facets of identity characterizing the increasingly culturally diverse German society. At the same time, however, the political and institutional discourse upholds the categories of the “majority,” somehow understood to be ethnically German, and the migrants and their descendants, imagined in the bulk (and allowing for the many individual examples to the contrary) as either outside of or only on the margins of the social mainstream.

Immigration into Germany has been continuous since the early 1960s, starting with the guest worker contracts with countries of the European South of the time and continued with economic immigration from the EU and outside of it. Further immigration has occurred with people seeking refuge or political asylum, firstly in the 1990s, during the wars in the countries of former Yugoslavia, and more recently in the migration resulting from the war in Syria, the continuing violence in Afghanistan, and political and economic instability in many other countries mostly of the Middle East, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, during the second decade of the twenty-first century.

The tremendous transformations since the 1960s have affected policies concerning education, the labor market, citizenship laws, immigration laws, antidiscrimination, and many others, but these have for the most part arisen as reactions to the evolving social situation, not as a result

of an encompassing vision on how the future of Germany in the times of globalized movements should look like or be actively shaped. Crises such as occasional labor shortages in individual industrial or service sectors, or the changing make-up and needs of the primary school classroom such as during the influx of refugees from Syria, have led to the introduction of policies that are largely approached as compensatory measures. As pointed out by German authors such as Terkessidis (2010, 2017), such policies have not arisen as proactive measures within a larger strategy concerning living in a society characterized by cultural heterogeneity. The transformation caused by the continuing movement of people as well as the changing make-up of the society has, in short, for the most part not been accompanied by profound institutional reflections concerning the very concepts of diversity, difference, and multiculturalism.

In this way, instead of more inclusive terms, the one term that has been at the center of the German discourse on migration for the past decades is integration. After the end of the active recruitment of the *Gastarbeiter* in the early 1970s, and continuing throughout the period until the refugee migration from the Middle East in the twenty-first century, integration denotes the array of demands posed on the migrants, pointing at the same time to the discursive framework of the nation-state, in which migrants continue to be seen as the exception in need of adjusting to the “normal” functioning of the society. At the same time, integration is central to the political statements of the actors who reject social heterogenization, such as the populist or the far right-wing forces, but used in the negative sense when lamenting “insufficient” or even the “impossible integration” of migrants. In this way, instead of considering what a long-term vision of Germany as a country of diversity could look like, both those who deal with migration constructively and those who reject it, continue to do so from the framework of a static and closed model of the German nation-state, in which migration or other cultural practices are seen at best as an add-on to the “national culture” or “identity,” not as a process that continually transforms both of these for *all* those living in the country and the ways citizenship is continuously remodeled.

This thesis has analyzed the ways in which the cultural politics of difference, nation, identity, and citizenship have been embedded and articulated in the German media, in particular through the public service broadcasters. Within the political debate and the institutional responses, the media discourse has in the past few decades also adopted as central the concept of integration but to a large extent, has failed to look for radically new media articulations of multiculturalism. As Shohat and Stam point out, it is within the realm of the possible in media

production to challenge Eurocentric or national paradigms by radically new articulations, such as those of multicultural belonging, although this endeavor remains mostly reserved for minority programs outside the media mainstream (1994, 2003, 2012). The radio station Funkhaus Europa, part of the public service broadcaster WDR, is an example of a media channel striving to challenge monocultural paradigms – in many ways, through its choice of music and topics, as well as through its team of culturally diverse radio makers. In this way, it succeeds in producing a sense of transnational belonging in its audience. The thesis has, however, also shown that this radio station has in many of its policies and transformations also upheld dominant discourses, even when striving to question them – for example, when defining the subject-citizens of its audience as urban mobile cosmopolitans, at the same time personifying the ideal-type citizens of the neoliberal globalized economy.

The thesis has critically examined the core concepts of the discourse on difference and diversity in Germany – integration, tolerance, cohesion, cosmopolitanism, and others – through the prism of their articulations in the media discourse. It has concentrated on media policy papers, on the analysis of the above-mentioned radio station dedicated to cultural diversity, and on a public service media event dedicated to the topic of tolerance. It identified and examined the core notions of how “difference” is articulated in these channels, looking at where the vectors of power and knowledge intersect in their particular discourses, and how these intersections have moved over time.

What fantasies of citizenship in diversity, what fantasies of the nation do such intersections arise from? In the case of WDR Funkhaus Europa, these movements led it from being dedicated to “integration,” through to “multicultural living,” and finally to an “urban” and “cosmopolitan” audience. So, what do these movements do? What effects do they have on subject citizens, especially the minoritized subjects? And what cultural politics of difference do they uphold? Those were the main questions underlying the analysis, which saw the media as a crucial space of representation in the society, and one where the control and quality of these representations arises from the distribution of social power – which in turn has consequences in a multicultural situation, where difference is still a matter of problematizations. Seen as closely related to social and political power, the media in this case were analyzed as technologies of government in the Foucauldian sense, as not only vessels through which to transfer messages, but as technologies that create subject-citizens. Concretely, they were analyzed in terms of their ability to reinforce discrimination and divisions, to fashion “atomized consumers or self-entertaining monads,” to foster a sense of

common belonging and social cohesion, and to offer alternative, transnational identifications (Shohat 2003: 1). The thesis, thus, in particular, asked how the media discourses of these two case studies relate to public policies in Germany through the ways in which they take part in the discourse on nation and cultural difference, and how they participate in the creation of subject-citizens of the new German diversity. It also asked how they articulate cultural politics of difference and what interests are served by these articulations.

In the first part of the thesis, some of the key concepts of the political discussion and the discourse on cultural difference were highlighted. These concepts show that recent developments, such as those in the course of economic or information globalization, have not only led to ambiguities concerning identity and belonging, but also to a re-negotiation of the concepts of nation: in some cases, however, they have lent the nation-state new strength. In spite of the Western desire for the rest of the world to “overcome” nationally and ethnically based confines and confrontations, such as those embodied in the ideal picture of the European unification and in the (neo-)liberal belief in the force of material globalization as a great eraser of national conflict, neither nationalism nor racism have diminished in the recent decades. Instead, as Étienne Balibar notes, their nature has changed so that after the abolishment of categories of biological race of colonial times, racist violence has moved to immigration as a new category, elevating cultural belonging to an essentialistic category and leading to social distance, which is seen as insurmountable (1991).

Balibar especially concentrates on the constitution of new political entities, such as the process of European integration, as offering a new field for the exploration of nation and citizenship, but also for posing questions of sovereignty and political power. Whereas on the level of public policies and proclamations European integration is hailed as an expression of historical progress towards peace, a culture of inclusiveness and tolerance of diversity, Balibar sees it as also housing mechanisms of exclusion. For him, the exclusion of non-members inherent in the very European project through its preferential treatment of nationals of member states is a crucial obstacle to the development of Europe as a democratic institution. Even if the European project has dissolved the link between nationality and formal European union citizenship, this has not led to a constitution of actual citizenship at the supranational level or to a dissolution of the notions of community in a post-national society (2004).

A crucial question in many discussions concerned with the discourse on difference, cultural diversity, and race, is under which political, social, economic, and cultural conditions racialized categories emerge, and under which conditions they can be made irrelevant. Both Sara Ahmed (2000) and Paul Gilroy (2004) call for a re-historization of stranger-production, for consideration of the history of creating power asymmetries as expressed in today's inequalities and discriminatory practices. Whereas the modern societies of Great Britain or Australia, for example, reject monoculturalism and racialized or ethnic divisions on the level of the official and institutional discourse, and construct an image of themselves as tolerant, multicultural spaces, these are underpinned by hidden hierarchical assumptions. Instead of weakening with the passage of time, the former racialized categories are transformed and again function in the assignment of societal positions. Ghassan Hage (2000) sees in the Australian brand of multiculturalism a "White multiculturalism," whereas Anne-Marie Fortier (2005, 2008) sees the pride of the modern British "mongrel nation" to be "multiculturalist nationalism" at its core, and exposes the fallacies hidden within the official discourse on multiculturalism.

At the center of the discussions considered in this thesis stands a rejection of classifications of groups and identities. Paul Gilroy (2004) questions the categories of "race" as a result of the raciological ordering of the world, and sees this ordering as rooted in imperial history and forming the base of today's patterns of discrimination and inequalities. As an alternative to what Gilroy sees as misuse of power through classifications of and within societies, he offers "planetary humanism" and cosmopolitanism, based on doubt and questioning instead of on hegemony, and on open, destabilized identities and planetary solidarity. Gilroy demands that the simple categories of identity and belonging be rethought and questions posed whether they are at all suitable for reflecting the complexities of life. In the words of popular culture, the energy spent on discussing whether the character of Ali G, played by Sacha Baron Cohen in his Channel 4 comedy series, was

a white Jew pretending to be black, a white Jew pretending to be a white pretending to be black, a white Jew pretending to be an Asian pretending to be black, and so on might have been better spent positioning his tactics in a proper historical and artistic sequence of strangers whose strangeness was functional and educative. (Gilroy 2004: 79)

Sara Ahmed proposes contact as a response, insisting it is crucial to recognize the importance of the *mode* of encounter, not the *status* of the stranger/other. In this way, difference ceases to be something to be judged, rejected, accepted, or overcome, and becomes instead a productive dynamic. She calls for

politics that is premised on closer encounters, on encounters with those who are other than ‘the other’ or ‘the stranger’ [...] bound up with responsibility – with recognising that (labouring) relations between others are always constitutive of the possibility of either speaking or not speaking. [...] It is the work that needs to be done to get closer to others in a way that does not appropriate their labour as "my labour," or their talks as "my talk," that makes possible a different form of collective politics. (Ahmed 2000: 180)

Even if dealing with specific national settings and conditions stemming in part from the historical legacy of British colonialism, the authors discussed here leave the tight frame of the nation-state, and allow a consideration of factors arising from the international markets, global histories of labor and power relations, communications, and global migratory movements in crossing social, cultural, and physical borders of the multicultural society. They refuse to consider racism or multiculturalism in an isolated manner, instead, understanding national space as formed within global interactions – occurring both along the state borders and within them, played out in the transnational experience and everyday practices of diasporas and migrant communities. They are asking for the debate to open up to the possibility of destabilizing the dominant narratives of the nation – this implies the willingness to acknowledge the existing power asymmetries, to process the histories of inequalities, to reject the modern forms of their continuation, and ultimately to redistribute power.

From the theoretical framework discussed above, the analysis turned to the specific political and institutional discourses around immigration and cultural diversity in Germany, as well as responses to this situation in the media policies and their elaborations in the media research in the German language literature. A historical overview of immigration into Germany and the political and discursive responses to this transformation, discussed in Chapter 4, showed the difficult path that has led the political institutions to admit that Germany is indeed a country of immigration in the first place. This admission has, however, not gone hand in hand with legislation that would adjust to the facts “on the ground,” nor a profound reflection on the part of political institutions on questions of what constitutes (national) culture, how identity can be

defined in this new Germany, or citizenship embodied and lived. The contact with “difference” continues instead to be a site of conflict and contention, where a range of institutional responses are negotiated, and where processes of problematization continue to unfold.

The thesis has identified some of the core concepts around which these negotiations turn, integration being the central one. In the German institutional discourse, “integration” is mostly presented as a non-hierarchical concept, one which must be undertaken both by the migrants and the “host” society, and as in the best interest of the migrants if they want to become a part of the German society. It is, however, quickly obvious that integration continues to be a demand strongly directed towards migrants, and in the best case migrants and institutions, but not towards the migrants and the rest of the society, *all* of the citizens. In this way, the narrative of migration and diversity as an exceptional state is upheld, as an anomaly added onto an existing and rather well-defined culture. It is something that needs to be molded in order to secure social cohesion and peace, not as something that continually transforms and redefines culture, state, and identity.

Furthermore, integration is a hierarchical term, based on the model of something well defined and relatively static: a culture, a set of norms, an array of social habits and accepted behaviors, that a migrant can integrate into. When directed at the descendants of migrants, the demand to integrate heightens the power asymmetry involved. It places them as citizens outside of the nation and the norm, still not full social members, regardless of formal citizenship. Integration thus remains a term based on empty assumptions, and while used frequently, depending on the context, it gets filled and re-filled with all sorts of meanings.

The analysis has indeed shown the inadequacy of terms such as integration to respond to the social developments of the recent decades. Even if presented as a “win-win” situation for both the host country and the migrants, integration is increasingly exposed as based on an antiquated national and cultural model, out of contact with social realities characterized by lived transnational practices and multiple memberships. Instead, through the continuing insistence on conditioning citizenship and inclusion on cultural conversion, integration as a consequence upholds the discourse of cultural distance.

At the same time, the term “multiculturalism” has, over the past years, exhausted itself, suffering criticism and rejection on the political level. A part of this fate can be attributed to the often disparate definitions of the term. The edge of critique is here pointed at its alleged

essentialization of identities, due to its defense of group rights. Allegedly reducing individuals to membership in disadvantaged groups, the multiculturalist approach and demands for specific rights and concessions are seen as eternally locking members into their fixed identities and disadvantaged positions. This critique, however, interprets group membership as the unavoidable result of essentialist racial or ethnic belonging, rather than considering those categories of belonging as a product of raciological or other discriminatory ordering of the world. In other words, the critique does not see belonging as based on a history of power inequalities involved in the production of an essential “difference.” Rather, it perpetuates the idea of this essential difference existing and forming the “natural” basis for problematizations within a society, producing what Balibar (1991) terms the current “neo-racism.”

On the level of media and political discourse, the term “multiculturalism” is increasingly being replaced by “interculturalism” or “cosmopolitanism.” Also lacking a clear definition, interculturalism differs crucially from multiculturalism in that it accentuates individual contact rather than group rights. Thought through to its conclusion, this means that the possibility of discrimination due to belonging to historically disadvantaged groups is not acknowledged. Instead, cosmopolitanism celebrates the existing diversity of second and third generation urban immigrants as “enriching” the host country. Its ideal citizen is a young, mobile, economically strong individual, unbound by a history of inequality and capable of being at home in various cultures, due to a set of universally acceptable (Western) cultural norms. Sara Ahmed also relates the term “diversity” to the discourse of new cosmopolitan citizenship, where diversity work is incorporated in the figure of the global nomad, who can move across national borders and feel at home in the world. At the core of both concepts – cosmopolitanism and diversity – there is an implicit wish for social homogeneity, envisioned as a constructive and positive social inclusiveness, a “unity in diversity.” However, for Ahmed, as long as the understanding of the national-state norm and the periphery has not been fundamentally transformed, diversity will remain little more than a decorative element enriching the host culture.

Seeing that the terminology concerning difference and belonging is in ongoing transformation – due to discursive exhaustion, political undermining, and conceptual changes – several authors have proposed new terms with the aim of conceptually coping with existing social realities or leading to conceptual changes of dealing with them. Terms such as super-diversity or civil-integration, proposed, for example, by Vertovec (2004, 2007, 2010) as more appropriate for depicting the complexities of today’s immigration societies and their everyday

cultural practices, reject the hierarchical positions implicit in terms such as integration. They also acknowledge factors that shape social realities more strongly than categories of nationality and which have largely been ignored in the political and institutional discussion so far. Instead of simplistic essentializations of ethnic belonging, terms such as super-diversity acknowledge the widely varying experiences in migration routes and channels, as well as legal and social statuses within and between groups. They also acknowledge the reality of social contact and mixing between groups, leading to new generations with migration backgrounds who cannot be neatly categorized in terms of national belonging. In this way, these terms overcome static models of identity and group belonging, along with the model in which a “host” culture “accepts” newcomers and expects them to adjust. Several authors, among them Gilroy and Vertovec, also concentrate on the city as the arena where the new super-diverse social cohesion (Vertovec) evolves and constantly regenerates itself. It is built in the city but it is also *of* the city, due to its character as a “world of strangers” (Lofland, quoted in Vertovec 2007: 30) in which a capacity for sustaining a functioning grid constructed of random, fleeting exchanges based on ground rules of civil-integration enables the functioning of urban life.

This acknowledgement of the self-regulating and spontaneously forming social cohesion presents a more accurate view of how European immigration societies function and makes “super-diversity” (Vertovec 2007) or “conviviality” (Gilroy 2004) more practical at least as descriptive terms. Even if they do not involve calls for action in the political public sphere, at least they expose the detachedness of the official policy debates and their top-down political prescriptions as separate from the lived reality, pointing to the life power fueling the existing multicultural life that rejuvenates itself often in the face of official denials of its very existence.

However, what is the role of media discourse in community and identity formation, in the construction of difference? And, what are the ideological grids – often hidden or naturalized – underlining media texts? Shohat and Stam (1994, 2002, 2003, 2012) explore the hidden paradigm of Eurocentrism underlining media texts from the peak of European imperialism to the media production of today, where the Western subjects continue to be implicitly positioned against the European/North American Other. In today’s multicultural situations – which arise from consequences of former colonial rule, from modern migration movements, and from globalized economic flows – the media have attained a crucial role as field of representation in which the Eurocentric grid is perpetuated or it is rejected. As fields of contestation, as spaces

of representation and dissemination of power structure models, they are also crucial in the project of a radical rethinking of today's relations, as spaces where dominant discourses can be resisted. This rethinking goes beyond both the descriptive and the normative approaches to multicultural realities, linking them instead to a thorough re-examination and rejection of global power structures, which can offer a contemporary answer to today's miscegenated spaces, superseding simple racial, national, and other binarisms.

The German language literature on the subject, analyzed in Chapter 4, does not dedicate much space to the questions of how media discourse can become a space of alternative narratives in multiculturalism. Most of the texts concentrate on analyzing media frames, occurrence of representation of difference through protagonists or authors, or rather media consumption, and reception and effects in terms of reinforcing discrimination or combatting stereotypes. The starting premise of most of the analyses that I encountered is the causal relationship between the participation of media makers of differing cultural origins and resulting media content on the one hand, and media content and usage and resulting integration success on the other.

Seen as important players in the process of integration and social cohesion, the media institutions are called upon by the relevant political institutions to work on facilitating integration, a demand represented in the media policy papers of the broadcasters, or various program projects and events, such as, for example, the thematic week on tolerance, analyzed in Chapter 8. Furthermore, a large body of literature in the area concentrates on questions of how the media can further integration, employing media consumption studies, representation studies, and others. As such, this research strengthens the narrative of migration and diversity as being an exception outside the norm, something that can be managed if approached right. It is implied that discrimination can be diminished through ethical reporting, social emancipation strengthened by showing role models on screen, and also that media channels can teach newly-arrived migrants about the modes of exercising citizenship in Germany.

The assumption of the integrative power of the media is reinforced by policies of the broadcasters, among them the policies that led to the inception of special-interest media, such as WDR Funkhaus Europa, and to the institutions concerned with furthering integration. Most of them place the term integration in the center, emphasizing the role of the media, particularly public service broadcasters, in processes of integration and social cohesion, as well as the political responsibility resulting from this role.

The third and fourth part of the dissertation looked at two specific case studies – the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa and the 2014 thematic week of the public service broadcasters dedicated to tolerance. The main question leading the analysis was how the media actually work on the multicultural society. What do they do to the citizens subjects when they embrace certain key terms, such as cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, or tolerance? What pictures of Otherness and social relations with Otherness do they transport? How do they articulate politics of difference? Do they offer counter-narratives? What national fantasies spawn them, and what fantasies of the good life in diversity do they produce?

The third part of the thesis concentrated on the case study of the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa. Even if this station, especially at the time of establishment, contained in its self-understanding some of the truisms mentioned above, such as that of the integratory function of the media, in many ways it abandoned and elaborated further the simple recipes of the integration frame. Explicitly dedicated to questions of difference in Germany and Europe, the station embarked on routes that left the well-traveled paths of the integration policies behind, in search of new, alternative ways of responding to the antagonisms of a society in constant change through cultural diversity. In any case, Funkhaus Europa has avoided the problematizations of the mainstream media discourse, as concerns migration and growing diversity, and has always worked on framing these in a positive, desirable light. As the analysis has shown, some of these responses have been emancipatory and political, others have furthered neoliberal commodifications of diversity, and thus – without intending to – actually perpetuated some of the dominant frames concerning diversity.

However, writing this conclusion from a distance of only a few years after the main period under analysis means that there is a completely different political environment, which allows for a somewhat different perspective on the media in question. In the midst of new and massive problematizations of migration evident in the German public and political discourse, and with the public service media in Germany (and many other European countries) under fierce attacks not only from the political right wing, such projects as Funkhaus Europa or Tolerance Week seem to paint an almost idyllic picture of a past in which difference and diversity were approached from a decidedly more positive stance.

Funkhaus Europa's development has been discussed in detail in Part III of the thesis: Established in 1999 as a special-interest radio station by the West German radio and television WDR, Funkhaus Europa was given the task of being the integration radio for the

German *Land* of North Rhine-Westphalia. The station was established by uniting previously existing programs in the languages of the largest migrant communities, and adding to them a daily program in German, with the emphasis of its word and music content being about diversity, as well as employing an international team of journalists. In a further policy change, while continuing to broadcast in German and foreign languages, and employing a team of journalists and editors of diverse cultural origins, Funkhaus Europa shifted its focus to become a station dedicated to celebrating cultural diversity as “enriching” the country through music, languages, and cuisine. Finally, after a brand and later a name change to WDR Cosmo, it became a radio station specifically addressing a young, urban, cosmopolitan audience of migrant and explicitly also of German origins.

At the beginning of writing this thesis, I was working as an editor for WDR Funkhaus Europa. I belonged to the middle generation of editors working there – not one of the “grounding generation,” but with a longer experience than the younger colleagues joining the station. In the early 2000s, which is the main analysis period of this thesis, the Funkhaus Europa radio station was going through a deep transformation that touched not only the practical questions of making a radio station and the everyday work involved, but through this also the political framework the station was articulating. It was transformed from a station that was founded as the “integration radio” of North-Rhine-Westphalia, that consisted of the German program and an important and large element of mother-tongue programs, to gradually become a radio depicting and celebrating the existing multicultural life in the broadcasting area. This was epitomized in its advertising tagline, “My music, my world, my radio” (*Meine Musik, meine Welt, mein Radio*) and its brand “Without borders” (*Grenzenlos*). One of its projects, *Roots – The story of your family* (*Roots – Die Geschichte deiner Familie*), strove to strengthen the self-esteem of students of migrant origins by letting them research the migration stories of their parents and grandparents. In its music color and word content, the station celebrated a happy mixing, the cheerful present tense of the multicultural society, with all its comparative advantages, such as its versatile music styles, tasty dishes, exotic travels – in short, a diversity that “enriches” and can be consumed.

In a further brand redefinition, Funkhaus Europa became a “Global Sounds Radio,” shifting its wording and with it its ideological framework from multiculturalism and integration towards cosmopolitanism and urban pop culture. The analysis of the trajectory of the station brand in Chapter 5 uncovered that such shifts not only affected the everyday work of program making, but also articulated deep ideological transformations concerning the ways of dealing

with difference, culture, identity, and citizenship. One particularly important aspect here – both in the analysis of concept shifts in the public discourse, as in the media policies – was the abandonment of the concept of multiculturalism and the adoption of concepts such as cosmopolitanism and unity in diversity. The analysis of the brand change towards cosmopolitanism uncovered processes of depoliticization at work, reflecting in the media discourse the overall shift away from difference as a site of emancipatory efforts, towards a situation where difference is made consumable and detached from its political connotations. The paradigm change of the program policy to a radio that wants to attract young cosmopolitans with hybrid identities rather than addressing the problematizations that make migrants subaltern was shown to be articulated within broader changes in the cultural politics of difference in Germany and Europe in general. The analysis uncovered how the imaginaries of citizenship created by the media went hand in hand with the shifts in public policies concerning Germany as a society of many cultures, a society that acknowledged itself to be an immigration country but did not quite develop a vision of how this would change its modes of citizenship, or its cultural identity, instead perpetuating the problematizations surrounding cultural difference.

As I showed in the analysis of interviews with the radio makers, discussed in Chapter 6, this shift towards a self-description as a cosmopolitan radio station left a deep mark on the team. It affected not only their working practices, but also their emotions about belonging and identity, which brought me back to questioning the viability of such media projects in terms of their impact on the existing discursive structures around nation, identity, and belonging. The finding that surprised me most from analyzing the interviews at this sensitive time for the radio station was the strong division between German editors and those of migrant origin (regardless of their generation) that was never articulated but was obviously *felt* by both sides. In a station celebrating diversity and intercultural mixing, the editors, even those who were descendants of migrants to Germany and had no migration experience themselves, saw themselves as a group socially separate from the German majority – they spoke of racism, of envy around the redistribution of resources, of special codes among migrants, and about losing their voice in the new, cosmopolitan Funkhaus Europa, which they judged to be apolitical in its celebration of unity-in-diversity in its urban mixing.

In the chapters of Part III, dedicated to Funkhaus Europa, I adopted a critical stance towards this transformation of the station. Both from an insider-position as editor on the program team at the time, and from a later, analytical point of view, I see in it a closing off of discursive

spaces for counter-narratives and people who are not part of the mainstream. I see the move from multiculturalism to cosmopolitanism as maintaining the framework of the dominant problematization of multiculturalism. The analysis also uncovered depoliticizing effects in this process, that precluded real emancipation of minoritized subjects. These were instead taken as belonging to this new diversity celebration only if they could be counted into the cosmopolitan spirit – itself a category referring more to class than to culture.

The analysis of Funkhaus Europa's construction of ideal listeners in Chapter 7 also showed the station leaving a political or emancipatory discourse, and a public sphere where political negotiations on the modes of citizenship can take place. Instead, the projection of the ways citizenship was to be embodied in this new diversity constructed by the station was one where difference could be consumed, and contact with it played out in the intimate sphere of the citizens' private lives and their bodies. I showed this to be a part of a larger discursive shift towards a privatization of citizenship within neoliberal policies.

Part IV of the thesis put the considerations on station policy into a different context, analyzing a media thematic week dedicated to the topic of tolerance. The event was organized by the Association of the German Public Service Broadcasters, ARD, in 2014 as part of a series of yearly thematic weeks of the ARD. I also participated in this media event as an insider, as a radio coordinator for the WDR radio content, and as an outside observer at the same time.

In this way, the analysis moved away from a specialized radio channel, such as Funkhaus Europa, to a mainstream event addressing the whole population. It concentrated on the question of what effects the term tolerance has, and in this context, what framework the public service broadcasters upheld when they placed the term tolerance at the center of a country-wide media event. In other words, I asked: what does the media mainstream do within the discourse on diversity when tolerance is at its center? Following Wendy Brown, I showed tolerance to be a tool of governmentality and pointed to the depoliticizing effect it has on the social struggle around cultural difference. The operation of tolerance was uncovered as constructing subjects in need of toleration by a presumed "norm" and fixing their identities as being outside of it. I showed that, rather than securing pluralism, which was the explicitly stated goal of Tolerance Week, tolerance tends to operate in a profoundly ideological way, preserving the social relations that define the norm and those who deviate from it. In Wendy Brown's words, it continually reproduces the position of the Other, "structurally inherent to

the discourse of tolerance, which stabilizes unequal positions between those tolerating and those tolerated” (Brown and Forst 2014:10).

Looking at the media event from the distance of a few years, a new question comes to mind when looking at the effect of the term tolerance. Whereas during the thematic week, tolerance could be placed as a desirable method of conflict resolution, possibly contributing to social justice, at the time of writing this concluding chapter, tolerance has become a term at the center of new problematizations around immigration. Instead of being the “civilized” response to difference, it becomes what distinguishes “us” from “intolerant others,” it belongs “collectively rather than selectively to Westerners” whereas intolerance “has become a code word not merely for bigotry or investments in whiteness but for a fundamentalism identified with the non-West, with barbarism, and with anti-Western violence” (Brown 2008: 16). In this, tolerance can be interpreted as an example of how the “nodal point” tolerance (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), which even during the thematic week was filled with all kinds of meanings, moves within the flow of competing discourses, suddenly becoming the center of new chains of equivalence.

The repositioning of “tolerance” towards the problematization around Islam and Moslems in the European discourses on diversity and cultural difference would certainly be of interest for further research that goes beyond the scope of this thesis.

It is not only the discursive repositioning of tolerance that shows how contingent on social and political power relations the scripts of diversity can be. In Chapter 7, I showed how such a repositioning happened to the script of the ideal-type listeners of Funkhaus Europa within a range of only a few years. The narrative of the German-North African couple Carla and Sami turned from being a script celebrating “happy multiculturalism” (Fortier 2005: 567) to a highly problematic one. In 2010, Sami was imagined as a young Arab man, with a distant relationship to Islam, and a German patriot. Only five years later, at the height of the refugee movement from the Middle East to Europe, and after the events of New Year’s Eve in Cologne, it was not only the problematizations around immigration that came to the fore of the political debate: a completely new discourse emerged, in particular around young male immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, who suddenly epitomized narratives of sexual predation against the body of the White European woman. For Kutlaçan, after the Cologne events, gender relations moved “to the center of the construction of an anti-muslim racism” (2016: 115). It is not only the growing racism against Muslims, but also the

interlocking and reciprocal action between sexism and racism against Muslims, that will certainly be a subject for further research and is already of growing interest to authors in the German context (Kutlaçan 2016, Messerschmidt 2016, Attia 2018, Yildiz 2013), some of it in explicit reaction to the problematizations of immigration in the wake of the “Cologne events.”

As I pointed out, such paradigm changes show just how fragile scripts concerning encounters with ethnic and cultural difference are, depending on the re-positionings in the struggle between competing interpretations of social reality, competing claims to “truth.” Again, further research on these transformations and the role of the media in them will certainly be worthwhile in light of the dramatic re-positionings within the discourses concerning difference in recent years in Europe and elsewhere.

In terms of the case studies of this thesis, in this conclusion I can only offer a perfunctory and personal “look back.” In the course of continuing (refugee and other) migration into Germany and the simultaneous rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) through the political institutions, a general shift in media discourse is obvious to anybody consuming the media, although a profound analysis of this shift would be a matter for further research. On the level of personal impressions, what was unthinkable on the rhetoric level a few years ago finds its way into media texts today. At the same time, the definitions of identity, homeland, culture, and nation are again a matter of fiery public contestation.

WDR Cosmo, formerly Funkhaus Europa, is at the moment of writing again tapping into the more politicized public sphere, dealing with topics ranging from the #MeToo movement through to uncovering racist experiences in Germany. It would be interesting for later analysis to see how a media project dedicated to diversity will navigate the current discursive shifts. What concepts will stand at the center of the new imaginary projected by a channel such as this one? Will they be more political and emancipatory, or will they continue to locate the “good life” in diversity in the area of consumption and intimate lives?

Also, in hindsight and from another vantage point outside of the radio station, it becomes obvious how different this station is from the media mainstream when it comes to its stance on diversity. Regardless of the critical points concerning the ways it transmits this, the station does offer alternative imaginaries to the dominant problematizations around diversity and migration. The question remains, however, to what extent a media channel, especially a public service channel, can respond to cultural diversity without tapping into dominant discourses. How can it create counter-discourses and what knowledge can they articulate? Can such a

channel, as Shohat and Stam state, become a space that escapes both the problematizations and discriminations on the one hand, and the dominant striving for cohesion on the other, and articulate modes of a new, transcultural belonging and citizenship instead?

This dissertation has attempted to uncover some of the strategies that the selected media follow in order to stake their “claims to truth” in the social struggle on difference and diversity. It has also shown where these media have succeeded or failed in offering alternatives to the dominant discourse. A large field for further research is opening in the context of growing polarizations surrounding immigration and diversity in Europe and the ways these are articulated in the media discourses. It will also be interesting to follow the way in which the responses of this media, specifically dedicated to cultural diversity, will develop in the future.

## Bibliography

- . "Kanzlerin erklärt Multikulti für gescheitert". *Die Welt* (16/10/2010).
- . "Merkel zur Flüchtlingskrise: "Multikulti bleibt eine Lebenslüge"". *Spiegel Online* (12/14/2015).
- . *Staatsvertrag für Rundfunk und Telemedien (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag - RStV -) vom 31. August 1991*, 31 Aug. 1991.
- Abu-Lughod, Lila. "The objects of soap opera: Egyptian television and the cultural politics of modernity". In *The anthropology of media: A reader*, edited by Kelly Askew, Wilk, Richard R.. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.
- Ahmed, Sara. "'She'll Wake Up One of These Days and Find She's Turned into a Nigger': Passing through Hybridity". *Theory, Culture & Society* 16, no. 2 (April 1999): 87-106.
- . *Strange encounters: Embodied others in post-coloniality*. London, New York: Routledge, 2000.
- . *The cultural politics of emotion*. London and New York: Routledge, 2004.
- . "'Liberal Multiculturalism is the Hegemony - Its an Empirical Fact' - A response to Slavoj Žižek". *Darkmatter* (17/Feb/2008).
- . "The Politics of Good Feeling." *ACRAWSA e-journal* 4, no. 1 (2008): 1-18.
- . *The Promise of Happiness*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2010.
- . *On Being Included: Racism and Diversity in Institutional Life*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012.
- Ahmed, Sara, Shona Hunter, Sevgi Kilic, Elaine Swan, and Lewis Turner. "Race, diversity and leadership in the learning and skills sector." *Final Report* (2006).
- Albrecht, Monika. "German multiculturalism and postcolonialism in comparative perspective. Prolegomenon for the framework for a postcolonial Germany". In *(Post-)Colonialism across Europe: Transcultural history and national memory*, edited by Dirk Götsche, Dunker, Axel. Bielefeld: Aisthesis Verlag, 2014.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso Books, 2006.
- Andrews, Molly, Corrine Squire, and Maria Tamboukou, ed. *Doing narrative research*. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore: Sage Publications, 2008.
- Ang, Ien. *Watching Dallas: Soap opera and the melodramatic imagination*. London and New York: Routledge, 1991.

- . "Multiculturalism". In *New keywords. A revised vocabulary of culture and society*, edited by Tony Bennett, Grossberg, Lawrence; Morris, Meaghan. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005.
- . "Beyond unity in diversity: Cosmopolitanizing identities in a globalizing world." *Diogenes* 60, no. 1 (Dec 9, 2014): 10-20.
- Ang, Ien, Gay Hawkins, and Lamia Daboooussy. *The SBS story: the challenge of cultural diversity*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2008.
- ARD. "Integration und kulturelle Vielfalt - Querschnittsaufgabe in der ARD". *Media Perspektiven* 9 (2007): 472-474.
- . "ARD-Studie "Medien und Toleranz": "Intolerant sind die anderen". ARD-Pressemitteilung". (14 Nov 2014).
- ARD / ZDF. *Migranten und Medien 2011 - Neue Erkenntnisse über Mediennutzung, Erwartungen und Einstellungen von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland*. ARD / ZDF, 2011.
- Askew, Kelly. "Introduction". In *The anthropology of media: A reader*, edited by Kelly Askew, Wilk, Richard R.. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.
- Askew, Kelly, and Richard R. Wilk, ed. *The anthropology of media: A reader*. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.
- Atmaca, Delal, and Roland Schatz, ed. *Integrations-Index 2012*. Beirut, Boston, Hanoi, Pretoria, Zürich: Innovatio Publishing Ltd., 2012.
- Attia, Iman. "Diskursive Interventionen in westliche Kopftuchmonologe". In *Transformation religiöser Symbole und religiöser Kommunikation in der Diaspora. Sozialpsychologische und religionssoziologische Annäherungen an das Diskursfeld Islam in Deutschland*, edited by Rauf Ceylan, Uslucan, Haci-Halil. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2018.
- Baldwin, James. "On being white... and other lies". *Essence* (April 1984).
- Balibar, Étienne. *We, the people of Europe? Reflections on transnational citizenship*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004.
- Balibar, Étienne, and Immanuel Wallerstein. *Race, nation, class: Ambiguous identities*. Radical Thinkers London and New York: Verso, 1991.
- Banting, Keith, and Will Kymlicka, ed. *Multiculturalism and the welfare state: recognition and redistribution in contemporary democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

- . "Introduction: Multiculturalism and the welfare state: setting the context". In *Multiculturalism and the welfare state: recognition and redistribution in contemporary democracies*, edited by Keith Banting, Kymlicka, Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Barker, Chris, and Dariusz Galasinski. *Cultural studies and discourse analysis. A dialogue on language and identity*. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001.
- BBC. "State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron". (5 Feb 2011).
- Beck, Ulrich. "Cosmopolitan sociology: The outline of an argument". (2010).
- . *Twenty observations on a world in turmoil*. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2012.
- Beck, Ulrich, and Edgar Grande. *Cosmopolitan Europe*. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2007.
- Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth. *Wir und die anderen. Kopftuch, Zwangsheirat und andere Mißverständnisse*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2007.
- Bell, Allan, and Peter Garrett, ed. *Approaches to media discourse*. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998.
- Belsey, Catherine. *Poststructuralism. A very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Bennett, Tony, ed. *Differing diversities: Transversal study on the theme of cultural policy and cultural diversity*. Council of Europe Publishing, 2001.
- Berlant, Lauren. "America, post-utopia: Body, landscape and national fantasy in Hawthorne's Native land". *Arizona Quarterly: A Journal of American Literature, Culture, and Theory* 44, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 14-54.
- . *The anatomy of national fantasy: Hawthorne, utopia, and everyday life*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- . "The queen of America goes to Washington City: Harriet Jacobs, Frances Harper, Anita Hilla". *American Literature* 65, no. 3 (September 1993): 549-574.
- . *The queen of America goes to Washington City*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.
- , ed. *Compassion. The culture and politics of an emotion*. New York and London: Routledge, 2005.
- . "Introduction. Compassion (and withholding)". In *Compassion. The culture and politics of an emotion*, edited by Lauren Berlant. New York and London: Routledge, 2005.
- . "Cruel optimism". *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 17, no. 3 (2006): 20-36.

- . "Citizenship". In *Keywords for American Cultural Studies*, edited by Bruce Burgett and Handler, Glenn. New York: NYU Press, 2007.
- . *Cruel optimism*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011.
- Berlant, Lauren, Gesa Helms, and Marina Vishmidt. "Affect & the politics of austerity. An interview exchange with Lauren Berlant". *Variant* 39/40 (2010).
- Berlant, Lauren, and Jay Prosser. "Life writing and intimate publics: A conversation with Lauren Berlant". *Biography* 34, no. 1 (2011): 180-187.
- Bertelsmann Stiftung. *The European added value of EU spending. Can the EU help its member states to save money? Exploratory study.*, 2013.
- Blommaert, Jan, and Ben Rampton. "Language and Superdiversity". *Diversities* 13, no. 2 (2011): 1-21.
- Bloom, Peter. "*Beur* cinema and the politics of location: French immigration politics and the naming of a film movement". In *Multiculturalism, postcoloniality, and transnational media*, edited by Ella Shohat, Stam, Robert. New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003.
- Bonfadelli, Heinz. "Die Darstellung ethnischer Minderheiten in den Massenmedien". In *Medien und Migration: Europa als multikultureller Raum?*, edited by Heinz Bonfadelli, Moser, Heinz. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007.
- . "Media use by ethnic minority youth in Switzerland". In *Media - migration - integration. European and North American perspectives*, edited by Rainer Geissler, Pöttker, Horst. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009.
- Bonfadelli, Heinz, and Heinz Moser, ed. *Medien und Migration: Europa als multikultureller Raum?*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007.
- Boswell, David, and Jessica Evans, ed. *Representing the nation. A reader: Histories, heritage, museums*. London and New York: Routledge, 1999.
- Božić-Vrbančić, Senka. *Tarara: Croats and Maori in New Zealand. Memory, belonging, identity*. Dunedin: Otago University Press., 2008.
- . "'Strong European emotions': The politics of culture in the EU". *Emotion, Space and Society* 1, no. 5 (13 Feb 2010).
- Božić-Vrbančić, Senka, Mario Vrbančić, and Olga Orlić. "European media programme: The role of 'language' and 'visual images' in the processes of constructing European culture and identity". *Collegium Antropologicum* 32, no. 4 (2008): 1013-1022.
- Božić-Vrbančić, Senka, and Mario Vrbančić. "Captain Euro: Time, space and imperial power". *Stud. ethnol. Croat.* 23 (2011): 25-46.

- Brah, Avtar. *Cartographies of diaspora: contesting identities*. London, New York: Routledge, 1996.
- Brown, Wendy. *Regulating aversion. Tolerance in the age of identity and Empire*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- . "Civilizational delusions: Secularism, tolerance, equality". *Theory & Event* 15, no. 2 (2012).
- . *Walled states, waning sovereignty*. New York: Zone Books, 2010.
- Brown, Wendy, and Rainer Forst. *The power of tolerance: A debate*. Edited by di Blasi, Luca And Holzhey, Christoph F. E. Columbia University Press, 2014.
- Brubaker, Rogers. "The return of assimilation? Changing perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States". *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24, no. 4 (2001): 531-548.
- Bundesagentur für Arbeit. "Employment of foreign workers in Germany. Questions, answers and tips for employees and employers". (2013/07).  
<http://www.arbeitsagentur.de/EN/zentraler-Content/Arbeiten/MB7-Beschaeftigung-ausl-AN-EN.pdf>, accessed 09 Nov. 2013
- Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge. "Integration".  
[https://www.bamf.de/DE/Service/Left/Glossary/\\_function/glossar.html?lv3=1504494&lv2=5831826](https://www.bamf.de/DE/Service/Left/Glossary/_function/glossar.html?lv3=1504494&lv2=5831826), accessed 23 Dec. 2018
- . *Integration in Germany. Support. Networking. Dialogue.*, 2007.
- . "Deutsch Lernen"., 2016.  
<http://www.bamf.de/DE/Willkommen/DeutschLernen/deutschlernen-node.html>,  
 accessed 23 Dec. 2018
- . *Den Menschen im Blick - Sicherheit geben. Chancen ermöglichen. Wandel leben.*, 2018.  
[http://www.bamf.de/SiteGlobals/Forms/Sprachumschaltung/DE/SprachumschaltungFormular.html;jsessionid=1347F72648B52575D449BCAF80849998.1\\_cid251](http://www.bamf.de/SiteGlobals/Forms/Sprachumschaltung/DE/SprachumschaltungFormular.html;jsessionid=1347F72648B52575D449BCAF80849998.1_cid251),  
 accessed 20 Dec. 2018
- Bundesregierung. *Der nationale Integrationsplan. Neue Wege - neue Chancen*. Die Bundesregierung, 2007.
- . *Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration. Zusammenhalt stärken - Teilhabe verwirklichen*. Berlin: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Dec 2011.
- . "Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration: Kurzfassung für die Presse." (2012).
- Bundesverfassungsgericht. "Ein pauschales Kopftuchverbot für Lehrkräfte in öffentlichen Schulen ist mit der Verfassung nicht vereinbar." (13 Jan 2015).

- Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. "Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund." (26 Sept 2018). <http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61646/migrationshintergrund-i>, accessed 12 Nov. 2018
- Burchell, Graham, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, ed. *The Foucault effect. Studies in governmentality*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Burgett, Bruce, and Glenn Handler, ed. *Keywords for American Cultural Studies*. New York: NYU Press, 2007.
- Burton-Carvajal, Julianne. "Oedipus Tex/Oedipus Mex: Triangulations of paternity, race, and nation in John Sayles's *Lone star*". In *Multiculturalism, postcoloniality, and transnational media*, edited by Ella Shohat, Stam, Robert. New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003.
- Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- . *Dispossession: The Performative in the Political. Conversations with Athena Athanasiou*. Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2013.
- . "Precariousness and grievability—When Is life grievable?". (11/16/2015).
- Butler, Judith, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek. *Contingency, hegemony, universality. Contemporary dialogues on the left*. London and New York: Verso, 2000.
- Butler, Judith, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. *Who sings the nation-state? Language, politics, belonging*. London, New York, Calcutta: Seagull Books, 2007.
- Carpentier, Nico, and Bart Cammaerts, ed. *Reclaiming the media: Communication rights and democratic media roles*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- Castillo, Edward D. "Dances With Wolves". In *Multiculturalism, postcoloniality, and transnational media*, edited by Ella Shohat, Stam, Robert. New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003.
- Castro Varela, María do Mar, and Paul Mecheril, ed. *Die Dämonisierung der Anderen. Rassismuskritik der Gegenwart*. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2016.
- Ceylan, Rauf, and Haci-Halil Uslucan, Haci-Halil, ed. *Transformation religiöser Symbole und religiöser Kommunikation in der Diaspora. Sozialpsychologische und religionssoziologische Annäherungen an das Diskursfeld Islam in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2018.
- Chouliaraki, Lilie. "Media discourse in the public sphere". In *Discourse theory in European politics: Identity, policy and governance*, edited by David Howarth, Torfing, Jacob. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

- Cooke, Paul. "Review: Sara Ahmed, *Strange encounters: Embodied others in post-coloniality*". *Gender Forum genderealizations* 1 (2002).
- Council of the European Union. *Immigrant integration policy in the European Union. Press release, 2618th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, Brussels*. 14615/04 (Presse 321), 19 Nov 2004.
- Coury, David N. "Enlightenment fundamentalism: Zafer Şenocak, Navid Kermani, and multiculturalism in Germany today": 1-27.
- Critchley, Simon, and Mami Kataoka. *Laughing in a foreign language*. London: Hayward Gallery Publishing, 2008.
- Cruikshank, Barbara. *The will to empower. Democratic citizens and other subjects*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Culture Action Europe. *The EU 2020 Strategy: Analysis and Perspectives*. 2010.
- Curran, James, Michael Gurevitch, and Janet Woollacott, ed. *Mass communication and society*. London: Arnold, 1977.
- De Maizière, Thomas. ""Wir sind nicht Burka": Innenminister will deutsche Leitkultur". (30 Apr. 2017).
- Dean, Jodi. "Why Žižek for Political Theory?". *International Journal of Žižek Studies* 1, no. 1 (2007): 18-32.
- Deleuze, Giles. "Postscript on the Societies of Control". *L'autre journal* 1 (May 1990).
- Dent, Gina, ed. *Black popular culture*. Seattle: Bay Press, 1992.
- Deutscher Presserat. *Publizistische Grundsätze (Pressekodex). Richtlinien für die publizistische Arbeit nach den Empfehlungen des Deutschen Presserats*. Konstanz, 2008.
- . *Publizistische Grundsätze (Pressekodex). Richtlinien für die publizistische Arbeit nach den Empfehlungen des Deutschen Presserates*. Berlin, 2017.
- . "Praxis-Leitsätze. Richtlinie 12.1 des Pressekodex ". (2017). Berlin, 2017.
- dpa. "Premiere in Frankfurt : Mehr als die Hälfte mit ausländischen Wurzeln\_". (26 June 2017).
- EBU. "What is public service media?". 2018.
- Egger, Andreas. "Medien und Toleranz: Erwartungen und Werturteile des Publikums". *Media Perspektiven* 3 (2015): 136-144.
- Ehlert, Jan. "Jan Delay." *NDR Kultur* (14 Nov 2014).
- Eitz, Thorsten. "Das missglückte Wort." *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung* (15 July

- 2010).
- Eis, Melanie. *Interview mit Prof. Ella Shohat und Prof. Robert Stam*. Bremen: Institut für postkoloniale und transkulturelle Studien (INPUTS), 2009.
- El-Mafaalani, Aladin. *Das Integrationsparadox. Warum gelungene Integration zu mehr Konflikten führt*. Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2018.
- European commission. *Media Mundus 2013. Europe joins forces with the global film industry*. 2013.
- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). *A Diversity Toolkit for factual programmes in public service television*, 2007.
- Evans, Jessica. "Feeble monsters: making up disabled people". In *Visual culture: The reader*, edited by Jessica Evans, Hall, Stuart. London: Sage Publications, 2005.
- Evans, Jessica, and Stuart Hall, ed. *Visual culture: The reader*. London: Sage Publications, 2005.
- Fairclough, Norman. "Political discourse in the media: An analytical framework". In *Approaches to media discourse*, edited by Allan Bell, Garrett, Peter. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998.
- Fanon, Frantz. *Black skin, white masks*. New York: Grove Press, 1967.
- Faris, James C. "The gaze of Western humanism". In *The anthropology of media: A reader*, edited by Kelly Askew, Wilk, Richard R.. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.
- Fenzel, Birgit. "Networking diversity". *Max Planck Research* 3, no. 10 (2010): 82-89.
- Fick, Patrick. "Der Wandel der Darstellung von Migranten am Beispiel Siegener Lokalmedien in den Jahren 1996 und 2006". In *Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland - Band 2. Forschungsbefunde*, edited by Rainer Geissler, Pöttker, Horst. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009.
- Fischer, Peter O. "Vom Essen der fremden Speisen". In *Vielvölkerstaat Bundesrepublik*, edited by Karl Markus Michel, Spengler, Tilman and Enzensberger, Hans Magnus. Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, Dezember 1980.
- Forst, Rainer, ed. *Toleranz. Philosophische Grundlagen und gesellschaftliche Praxis einer umstrittenen Tugend*. Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2000.
- . "Einleitung". In *Toleranz. Philosophische Grundlagen und gesellschaftliche Praxis einer umstrittenen Tugend*, edited by Rainer Forst. Frankfurt / New York: Campus Verlag, 2000.
- . "Der schmale Grat zwischen Ablehnung und Akzeptanz". *Frankfurter*

- Rundschau* (28/12/2001).
- . "'To tolerate means to insult': Toleration, recognition, and emancipation". In *Recognition and power. Axel Honneth and the tradition of critical social theory*, edited by Bert van den Brink, Owen, David. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- . *Toleration in conflict: Past and present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Fortier, Anne-Marie. *Migrant belongings. Memory, space, identity*. Oxford and New York: Berg, 2000.
- . "Pride politics and multiculturalist citizenship". *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 3 (3 May 2005): 559-578.
- . *Multicultural horizons: Diversity and the limits of the civil nation*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Foucault, Michel: *Ethics, subjectivity and truth*. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: New Press, 1997.
- . *Power/knowledge. Selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977*. Edited by Colin Gordon. New York: Vintage Books, 1980.
- . "Technologies of the self". In *Technologies of the self. A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, edited by Martin H. Luther, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.
- . "Governmentality". In *The Foucault effect. Studies in governmentality*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- . "Panopticism". In *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*, edited by Alan Sheridan. Second Vintage Books Edition. New York: Random House, 1995.
- . "Security, Territory and Population". In *Ethics, subjectivity and truth. Essential works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 1*. Edited by Paul Rabinow. New York: New Press, 1997.
- . *The birth of biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979*. Edited by Graham Burchell, and Arnold Davidson. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Frehe, Michael. "Integrationspolitik und Medien - Politische Perspektiven". In *Migration und Medien: Standortbestimmungen aus Wissenschaft, Politik und Journalismus*, edited by Roland Löffler, Stolz, Miriam. 12. Konferenz Dialog der Kulturen Frankfurt: Heribert Quandt-Stiftung, 11 / 2008.
- Galeotti, Anna Elisabetta. "Zu einer Neubegründung liberaler Toleranz. Eine Analyse der

- "Affaire du foulard"". In *Toleranz. Philosophische Grundlagen und gesellschaftliche Praxis einer umstrittenen Tugend*, edited by Rainer Forst. Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2000.
- Gammerl, Bruno. "Review of Gilroy, Paul, *After Empire: Melancholia or convivial culture*". *H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews* (May 2005).
- Garber, Marjorie. "Compassion". In *Compassion. The culture and politics of an emotion*, edited by Lauren Berlant. New York and London: Routledge, 2005.
- Garcia, Nria. "Debating language regimes and citizenship: the politics of multilingualism and the (non)recognition of multiple identities in Germany". Paper presented at Conference "IPSA 23rd World Congress of Political Science ", IPSA, Montreal, 19-24 July 2014.
- Gardner, Jared. "National longings, critical investments". *American Literary History* 11, no. 1 (1999): 107-124.
- Geissler, Rainer, and Horst Pttker, ed. *Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland. Problemaufriss - Forschungsstand - Bibliographie*. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2005.
- . "Bilanz". In *Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland. Problemaufriss - Forschungsstand - Bibliographie*, edited by Rainer Geissler, and Horst Pttker. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2005.
- . *Integration durch Massenmedien: Medien und Migration im internationalen Vergleich*. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2006.
- . "Mediale Integration von Migranten. Ein Problemaufriss". In *Integration durch Massenmedien: Medien und Migration im internationalen Vergleich*, edited by Rainer Geissler, and Horst Pttker. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2006.
- . *Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland - Band 2. Forschungsbefunde*. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009.
- . *Media - migration - integration. European and North American perspectives*. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009.
- Geissler, Rainer, and Sonja Weber-Menges. "Media reception and ideas on media integration among Turkish, Italian and Russo-German migrants in Germany". In *Media - migration - integration. European and North American perspectives*, edited by Rainer Geissler, and Horst Pttker. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009.
- Gillespie, Marie, Webb, Alban, ed. *Diasporas and diplomacy. Cosmopolitan contact zones at the BBC World Service (1932–2012)*. London: Routledge, 2012.

- Gillespie, Marie, and Alban Webb. "Diasporas and diplomacy at the BBC World Service, 1932-2012". In *Diasporas and diplomacy. Cosmopolitan contact zones at the BBC World Service (1932–2012)*, edited by Marie Gillespie, and Alban Webb. London: Routledge, 2012.
- Gilroy, Paul. *There ain't no black in the Union Jack. The cultural politics of race and nation*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1987.
- . "One nation under a groove: The cultural politics of 'race' and racism in Britain". In *Anatomy of racism*, edited by David Theo Goldberg. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.
- . *Small acts. Thoughts on the politics of black cultures*. London: Serpent's Tail, 1993.
- . *After empire: Melancholia or convivial culture?*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2004.
- . "Melancholia and multicultural". *openDemocracy.net* (3 Aug. 2004).
- Ginsburg, Faye. "Mediating culture: Indigenous media, ethnographic film, and the production of identity". In *The anthropology of media: A reader*, edited by Kelly Askew, and Richard R. Willk. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.
- . "Screen memories and entangled technologies: Resignifying indigenous lives". In *Multiculturalism, postcoloniality, and transnational media*, edited by Ella Shohat, and Robert Stam. New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003.
- Glynos, Jason, and David Howarth, ed. *Logics of critical explanation in social and political theory*. London and New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Goldberg, David Theo, ed. *Anatomy of racism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.
- Göttsche, Dirk, and Axel Dunker, ed. *(Post-)Colonialism across Europe: Transcultural history and national memory*. Bielefeld: Aisthesis Verlag, 2014.
- Gordon, Colin. "Governmental rationality: An introduction". In *The Foucault effect. Studies in governmentality*, edited by Graham Burchell, Gordon, Colin and Miller, Peter. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Gready, Paul. "The public life of narratives: Ethics, politics, methods". In *Doing narrative research*, edited by Molly Andrews, Corinne Squire, and Maria Tamboukou. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore: Sage Publications, 2008.
- Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson. "Beyond "culture": Space, identity, and the politics of

- difference". *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no. 1 (Feb. 1992): 6-23.
- Habermas, Jürgen. "Geschichtsbewusstsein und posttraditionale Identität. Die Westbindung der Bundesrepublik. Die Westorientierung der Bundesrepublik". In *Eine Art Schadensabwicklung*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987.
- . "Können komplexe Gesellschaften eine vernünftige Identität ausbilden?". In *Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991.
- . "Struggles for recognition in the democratic constitutional state". In *Multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition*, edited by Charles Taylor, and Amy Gutmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- . "Intolerance and discrimination". *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 1, no. 1 (2003): 2-12.
- . "Towards a United States of Europe". *signandsight.com* (2006).
- . "Europa: Vision und Votum". *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, no. 5 (2007): 517-520.
- Habermas, Jürgen, and Jacques Derrida. "February 15, or What binds Europeans together: A plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in the core of Europe". *Constellations* 10, no. 3 (2003): 291-297.
- Hage, Ghassan. "At home in the entrails of the West: Multiculturalism, 'ethnic food' and migrant home-building". In *Home / world: Communalism, identity and marginality in Sydney's West*, edited by Helen Grace, Ghassan Hage, Lesley Johnson, Julie Langsworth, and Michael Symonds. Sydney: Pluto Press, 1997.
- . *White nation: Fantasies of white supremacy in a multicultural society*. Annandale and New York: Routledge, 2000.
- . "On the ethics of pedestrian crossings or why 'mutual obligation' does not belong to the language of neo-liberal economics ". *Meanjin* 59, no. 4 (2000): 27-37.
- . "On worrying: The lost art of the well-administered national cuddle". *borderlands* 2, no. 1 (2003).
- . "Journalists and the 'ethnic question': Towards an ethics of viability". In *Remote control: New media, new ethics*, edited by Catherine Lumby, and Elspeth Probyn. Melbourne and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- . "Multiculturalism and the ungovernable Muslim". In *Essays on Muslims & multiculturalism*, edited by Raimond Gaita. Melbourne : Text Publishing, 2011.
- Hajer, Maarten A. "Coalitions, practices, and meaning in environmental politics: From acid

- rain to BSE". In *Discourse theory in European politics: Identity, policy and governance*, edited by David Howarth, and Jacob Torfing. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Hall, Stuart. "Culture, the media and the "ideological effect." ". In *Mass communication and society*, edited by James Curran, Michael Gurevitch, and Janet Woollacott. London: Arnold, 1977.
- . "What is this "Black" in Black Popular Culture?". In *Black popular culture*, edited by Gina Dent. Seattle: Bay Press, 1992.
- . "Which public, whose service?". In *All our futures: The changing role and purpose of the BBC*, edited by Wilf Stevenson. London: British Film Institute, 1993.
- . "Culture, community, nation". In *Representing the nation. A reader: Histories, heritage, museums*, edited by David Boswell, and Jessica Evans. London and New York: Routledge, 1999.
- . "Cultural identity and cinematic representation". In *Film and theory. An anthology*, edited by Robert Stam, and Toby Miller. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell Publishers , 2000.
- . "The multicultural question". In *Un/settled multiculturalisms: Diasporas, entanglements, transruptions*, edited by Barnor Hesse. London: Zed Books, 2000.
- . "Encoding, decoding". In *The cultural studies reader*, edited by Simon During. London and New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Hammeran, Regine, Baspinar, Deniz. "Selbstbild und Mediennutzung junger Erwachsener mit türkischer Herkunft". In *Zwischen den Kulturen. Fernsehen, Einstellungen und Integration junger Erwachsener mit türkischer Herkunft in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Ergebnisse der Medienforschung* , edited by WDR. Köln: Westdeutscher Rundfunk, Aug-Sept 2006.
- Haug, Sonja. *Sprachliche Integration von Migranten in Deutschland. Working Paper 14 der Forschungsgruppe des Bundesamtes*. Integrationsreport, Vol. 2, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2008.
- Hermes, Joke. *Re-reading Popular Culture*. Malden: Blackwell, 2005.
- Hogan-Brun, Gabrielle, Clare Mar-Molinero, and Patrick Stevenson, ed. *Discourses on language and integration: Critical perspectives on language testing regimes in Europe*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2009.
- hooks, bell. *Black looks: Race and representation*. Boston: South End Press, 1992.
- . "Dialectically down with the critical program". In *Black popular culture*, edited by Gina

- Dent. Seattle: Bay Press, 1992.
- Howarth, David. "Applying discourse theory: the method of articulation". In *Discourse theory in European politics: Identity, policy and governance*, edited by David Howarth, and Jacob Torfing. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Howarth, David, and Yannis Stavrakakis. "Introducing discourse theory and political analysis". In *Discourse theory and political analysis*, edited by David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval, and Yannis Stavrakakis. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000.
- Howarth, David, and Jacob Torfing, ed. *Discourse theory in European politics: Identity, policy and governance*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Huttunen, Rauno. "Derrida's deconstruction contra Habermas's communicative reason and the fate of education". In *Encyclopedia of educational philosophy and theory*, edited by Michael Peters. Singapore: Springer, 2017.
- Hydén, Margareta. "Narrating sensitive topics". In *Doing narrative research*, edited by Molly Andrews, Corinne Squire, and Maria Tamboukou. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore: Sage Publications, 2008.
- Ingram, James D., and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos. "Rights, norms and politics: The case of German citizenship reform". *Social research* 77, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 353-382.
- James, Malcolm. *Interculturalism: Theory and Policy*. London: The Baring Foundation, 2008.
- Jhally, Sut. "Image-based culture: Advertising and popular culture". In *The anthropology of media: A reader*, edited by Kelly Askew, and Richard R. Wilk. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.
- Joppke, Christian. *Selecting by origin. Ethnic migration in the liberal state*. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- . "Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe". *West European Politics* 30, no. 1 (2007): 1-22.
- Karppinen, Kari. "Making a difference to media pluralism: a critique of the pluralistic consensus in European media policy". In *Reclaiming the media: Communication rights and democratic media roles*, edited by Nico Carpentier, and Bart Cammaerts. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.
- Kendall, Gavin, and Gary Wickham. *Using Foucault's Methods*. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999.
- Klapeer, Christine M. "Vielfalt ist nicht genug! Heteronormativität als herrschafts- und machtkritisches Konzept zur Intervention in gesellschaftliche Ungleichheiten". In *Selbstbestimmung und Anerkennung sexueller und geschlechtlicher Vielfalt*:

- Lebenswirklichkeiten, Forschungsergebnisse und Bildungsbausteine*, edited by Friederike Schmidt, Anne-Christin Schondelmayer, and Ute Schröder. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2015.
- Koopmans, Ruud. "Germany and its immigrants: An ambivalent relationship". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 25, no. 4 (30 June 2010): 627-647.
- Krtalić Muiesan, Iva. "WDR Funkhaus Europa - između programske niše i medijskog mainstreama ". In *Izolacija ili integracija - Kako mediji pristupaju uključivanju manjina u javnu sferu*, edited by Milana Romić. Zagreb: B.a.B.e., 2011.
- Krtalić Muiesan, Iva, and Senka Božić-Vrbančić. "The ARD tolerance week - politics of difference". Paper presented at Utopias, realities, heritages, Zagreb 2015.
- . "Creative cosmopolitanism on radio waves". Paper presented at MeCCSA 2018: Creativity and Agency, London 2018.
- Krüger, Udo Michael, and Erk Simon. "Das Bild der Migranten im WDR Fernsehen. Ergebnisse einer empirischen Programmanalyse". *Media Perspektiven* 3 (2005): 105-114.
- Kunin, Aaron. "What if the citizens is a girl?". *Action Yes* 1, no. 9 (2009).
- Kutlačatan, Meltem. "Die verkannte Angst des Fremden. Rassismus und Sexismus im Kontext medialer Öffentlichkeit". In *Die Dämonisierung der Anderen. Rassismuskritik der Gegenwart*, edited by María do Mar Castro Varela, and Paul Mecheril. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2016.
- Kymlicka, Will. "The rise and fall of multiculturalism?". In *The multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices*, edited by Steven Vertovec, and Susanne Wessendorf. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Kymlicka, Will, and Keith Banting. "Immigration, Multiculturalism, and the Welfare State". *Ethics & International Affairs* 20, no. 3 (2006): 281-304.
- Laclau, Ernesto. *New reflections on the revolution of our time*. London and New York: Verso, 1990.
- . *On populist reason*. London and New York: Verso, 2007.
- Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. *Hegemony and socialist strategy. Towards a radical democratic politics*. London and New York: Verso, [1985] 2014.
- Lazzarato, Maurizio. "From biopower to biopolitics". *Pli - The Warwick Journal of Philosophy* 13 (2002): 99-113.
- Lemke, Thomas. "Foucault, governmentality, and critique". *Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society* 14, no. 3 (2002): 49-64.

- . "Biopolitics and beyond. On the reception of a vital Foucauldian notion".  
[www.bipolitica.unsw.edu.au](http://www.bipolitica.unsw.edu.au) (2005).
- Lewis, Gail. "Welcome to the margins: Diversity, tolerance, and policies of exclusion."  
*Ethnic and Racial Studies* 28, no. 3 (2005): 536-558.
- Löffler, Berthold. *Integration in Deutschland. Zwischen Assimilation und Multikulturalismus*.  
 München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011.
- Löffler, Roland, and Miriam Stolz, ed. *Migration und Medien: Standortbestimmungen aus  
 Wissenschaft, Politik und Journalismus*. 12. Konferenz Dialog der Kulturen,  
 Frankfurt: Heribert Quandt-Stiftung, 11 / 2008.
- Loizidou, Elena. "Lauren Berlant as cynical philosopher: An introduction". *Critical Legal  
 Thinking* (19 Dec 2013).
- Loomba, Ania. *Colonialism / postcolonialism*. London and New York: Routledge, 2015.
- Loomba, Ania, Suvir Kaul, Matti Bunzl, Antoinette Burton, and Jed Esty, ed. *Postcolonial  
 studies and beyond*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005.
- Lorey, Isabell. *State of insecurity. Government of the precarious*. London and New York:  
 Verso, 2015.
- Lukkonen, Juho. "Planning in Europe for 'EU'rope: Spatial planning as a political technology  
 of territory". *Planning Theory* (2014): 1-21.
- Luley, Peter. "Dokusoap "Die Özdags": Unterwegs mit den Teutonen-Türken". (15 July  
 2008).
- Mall, Ram Adhar. "Begriff, Inhalt, Methode und Hermeneutik der interkulturellen  
 Philosophie". In *Philosophische Grundlagen der Interkulturalität*, edited by Ram  
 Adhar Mall, and Dieter Lohmar. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1993.
- Mall, Ram Adhar, and Dieter Lohmar, ed. *Philosophische Grundlagen der Interkulturalität*.  
 Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1993.
- Marcus, George E. "Ethnography in/of the world system: The emergence of multi-sited  
 ethnography ". *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 95-117.
- . "Multi-sited ethnography. Five or six things I know about it now". In *Multi-sited  
 ethnography. Problems and possibilities in the translocation of research methods*,  
 edited by Simon Coleman, and Pauline von Hellermann. New York and London:  
 Routledge, 2011.
- Marcuse, Herbert. "Repressive Tolerance". In *A critique of pure tolerance*. Robert  
 Paul Wolff, Barrington jr. Moore, and Herbert Marcuse. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.
- Martin, Luther H., and Huck Gutman. *Technologies of the Self. A Seminar with Michel*

- Foucault*. Edited by Patrick H. Hutton Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.
- Mautner, Gerlinde. "Analyzing Newspapers, Magazines and Other Print Media". In *Qualitative Discourse Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by Ruth Wodak, and Michael Krzyzanowski. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- McClean, Georgie. "Special broadcasting: Cultural diversity, policy evolutions and the international 'crisis' in public service broadcasting". *Media international Australia: incorporating culture and policy*, no. 129 (2008): 67-79.
- McCormack, Paul. "Fantasy island? Ghassan Hage's 'White Nation'". *M/C Reviews*\_ (16 Oct 1999).
- McLuhan, Marshall. "The medium is the message". In *The anthropology of media: A reader*, edited by Kelly Askew, and Richard R. Wilk. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.
- McNamara, Tim, and Elana Shohamy. "Language tests and human rights". *International Journal of Applied Linguistics* 18, no. 1 (2008): 89-95.
- McRobbie, Angela. "The Los Angelesation of London: Three short waves of young people's micro-economies of culture and creativity in the UK". In *Critique of creativity: Precarity, subjectivity and resistance in the 'creative industries'*, edited by Gerald Raunig, Gene Ray, and Ulf Wuggenig. London: MayFlyBooks, 2011.
- Mead, Margaret, and Gregory Bateson. "On the use of the camera in anthropology". In *The anthropology of media: A reader*, edited by Kelly Askew, and Richard R. Wilk. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.
- Mecheril, Paul. *Politik der Unreinheit. Ein Essay über Hybridität*. Wien: Passagen Verlag, 2009.
- Messerschmidt, Astrid. ""Nach Köln" - Zusammenhänge von Sexismus und Rassismus thematisieren". In *Die Dämonisierung der Anderen. Rassismuskritik der Gegenwart*, edited by María do Mar Castro Varela, and Paul Mecheril. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2016.
- Michel, Karl Markus, Tilman Spengler, and Hans Magnus Enzensberger, ed. *Vielvölkerstaat Bundesrepublik*. Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, Dezember 1980.
- Mills, Sara. *Discourse*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Mills, Tom. *The BBC. Myth of a public service*. London and New York: Verso, 2016.
- MMB, Institut für Medien- und Kompetenzforschung. *Ausbildung von Volontärinnen und Volontären in den Medien.*, 2006.

- . *Migranten in Deutschland. Teilnahme an Qualifizierung und Beruf.*, 2007.
- Modood, Tariq. "Anti-essentialism, multiculturalism and the 'recognition' of religious groups". *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 6, no. 4 (1998): 378-399.
- Modood, Tariq, and David Edmonds. *The history of multiculturalism*. The Open University, 3 July 2011.
- Mohr, Cornelia, Harald Bader, and Malte Wicking. "'Da weiß ich immer schon, dass es ein Ausländer war" - Zur Wirkung der Richtlinie 12.1 des Pressekodex". In *Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland - Band 2. Forschungsbefunde*, edited by Rainer Geissler, and Horst Pöttker. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009.
- Moller Okin, Susan. "Is multiculturalism bad for women?". In *Is multiculturalism bad for women?*, edited by Susan Moller Okin, Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- Moser, Heinz. "Medien und Migration: Konsequenzen und Schlussfolgerungen". In *Medien und Migration: Europa als multikultureller Raum?*, edited by Heinz Bonfadelli, and Heinz Moser. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007.
- Müller, Daniel. "Die Darstellung ethnischer Minderheiten in deutschen Medien". In *Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland. Problemaufriss - Forschungsstand - Bibliographie*, edited by Rainer Geissler, and Horst Pöttker. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2005.
- . "Von der "Parallelgesellschaft" zur pragmatisch-kulturellen Öffentlichkeit". In *Migration und Medien: Standortbestimmungen aus Wissenschaft, Politik und Journalismus*, edited by Roland Löffler, and Miriam Stolz. 12. Konferenz Trialog der Kulturen Frankfurt: Heribert Quandt-Stiftung, November 2008.
- . "Inwieweit berichten Journalisten ohne begründbaren Sachbezug über die Zugehörigkeit von Straftatverdächtigen zu ethnischen Minderheiten?". In *Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland - Band 2. Forschungsbefunde*, edited by Rainer Geissler, and Horst Pöttker. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009.
- Mysorekar, Sheila, and Konstantina Vassiliou-Enz. "Vielfältige Kompetenzen und wurzeln, ein Ziel: "Die Neuen deutschen Medienmacher"". In *Integrations-Index 2012*, edited by Delal Atmaca, and Roland Schatz. Beirut, Boston, Hanoi, Pretoria, Zürich: Innovatio Publishing Ltd., 2012.
- Namin, Parisa Javadian. "Die Darstellung des Islam in den deutschen Printmedien". In

- Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland - Band 2. Forschungsbefunde*, edited by Rainer Geissler, and Horst Pöttker. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009.
- Nolan, David. "Media governmentality, Howardism and the Hanson effect". *International Journal of the Humanities* 1 (2003): 1367-1377.
- . "Media, citizenship and governmentality: Defining "the public" of public service broadcasting". *Social Semiotics* 16, no. 2 (June 2006): 225-242.
- Nolan, David, and Natalia Radywyl. "Pluralising identity, mainstreaming identities: SBS as a technology of citizenship". *Southern Review* 37, no. 2 (2004): 40-65.
- Nussbaum, Martha C. "Toleranz, Mitleid und Gnade". In *Toleranz. Philosophische Grundlagen und gesellschaftliche Praxis einer umstrittenen Tugend*, edited by Rainer Forst. Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 2000.
- Oulios, Miltiadis. "Wehalb gibt es so wenig Journalsiten mit Einwanderungshintergrund in deutschen Massenmedien? Eine explorative Studie". In *Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland - Band 2. Forschungsbefunde*, edited by Rainer Geissler, and Horst Pöttker. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009.
- Owen, David, and Anthony Simon Laden, ed. *Multiculturalism and political theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Parekh, Bhikhu C., Runnymede Trust, Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain. *The future of multi-ethnic Britain*. London: Profile Books, 2000.
- Patterson, Wendy. "Narratives of events: Labovian narrative analysis and its limitations". In *Doing narrative research*, edited by Molly Andrews, Corinne Squire, and Maria Tamboukou. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore: Sage Publications, 2008.
- Phoenix, Ann. "Analysing narrative contexts". In *Doing narrative research*, edited by Molly Andrews, Corinne Squire, and Maria Tamboukou. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore: Sage Publications, 2008.
- Piller, Ingrid. "Naturalization language testing and its basis in ideologies of national identity and citizenship". *International Journal of Bilingualism* 5, no. 3 (September 2001): 259-277.
- Pöttker, Horst. "Wann werden Diskriminierungsverbote von Journalist(inn)en akzeptiert?". In *Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland - Band 2. Forschungsbefunde*, edited by Rainer Geissler, and Horst Pöttker. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2009.

- Powdermaker, Hortense. "Hollywood and the USA". In *The anthropology of media: A reader*, edited by Kelly Askew, and Richard R. Wilk. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.
- Raunig, Gerald, Gene Ray, and Ulf Wuggenig, ed. *Critique of creativity: Precarity, subjectivity and resistance in the 'creative industries'*. London: MayFlyBooks, 2011.
- Rear, David. "Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory and Fairclough's critical discourse analysis: An introduction and comparison". (2013): 1-26.
- Reckwitz, Andreas. "Multikulturalismustheorien und der Kulturbegriff: Vom Homogenitätsmodell zum Modell kultureller Interferenzen". *Berliner Journal für Soziologie* 11, no. 2 (2001): 179-200.
- Roberts, Neil. "Paul Gilroy's postcolonial melancholia". *Journal of Comparative Theory* 2, no. 2 (2008): 163-166.
- Rogers, Daniel. "The uses and abuses of 'neoliberalism'". *Dissent Magazine* (Winter 2018).
- Romić, Milana, ed. *Izolacija ili integracija - Kako mediji pristupaju uključivanju manjina u javnu sferu*. Zagreb: B.a.B.e., 2011.
- Rose, Gillian. *Visual methodologies. An introduction to the interpretation of visual materials*. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2007.
- . *Visual methodologies: An introduction to researching with visual materials*. Los Angeles: SAGE, 2012.
- Rose, Nikolas, Pat O'Malley, and Marian Valverde. "Governmentality". *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 2 (2006): 83-104.
- Ruhrmann, Georg. "Berichterstattung über Migranten - Befunde der inhaltsanalytischen Kommunikationsforschung". In *Migration und Medien: Standortbestimmungen aus Wissenschaft, Politik und Journalismus*, edited by Roland Löffler, and Miriam Stolz. 12. Konferenz Dialog der Kulturen Frankfurt: Heribert Quandt-Stiftung, 11 / 2008.
- . *Migranten und Medien: Dokumentation zum Forschungsstand der wichtigsten Studien über die Mediendarstellung, Nutzung und Rezeption von Migranten und ethnischen Minderheiten von 2003 bis 2009*. Jena: Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaft, 2009.
- Ruhrmann, Georg, and Denise Sommer. "Migranten in den Medien - von der Ignoranz zum Kontakt?". *Zeitschrift für Ausländerrecht und Ausländerpolitik* 25, no. 3/4 (2005): 123-127.
- Ruhrmann, Georg, Denise Sommer, and Heike Uhlemann. "TV-Nachrichtenberichterstattung

- über Migranten - Von der Politik zum Terror". In *Integration durch Massenmedien: Medien und Migration im internationalen Vergleich*, edited by Rainer Geissler, and Horst Pöttker. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2006.
- Saha, Anamik. *Race and the Cultural Industries*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018.
- Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. New York: Random House, 2003.
- Salecl, Renata. *Choice*. London: Profile Books, 2010.
- Santos, Emanuelle, and Patricia Schor. "'Brazil is not traveling enough': On postcolonial theory and analogous counter-currents. An interview with Ella Shohat and Robert Stam". *Portuguese cultural studies* 4 (Fall 2012): 13-40.
- Sarrazin, Thilo. *Deutschland schafft sich ab: wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen*. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2010.
- . "Deutschland wird immer ärmer und dümmmer!". (23 Aug. 2010).
- . "Wenn ich den Muezzin hören will, buche ich Urlaub im Morgenland". (24 Aug. 2010).
- Scally, Derek. "Documentary about German-Arab romance sparks outrage". (11 Jan 2018).
- Schatz, Roland. "Zur Darstellung von 'Ausländern/Migranten' und dem 'Ausland' in den Medien 1994-2012". In *Integrations-Index 2012*, edited by Delal Atmaca, and Roland Schatz. Beirut, Boston, Hanoi, Pretoria, Zürich: Innovatio Publishing Ltd., 2012.
- Schiffrin, Deborah, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, ed. *The handbook of discourse analysis*. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004.
- Schönwälder, Karen. "Germany: Integration policy and pluralism in a self-conscious country of immigration". In *The multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices*, edited by Steven Vertovec, and Susanne Wessendorf. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Schwarzer, Alice. "Die Folgen der falschen Toleranz". (05 Jan 2016).
- Seidman, Steven, ed. *The postmodern turn: New perspectives on social theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Shachar, Ayelet. *Multicultural jurisdictions: Cultural differences and women's rights*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- . "Feminism and multiculturalism: Mapping the terrain". In *Multiculturalism and political theory*, edited by David Owen, and Anthony Simon Laden. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Shohamy, Elana. "Language tests for immigrants. Why language? Why tests? Why citizenship?". In *Discourses on language and integration: Critical perspectives on language testing regimes in Europe*, edited by Gabrielle Hogan-Brun, Clare Mar-

- Molinero, and Patrick Stevenson. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 2009.
- Shohat, Ella, and Robert Stam. *Unthinking Eurocentrism: Multiculturalism and the media*. London: Routledge, 1994.
- , ed. *Multiculturalism, postcoloniality, and transnational media*. New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003.
- . "Introduction". In *Multiculturalism, postcoloniality, and transnational media*, edited by Ella Shohat, and Robert Stam. New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003.
- . "The imperial imaginary". In *The anthropology of media: A reader*, edited by Kelly Askew, and Richard R. Wilk. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.
- Shore, Cris. "Governing Europe: European Union audiovisual policy and the politics of identity". In *Anthropology of policy: Critical perspectives on governance and power*, edited by Cris Shore and Susan Wright. New York: Routledge, 1997.
- . "The cultural policies of the European Union and cultural diversity". In *Differing diversities: Transversal study on the theme of cultural policy and cultural diversity*, edited by Tony Bennett. Council of Europe Publishing, 2001.
- Shore, Cris, Susan Wright. "Policy: A new field of anthropology". In *Anthropology of policy: Critical perspectives on governance and power*, edited by Cris Shore and Susan Wright. New York: Routledge, 1997.
- Shore, Cris, Susan Wright, and Davide Però, ed. *Policy worlds: Anthropology and the analysis of contemporary power*. Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2011.
- Siebold, Sabine. "Merkel says German multiculturalism has failed". *Reuters* (2010/10/17).
- Siepmann, Ralf. "Die Matrix des Respekts - Medien und Integration: Signale einer europäischen Konferenz in Essen". *Funkkorrespondenz* 48 (2006): 7-11.
- Smaill, Belinda. "Narrating community: Multiculturalism and Australia's SBS television". *Journal of Communications Inquiry* 26, no. 4 (October 2002): 391-407.
- Sokhi-Bulley, Bal. *Governmentality: Notes on the thought of Michel Foucault.*, 2 Dec 2014.
- Spitulnik, Debra. "Anthropology and mass media". *Annual Review of Anthropology* 22 (1993): 293-315.
- Srikiow, Lisa. "Die neue Zielgruppe". *Journalist* (12/2015): 46.
- Stam, Robert. "Fanon, Algeria, and the cinema: The politics of identification". In

- Multiculturalism, postcoloniality, and transnational media*, edited by Ella Shohat, and Robert Stam. New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003.
- Stam, Robert, and Toby Miller, ed. *Film and theory. An anthology*. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2000.
- Stam, Robert, and Ella Shohat. *Race in translation: Culture wars around the postcolonial Atlantic*. New York and London: New York University Press, 2012.
- . "Traveling multiculturalism. A trinational debate in translation". In *Postcolonial studies and beyond*, edited by Ania Loomba, Suvir Kaul, Matti Bunzi, Antoinette Burton, and Jed Esty. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005.
- Staschen, Björn. "Neue Programmformen für einen Medienmarkt im Wandel". *Media Perspektiven* 6 (2006): 302-305.
- Statistisches Bundesamt. "Zahl der Ausländer im Zentralregister stieg 2012 um 4,1% - Pressemitteilung Nr. 354". (22 Oct 2013).
- Stevenson, Wilf. *All our futures: The changing role and purpose of the BBC*. London: British Film Institute, 1993.
- SWR. "Qualifizierte Arbeitskräfte aus dem Ausland gesucht". (02 Aug. 2011).
- Tacchi, Jo. "Radio texture: Between self and others". In *The anthropology of media: A reader*, edited by Kelly Askew, and Richard R. Wilk. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002.
- Tarschys, Daniel. *The enigma of European added value. Setting priorities for the European Union*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2005.
- Terkessidis, Mark. *Die Banalität des Rassismus. Migranten zweiter Generation entwickeln eine neue Perspektive*. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2004.
- . *Interkultur*. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010.
- . "'Interkultur' statt Integration! Zehn Fragen an Dr. Mark Terkessidis". In *Integrations-Index 2012*, edited by Delal Atmaca, and Roland Schatz. Beirut, Boston, Hanoi, Pretoria, Zürich: Innovatio Publishing Ltd., 2012.
- . *Nach der Flucht – Neue Ideen für die Einwanderungsgesellschaft*. Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 2017.
- Tibi, Bassam. *Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft*. München: Bertelsmann, 1998.
- Tietze, Nikola. "La politique de la langue: entre intégration et reconnaissance de la

- différence". In *Les codes de la différence: Race - origine - religion. France - Allemagne - Etats-Unis*, edited by Riva Kastoryano. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2005.
- Torring, Jacob. *New theories of discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.
- . "Discourse theory: Achievements, arguments, and challenges". In *Discourse theory in European politics: Identity, policy and governance*, edited by David Howarth, and Jacob Torring. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Trebbe, Joachim. *Ethnische Minderheiten, Massenmedien und Integration. Eine Untersuchung zu massenmedialer Repräsentation und Medienwirkungen*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009.
- UNHCR. *Country update: Germany | Q4 2017.*, 13 Nov. 2017.
- Van Dijk, Teun A. *Racism and the press*. London and New York: Routledge, 1991.
- . "Critical discourse analysis". In *The handbook of discourse analysis*, edited by Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton. Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2004.
- Verbeet, Markus. "Pisa 2000-2009. Bilanz eines Schock-Jahrzehnts". (07 Dec. 2010).
- Vertovec, Steven. "Minority associations, networks and public policies: re-assessing relationships". *Journal for Migration and Ethnic Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 1-38.
- . "Fostering cosmopolitanisms: A conceptual survey and a media experiment in Berlin". (2006): 1-31.
- . *New complexities of cohesion in Britain: Super-diversity, transnationalism and civil-integration*. Commission on Integration and Cohesion, June 2007.
- . "Towards 'post-multiculturalism'? Changing communities, conditions and contexts of diversity". *International Social Science Journal* 61, no. 199 (March 2010): 83-95.
- Vertovec, Steven, and Susanne Wessendorf. "Migration and cultural, religious and linguistic diversity in Europe: An overview of issues and trends". (2004).
- , ed. *The multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices*. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2010.
- . "Assessing the backlash against multiculturalism in Europe". In *The multiculturalism backlash: European discourses, policies and practices*, edited by Steven Vertovec, and Susanne Wessendorf. Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Vrbanić, Mario, Senka Božić-Vrbanić, and Iva Krtalić Muiesan. "Facing others:

- Contemporary culturalization of politics". Paper presented at Nationalism, old and new: Europe, Australia and their Others, Barcelona 2018.
- Walters, William, and Jens Henrik Haahr. "Governmentality and political studies". *European Political Science* 4, no. 3 (2005): 288-300.
- Watson, Patty Jo. "Archeology, anthropology, and the culture concept". *American Anthropologist* 97, no. 4 (Dec 1995): 683-694.
- WDR. *WDR Funkhaus Europa. Europäische Vielfalt: 24 Stunden täglich*. Köln: Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 2000.
- . *Zwischen den Kulturen. Fernsehen, Einstellungen und Integration junger Erwachsener mit türkischer Herkunft in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Ergebnisse der Medienforschung*. Köln: Westdeutscher Rundfunk, Aug-Sept 2006.
- . *WDR-Programmleitlinien*. Köln: Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 2008.
- . *Zielhörer für Funkhaus Europa*. Köln: Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 2010.
- . *Gesetz über den Westdeutschen Rundfunk Köln*. Köln: Westdeutscher Rundfunk, 2016.
- Weber-Menges, Sonja. "Die Wirkung der Präsentation ethnischer Minderheiten in deutschen Medien". In *Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland. Problemaufriss - Forschungsstand - Bibliographie*, edited by Rainer Geissler, and Horst Pöttker. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2005.
- West, Cornel. "The new cultural politics of difference". In *The postmodern turn: New perspectives on social theory*, edited by Steven Seidman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Wiegman, Robyn. "'My name is Forrest, Forrest Gump': Whiteness studies and the paradox of particularity". In *Multiculturalism, postcoloniality, and transnational media*, edited by Ella Shohat, and Robert Stam. New Brunswick, New Jersey and London: Rutgers University Press, 2003.
- Wilson, Janet. "Living in Diasporic Space: art, memory, belonging". Paper presented at ASNEL Summerschool, Sept 2011.
- Wimmer, Franz Martin. "Ansätze einer interkulturellen Philosophie". In *Philosophische Grundlagen der Interkulturalität*, edited by Ram Adhar Mall, and Dieter Lohmar. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1993.
- Winter, Carsten, Andreas Hepp, and Friedrich Kroz, ed. *Theorien der Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft*. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008.
- Wodak, Ruth. "Aspects of critical discourse analysis". (2001).

- . "Introduction: Discourse studies. Important concepts and Terms". In *Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences*, edited by Ruth Wodak, and Michael Krzyzanowski. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Wodak, Ruth, and Michael Krzyzanowski, ed. *Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
- Wright, Susan. "Anthropology of Policy". *Anthropology News* (Nov. 2006): 22.
- Wright, Susan, and Susan Reinhold. "'Studying through': a strategy for studying political transformation. Or sex, lies and British Politics.". In *Policy worlds: Anthropology and the analysis of contemporary power*, edited by Cris Shore, Susan Wright, and Davide Però. Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2011.
- Yildiz, Safiye. "Die Macht der Nation: Zur Vergeschlechtlichung der Migration". In *Das Geschlecht der Migration. Bildungsprozesse in Ungleichheitsverhältnissen*, edited by Isabell Diehm, and Astrid Messerschmidt. Opladen, Berlin, Toronto: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2013.
- Zambonini, Gualtiero, and Erk Simon. "Kulturelle Vielfalt und Integration: Die Rolle der Medien". *Media Perspektiven* 3 (2008): 120-124.
- Zeit Online. "Spahn will Pflegekräfte aus Albanien und dem Kosovo anwerben, (1.7.2018).
- Zöllner, Oliver. "Zugehörigkeit und Teilhabe von Migranten in der Mediengesellschaft". In *Theorien der Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft*, edited by Carsten Winter, Andreas Hepp, and Friedrich Kroz. Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008.
- Žižek, Slavoj. *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London and New York: Verso, 1989.
- . "Enjoy your nation as yourself!". In *Tarrying with the negative: Kant, Hegel, and the critique of ideology*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993.
- . "Multiculturalism, or, The Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism". *New Left Review* 1, no. 225 (Sept.-Oct. 1997): 28-51.

### Video clips:

- Kinospot Funkhaus Europa*. WDR, 2003. DVD.
- Fünf Jahre Funkhaus Europa*. Directed by Ravi Karmalker. WDR, 2007. DVD.
- Roots: Die Geschichte deiner Familie*. Directed by Ravi Karmalker. WDR, 2007. DVD.
- Die starken Töchter von Hasan Özdog*. Directed by Jürgen Kura. WDR, 2009. Youtube. Web. Accessed 12 Nov. 2018.
- Marhaba – Ankommen in Deutschland*. n-tv, 2015. n-tv.de. Web. Accessed 12. Nov. 2018

*WDRforyou – Angebote für Flüchtlinge in vier Sprachen.* WDR, 2015. WDR. Web. Accessed 12 Nov. 2018.

*WDR Funkhaus Europa.* WDR, 2015. DVD.

### Websites:

*Funkhaus Europa - Wir über uns.* WDR,

[http://www.funkhauseuropa.de/kontakt/ueber\\_uns.phtml](http://www.funkhauseuropa.de/kontakt/ueber_uns.phtml). Accessed 1 July 2012.

*Cosmo – Global Sounds Radio.* WDR, <https://www1.wdr.de/radio/cosmo>. Accessed 12 Nov. 2018

*ARD.* ARD, [http://www.ard.de/home/ard/ARD\\_Startseite/21920/index.html](http://www.ard.de/home/ard/ARD_Startseite/21920/index.html). Accessed 12 Nov. 2019

*Anders als du denkst – Themenwoche Toleranz.* ARD,

[http://www.ard.de/home/themenwoche/Startseite\\_ARD\\_Themenwoche\\_2014\\_Toleranz/1095226/index.html](http://www.ard.de/home/themenwoche/Startseite_ARD_Themenwoche_2014_Toleranz/1095226/index.html). Accessed 12 Nov. 2018

*Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge.* BAMF,

<http://www.bamf.de/DE/Startseite/startseite-node.html>. Accessed 04 Feb. 2012

European Commission. *Creative Europe - The European Union programme for the cultural and creative sectors 2014-2020.*

[https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/node\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/creative-europe/node_en). Accessed 23 Dec. 2018

*Medialexikon. Auf einen Blick.* NDRmedia, 2018,

<https://www.ndrmedia.de/medialexikon/?chr=z>. Accessed 12 Nov. 2018

## Abstract

Media discourses of nation and cultural differences: A case study of Westdeutscher Rundfunk

Germany is a country of migration and continues to be so, increasingly becoming a society of diverse ethnic and cultural identities. Today, over one fifth of its inhabitants have a so-called migration background, defined either as having migrated themselves or having at least one parent who has migrated to Germany. In institutional politics, or in the media, this reality is, however, often represented in a fragmented, belated, or even contradictory manner. At the same time, ways of responding to and “managing” difference within the territorial borders of the nation-state remain crucial concerns in the approaches to the questions of nation and citizenship. The thesis unlocks the régimes of truth that construct the discourses of the German society, identity, or belonging, identifying some of the core “nodal points” of these discourses, among them the terms multiculturalism, integration, tolerance, and cosmopolitanism. The thesis unpacks some of the concepts of the media discourses on “difference” and locates the points where they crack and rupture, pointing to the intersections of power and knowledge, and the shifting historical conditions that provide the horizon for their construction. The analysis is focused on a set of broadcasts specifically dedicated to multicultural life: Funkhaus Europa, a radio station within the biggest public service broadcaster in Germany, the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), established with the purpose of reflecting the cultural diversity in the country, and the thematic week dedicated to tolerance, organized by the German public service broadcasters in 2014.

## Keywords

Germany; media discourse; public service media; migration; cultural difference; integration; multiculturalism; cosmopolitanism; tolerance

## Sažetak

### Medijski diskursi nacije i kulturne različitosti na primjeru Westdeutscher Rundfunka

Njemačka je danas zemlja obilježena migracijom, pretvarajući se sve više u društvo raznolikih etničkih i kulturnih identiteta. Preko petine njezinih stanovnika ima takozvanu „migracijsku pozadinu“, što znači da su ili sami uselili ili potječu iz useljeničkih obitelji. Useljavanje u Njemačku kontinuirano traje od šezdesetih godina 20. stoljeća, a čak kad bi useljavanje odjednom i posve prestalo, broj ljudi „migracijske pozadine“ nastavit će rasti, budući da je svako treće dijete u Njemačkoj rođeno u useljeničkoj obitelji. Institucionalni odgovor na ovu transformaciju bio je spor, pa je tek posljednjih godina uopće postignut konsenzus oko toga da je Njemačka useljenička zemlja. Službeni stav institucija danas je usredotočen na naglašavanje potrebe integracije i osjećaja zajedničkog građanstva, te lojalnosti zajedničkim kulturnim normama. Temeljni je cilj ove disertacije istražiti nove politike različitosti koje nastaju u suvremenom njemačkom društvu kroz analizu kulturnih javnih politika te artikulacija tih politika kroz medijske programe. Analiza se usredotočuje na radio Funkhaus Europa, jednu od šest radio postaja zapadnonjemačkog javnog medijskog servisa Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR), te tematski tjedan posvećen toleranciji, u organizaciji Radne skupine njemačkih javnih medijskih servisa ARD, 2014. godine. Kroz etnografsko istraživanje ovih medijskih programa rad kritički analizira glavne koncepte diskursa različitosti u Njemačkoj – integracije, tolerancije, zajedništva, kozmopolitizma i drugih – kroz prizmu njihovih artikulacija u medijskom diskursu, otkrivajući neke od strategija koje mediji slijede kako bi položili vlastito pravo na istinu u socijalnoj borbi oko razlike i različitosti. Glavna pitanja u analizi su: Što mediji zapravo čine u multikulturnom društvu? Kakve slike Drugosti i odnosa s Drugošću transportiraju? Kako artikuliraju politiku različitosti? Nude li alternativne narative? Koje subjektne pozicije stvaraju? Iz kojih nacionalnih fantazija proizlaze i kakve fantazme „dobrog života“ produciraju? Pristup analizi medijskih programa kao i javnih politika u ovom je radu inspiriran teoretičarima i teoretičarkama diskursa, a interes je utemeljen u teorijskom okviru “moći i znanja” i “identiteta i subjektivnosti”, te uzima u obzir suvremene debate u društvenim i humanističkim znanostima oko koncepata “identiteta” i “kulture” (Ahmed 2000; Balibar 2004; Gilroy 2004; Laclau 1990, 2007; Stam i Shohat 1994, 2003, 2012). Disertacija također slijedi i teoretičare kulturnih studija (Brah 1996, 2000, Hall 1992, 1996, 2003), koji koncepte “kulture”

i "identiteta" promatraju kao diskurzivne artikulacije koje označavaju povijesno promjenjivu sponu društvenih značenja. Ovi koncepti, koji se propituju u prvom dijelu disertacije, ne promatraju se kao odvojeni od ekonomskih, socijalnih i političkih odnosa već kao polja koja su kroz te odnose konstruirana (Božić-Vrbančić 2008). U tom smislu na „kulturu“ se gleda kao na društveni konstrukt, i kao što Stuart Hall (2003) tvrdi, kultura je proces, skup praksi, ona je uključena u stvaranje i promjenu značenja koja nastaju među članovima nekog društva ili grupe. U skladu s takvim konceptom „mediji“ su konstruirani kulturom, odnosno društvenim, gospodarskim i političkim odnosima, ali oni tu kulturu kroz procese reprezentacije istovremeno i konstruiraju. U analizi uloge koju mediji igraju u kulturnoj raznolikosti u Njemačkoj, mediji se ne promatraju samo kao odraz socijalnih pitanja, već i kao oblik socijalne akcije, mehanizam koji pridonosi formaciji identiteta. Kao i u institucionalnoj politici, i u medijima se stvarnost Njemačke kao zemlje kulturne raznolikosti često reprezentira na fragmentiran, zakašnjeli ili čak kontradiktoran način. Ipak, mediji su od strane službenih vlasti prepoznati kao ključni faktor koji može pomoći pri integraciji, te se u tom smislu potiču medijske politike koje promoviraju interkulturalizam i toleranciju, a jedan od proizvoda takvog pristupa je i radio program Funkhaus Europa, na koji se rad usredotočuje. U ovom dijelu analize otkrivaju se neki od ključnih koncepata njemačkog diskursa identiteta, pripadanja ili „razlike“, među kojima su multikulturalizam, integracija, tolerancija i kozmopolitizam, te se lokaliziraju točke na kojima se ti diskursi lome, što pak ukazuje na intersekcije moći i znanja i klizeće povijesne uvjete koji stvaraju horizont za njihovu konstrukciju. U povijesnom prikazu migracija i diskursa o migraciji u Njemačkoj, disertacija pokazuje kako su politički pristupi multikulturnoj situaciji i načini „upravljanja“ kontaktom s razlikom i prisustvom razlike unutar nacionalne države artikulirani kroz političke i medijske diskurse. Takav pristup u kontekstu današnjih javnih i medijskih politika u Njemačkoj poprima nov značaj te omogućava sagledavanje politika identiteta, pa time i konstrukcije različitosti, kroz prizmu upravljalatstva. Foucaultove teze o upravljalstvu i tehnologijama vladanja povezuju se ovdje s djelovanjem medijskih diskursa, koji se promatraju kao prostori u kojima se snažno artikuliraju javne politike i kreiraju subjekti-građani te prava na istinu. Ovdje se ključni koncepti kulture, moći, nacije i identiteta koji su utjecali na analizu snažno oslanjaju na koncept artikulacije Laclaua i Mouffe (1985). U analiziranim tekstovima i dokumentima, disertacija otkriva neke od režima istine koji konstruiraju diskurse njemačkog društva, nacije i građanstva, a konflikti oko pitanja identiteta, pripadnosti, razlike i rase identificiraju neke od "čvornih točaka" (Laclau i Mouffe 1985) ovih diskursa, među njima multikulturalizam, integraciju ili kozmopolitizam. Upravo analizi upravljalatstva i specifičnosti njemačkog konteksta posvećen je drugi dio disertacije. Prema

Foucaultu (1991, Rose 2006), analiza upravljalatva pokušava identificirati stilove mišljenja u vezi upravljanja populacijom, uvjete nastanka određenih mišljenja, principe znanja na koje se upravljanje oslanja, te prakse od kojih se upravljalatvo sastoji. Foucault pri tome prepoznaje čitav niz autoriteta koji upravljaju na različitim mjestima, pa glavni fokus političke analize moći iz ove perspektive nije država, već tehnologije i strategije koje se koriste da bi se upravljalo populacijom, odnosno teorije koje se koriste da bi se objasnila „stvarnost“ i legitimirale prakse i programi koji se uvode u tu svrhu. U tom smislu, disertacija i medije promatra kao tehnologiju moći u foucaultovskom smislu te riječi. Inspirirana pristupima koje su razvile Lauren Berlant (1997, 2011), Sara Ahmed (2000, 2004) i Anne-Marie Fortier (2000, 2005), posebna se pozornost posvećuje i analizi zamišljenog ideala kako nacije, tako i medijske publike, te politika sentimentalnosti koje uokviruju i obilježavaju javni prostor današnje Njemačke. U središtu analize je radio Funkhaus Europa, osnovan 1999. godine kao program posvećen kulturnoj raznolikosti u području emitiranja, Sjevernoj Rajni-Vestfaliji, a s ciljem poboljšanja integracije. Radio od tada emitira program na njemačkom jeziku, te na jezicima većih useljeničkih skupina. Uređuje ga tim novinara i novinarki različitog etničkog porijekla, a na valovima ovog radija čuju se teme, glazba i protagonisti koji kulturnu raznolikost predstavljaju kao njemačku i europsku stvarnost. U dvadesetak godina od osnutka, “duh“ ovog programa prešao je put od integracijskog, preko programa koji slavi multikulturalizam i raznolikost, do programa koji se definira kao “kozmpolitski” i slavi ”urbanu mješavinu” kultura. Premda se radi o vrlo maloj radio postaji, ona ima jedinstvenu zadaću, pa se stoga razvoj njezine programske politike može interpretirati kao artikulacija određenih kulturnih politika koje se odnose na pitanja “različitosti” u Njemačkoj. U trećem dijelu rad se bavi programskim reformama ovog radija. Analiziraju se intervjui vođeni s novinarima i urednicima programa, koji pokazuju kako konceptualni pomak programa prema kozmpolitizmu djeluje na emocije i mišljenja ljudi koje program proizvode, te kako oni u jeku programske reforme redefiniraju vlastite pozicije u društvu karakteriziranom migracijama i kulturnom raznolikošću. Također se analiziraju dokumenti u vezi programskih reformi, među njima novo definiranje *branda* ovog radija kao kozmpolitskog, te elaborat zamišljenog ideala publike radija Funkhaus Europa. Analiza pokazuje da ono što u prvom trenutku izgleda kao progresivni slijed - s etničkog na integracijski i multikulturalni, a potom na kozmpolitski program – zapravo ukazuje na različite antagonizme njemačkog društva i odnosa spram Drugosti. Jedan od glavnih argumenata ovog dijela disertacije je da je promjena paradigme prema kozmpolitizmu dovela do snažne depolitizacije. Diskurs kozmpolitizma gura pitanje različitosti u privatnu sferu, a različitost pri tome postaje esencijalizirana kao osobni identitet, te na taj način i depolitizirana, što ukida

ideju javne politike kao područja debate. Problemi se svode na identitarne odrednice, više se ne govori o građanima i građankama, već o potrošačima i potrošačicama određenih identiteta. U posljednjem dijelu rad promatra procese depolitizacije u kontekstu pitanja tolerancije, u okviru analize tematskog tjedna javnih medija posvećenog toj temi. Tolerancija, koja se obično predstavlja kao način osiguravanja pluralizma, ovdje se analizira u smislu operacije u konstruiranja subjekata i fiksiranja njihovih identiteta kao objekata tolerancije. Ukratko, kao što to tvrdi Wendy Brown (2008, 2014) tolerancija producira subjektne pozicije, ona orkestrira identitete, daje im značenja, obilježava tijela i uvjetuje političke subjekte. Drugim riječima, ona definira normu i one koji od te norme odstupaju. Analiza u konačnici ukazuje i na nove lomove u borbi oko definiranja razlike i pripadnosti, nacije i kulture, te ukazuje na krhkost narativa kontakta s etničkom ili kulturnom razlikom, te na to koliko snažno oni ovise o borbi između interpretacija stvarnosti i svojatanja prava na istinu. Pomaci u medijskom diskursu u jeku novih migracijskih pokreta i antagonizama koji se stvaraju, otvaraju i pitanja za daljnje istraživanje u smislu strategija kojima mediji odgovaraju na nove problematizacije oko ovih pitanja, ne samo u njemačkom već i u europskom kontekstu.

#### Ključne riječi

Njemačka; medijski diskurs; javni medijski servisi; migracija; kulturna različitost; integracija, multikulturalizam; kozmopolitizam; tolerancija

## Appendix 1

### Transcripts of interviews

Interview Yildiz

Cologne, 12 July 2012

Q: SBS ist ein sehr erfolgreicher Sender in Australien, der sich dem Thema Multikulturalismus verschrieben hat. In Australien ist Multikulturalismus eine Art Staatspolitik. Das ist hier in Deutschland ganz anders. Die reden da von einem Paradigmenwechsel, der sich da vollzogen hat, von diesem Ethno-Multikulturalismus, wo du so zu sagen auf die Gemeinschaften guckst, auf die Einwanderergruppen und so weiter, zu einer Art kosmopolitischen Multikulturalismus, wo gesagt wird: Ja, diese Gruppen sind nicht mehr wichtig, wir sind so zu sagen...

A: ... kosmopolitisch.

Q: Wir sind sehr kosmopolitisch. Also du hebst diese ethnische Ebene weg, als ob es sie nicht gäbe, und tust so, als ob alles in Ordnung wäre...

(unverständlich)

... dann gibt es dieser populäre, das ist die dritte Phase, die sind sehr kritisch, dieser populäre Multikulturalismus, so zu sagen, Multikulturalismus als Mainstream, was auch eine Illusion ist, weil so funktioniert es in der Realität nicht. Kurzum: Funkhaus Europa jetzt, die machen jetzt, wo sind wir? Wo siehst du uns jetzt? Oder unsere jetzige Farbe? Die versuchen jetzt diesen kosmopolitischen Multikulturalismus herzuzaubern. Ist das das richtige? Oder siehst du uns da?

A: Also, diese Entwicklung, die du von diesem australischen Radio beschreibst, passt eins-zu-eins auch zu Funkhaus Europa. Genau dieser Schritt ist auch vollzogen worden. Deine Frage war genau?

Q: Wo siehst du uns? Sind wir überhaupt so weit, dass wir so was herzaubern können?

A: Ich kann ja nur spekulieren, warum man das macht. Also, erstmal ist ja diese Idee, das mit Einwanderern, für Einwanderer, zu multiethnischen Gruppen, sowohl von innen als auch von außen, das zu machen, ist was sehr ordinäres, das ist wirklich was, was in sich total logisch ist. Es ist aber natürlich schwierig durchzuhalten, weil du dich drüber immer wieder

austauschen, immer wieder neu definieren und finden musst, ne? Ich glaube auch, dass die, die jetzt nicht der ethnischen Gruppe angehören, die jetzt, oder nicht der hauptethnischen Gruppe angehören, also in diesem Fall den Deutschen, dass denen schwerer fällt in dem Zusammenhang, immer wieder halt mit den ethnischen Gruppen zu tun zu haben, ohne selber ein Teil davon zu sein. Ich glaube, das fällt ihnen einfach schwer und da geht es ja auch noch um Machtverhältnisse der Definition, und die Definition, wie sich so ein Programm ausrichtet liegt ja nicht bei den ethnischen Gruppen sondern bei der Hauptgruppe, nämlich der Deutschen. Und die, glaube ich, findet das einfach, um in dem Sprachgebrauch zu bleiben, irgendwie sexier. Also, dass sie sich selber, sie sind dann ja auch wieder ein Teil davon, sie sind dann kosmopolitisch, sie sind das halt auch. Sie sind jetzt nicht nur die Deutschen sondern eben kosmopolitisch. Alle anderen sind kosmopolitisch, wir alle sind kosmopolitisch, wir fassen uns an den Händen und tanzen ein Reigen, so. Dadurch sind alle wieder gleich, quasi. Und sie müssen sich auch nicht mehr, die müssen sich auch mit den Realitäten dieser ethnischen Gruppen nicht mehr beschäftigen. Weil einfach, weil du diese, du scheinbar irgendwas aufhebst.

Q: Es ist ein ganz großer Teil dieser ganzen Entwicklung ist, dass du diesen Unterschied, der natürlich aus bestimmten Machtverhältnissen entsteht, dass du den konsumierbar machst. Dass du den so klein machst, dass er konsumierbar ist. Das heißt, der äußert sich dann dadurch, dass du fremde Küchen magst, oder Musik, oder Tänze...

A: Das wird zum Selbstbedienungsladen.

Q: Also, irgendwas was du konsumieren kannst, ohne dass du dich jetzt mit der politischen Dimension befasst.

A: Du musst dich nicht mehr mit der Realität oder mit dem, was eben der Unterschied ist, und was er eben auch für Teile der ethnischen Minderheiten ausmacht, nicht beschäftigen, weil du sagst, wir sind alle gleich, ich bin genauso ein Kosmopolit wie du.

Q: Also, du meinst, dass diese ganze Bewegung, die wir jetzt durchmachen im Radio, dass es so zu sagen... ja, das hat sich so zu sagen in diesem Fall die Mehrheitsgesellschaft, die Deutschen, so zurecht gelegt, damit sie...

A: Sich besser fühlen. Die fühlen sich dann besser, sie fühlen sich zugehörig, sie erheben sich ja über alle, ne? Also, sowohl über die Mehrheit der Deutschen, die das nicht interessiert, jetzt in dem Fall. Und sie schaffen eine gleiche Ebene mit den ethnischen Gruppen, weil die sagen,

ihr seid ja auch nichts Besonderes, ich bin genauso wie ihr, seht her, weil ich bin ja Kosmopolit. Und wenn du auch einer bist, dann gehören wir zusammen. Also, das ist, glaube ich so, dieser Punkt, und dass sie sich einfach nicht mehr auseinander, also dass man gar nicht dahin kommt, dass die Machtfrage gestellt wird, indem du halt diesen Deckel da drauf machst, ne. Es wird gar nicht mehr geguckt und du machst das. Dieses Konsumistische sehe ich auch, also wo ich jetzt bei 5 (WDR5) bin, sehe ich auch, dass die, also alle anderen Wellen sich auch von Funkhaus Europa bedienen, wir sind wie so ein Gefäß, ne, also WDR5 hat viel von dieser etwas ruhigeren Weltmusik, bei WDR2 höre ich bestimmt Sachen, bei EinsLive sowieso, WDR3 hat ja auch seine Weltmusik-Sendung. Und dieses, das was uns wirklich abgehoben hat, teilweise sind die Autoren auch die gleichen, das was uns immer unterschieden hat, war ja dieses Programm aus uns selber auch für Menschen, die so sind, die diese Erfahrung haben. Dadurch dass das nicht mehr ist, hat dieses Programm eigentlich kein Alleinstellungsmerkmal mehr, die Musik ist das nicht mehr und die Themen auch nicht. Weil, auch die anderen verstehen sich als Kosmopoliten, die sitzen ja nicht in den Redaktionen und sagen, ich bin ein Deutscher und will nur deutsche Themen um mich herum, ne. Teilweise sind die, gucken die sogar genauer hin auf bestimmte Sachen, die bei uns jetzt nicht mehr stattfinden, finden da trotzdem statt, weil da dieser Diskurs trotzdem noch da ist, so zu sagen, es gibt diesen Unterschied, es gibt die Machtfrage, ne. Aber, ich glaube, dass es für viele, viele der, also wenn du der, eigentlich der Hauptgruppe angehörst, also der Mehrheit hier, und mit Leuten zusammen arbeitest, die eben eine andere ethnische Herkunft haben, dass das auf Dauer nicht auszuhalten ist für die, da irgendwie mit zugerechnet zu werden. Sondern dann sich auf eine komfortablere Position zurück zu ziehen, ne, und sich damit beschäftigen. Weil, das ist ja auch eine unbequeme Position, es ist ja auch unbequem. Als Einwanderer gewöhnst du dich da dran, aber warum soll das einer tun, der eigentlich der Mehrheitsgesellschaft angehört. Letztendlich denke ich, glaube ich, geht es einfach um Verteilung von Ressourcen und Führungspositionen und auch Qualifikationen, wenn du sagst, das ist uns egal, oder das ist nicht mehr wichtig, weder von der Sender-Seite als auch von der Empfänger-Seite, dann musst du dich auch nicht mehr drum kümmern, dass du irgendwelche Vertreter von ethnischen Minderheiten als Hörer gewinnst oder als Mitarbeiter gewinnst, weil das ist ja egal. Hauptsache, du bist Kosmopolit, ne. Es erinnert mich an die Linken, die türkischen Linken früher, die, für die war es immer ganz wichtig, dass du eine Position hast, im linken Spektrum, innerhalb des, und wenn du das nicht hattest, dann warst du für die ein Demokrat. Aber, das war für die das größte Schimpfwort überhaupt, weil das eigentlich nichts war, in

deren Augen, ne. Und so ist es mit den Kosmopoliten auch, das ist eigentlich ein total blasser Zustand. Er zieht sich ja eigentlich immer auf den neutralen Standpunkt zurück, ne.

Q: Auch eine kontrollierbare Situation.

A: Ja, eine kontrollierbare und im Grunde genommen, machst du dich damit überflüssig, weil, ich meine, wer würde von sich gerade in so einer Radio-Landschaft behaupten, es sei es nicht, zumindest als Macher. Kenne ich jetzt niemanden, der sagen würde, ich bin provinziell, oder ich denke immer nur an das deutsche Volk, oder mir sind die Minderheiten in diesem Land und in der Welt egal.

Q: Was meinst du jetzt, wenn wir einen Schritt zurück tun könnten, für wen, oder... ja, für wen sollten wir eigentlich senden? Oder, dass wir jetzt für keinen senden, das dürfte klar sein, aber für wen sollten wir eigentlich Programm machen?

A: Also, ich fand den Ursprungsgedanken, zu sagen, wir machen Programm für all die, die irgendwie in dieses Land zugewandert sind, ob nun jetzt als Angeworbene, so genannte Gastarbeiter, oder sind nach dem Studium hier geblieben, oder jetzt irgendwie, es gibt immer noch Leute, die kommen. Und das verbindende Glied ist halt, Deutschland ist irgendwie vielleicht in erster, vielleicht in mehrfacher Generation nicht Heimatland. Das fand ich eine gute Klammer, und ich glaube schon, dass es unter den eingewanderten Gruppen also wiederum eine kleine Gruppe gibt, die sich dessen bewusst sind, und nicht nur die eigene Gruppe sieht, sondern auf dieses Gesamte. Aber, ich glaube, das ist eine kleine Gruppe. Und dass man dieses Wunschdenken vielleicht hat, nur weil man jetzt zugewandert ist, hat man viel mit anderen Zugewanderten zu tun, du kannst als Türke, die Asylbewerber auch zu viel finden, ist ja kein Widerspruch. Und trotzdem verbindet dich was mit den anderen, und dennoch ist es eine kleine Gruppe, aber für diese kleine Gruppe, fand ich das absolut richtige Zielgruppe, weil mich hat am Anfang immer total berührt, dass ganz selbstverständlich in einem deutschsprachigen Umfeld, dass ich informiert worden bin um die Welt und trotzdem zu dem Land, aus dem ich stamme, noch mal einen anderen Zugang hatte, thematisch viel von anderen Ländern gelernt habe und ganz selbstverständlich in diesem Musikprogramm auch mal ein türkischer Titel läuft. Das hört sich total banal an, aber das war das. Für mich hat das so eine Lücke geschlossen, dass du nicht mehr dieses nur deutsche oder ethnische hast, sondern dass es etwas gibt, was eigentlich das spiegelt, was du selber ja in dir hast, ne. Also, das fand ich richtig gut und ich fand immer auch gut am Anfang oder eigentlich immer zwischen durch, das Programm von den Erfahrung derer gelebt hat, die da gearbeitet haben.

Also dass das jetzt nicht aus so einem Agenturwissen sich schöpfte oder aus dem Zeitungswissen, sondern dass du gelebtes Leben halt in dieser Redaktion hattest, die auch einschätzen konnten, was ist das, was ich da jetzt mache oder sende, oder dass sich das quasi so, dass das zusammen passte, das fand ich gut. Ich glaube, das war auch richtig. Ich meine, die Frustration darüber, dass man da jetzt mit nicht die Massen erreicht, kann ich verstehen, aber, ich meine, es ist doch selbst unter Deutschen oder der Mehrheitsgesellschaft, die sich, die über den Tellerrand blicken, einen anderen Blick haben, sie ist klein und die ist natürlich naturgemäß bei den Einwanderern noch kleiner, weil sie ja immer noch ein kleiner Teil der Bevölkerung sind, sie sind ja nicht die Mehrheit. Was sind die, 12% 10%? Mehr ist es ja nicht, ne. Und trotzdem finde ich, hätten sie es verdient, ein Programm zu haben, was ihre Realität spiegelt, ne. War das.. hat das deine Frage beantwortet?

Q: Ja, ja. Ich habe mir ja im Zuge meiner kleinen Recherche bisher, du wirst es nicht glauben, ich habe mir die alten Roots-DVD und diese ganzen Dinge angeschaut. Dabei ist mir aufgefallen, es gibt da diesen alten Beitrag von Ravi über den Preis oder das Preisausschreiben, und da bist du drin und Jona, ne, als O-Ton-Geberinn. Und es ist mir jetzt echt so aufgefallen, dass du... also die Jona ständig von dieser Warte spricht, da sind Potentiale, auch in der Hauptschule, wenn die Leute erstmal ein Selbstbewusstsein kriegen, dann müssen wir das so betrachten, als Chance, die bringen uns was, so, ne? Sie spricht von „wir“, „sie“, so, das ist total offensichtlich irgendwie, dabei sagt sie nette Sachen, aber irgendwie ist das, sind das zwei Pole. Und du sprichst viel emotionaler, sagst dann, also jetzt nicht „wir“ oder so, aber so Sachen wie: Wenn man sich mit der eigenen Geschichte befasst, dann sieht man, dass die Eltern was Wichtiges gemacht haben, indem sie nach Deutschland gekommen sind. Also, wie siehst du dich jetzt, in deinem Alter als Journalistin, ne, nach so vielen Jahren, weißt du, gehörst du, nö, weißt du, was ich meine? Bist du jetzt Mainstream oder bist du...

A: (laughter)

Q: Weil du siehst das total anders. In diesem einen O-Ton, du gehst von einer ganz anderen Position und sagst nicht: Ich bin Einwanderin, oder so, aber schon dieser Satz: Dann erkennst du, dass deine Eltern was Wichtiges gemacht haben, indem sie ihr Land verlassen haben, nö, ist schon eine ganz andere Perspektive.

A: Ja, natürlich, ich habe das Projekt ja auch bezogen, wo du dich ja mit Wurzeln beschäftigst. Ich weiß nicht, ob du das weißt, als ich angefangen habe journalistisch zu

arbeiten, habe ich ja nicht mit Themen angefangen, die was mit Einwanderern zu tun haben, weil ich nicht in die Ecke wollte. Das fand ich auch gut, hat mir auch gut getan, und bei Funkhaus Europa war das ja anders, also genau das Gegenteil. Viele Diskussionen, viele Beiträge, die daraus entstanden sind, die aus dieser Geschichte sich gespeist haben, das hat mir irgendwie gut getan, das war wie so eine... ja, Heilung ist jetzt übertrieben, aber wie so ein Trost oder wie so ein Zusammenwachsen von etwas, ich kann halt ganz normal, bei allen möglichen Themen arbeiten, aber ich kann auch meine Herkunft daran einbinden, ohne jetzt da völlig drin aufzugehen oder die irgendwie zu verherrlichen oder zu romantisieren oder so. Da hat sich irgendeine Lücke geschlossen und da bin ich total dankbar für. Jetzt merke ich, wo ich auch bei den anderen wieder arbeite, dass aber schon bei mir dieser Punkt überwiegt, gute Geschichten zu recherchieren und an einem Punkt ist es mir eben egal, die müssen sich nicht aus mir speisen. Also, mein journalistischer Ehrgeiz oder mein Werdegang ist nicht an meine Herkunft gekoppelt, dass da Sendungsbewusstsein ist oder so, ne, das habe ich so festgestellt, aber in einer Zeit war Funkhaus Europa total wichtig, weil, es hat ja auch eine Wertung oder Aufwertung erfahren, dass ich diese Geschichten auch loswerden konnte, dass die irgendwie dich selber, deine Gruppe, also auch im Austausch mit Deutschen darüber zu sein, dass man sie auch journalistisch verarbeitet und jetzt nicht nur einfach erzählt hat, das war total wichtig, aber das wäre jetzt nicht etwas, wo ich sagen würde, dass ich das jetzt auf Dauer nur machen will, weil im Grunde ist das andere, journalistisch zu arbeiten, mindestens genauso stark. Ich hätte das jetzt, glaube ich, weiter gemacht, wenn es so weiter gegangen wäre, aber. Es hatte eine wichtige Funktion, also ich finde nach wie vor absolut richtig, dass es auch das bessere Konzept ist, dann natürlich immer wieder mit anderen Leuten, ich glaube, du kannst es halt auch nicht auf die Dauer machen, irgendwann hast du auch, brauchst du auch, das war ja, glaube ich, das besondere auch in der Startphase, dass da Leute dazu gekommen sind. Jeder von uns hatte einen Bruch in der Biographie gehabt, da war ja keiner, der zur Schule gegangen, Abi gemacht, Journalistik studiert, ist dann beim Hörfunk gelandet, ne. Da ist jemand abgehauen von zu Hause, ein anderer ist von der Armee geflüchtet, ich habe vorher beruflich was ganz anderes gemacht, also, daraus ergab sich dieses Spannungsfeld ja auch, und ich glaube, dass so ein Konzept von Einwanderern auch mit Blick auf die Zugewanderten Programm zu machen, auch immer wieder Leute braucht, die dazu kommen. Also, jetzt in dem Fall hätte das bedeutet, dass man verstärkt Leute nimmt, die jetzt so neu dazu ziehen, das wäre auch Osteuropa, zum Beispiel, oder jetzt ganz aktuell, Griechen zu holen, Portugiesen, Spanier, was auch immer, also dass du das immer wieder erfrischt.

Q: Gut, aber heute haben diese Leute ganz, also diese Generation hat ganz andere Werdegänge, die machen halt diese klassische Biografie, um in den Journalismus zu kommen. Nur, meinst du, das sind dann die Leute, die noch die politische Tragweite, nö, diese, diese ganzen Rahmenbedingungen überhaupt durch blicken können? Ich...

A: Einwanderer auch, Einwanderer?

Q: Ja.

A: Doch, ich glaube, dass die Mischung total wichtig ist. Also diesen Bruch hast du ja allein dadurch, dass ein Teil deiner Familie in der ersten, zweiten Generation nicht da lebt, wo du lebst. Also, du hast den Bruch sowieso. Du hast ihn da drin, dass du noch eine andere Sprache hast, die dir wichtig ist. Und den Bruch meine ich gar nicht negativ, da ist einfach nicht alles glatt, so linear abgelaufen. Aber so ein Programm, also gerade wenn du dich an Einwanderer wendest, du brauchst eben auch Leute, die das erneuern, und dann ist, glaube ich, die Mischung wichtig, nicht dass ich denke, dass die Leute, die da lange arbeiten, da nicht mehr hingehören, aber dass du, wenn du den Anspruch hast, da auch quasi am Puls zu sein und da was zu fühlen, dann auch tatsächlich die Leute für diesen Sender auch irgendwie im Programm hast, entweder sie mehr reinholst oder ihnen mehr Platz gibst aber auch tatsächlich den Platz schaffst, dass sie da auch wirklich als Redakteure arbeiten und nicht nur als freie oder Producer oder so. Weißt du, das Gegenkonzept zum Kosmopolitschen, das kann dann quasi jeder machen. Ich glaube nicht, dass das, also so ein Programm, ich glaube auch, die machen es auch nicht mehr, weil sie es nicht könnten. Du kannst es eben nicht mit so einer ganz linearen Biographie, wenn du da die Mehrheit in der Redaktion hast, die aus solchen Leuten besteht, da kannst du so ein Programm nicht machen, wie? Das muss sich schon aus dir speisen oder aus deinen Erfahrungen in der Community, wo du dich bewegst und alles.

Q: Was meinst du eigentlich von diesen Fremdsprachen- oder Muttersprachensendungen? Haben die heute noch, was haben die für einen Sinn, haben die einen Sinn? Deine Meinung.

A: Also, ich verstehe die ja leider nicht, aber das Türkische verstehe ich schon. Also, ich glaube, sie machen keinen Sinn in der Richtung, dass sie Wissen oder Nachrichten in der jeweiligen Sprache vermitteln, die du auch aus der Tagesschau beziehen kannst. Also, ich könnte mir vorstellen, dass man, wie am Wochenende ja auch, wenn es so Gäste sind, wenn du einfach, ich glaube, es gibt ein Bedürfnis danach, einfach die Sprache zu hören, das Radio einzuschalten und die Sprache zu hören. Also, da würde ich auch denken, dass man sich an denen orientiert, die hier leben und zugewandert sind und an deren Alltagsrealität, ne. Da ist

ja immer noch dieser Gedanke hinter, man muss diese Menschen informieren, die müssen irgendein Wissensdefizit aufholen. Und ich glaube, der ist echt überholt. Ich glaube, kein Mensch braucht mehr eine Sendung auf Türkisch oder Italienisch, wo ihm der EU-Gipfel oder, was haben wir denn jetzt, keine Ahnung, das Elterngeld erklärt wird, ehrlich gesagt, glaube ich das nicht. Weil sich die ganze digitale Welt verändert hat. Du kannst hier Radiostationen empfangen, du kannst Fernsehstationen, und, und, und. Also, das glaube ich nicht. Es müsste also, es würde Sinn machen, genau wie bei dem deutschen Programm, wenn du etwas findest, wo du diese Realität dieser Community, dann noch viel kleiner ist als das Gesamtprogramm, auf die Pelle rückst und die quasi reinholst, dann würde das noch mehr ... das zu, mit den Leuten, die da jetzt in dem Fall, wenn wir jetzt bei den Italienern bleiben, die hier als italienische Community leben, dich viel stärker verzahnt mit denen, viel mehr Programm mit denen machst, da draußen bist, und das jetzt weniger, weil sie das brauchen, sondern weil es einfach schön ist, diese Sprache, immer noch Mal mit der Sprache was zu machen und in der Community sich zu fühlen, ne.

Q: Also, ich finde, man kann diese Sachen nur auf der affektiven Ebene irgendwie packen, vor allem was diese Muttersprachen angeht. Weißt du, das ist etwas, was du verbindest mit deiner persönlichen, irgendwie... du willst jetzt nicht ein Service haben in deiner Muttersprache, oder so, aber ein bisschen auch auf dieser Ebene, so, wir sind ein Teil von dem und dem oder wir, nö, so, oder man findet uns interessant oder so, etwas ja, weil es die Leute auf der emotionalen Ebene anspricht, ohne Soapopera zu machen, aber so auf, weißt du, was ich meine? Etwas was nicht reine Information ist.

A: Dass du auch präsent bist, zum Beispiel bei dem Fußball-Spiel Italien-Deutschland, da war ich auch noch in der italienischen Kneipe oder Verein, wo auch viele italienische Kollegen waren, übrigens, die haben das da...

Q: Im Mondo Dings-Bums.

A: Ja, ja. Aber, die haben das da auch genau wie ich geguckt. Aber, ich finde, da hätte halt ein Ü-Wagen da hingehört. Und dann das auf italienisch, auf deutsch, ist egal wie, aber da brauchst du, glaube ich, wenn du das auch noch, noch Mal in so einer kleineren Gruppe machst, einen viel stärkeren, also unmittelbaren Kontakt zu den Leuten, die hier leben. Also, die müssen meiner Ansicht nach, dauernd unterwegs sein, ne. Und das ist ja das, was die anderen nicht können, dein Radiosender aus der Türkei, der kann das nicht mit dir machen, ne. Und das deutsche Radio hier auch nicht. Aber mein türkischer Sender, der kann mit mir

auf Tuchfühlung gehen, auf Augenhöhe, und das ist, glaube ich, ich glaube, so sehen sie sich nicht, oder? Keine Ahnung, ich weiß es nicht, weil ja auch dieses, das ist ihnen dann nicht journalistisch genug, aber im Grunde ist es das einzige, das ist, wenn man überlegt, das ist das einzige, was die anderen nicht können.

Q: Genau, ja. War es eigentlich, als du angefangen hast als Journalistin, war es eigentlich schwer für dich in dieser Welt, also journalistische Szene, sagen wir mal, sich zu behaupten, oder war das, wie war das eigentlich? Ich war ja in der Zeit nicht hier, deswegen.

A: Ja, ja. Ne, also, sagen wir mal... Ich habe das Glück gehabt, dass es zwei-drei Leute gab, die erkannten, dass ich das kann und mich nur trauen muss, also ich hatte Unterstützung. Und dann war ja meine eigene Überlegung, fang nicht mit Ausländerthemen an, das wirst du nicht wieder los, und das war, glaube ich, auch eine gute Entscheidung. Und mir ist es nur... ich erzähle dir ein Positiv- und ein Negativ-Rassismusbeispiel. Ein Mal passierte, ich habe einem Sender, das war nicht der WDR, etwas über Kurden, Kurden-Türken, ich weiß gar nicht mehr was, und dann hatte ich eine lange Diskussion mit dem Redakteur darüber, ob eine Türkin was zu einem Kurden-Thema machen kann, also das Übliche. Dann habe ich so lange mit ihm hin- und herdiskutiert, bis ich das gemacht habe und er war am Ende dann auch mit dem Ergebnis ganz zufrieden. Das andere war, da hatte ich mit einem deutschen Kollegen etwas gemacht, was wir auch in Berlin einem Sender angeboten haben, und da mussten wir Kassetten einschicken, ob wir auch sprechen können, und da durfte mein Kollege den Beitrag nicht sprechen, aber ich, weil der Redakteur war der Ansicht, der hatte einen rheinischen Akzent, bei mir hört man das nicht, wo ich herkomme. Das war dann ein großes Lob, also. Ne, ich habe jetzt da, auf der Ebene das nicht erlebt, aber ich glaube, das hatte total viel damit zu tun, dass ich so zwei-drei Beiträge über irgendwas erotisches gemacht habe, die Sex-Tante auf einmal war und irgendwie alle Themen bei mir gelandet haben, die irgendwas mit Erotik und weiß-ich-nicht-was, total skurril, wie schnell das geht. Fand ich dann auch irgendwie ein bisschen komisch, also man muss unheimlich aufpassen, dass du nicht irgendwie auch in der total seichten Ecken landest oder dieser Problem-Ecke oder in dieser Ausländer-Ecke, also das ist, glaube ich, die große Kunst so als Freier auf Dauer, außer das gefällt dir da. Also, deswegen ich überlege gerade, ist mir jetzt nicht so. Jetzt auf dieser reinen Arbeitsebene, habe ich das nicht erlebt, als Feste dann schon eher, ne. Dass du da schon denkst oder merkst, die Leute können nicht davon abstrahieren, dass du eben diese Herkunft hast. ... Also, das ist dann immer wieder Thema. Komischerweise habe ich das als Redakteurin eher erlebt, dass irgend jemand sagt, ja, Sie sehen ja nicht so aus, oder dann dir total persönliche Fragen stellt,

wie ob meine Mutter das oder jenes, oder mein Vater, oder wie genau, und so Biographisches abfragt, was ich sonst, eigentlich so als Freie eigentlich überhaupt nicht gekannt habe. Und komischerweise, wenn du dann Kollege bist, dann eher passiert, ne. Und dass es so eine strukturelle, ja, Benachteiligung, Diskriminierung gibt, das glaube ich schon. Und das, so gut ich das eigentlich für mich finde, dass sich bei Funkhaus Europa so ein Kreis für mich geschlossen hat emotional, so Karriere-technisch war das kein guter Schritt, also. Ja, weil man wird da nicht so ernst genommen, ist einfach so. Aber, gut., das ist halt so. Ist jetzt auch nicht schlimm.

Q: Warum, ja. Du bewegst dich ja in den WDR-Strukturen. Ich weiß ja, dass uns keiner ernst nicht, aber warum eigentlich? Liegt es an dem...

A: Das ist normaler Rassismus, du. Ich glaube, zum Rassismus gehört auch, dass du dich besser fühlst als der andere.

Q: Also, es liegt nicht an unserem Programm, dass es schlecht ist, sondern es liegt in der Tat daran, an diesem...

A: Nein. Ja, das ist ja auch genau der Punkt, wo die Deutschen jetzt, die Kollegen, diese Diskrepanz nicht aushalten. Weil sie sind in dem Moment auch Türke oder Italiener oder Serbe oder Kroate. Dann sind sie doch lieber Kosmopolit. Für mich ist das so was wie Demokrat. Ich meine... (laughter). Hey, ich habe diese Herkunft und ich finde es dann komisch zu sagen, ich bin kosmopolitisch, finde ich ein bisschen albern, ehrlich gesagt. Aber, ich glaube, warte mal, deine Ursprungsfrage war was?

Q: Ja, wie man uns, warum...

A: Warum das so ist? Ja, das ist der ganz normale Rassismus. Du fühlst dich besser als die Minderheit, na klar. Also, ich glaube, dass viele sich darüber wundern würden, wenn sie so, dieses journalistische Potential, was es ja bei Funkhaus Europa gibt, tatsächlich erleben, ich glaube, da wundern sich viele. Ich glaube, viele denken, auch viele Kollegen, dass da einfach irgendwelche hoch bezahlten Dummköpfe rum rennen, die diesen Job haben, weil die die richtige Herkunft haben, ne.

Q: Quote erfüllen?

A: Weil sie eine Quote erfüllt haben, ja, oder weil du... Du kannst halt fürs italienische Programm nur arbeiten, wenn du italienisch sprichst. Aber das sind ja trotzdem noch

Journalisten. Und ich glaube, das spricht man ihnen gerne ab, aber gibt es natürlich auch, ich meine, Journalismus wollen ja viele machen, da sind die Ressourcen knapp und da geht es auch um Konkurrenz und ich glaube, das ist der Rassismus auch nicht mehr weit. Also, wenn du eh so tickst. Also, da sind Journalisten nicht anders als andere. Wenn es um die eigenen Jobs geht, dann... Ich hatte so ein Erlebnis in so einer WG, das war ja eine linke WG mit lauter aufgeklärten alternativen linken Menschen, damals habe ich schon als Freie gearbeitet und dann, in der Zeit, habe ich den Job beim WDR bekommen, so als Redakteurin, und irgendwann war klar, dass ich einen Vertrag kriege, ich weiß nicht, der drei, fünf, oder wie lange Jahre war. Und dann haben wir da darauf angestoßen in dieser Gruppe von sieben-acht Menschen, und du merktest richtig, wie schwer denen das fiel, wie die echt schlucken mussten, weil das war jetzt zu viel. Also, du kannst als Türkin vielleicht Managerin bei McDonald's werden oder meinetwegen auch als freie Journalistin arbeiten, aber Redakteurin beim WDR, das ist echt, das ist jetzt zu viel. Weißt du, da merkst du richtig, dass auch bei den Alternativen, weil sie ja, weil das so an ihre eigenen Träume grenzt, ne, das da auch dann der Rassismus eben hoch kommt, wenn es etwas ist, was du machst, was auch für sie attraktiv ist, für sie selbst.

Q: Bist du eigentlich hier geboren?

A: Ne, mit sieben Jahren bin ich gekommen. Ich bin der lebende Beweis dafür, dass du in einem halben Jahr in der Kita Deutsch lernen kannst. (laughter) Das geht.

Interview Amir

Cologne, 19 July 2012

Q: Kad ti radiš na ovom programu za koji radiš, za koga ti radiš, kome se obraćaš? Što je tvoj *Selbstverständnis*?

A: Kojoj publici se obraćam?

Q: Ne mislim samo u etničkom smislu, nego kako zamislijas svoju publiku?

A: To se mijenjalo, na početku kad sam došao na ovaj radio, kad sam počeo raditi, mislio sam da je moja publika zapravo ona tipična strana publika, znači doseljenici i oni koji imaju senzibilitet za doseljeničke teme, znači oni koji mnogo putuju, koji su na neki način povezani sa doseljeničkim životom. E, to se u međuvremenu promijenilo. Ja sad, 2012., imam osjećaj da se obraćam ne samo doseljenicima i ljudima koji, ajmo reći, imaju senzibilitet za te neke ekstravagantne doseljenike, već i jednoj cijeloj mlađoj generaciji, pod navodnicima, ljudi za koje je to nešto normalno. Znači, da su im roditelji iz neke zemlje, da imaju iskustvo drugih jezika, itd. Znači, ja se obraćam ne baš onoj mainstream publici kojoj se obraća EinsLive koji je kao veliki radio za masovnu publiku, već jednoj publici koja raste, koja vrlo brzo raste, recimo između 20 do 50 godina. Oni su mlađi možda malo premladi za to, a recimo dvadesete do pedesete godine su tu negdje.

Q: Sad se ide nekako politički prema nekom kozmopolitskom shvaćanju. Dakle, više se ne govori o multikulturalizmu, nego o kozmopolitizmu. Da li misliš da je Njemačka, u smislu javnog diskursa, u političkom smislu, ili u bilo kojem drugom smislu, u socijalnom smislu, stigla do te neke točke da se...?

A: Opet ću to prepoloviti preko sebe. Znači, ja sam... ovo je tipična bosanska priča, kad ti netko postavi pitanje, ti kažeš, pričat ću ti priču... Kako sam počeo navijati za njemačku reprezentaciju u košarci i fudbalu? Dugo nisam navijao, paralelno sam trenirao djecu, znači mladi košarkaši od 12 do 15 godina. I tako sam ja njih trenirao, znači iz Rusije, Albanije, Belgija, Venecuela, tralala. Znači, oni su tako odrastali, ti klinci, i ja sam ih trenirao. I jedne godine je bilo svjetsko prvenstvo u košarci, ne znam gdje. Ja do tada nisam nikada navijao za Njemačku, i onda sam odjednom shvatio da ta moja djeca igraju, da su to ti moji, zapravo taj moj svijet koji odjednom igra za Njemačku. I tu sam počeo navijati za Njemačku, i za njemačku fudbalsku reprezentaciju. E sad ne znam koliko je to vjerodostojno, ali ja mislim da se to u mojoj nekoj parcijalnoj svijesti ipak nešto ogleda. Ja mislim da taj neki, opet ću reći

ne, da to nije dio mainstream politike, znači onoga što ćemo čuti od Merkelice kad su stranci u pitanju, ali to je tako, dio neke popularne svijesti, koju ja doživljam kao lično iskustvo. Znači, ja sam pronašao radeći kao novinar zaista mnogo... Italijana nisam pronašao... ali Turaka koji navijaju za Njemačku. I to je nešto što se kod mene promijenilo i imam osjećaj da se to promijenilo u Njemačkoj u posljednjih petnaest godina.

Q: Dobro, a zašto onda? Da li misliš da...? Dakle, mi očito radimo program koji je namijenjen publici koja je po nečemu različita od mainstreama. Da li misliš da treba toj publici taj program i zašto? Ili zašto ne? Jer, mislim, ako je ta svijest već tako daleko, što je tu još različito? Zašto treba nekome taj program?

A: Ja mislim da su opet tu dvije stvari. Ja mislim da imamo na jednoj strani tu neku ulicu, ja ću je nazvati ulicom, jer ja radim puno na ulici, imamo politički establishment, političke programe i političku vlast. I ja mislim da to stoji u suprotnosti. Znači, ono što ja doživljam na ulici, da to nećemo pronaći u njemačkim, recimo, ustanovama, kao što su, ne znam, kako se to zove... Bezirksamt. Znači, koliko god ti pronađeš puno nekih tih takozvanih multikultikova na ulici, za koje je to najnormalnije, tu sliku nećeš pronaći u javnim ustanovama, isto tako u politici, isto tako u medijima. Isto tako ni u mainstream medijima nema još uvijek. Milto i ja se šalimo, kad gledamo RTL kažemo, ej, jesi vidio kad je bila ona anketa na ulici, prošao je jedan stranac iza onoga koga su pitali i kamera se malo uvrnula, malo se pomakla, znaš, ali još nije, znaš, hahaha, još nije. Znači, još uvijek se, postoji, mislim da mi je čak kolega Terkessidis to rekao jednom, ima to neko mainstream fetišiziranje multikulti, znači gdje se bukvalno fetišizira to, ali to još uvijek nije postalo dio strukture, znači, kao što rekoh, u ustanovama, u politici, na našem WDR-u, kad pogledamo strukturu cijelog radija, tu još uvijek nisu stranci na ključnim mjestima. Jesu tu i tamo šef, ali nisu kad pogledaš na široko. Recimo na EinsLiveu sam slušao prije dvije godine emisiju posvećenu turskom slušateljstvu i cijeli dan im je bila tema kebab i trbušni ples, cijeli dan. Zašto? Zato što u EinsLiveu ne sjede ljudi koji sjede u Funkhaus Europi. To u Funkhaus Europi ne bi prošlo, nema teorije, zašto, zbog Ayce i zbog Turaka koji bi ubili ostale prije nego što bi to uradili. I to tako možemo prepoznati, baš zbog toga što u EinsLiveu nema niti jednog moderatora čije ime završava na – ić ili ne znam ni ja što, koji radi takve teme ili betonira stanje, jel tako.

Q: Kako ti sebe vidiš kao novinara? Ti si došao kao gotov čovjek u Njemačku, mislim mlad. I sad tu radiš kao novinar. Ti ne radiš za mainstream medije.

A: Da.

Q: Da li bi ti mogao raditi za mainstream medije, odnosno po čemu si ti različit od mainstream novinara? Da li si različit? Zašto ne radiš za njih? Da li je to neka, neko pitanje diskriminacije, ili je li teško ući u to, ili ti misliš da tematski nisi?

A: Radi se o različitom iskustvu prije svega, znači kad ja nastupim, opet ću se vratiti ulici, znači, ako ja na ulici radim anketu, kao Bosanac, drugačije ću komunicirati s tim velikim šarenilom na ulici od, recimo, tipa s EinsLivea, prosječnim Nijemcem iz srednjeg sloja, koji ljetuje na Mallorci i koji nema toliko ožiljaka na tijelu niti na duši kao ja. Ja to iskustvo ne krijem, znači ja kad s tim iskustvom razgovaram s ljudima, onda dobijam drugačije, druge informacije, odnosno druge O-Tonove. I ja mislim da je to razlika. Znači, kad ja kao Bosanac intervjuišem Turčina, on će meni potpuno drugi statement dati nego EinsLive dečkić koji je došao da napravi nešto zanimljivo o kebabu i trbušnom plesu. Ja mislim da je to kvalitativno, ne sad dobro ili loše, nego što se tiče sadržaja, to su dva svijeta. Po tome se možda razlikujem.

Q: Da, ali zašto ne plasiraš te materijale u druge medije? Da li ne želiš to, ili misliš da ne bi pasalo?

A: Dobro, ja sad opet, sebe smatram kao, ja nikad ne bih rekao da sam novinar, ja uvijek kažem da radim kao novinar. Znači, ja sebe ipak smatram autorom, i ja mislim da je za autora uvijek... i to možda nije tipična posljedica, ja sebe uvijek smatram, smatram da se uvijek može bolje opisati stvar kad je posmatraš sa strane, znači ja bukvalno tražim marginu i uopće mi nije u interesu da idem u centar. Premda to ne bih isključio, znači može se potrefiti da netko dođe, da mi nešto ponudi, da ja kažem, uradit ću to, ali to nije dio moje energije, ja tako ne radim, ja ne idem ka centru, odnosno sve što sam do sada uradio sam uradio tako da su ljudi meni, došli do mene, a ne ja do njih, možda sam ja takav tip, ne znam.

Q: Da, nisam išla za tim, zašto ne radiš za 1LIVE recimo, nego više, ne znam, ti bi mogao feature raditi za WDR5. Nisi tražio to, ili nisi htio do sada?

A: To nije neka politička odluka. Ja mislim da sam ja, ja sam uvijek radio, shvaćam taj posao... Kao, zarađujem dovoljno, da mogu imati mir za sebe i za neku knjigu, za pisanje, za familiju, i to je to. Znači, ja nemam te neke pretenzije da otkrivam nove, imam pretenziju da radim uvijek nešto drugačije, ali nemam pretenziju da, ono, politički mijenjam busiju, da kažem, idem sad u WDR5, pošto je to top. Znači, ja sam uradio za Consuelo neka dva komentara, oni su me nazvali, i ja sam to uradio. Ali, u mom nekom habitusu nije to da ja

idem i kažem, ej, ljudi, imam. Znaš, pitao me ovaj iz Neugier genügt da nešto radim za njih i ja sam rekao, uradit ću, znaš.

Q: Ti si prošao kroz nekakve WDR-ove konkretne instrumente, kao što su *grenzenlos*, je li tako?

A: Da.

Q: Kako sad gledaš na to? Je li to bila ulaznica I da li bi bez toga ušao? Kako gledaš na takve instrumente iz vlastitog iskustva? Jel ti to pomoglo, jel ti odmoglo?

A: Meni to nije odmoglo, ali nije me to ni ubacilo u priču, Grenzenlos. Znači, ja sam već bio na radiju kad sam išao na Grenzenlos. Ali je bilo zanimljivo kako to funkcionira u Njemačkoj. Ja mislim da je to ista priča kao ova priča o kvoti za žene, znaš. Znači, ja čisto vidim da je to etnički, da je to dobar instrument da tu uđu ljudi koji inače možda ne bi ušli u tu instituciju. Ja to totalno tako na to gledam. Ne govorim uopće o kvalitetu te stvarno radionice, i o tome što smo mi tu radili i koliko je to bilo malo romantično, nonšalantno, glupo urađeno, ali čisto kao instrument otvaranja vrata, da.

Q: Da se vratimo sad na svakodnevni rad. Možeš slobodno onako, na glupom nivou možemo razgovarati. Kad radiš s urednikom koji ima migracijsko iskustvo, da li drugačije radiš nego s urednikom koji je Nijemac? I, sad se vraćam na Luigija koji hoće prilog o tome da su migranti zmazani, koja su tvoja iskustva?

A: Moram napomenuti da živimo u jednoj Njemačkoj, u kojoj jedan stranac može biti veći Nijemac od Nijemca. Znači, takvi su uslovi. Ja tu ne bih vukao baš striktno po... ne bih vukao, ja bih tu više išao u pravcu miljea, znači, da li je u pitanju neki stranac koji dolazi iz srednjeg sloja turskog, ili je u pitanju, ne znam ni ja, Bosanac koji dolazi iz tipičnog gastarbajterskog sloja, koji su tu, ovaj, došli, pa postali veći Nijemci od Nijemaca, ili je u pitanju neki stranac koji je došao prije godinu dana. Ne znam, ne mogu...

Q: Dobro, ali u svakodnevnom radu s urednicima?

A: U svakodnevnom radu? Evo, u svakodnevnom radu, posao s urednicima. Turske teme s Aycom raditi ili s Luigijem je isto kao raditi turske teme s Nijemcem i s Turčinom. Jer, ti imaš recimo osjećaj, a to ti je ta njemačka strast, sigurnost, samokritika, to vole, to je dio njemačke kulture koja drži ovu kulturu stabilnom donekle, ali to kad primijeni netko tko je i ovako i onako marginaliziran na sebe, je ovaj, nije nepotrebno, ali može postati groteskno,

znaš. To je onaj primjer, hoćemo li raditi prilog o strancima koji prljaju okolinu i stvarno misliti da ćemo biti kritični prema sami sebi i da će time priča biti završena, a previdjeti to da time služimo jedan veliki kliše, politički kliše o prljavom strancu, i time uzrokuje više štete. Otišao sam u neku priču... ne, nemam... pazi, ne bih bio u Funkhaus Europi... čekaj radio sam na WDR5, kad sam na WDR5, radio sam sa njemačkim urednicima nekoliko puta, ali sam to radio na način na koji radim za Funkhaus Europu, i to je uvijek bilo super prihvaćeno, ali je to bila velika, ono, zoološki vrt je to bio, ja sam za njih bio zoološki vrt, onako kako sam ja radio stvar. Jer njemački radio, njemački WDR5 radio još uvijek ima sakralnu auru, ja mislim da je to njemački radio, Deutschlandfunk i svi ostali, imaju još uvijek taj neki sakralni, onako, to onako ozbiljno. I jednom sam radio priču za WDR5... ja se javljam sa lotto iz kioska, lotto, nešto 30 miliona su u igri, i ja kao nešto javljam se, ljudi uplaćuju, tip čiji je kiosk je Englez, tamo je neki Albanac, Cigan, Rom, i radim za Funkhaus Europu se javljam uživo, i napravimo ono, pravi cirkus multikulti, znači, ovaj Rom napušta Njemačku ako dobije, ovaj Englez ne znam što, ludilo. I onda razgovaram sa WDR5, totalno druga atmosfera, znači, ja kad govorim o Romu, nitko se ne smije, prije svega, to nikome nije smiješno, što neki Rom hoće da napusti Njemačku ako dobije na lottu. Onda me onako, hahaha, meni je to totalno smiješno, onda ja onako bla-bla-bla, a onda dođe neko pitanje sasvim ozbiljno. Znači, nula humora, nula. I, ovaj, na kraju se završava tako da je on zaista htio od mene saznati što će se desiti ako nitko ne dobije, ako dvojica dobiju, mislim, neku matematiku su htjeli sa mnom napraviti, ja pojma nemam, mislim, ja sam došao tamo da kažem kakva je atmosfera, razumiješ, on mene nešto, neke informacije. Uglavnom, možda je razlika u, je li to humor, ne znam. Možda je razlika u distanci. Možda ti kad si Funkhaus Europa priču pričaš iznutra, ovu pričaš bukvalno odozgo, iako nije ti društvo takvo, ali ti još uvijek odozgo pričaš, ti si još uvijek ono... i to su svi ti njihovi, WDR5 je tako, imam taj osjećaj.

Q: Da se vratimo sad na tvoju osobnu procjenu. Ti kad govoriš o Nijemcima, onda govoriš o tome tko je veći Nijemac od Nijemaca, dakle u nekom 3. licu, mislim, nisi ti doma tu, očito. Mislim, nisam ni ja doma, ne? U smislu, ti govoriš o tome kao da nisi dio, što je meni normalno, ali (hahaha).

A: Mislim, nisam dio ove strukture, ali...

Q: Ne govorim sad o medijima, nego čisto koja je, ja sam starija od tebe nešto i došla sam sad tek nedavno do nekih zaključaka za sebe, nakon višegodišnjih frustracija koje nisam mogla imenovati točno (hahaha). Ti sad napuštaš ovu zemlju...

A: Da, ali uzimam njemački pasoš.

Q: Da li si ti dio ovog društva?

A: Jesam. Jesam. Totalno, skroz sam dio ovoga društva. Isto toliko koliko sam dio društva ovog u Sarajevu. Možda čak i sekundu više zato što ovdje plaćam te neke poreze. Totalno se osjećam kao dio društva, ali se osjećam kao dio jednog društva, opet ću se vratiti mojoj ulici i mom tom nekom, margini, kao dio margine. Kao dio društva, ali kao dio margine se osjećam. I možda iz te margine proizlazi neka produktivna nelagoda koju ja iskorištavam kao novinar. To znači da se ne osjećam kao dio WDR-aparata niti kao dio, ne znam, tih nekih struktura koje, ovaj, kako lijevih, tako i desnih, koje vole opaučiti po multikulturalizmu, znaš.

Q: U Njemačkoj je veliki tabu, jedan od najvećih tabua danas, je taj da je ovo društvo jednakosti. Da svi imaju jednake šanse. Da nema strukturne diskriminacije. Onda doletiš u Njemačku s avionom, onda vidiš da samo Turkinje čiste podove (hahaha), niti jedan Nijemac. Da li si ikad...? Da li na bilo kojem nivou se susrećeš, ne na ovom nivou što govore političari i ne što govore asocijalni, ali da li se na nekom nivou u svom životu susrećeš s nekom strukturnom diskriminacijom, ili rasizmom? To nije mržnja prema imigrantima, nego rasizam u tom smislu.

A: Rasizam?

Q: Ne rasizam zbog rase, nego...

A: Strukturne, da. Na koje strukture misliš, medija, ili? Kako mediji rade?

Q: Svejedno, iz svog života. Mislim, gdje si izvan?

A: Gdje sam izvan? Izvan sam na mnogo toga. Izvan sam kad sam prije nekoliko godina bio student još, znači, kad te kontroliraju u tramvaju i kad pokažeš, ovaj, Semesterticket, je li, onda ti Nijemac pokaže to, i to je to, a ja, kad ja pokažem Semesterticket, onda su često od mene tražili još ovaj, ličnu kartu, razumiješ, što se sad možemo se smijati, znaš, ali to je jedan simptom od mnogih. Evo sad još jednog, sačekaj, ima njih puno. Mene su, recimo, zaustavili, ja sam jednom trčao, zakasnio sam na tramvaj, i ja trčim da uhvatim tramvaj, i iza mene se pojave dva tipa u civilu i zaustave me, ne zaustave me, i prislone uza zid, da dignem ruke i da

raširim noge, i pretresu me, razumiješ, i ono, walkie-talkie, znaš, policajci, nešto, droga, ovo-ono. Kao, oni ganjaju neke drogeraše i sad misle da ja bježim, kao tu, i zašto su pomislili da sam ja taj, zato što tako izgledam valjda, zato. I sad, opet se tu možemo smijati, ali to je meni malo, ovaj, traumatično, recimo, iskustvo. Čekaj, što ima još? Ima toga koliko hoćeš. Recimo, kad tražiš stan, ja kad sam sa ženom tražio stan, moja žena je zvala uvijek, nikad nisam ja zvao. Što ima još?

Q: Postoje neke studije, ali kad malo čovjek bolje razmisli, doći će i sam do tog zaključka da diskriminacija na osnovu jednog latentnog rasizma u zemljama poput Njemačke, postoji više na nivou... Oni stalno govore, to je socijalno pitanje. Dakle, kad si iz nižih slojeva, onda imaš te i te probleme, nije bitno da li si stranac ili Nijemac. Postoji saznanje da je diskriminacija raste u srednjim slojevima, prema srednjim slojevima, dakle, da ću ja možda biti veća žrtva diskriminacije nego neki radnik, jer radnik, na nisko plaćenim poslovima nikome nije trn u oku Turčin. Ali, ti možeš biti kao urednik na WDR-u trn u oku njemačkom slobodnjaku koji ne može dobiti uredničko mjesto. Zato što na osnovu latentnog rasizma se smatra da ti nemaš što tražiti, da ti njihove interese....

A: Da, da. Ja mislim da je to konflikt koji dolazi. Kada, znači, ovi stranci koji dolaze mahom iz nižih slojeva, i koji polako nekako, čisto statistički, grabe prema srednjem sloju, kad oni počnu u srednjem sloju preuzimati pozicije, da će tu doći do pravih konflikta, kao što, recimo, sad primjećujemo u ovim fenomenima tipa, a to sam i ja, recimo primijetio, recimo, to je iskustvo koje se ponavlja. Ja bukvalno znam da je svaka anketa, kolaža, manipulirana. Znači, do mene je kako ću je manipulirati, da li ću je manipulirati tako da zaista pokušam napraviti sliku neku mišljenja ljudi, koje sam ja, evo, sam uočio, pa ću je tako sasjeci, ili ću ići u to da provociram. Znači, ako radimo call-in, onda će moj zadatak biti da ja provociram. I onda ću ja iz svog iskustva tačno znati na ulici kome da priđem i da izvučem rasistički ton protiv Islama, protiv muslimana. Daj mi, ono, pet pokušaja, ja ću četiri puta ću izvući najcrnije. A to koga šicam, šicam u srednji sloj, znači, ne baš skroz mladi, nego ajmo reći onako, pedesetak godina, mogu biti i mladi nekada, ali su oko pedesetak godina, onako fine jakne, gospođa i gospodin, uvijek u paru, pošto se uvijek voli se muškarac dokazati pred ženom, znači tako uvijek u parovima pohvataš, tamo gdje Stammtisch gdje krene, i tu u srednjem sloju pronalazim najčešće te animozitete, i to artikulirane. Znači, onaj će ti smetljak onako nešto, znaš, pljunuti, ali ti neće znati to obrazložiti, a ovaj tip je čitao Sarrazina, razumiješ, i on će ti to dobro razložiti.

Q: Tog Sarrazina nitko živ nije čitao jer je toliko dosadan i glup da to ne možeš pročitati. To su ljudi kupili, jer je...

A: Da imaju, da, da ih čuva, da se bolje osjećaju, da se bolje osjećaju, znaš, (hahaha).

Interview Miltiadis

Cologne, 19 July 2012

Q: Ich weiß nicht, worum es geht in deinem letzten Werk. Aber davor hast du was gemacht über Personalpolitik. Was sind jetzt deine Erfahrungen? Sagen wir so: Du bist ja griechischstämmig, aber eigentlich deutsch. Was sind jetzt deine persönlichen Erfahrungen als Journalist? Sagen wir so: Wo siehst du dich hier in den deutschen Medien? Wo kannst du arbeiten? Für welche Themen wirst du genommen?

A: Gut, OK, das ist natürlich schon so, wo sehe ich mich da? Ich meine, es ist halt so... Ich hatte ja früher gar nicht vorgehabt, im Funkhaus Europa zu arbeiten. Ich hatte es mal so gehört, so, als Hörer, entdeckt, fand das auch ganz gut, hatte aber gar nicht vor, da zu arbeiten. So, das war nicht so, oh, da musst du jetzt irgendwie hin, sondern ich hatte weiter im Studium so weiter gejobbt, dann irgendwie mich auch formell beworben, ich hatte mich noch ein Mal für so eine Moderation von so einer Sendung beworben, die diese Gastarbeitersendung gelöst hat, die gibt es aber auch nicht mehr, habe bei so einem Casting mitgemacht, aber da bin ich auch nicht genommen worden. Ansonsten hatte ich mich da für so ein Volontariat noch mal beworben, wo die mich auch nicht genommen haben. Dann hatte ich irgendwie ein Volo gemacht bei so einer IT-Zeitschrift, das war einfach gut, um einfach sagen zu können: Ich habe ein Volo gemacht. Die ist dann auch Pleite gegangen, weil die Internet-Blase geplatzt ist, ich glaube, das war auch gut, weil dann war ich mit meinem Volo schon nach einem Jahr durch, musste nicht mehr nach Hürth fahren und irgendwelche IT-Themen schreiben. Das war eine gute Erfahrung, weil ich habe irgendwie die Scheu davor verloren, ich hatte auf einmal Titelgeschichten da, ja? Weil, irgendwie, es reichte schon, dass man ein bisschen gut schreiben kann, so, und du musstest du gar nicht mit IT auskennen, sondern es ging darum, Themen gut zu verpacken. Meistens hast du ehe irgendwelche Marktforschungsinstitute zitiert, OK? Dann hat sich das aber doch so herausgestellt, dass ich dann doch in dieser Multikulti-Nische, würde ich jetzt mal sagen, gelandet bin, obwohl ich mich da nie gesehen habe, so. Es war halt über Mark, weil er halt meinte, die suchen jemanden, der Mal eine griechische Presseschau machen kann, würdest du machen, habe das gemacht, dann hatte ich noch einen Beitrag direkt angeboten, so und darüber bin ich halt dahin gekommen, so. Wenn ich jetzt reflektiere, ist es natürlich schon so, dass es über den normalen Weg nicht geklappt hat, dass es über einen Kontakt geklappt hat und das hat über eine bestimmte Nachfrage geklappt, die ich spezifisch bedienen konnte, was eben diese Multikulti-Thematik ist, obwohl ich das gar nicht vor hatte.

Q: Das ist die klassische Erfahrung, das sagen alle, die am Anfang sich nicht fest machen wollen, einengen wollen auf die multikulti-Themen, aber dann zwangsläufig dahin gehen, wo sie überhaupt Karriere-Chancen haben.

A: Klar, klar. Auf der anderen Seite ist es natürlich auch so, dass ich selber auch ein Anliegen habe, weil mich die Themen interessieren, weil ich bin auch selber antirassistisch aktiv, und so. Und ich meine, klar, wir sind schon, ich meine, ich habe in den Neunziger Jahren die Themen so wahrgenommen, dass da immer so „das Boot ist voll“-Diskussion, die Ausländer-Diskussion statt fand in den Medien, ohne dass Migranten dort selber zu Wort kommen, insofern fand ich es natürlich wichtig, dass sich das ändert. Insofern hatte ich ja natürlich selber Interesse daran, an solchen Themen zu arbeiten und zu publizieren, und eben diese Sichtbarkeit herzustellen und andere Sichtweisen präsent zu machen in der Berichterstattung. Insofern bedingt sich beides, sozusagen, ich hätte es auch so, in gewisser Weise geht es auch von mir aus, klar, weil ich mich solcher Themen annehme, was ich ja immer noch mache. Mache jetzt halt was zur Abschiebung in meinem Buch, klar, warum interessiert man sich. Ich habe letztens so eine kleine Lesung gehabt in Düsseldorf, habe ich ein bisschen unterstützt, da war so eine Frau, die dann meinte, ja, also, Sie sind ja selber gar kein Flüchtling, und so, wie kommen Sie überhaupt zu so einem Thema, sich zu interessieren halt, so. Sie hatte selber so einem migrantischen Hintergrund, so einen Akzent halt, ne. Sie hatte es sozusagen von dieser Sichtweise, ne, interessant, wie kommen Sie dazu. So, sie hatte aus Interesse gefragt, nicht, die hat das nicht abwertend gemeint, hat sich gewundert halt, ne. Und deswegen, das ist sozusagen beidseitig in einer gewissen Weise. Aber ich hätte, wie soll ich sagen, es ist auch jetzt so in dieser Gesichte, zum Beispiel, mit der Schuldenkrise, dass ich halt irgendwie durch das Griechen-Ticket halt dazu ein paar Sachen geschrieben habe, weil es halt in Griechenland ist und weil ich einen Bezug zu habe und dann eben auch mit diesem Bezug das thematisieren konnte und so, obwohl ich sicherlich grundsätzlich Sachen zu Griechenland machen würde, und es ist immer so eine ökonomische Sache, weißt du, weil, die Frage ist, also, ich würde auch allgemein, grundsätzlich Sachen schreiben, zum Beispiel zur Schuldenkrise, ja, und ich würde es im allgemeinen auch für die anderen Programme machen, mache ich aber nicht. Ich habe das vielleicht mal gemacht als Tagesreporter, als einer der ersten habe ich, glaube ich, diesen Max Otte wahrgenommen mit seinem Buch „Der Crash kommt“, als es raus gekommen ist, und dann habe ich gesagt, hier den müssen wir machen, dann habe ich angerufen, einen Telefon-O-Ton, so einen Beitrag gebastelt, wo alle gedacht haben, ah, Telefon-O-Ton ist Scheiße, mach mal, und dann hat noch kein Hahn danach gekräht, so, aber

der hat damals schon gesagt, das wird hier noch den Bach runter gehen, dann im Nachhinein super, das war bevor irgendwas mit Griechenland los gegangen ist. Aber ich hatte es natürlich für Funkhaus Europa gemacht, weil ich da angebunden bin, weil ich da halt als Tagesreporter, und da muss ich nicht groß Akquise machen, weißt du. Und dasselbe ist es, sozusagen, mit dieser Thematik, ne. Irgendwie dann kann ich sagen, ich bin ein bisschen faul und ich weiß, wenn ich sozusagen mit dem Griechen-Ticket fahre, kann ich halt irgendwie das in diesen Grenzen einfacher an den Mann bringen in dem Moment wo das auf einmal hoch kocht und Interesse da ist, als wenn ich sozusagen allgemein jetzt versuche, im Wirtschaftsmagazin, Zeitung, Feuilleton, was auch immer, versuche im Heer der anderen Autoren mich da durchzusetzen.

Q: Also jetzt, das sind zwei verschiedene Paar Schuhe. Einmal die Frage, ob du mit einem allgemeinen, nicht Griechenland-gebundenen Thema, hättest du da Chancen? Das hast du selber gesagt jetzt, dass du nicht großartig Akquise machst, und es ist ein bisschen schwierig, in einem Mainstream-Medium anzukommen mit einem Thema, was jetzt nicht an deine Herkunft gebunden ist.

A: Ja, das wäre schon, das wäre schon... Das ist ja nicht so, es gibt ja Journalisten, die das machen, das ist ja nicht der Punkt, natürlich kann man es machen. Man kann es nicht ausschließen, dass es völlig unmöglich wäre, das wäre jetzt unfair. Aber, es ist halt eine Frage der Ökonomie, weißt du? Es ist halt ökonomischer für mich das so zu machen, weil ich dann irgendwie, es hat sich eingespielt, so, und das andere würde jetzt noch mal einen erneuten Aufwand bedeuten, weißt du, mit ungewisserem Ausgang. Und das heißt nicht, dass es nicht erfolgreich sein könnte, aber...

Q: Also, könnte man in diesem Fall sagen, oder positiv formuliert, hilft dir das, dass du das mit, dass du das sozusagen anbinden kannst an die...

A: Ja, es hilft mir, ich ruhe mich ein bisschen drauf aus, negativ formuliert, es behindert aber natürlich auch, ja? Weil sozusagen dadurch, dass es sich eher lohnt es so zu machen, verhindert das eben, dass man anderswo präsent wird und dann anderswo tätig wird, ja? Das ist einfach der Punkt. Das hat sozusagen auch einen gewissen negativen Effekt dann wiederum. Es ist nicht so, dass ich, ich habe schon Sachen für andere Programme gemacht, ich habe schon mal Features gemacht für WDR5 für Neugier genügt, die nichts mit Migration zu tun hatten, ich habe auch mal Beiträge über Mindestlohn oder so für WDR2 gemacht, die nichts mit Migration zu tun hatten, aber ich werde da selten angefragt, ja, angefragt werde ich

eher für diese Themen. Ich meine WDR2 hat mich angefragt, um was zu Griechenland zum EM-Spiel zu machen, also, die haben mich nicht angefragt zum Thema von der Leyen will jetzt, so halt, obwohl ich dazu schon mal was gemacht habe.

Q: Klar, man kann die Ursachenforschung jetzt...

A: Nein, aber offensichtlich, verstehst du? Das ist auch ein Thema, was ich schon oft gemacht habe. Das ist so, also, man hätte ja auch sagen können, der hat dazu schon was gemacht, aber da gibt es auch andere, die das machen können. Und während das ist sozusagen ist etwas, gut, da gibt es nicht so viele andere und das hat diesen positiven und gleichzeitig negativen Nebeneffekt.

Q: Zurück zu diesen Multikulti-Themen und Antirassismus-Themen und so weiter. Unser Programm definiert sich auch teilweise dadurch, oder hat sich dadurch definiert. Jetzt viel weniger, nö? Aber, was ist deine Erfahrung? Also, du sagst, wir sprechen nicht, also man spricht nicht über Ausländer, sondern wir sprechen selbst oder mit ihnen, oder wie auch immer.

A: Ja, genau, genau.

Q: Wie ist es, deine Erfahrung, jetzt nur deine Erfahrung in den anderen Medien? Kannst du da diese Themen platzieren, wie ist da die Nachfrage? Oder, wie ist die Tendenz, über diese Themen zu sprechen oder über diese Menschen? Oder eher, ändert sich da was? Rein aus deiner Erfahrung jetzt. Oder, hast du da welche? Hast du bestimmt.

A: Ja, doch, eigentlich schon. Es ist natürlich eine begrenzte Aufnahmefähigkeit für solche Themen. Aber eigentlich schon und es hängt davon ab, wie hintergründig die Sendungen sind, die Sender sind, also du kannst bei WDR5 und Deutschlandfunk da mehr unterbringen als bei WDR2, verstehst du. Also, ich habe damals schon, als dieses No Border Camp auf Lesbos war, wo ich ja war, habe ich nicht mal für Funkhaus Europa was gemacht, da habe ich für diese Europa heute Sendung von Deutschlandfunk was gemacht, was natürlich viel mehr Leute hören. Ich weiß überhaupt nicht, ob ich das überhaupt WDR2 oder EinsLive angeboten habe, aber so was würdest du nicht machen können, das ist schon zu abseitig. Und irgendwie dasselbe ist jetzt mit diesen Geschichten halt auch in anderen Fällen. Das ist halt eher, je mainstreamiger es ist, desto weniger ist da Platz für. Im Fernsehen ist es vielleicht noch ein bisschen anders, aber dafür arbeite ich nicht, aber so was ich halt so mitbekomme und sehe, Zeitungen arbeite ich ja selten für, so, und für die, für die ich arbeite, na gut, dann ist es

wirklich auch... also ich habe dann, so gesehen, wenn ich das in Angriff genommen habe und das waren dann entsprechende Medien, die entsprechend ticken, die kritischer sind, so, dann geht das auch, das muss man schon sagen. Aber es gibt natürlich immer eine gewisse... ja, die Grenze ist halt immer sozusagen da, wie viel Selbstbewusstsein ist da möglich, wie viel Infragestellung des Systems ist möglich, weil da ist natürlich immer im Hinterkopf, ja da könnten sich jetzt die Hörer, oder die Mehrheit der Hörer provoziert fühlen, ja? Ich habe dieses Stück hier, was ich gestern gemacht habe für WDR5, die haben eine Stelle herausgeschnitten von dieser Nojana (?), und zwar war das die Stelle, wo sie sagt, sie kriegt eigentlich die 40 Euro nicht bar ausbezahlt, weil die haben sie ihr gekürzt auf 1,63 Euro, weil sie wirkt halt nicht mit bei ihrer Pass-Beschaffung. Sie sagt, warum soll ich der Ausländerbehörde dabei helfen, mich abzuschieben, und so, ne? Und das haben die jetzt raus geschnitten. Jetzt kann man sagen, ich finde es eigentlich ganz interessant, so, jetzt kann man sagen, warum haben die das jetzt raus geschnitten? Ich denke schon, dass ist sozusagen so ein Punkt, wo man halt sagt, OK, das wird dazu führen, dass so mancher sagt, na ja, das geht jetzt auch nicht, also man muss ja schon mitwirken und so, ne. Man kann ja nicht irgendwie sagen, ich mache gar nichts und dann beschwere ich mich auch noch irgendwie, dass ich das... also, ich denke, da gibt es sozusagen die Grenze, ne, wo ich jetzt sagen würde, das ist eine Form von Widerstand, und das ist es auch, die meisten Leute verhindern ihre Abschiebung vorläufig, weil sie ihren Pass nicht vorlegen, ne (laughter). Und so eine Message ist sozusagen durchaus eine Provokation, inwieweit kann man darüber berichten und das halt sozusagen nicht, erstmal einfach so darstellen, das ist halt so, ne. Ich will das gar nicht als schlecht bewerten, das ist immer ein bisschen so eine Grenze da, aber ansonsten, ja.

Q: Ja, das ist ja, das kann man schon als Infragestellung des Systems bewerten. In jedem normalen Beitrag macht man das.

A: Ja, klar.

Q: Aber, würdest du sagen, dass die Autoren, oder du, eine kleine Selbstzensur betreiben, um diese Themen in den Mainstream-Medien konsumierbar zu machen, weißt du? Oder nicht? Oder, ich meine, du bist nicht so ein Typ.

A: Ja, eben. Also, ich persönlich mache das eigentlich nicht, seltener, wobei es kommt immer darauf an, wem du ein Angebot machst und dann machst du schon immer das entsprechend so, dass du da ein bisschen vielleicht Selbstzensur machst, aber eigentlich würde ich jetzt sagen, dass ich das nicht mache.

Q: Aber irgendwie, man holt dann irgendwelche vorzeigbaren, netten Ausländer. Nicht irgendwelche Asis.

A: Ne, das stimmt nicht. Also, ich habe zum Beispiel auch mal was gemacht, und das hat nicht geklappt, weil ich was machen wollte über Leute, die abgeschoben werden aufgrund von Straftaten. Da war so ein Typ, so ein Roma aus ex-Jugoslawien, aus dem Kosovo, und, aber Vater war schon als Gastarbeiter hier, ich meine, das ist natürlich, der ist ein Asi, verstehst du, der hat sogar den Pfarrer beklaut, der ihm geholfen hat im Knast, den Gefängnispfarrer und so, ja, ne? Den habe ich ja zitiert in meinem Buch halt, ich habe nicht alles gesagt, nur der Rechtsanwalt meinte irgendwann zu mir, so, hören Sie auf mit dem und so, der kam irgendwann und meinte er, er hatte kein Geld und der wollte mich halt in Naturalien bezahlen, hatte er da eine junge Frau dabei, und für die er dann als Zuhälter, verschwinden Sie hier, hahaha. Total Horror. Das ist aber so, da hat die Familie drunter gelitten, weil er hatte eine Frau aus Mazedonien, wahrscheinlich arrangierte Heirat, die war als Flüchtlingsstatus hier und als er im Knast war, haben die die abgeschoben, die Familie, mit Kindern. Sind dann illegal zurück gekommen und so, aber verstehst du, der ist ein Essener Jung, so gesehen, er spricht auch Deutsch und so, die nennen ihn alle Toni und ich habe gedacht, es ist eigentlich eine interessante Geschichte. Man muss sagen, gut, es ist ein Kleinkrimineller aber der ist in Essen geboren, aufgewachsen, warum soll er jetzt da nicht leben, ne, und vor allem, wenn die Familie noch illegal zurückkommt, warum soll man nicht sagen, so, pass mal auf, OK, das bringt ja auch nichts, so, das fördert seine Kriminalität, wenn die dann ständig in der Illegalität leben, und darüber habe ich halt sozusagen Angebote gemacht, und das ist halt von niemanden genommen worden, also das ist auch von der WAZ nicht genommen worden ins Ressort (?) der meinte irgendwann, ne, er traut der Sache nicht, weil so Leute, die erzählen dann immer was anderes, als dann wirklich stimmt und so, ja? Ich hatte aber auch, ich hatte von der Stadt Essen die Aussagen, was die dazu sagen, so nach dem Motto, ja, wer die Gesetze bricht, der will sich ja nicht integrieren und dann ist bei uns Schluss, Ende der Fahnenstange und so, und das habe ich der WAZ angeboten, mit denen diskutiert, wollten sie nicht haben, die trauten da der Sache nicht, und irgendwie der, auch WDR5 wollte das nicht haben, also das wollte eigentlich keiner haben. (laughter) So, da war das Ende, ich hätte das ein bisschen so, die Überschrift war Heimatrecht für Straftäter, so, wenn Deutschland doch deren Heimat ist, irgendwie, soll man dann trotzdem abschieben, obwohl die Straftäter sind, die konnten noch nicht mal abschieben, weil das Strafmaß von ihm war unter dem, wo die Ausweisung zwingend ist, es gibt ja Ausweisung zwingend und

Ausweisung kann, ne? Und der hat dann quasi gesagt, ne, ich stimme dem nicht zu, wir bekommen ihn nicht ausgewiesen, nur die anderen, als er im Knast war, haben die seine Familie ausgewiesen, ne, also die Frau und die Kinder halt, ne, so. Ich finde es ein interessantes Thema, aber das ging nicht, bei niemandem, weil das ist, was du gesagt hast, die guten, da habe ich das auch nicht zensiert, im Gegenteil, ich habe das unzensiert angeboten und das funktioniert nicht.

Q: Jetzt wollte ich dich zu diesem Programm was fragen.

A: Ja.

Q: Du arbeitest seit Jahren...

A: Ja, zehn Jahre...

Q: Ja, ich bin seit 12 Jahren...

A: Ja, du warst vorher bei den Jugos...

Q: Ja, Wahnsinn.

A: Ja!

Q: Hat sich... jetzt hat sich einiges geändert. Wenn du jetzt arbeitest, jetzt nur angenommen heute und so, für wen machst du das? Was ist jetzt... wie siehst du das als Autor? Also, ich habe da meine Meinung, nö? Aber, du bist jetzt Autor, freier Autor, der nicht jeden Tag hier ist. Für wen sendest du jetzt hier? Wenn du hier jetzt was machst? Was ist jetzt dein... weil, es gibt Papiere, konzeptuelle Papiere, darüber, wer unser Publikum heute ist.

A: Für wen sende ich? Ja. Ich sende für, kann ich schlecht sagen, vielleicht mache ich mich zu wenig Gedanken darüber. Ich glaube, ich sende halt für Leute, die halt so irgendwie kritisch, alternativ sind, ich sende für Migranten, die halt eher so, gebildet sind, und eine gewisse, dieselbe Weltoffenheit und Interesse haben an Themen, wie halt Deutsche, die halt ähnlich ticken, eher so für Leute in unserem Alter, also für dieses Milieu sende ich, und die griechische Sendung, da sende ich noch mal für ganz andere Leute, auch. Da ist es sozusagen schon auch ähnlich auch, ja, aber durchaus, ich kriege es dann auch mit, da ist irgendwie sowohl die Bildungsspanne als auch die Altersspanne ist da weiter, ja. Ich weiß, dass es auch Rentner hören, kriege es immer über meinen Vater mit, der hat mir letzters erzählt, der So-und-so ist gestorben, und ich so, wer? Ja, Der-und-der, der hat da-und-da gearbeitet und so, ja

und der hat dich auch immer gehört. Ich kannte den Mann gar nicht, verstehst du, ich kannte den gar nicht, aus der Vater-Generation halt, ne? Aber auch manchmal, wenn man irgendwo, ah so, du bist es, so, da kriegt man immer so mit, so. Da ist sozusagen der Hörerkreis weiter, weil es so...

Q: Aber jetzt die zweite Generation, dritte, was weiß ich?

A: Die hören das auch, aber nicht alle, ne. Also, die hören das auch, aber nicht alle, manche hören es auch sporadisch, viele hören es auch im Auto, das kriegt man halt mit. Und ich glaube, für die griechische Disco-Fraktion sind wir wahrscheinlich und die Hauptschul-Discofraktion sind wir wahrscheinlich schon wieder zu anspruchsvoll, für die ganz Kulturbeflissenen sind wir wahrscheinlich musikalisch zu wenig anspruchsvoll, so das ist immer so ein bisschen ein Spagat, aber ich glaube, man kriegt, in jeder Gruppe kriegt man so ein Fuß rein, holt man so eine gewisse Schnittmenge ab. Die ganz traditionellen, die in ihrer Parallelwelt leben, die kriegst du oft auch nicht, weißt du, es sei denn, die sind Rentner und die haben Zeit.

Q: Aber du bist schon unterwegs in der Community, präsent, ne? Also, du bist... du hast Kontakt, so, mit deinen Hörern, ne? Ich meine...

A: Ja...

Q: Gehst du in die griechische Disco jeden Samstag?

A: Nicht mehr. Nein, nicht mehr. (laughter) Ich habe das vielleicht mal gemacht vor zwanzig oder fünfzehn Jahren halt, wobei da sind wir auch nicht immer dahin gegangen, aber, ich bin auch nicht derjenige gewesen, der halt immer nur in griechische Läden gegangen ist, ich habe die Leute eigentlich verachtet, die immer nur in griechische Läden gegangen sind. Aber mir fällt auf, dass wir dann doch regelmäßig in griechischen Läden waren, es gab so eine Bar in (inaudible) Bahnhof, die gibt es nicht mehr, es gab halt eine Disco, Rheingold, die haben ab und zu griechische Parties gemacht, da sind wir eigentlich auch immer hingegangen, aber es gab Leute, die sozusagen immer nur in so was gegangen sind, in griechische Cafés, das habe ich nicht gemacht. Und jetzt bin ich natürlich irgendwo, also ich habe schon Kontakt, das kann man schon sagen, ne, aber ich bin jetzt nicht so Teil der, was soll ich sagen, des Ghettos oder so.

Note:

After the interview, we discuss the concept of „cosmopolitan multiculturalism“, which Milto says is „everything but multiculturalism“ („alles außer Multikulturalismus“). According to Milto, Funkhaus Europa has always had a „funny relationship towards migration“, so that somehow it did not happen in the program itself. Even the music is Latino or French, not that kind of music the migrants like, but one the dominant majority likes, says Milto.

Interview Ioannis

Cologne, 20/July/2012

Q: Du bist jetzt seit sehr vielen Jahren Medienmacher, Journalist usw. Wie... wo soll ich anfangen? Was ist deine Erfahrung? Bist du ein Nischen-Autor? Oder bist du... siehst du dich in der Lage... Hast du einen Platz in den Mainstream-Medien oder bist du...

A: Mainstream bin ich nicht, nein. Würde ich auch nicht wollen, mehr...

Q: Hat sich das geändert?

A; Ja. Also, zuerst habe ich geguckt, ob ich irgendwo reinkomme, dann habe ich gemerkt, ich passe nicht rein, weil, es liegt nicht nur am Namen und der Nase, oder so was, und ich will jetzt auch gar nicht über Mainstreaming in deutschen Medien sprechen, weil das werden unsere Kinder erst erleben. Ich habe zum einen ein Problem mit der Sozialisation der Leute, die mich befehligen und das hat sich in den letzten, würde ich mal sagen, seit dem 26. Januar 2010 hat sich das geändert.

Q: Wieso? Was hat es da gegeben?

A: Ich habe damals im Flugzeug gesessen nach Athen und ich hatte mir fest vorgenommen, ich werde, ich hatte der Eva gesagt, ich habe einfach kein Bock mehr, ich will jetzt vier-fünf Tage in Athen Konzerte besuchen, bisschen mich tummeln und dann komme ich wieder und mache ein-zwei Beiträge. Und damals hatte ich den Flug aus Frankfurt genommen, der ganze Flieger war voll mit Chinesen, ich hatte das Wall Street Journal in der Hand, da stand irgendwas von Chinesen wollen Griechen einen Kredit geben oder nicht, und seitdem ist sozusagen die Finanzkrise eskaliert. Und in der Zeit habe ich oft darüber nachgedacht, ob ich persönlich eigentlich so was wie ein Pausenc clown bin, so ein Jack-in-the-box. Konkret habe ich mich gefragt, auf wessen Rechnung arbeite ich. Ich habe die Situation verglichen oft mit der Berichterstattung im Stürmer vor Verabschiedung der Rassengesetze, weil, ich würde mal sagen, meine Mutter sagt immer, im Krieg muss man sich entscheiden, auf welcher Seite man steht, damit man nicht ins Kreuzfeuer gerät. Und ich habe mich entschieden, anti-deutsche Positionen zu vertreten, und zwar systematisch.

Q: Jetzt meinst du, in diesem Zusammenhang?

A: In diesem Zusammenhang der Krise. Ich habe drei Vorlesungen besucht in meinem Volkswirtschaftsstudium und ich fand die alle bescheuert und habe aufgehört zu studieren.

Und vieles von dem was ich mache, ist eigentlich nur noch Wirtschaftsgeschichten. Und ich habe festgestellt, dass die Leute, mit denen ich zusammenarbeite, die das redigiert habe, dass die a), erstens keinen blassen Schimmer haben von dem Thema, zweitens dass die eine ganz klar vorformulierte Position haben und drittens, dass man gegen diese Klischees und Vorurteile, die es als amalgamierte Meinung gibt in den Köpfen, dass man da wenig tun kann.

Q: Hast du denn die Möglichkeit, du, als Journalist mit deinem Background, irgendwelche Thesen zu vertreten, die...

A: Ja, ich vertrete zum Beispiel in meiner Sendung Radiopolis...

Q: Die das System bedrohen, sagen wir so, oder in Frage stellen?

A: Ich sage ja immer, Radiopolis, das ist ja Finanzpornographie, es geht immer nur ums eine, man weiß, wie es endet, das Drehbuch ist also klar, und am Ende muss es allen noch gefallen. Und das ist eigentlich die Quintessenz sozusagen der deutschen Position in der ganzen Krise, ihr musst sparen, weil ihr braucht das. Ich habe oft überlegt, ob ich nicht mal den Beruf wechseln soll, oder habe ihn eigentlich schon gewechselt, weil ich berichte nicht mehr objektiv, sondern bin wertend, Meinung, auch oft so, ich spiegele oft so diesen Gestus wieder, oh, das wissen wir doch alles schon. Und insofern, das ist eigentlich nicht das, wofür ich damals diesen Beruf ergriffen habe. Das kann man vielleicht so in eine Position zusammenfassen, man wird oft gruppiert, sozusagen als griechischer Journalist, der ich nicht bin, und ich bin froh, dass ich keiner bin, weil ich nicht den Zwängen ausgesetzt bin, die meine Kollegen in Griechenland haben. Man könnte dem Berufsfeld Journalist in beiden Ländern vorwerfen, dass sie den Möbelwagen nicht gesehen haben, der vor ihnen stand, wo drauf stand, das wird kommen. Ich finde es ganz witzig, ich war öfter mal mit einer Delegation der EZB unterwegs auch in Griechenland, dann später mal in Rumänien, das waren alles Feuilletonisten und wir saßen zum Beispiel in Rumänien, in Bukarest, während der Generalstreik war, mit dem griechischen, mit dem rumänischen Zentralbankchef zusammen und es wurde nicht gefragt, warum streiken die Leute, was ist hier los, was kommt, so, möglicherweise auf andere Länder zu, sondern es wurde einfach gesagt, na, das ist jetzt einfach so, ne. Und da merkt man die Sozialisation vieler Leute in dem Bereich ist entweder arme Kinder reicher Eltern oder eben die kommen aus so einem kleinbürgerlichen Bereich, wo sie sich hochgearbeitet haben, wo auch die Engstirnigkeit ganz klar zu sehen ist. Und da ist man nicht offen, und das ist leider auch national geprägt.

Q: Und, jetzt aus deiner journalistischen Biografie, so eine Geschichte, dass du jetzt als griechisch-stämmiger Journalist mitten in der Krise vielleicht mehr Aufträge hast. Ist das gut oder schlecht, in diese Ecke gedrängt zu werden?

A: Manchmal habe ich gekotzt.

Q: Ja, aber ist das jetzt...

A: Ob mir das Umsatz gebracht hat? Ja. Weil es war klar, zum Beispiel, es war für mich klar letztes Jahr, die Nummer wird abreißen, die reißt ab, und es ist jetzt auch inzwischen so, ich sage mal so, Ende Juli wird es wieder hoch kochen, das haben inzwischen, was das öffentlich-rechtliche Fernsehen betrifft und das Radio, das haben die inzwischen ganz gut selber abgedeckt. Lange Zeit war Griechenland ein weißer, schwarzer, weißer Fleck, weil die alten Hippies, die Griechenland toll fanden, die waren alle in Rente, und die ganzen neoliberalen Kiddies oder auch die Generation danach, sie hat sich für alles andere interessiert aber nicht für Griechenland. Oder die kannte das eben als Gyros, Tsatsiki und Salat, und inzwischen hat man das erkannt und abgedeckt, das heißt, für mich ist auch gar kein Platz mehr da, außer vielleicht mal für so eine extra-Meinung.

Q: Aber jetzt abgesehen von der Krise, jetzt lass uns so tun, als ob es die Krise nicht gegeben hätte und so weiter, in deinem journalistischen Werdegang, bist du jemand, der Chancen hat? Oder, was...

A: Keine Chance, eine feste Stelle zu kriegen.

Q: Nicht eine feste Stelle, aber jetzt, würdest du mehr Akquise machen in den anderen Medien außerhalb von Funkhaus Europa oder so? Würdest du...

A: Im Moment bin ich am überlegen, das zu machen.

Q: Könntest du zu Themen arbeiten oder nicht, arbeiten, die jetzt nichts mit...

A: Ja, gut, kann ich machen. Ich mache ja...

Q: Mit Griechenland oder Multikulturalismus zu tun haben?

A: Ich mache nebenbei eine Kochrubrik bei WDR5 und theoretisch kannst du dich in jedes Thema einarbeiten. Nur ich sehe die Affinität ist einfach im Moment, die ist nicht da. Ich würde auch gerne über Fußball, nur ich habe keine Lust auf dieses Sportreporter Getue, also ich sehe, dass immer mehr Türen zugehen und bin am überlegen, wie ich das jetzt sozusagen

umnutze. Weil, ich behaupte, mir sieht man es sowieso auf der Stirn angeschrieben, ob mich ein Thema interessiert oder nicht. Ich kann, vielleicht sozusagen dieser Background, den ich habe... man muss es vielleicht so erklären: Man kann eh nicht alles machen. Ich bin jetzt nicht der Generalist von der Zeitung, der alle Rubriken abdecken kann, da habe ich auch keine Lust zu, will ich auch nicht mehr. Und das ist jetzt das letzte Wort zur Krise: Wenn du merkst, dass ein Thema dich abstößt, oder wenn du merkst, dass du eine Meinung hast, dann musst du das auch sagen, du kannst nicht so tun, als ob. Und die Frage ist, ich sehe inzwischen hier die Medien, das ist, stößt mich ab, wenn ich sehe, dass sozusagen das Seichte und so weiter, dass es Überhand nimmt, da habe ich auch kein Bock mehr zu.

Q: Jetzt, wenn wir auf Funkhaus Europa gucken, das ist sozusagen irgendwie deine Stammredaktion lange Jahre gewesen, oder so...

A: OK, wenn ich so sehe, was an Hauptumsatz da läuft, dann nicht.

Q: Genau. Wie siehst du das Programm jetzt? Weil, du arbeitest ja immer noch. Für wen...

A: WDR4 für urbane, Möchtegern-Nomaden. Das Problem ist, du kannst so ein Programm nicht machen, ohne emanzipatorischen Ansatz. Wenn du das machst, nur damit die Bum-Schakala-Fraktion was schönes zum wippen hat, wird jemand kommen und er wird dieses Programm besser machen. Weil ich das höre, zumindest die Programme, die es da teilweise auch zu hören gibt, seit ich klein bin, wundert mich, dass man einfach ein Stück der Hörerschaft einfach wegwirft, und sagt: Das andere ist aber viel wichtiger. Das ist wohl nur in den Köpfen der Menschen, die Medienanalysen lesen so, dass man die nicht braucht. Und ich sehe, in zehn Jahren wird es türkische, griechische, spanische Sender geben in Deutschland, so wie in anderen Ländern auch. Die Zeit ist noch zu früh.

Q: Du meinst, also du meinst, du machst ja auch Radiopolis. Wer ist da dein Publikum? Oder, bzw. was ist der Sinn dieser Sendung?

A: Hippies, Grecos der dritten Generation, Griechenland-Möger und von mir aus die Leute, die einfach die Musik gut finden. Es sind nicht nur, ich mache das nicht nur für die Grecos, ich mache das auch für die Leute, die Griechenland ein bisschen näher kennen und die von mir aus den einen Gag, den ich da mache, auch noch goutieren und sagen: Das hat er wieder richtig ausgedrückt, wo der normale deutsche Hans Fritz Kartoffel daneben steht und sagt, das habe ich jetzt aber nicht verstanden. Das geht mir sowieso auf den Sack, dass ich oft vor allem, ah ja, meine Erinnerungen, mit Leuten zu tun hatte, die oft sagten, das versteht man

doch nicht. Wo ich dann denke, ja, du verstehst das nicht, es gibt aber genug andere Leute, die es kapieren, die sofort schalten.

Q: Aber jetzt erstmal zurück zum deutschsprachigen Programm. Meine Meinung müssen wir jetzt nicht...

A: Ja, ist ja deine Meinung. Ich kann ja meine Meinung sagen.

Q: Man hat jetzt diesen Schritt vollzogen von einem ungeliebten ethnischen Multikulturalismus zu diesem Kosmopolitischen. Was heißt das für dich? Ist das machbar, ist das möglich in Deutschland oder macht es, macht das Sinn?

A: Die krumme Nase kriegst du nie aus dem Gesicht. Guten Appetit.

Q: Guten Appetit.

A: Die krumme Nase kriegst du nie aus dem Gesicht. Und jetzt so tun, als ob uns die krummen Nasen alle nicht mehr interessieren, kannst du machen, aber es ist immer die Frage, zahlt sich das aus.

Q: Weil ich meine, dieser emanzipatorische Ansatz ist jetzt komplett weg.

A: Ja, den gibt es nicht mehr.

Q: So, den gibt es nicht. Meinst du, das macht noch Sinn oder für wen würde man jetzt diese Sachen machen?

A: Wenn du es nur machst als lustige Musikfarbe, das können private Anbieter besser, weil die das günstiger machen. Das macht die PR-Abteilung von der Plattenfirma gleich mit.

Q: Was die Praxis betrifft, habe ich den Eindruck, dass manche Mainstream-Programme diese Themen mittlerweile besser abdecken als...

A: Ja, du siehst oft im RTL bessere Beiträge zu dem Thema als in der ARD. Und was in den deutschen Medien gelaufen ist während der Griechenland-Krise, will ich überhaupt gar nicht sagen, ne.

(Interview interrupted)

A: Jeder dahergelaufene Korrespondent hat sich wahlweise im King George, im Athens Plaza oder im Grande Bretagne einquartiert, hat einen lustigen Abend gehabt und zwischendurch noch irgendwie zwei-drei Leute auf der Straße interviewt, so waren ja die Beiträge der ersten

Stunde. Oder (inaudible) hat gesagt nein, das kann nicht sein, erzählt ihr eurem Friseur, aber nicht mir. Meinen die, aber ja, so muss das sein.

Q: Bist du eigentlich hier geboren?

A: Ja, ja, hier geboren, aufgewachsen.

(Pause)

Was ich ein bisschen schade finde, ist einfach, dass man im Rahmen, dass man auf Quote guckt und auf die Medienanalyse, dass man Profile runterkocht, abschmirgelt, ne. Lass es doch anders sein, verdammt noch mal. Lass es doch anders sein, Fritzchen Müller muss es nicht kapieren. Mach es doch einfach. Wenn du WDR3 halten kannst, dann halte das Programm auch.

Q: Ja, man schmirgelt das erstens auf den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner...

A: Ne? Das ist sozusagen so Sozialdemokratie für blöde.

Q: Wie der Milto sagt, das ist dann Multikulturalismus ohne den multikulturellen Mann. So, alles was, du hast nur so kleine häppchenweise, so, nö, so... Wir sind alle kosmopolitisch.

A: Lass es doch.

Q: Nichts was beleidigen könnte, nichts was in Frage stellen könnte.

A: Kostet nichts, tut nicht weh, etc. etc. Du hättest kein Problem damit, wenn so, wie es eigentlich gedacht war, dieses Programm sozusagen als Farbenteam gedacht wäre. Effektiv hast du zwei Leute gehabt, die sich durchgesetzt haben, das ist Asli Sevindim, AKS, und Birand Bingül als stellvertretender Pressesprecher. Dann musst du sagen, OK, wir haben es in der Hierarchie, Alse ist keine Hierarchin, aber wenn man die fragt, erzählt mal, was Harald Brand mit dir angestellt hat früher, dann wird sie dir Geschichten erzählen, da rennst du die Wände hoch. Die Geschichte ist, es müssen sich erstmal Seilschaften bilden, und dann ziehen dir die anderen nach. Aber das funktioniert nur innerhalb eines Senders, ich sehe das ja auch, beim SWR gibt es auch so eine kleine Griechen-Fraktion, bevor die mit uns reden, schneiden sie sich eher die rechte Hand ab. Dann sprechen sie, der Milto und ich, Milto auf seine Art, ich eben so, machen wir eben so einen auf Partisanenkampf, wobei mein Großvater eben im EDES war, nicht ELAS, das nur so nebenbei, also er war rechts. Oder wie mein ehemaliger Teamleiter gerne zu sagen pflegte, dein Großvater hat für die Führer gekämpft, und mein

Großvater stand im Dienste Seiner Majestät des Königs von England, also das nur so neben bei. Wirkt übrigens immer wieder gern als Spruch.

Q: Ihr seid ja auch so...

A: Total bescheuert. Kannst du eigentlich nur an den elektrischen Stuhl anschließen. Was ist denn jetzt mit dem Casting zum Beispiel? Ist Milto eingeladen worden? Bin ich eingeladen worden? Also, ich nicht, aber Milto?

Q: Was heißt eingeladen? Der steht nicht mal auf der Liste, aber hat er sich da angemeldet?

A: Musste man sich da anmelden?

Q: Es sieht so aus, dass man Interessen bekunden sollte. Ich weiß nicht, ob er da... Keine Ahnung, auf der Liste ist er nicht. Der kommt nicht ins Casting, soweit ich weiß.

A: Ne, der macht jetzt Elternzeit und dann gucken wir mal weiter.

(Pause)

A: Es ist alles so, also jetzt zum Beispiel die Moderatoren-Auswahl bei Funkhaus Europa, man hat sich die Leute ausgesucht nach Profil, also von mir aus jetzt Juan Moreno, ah, der schreibt für den Spiegel, oder SZ vorher. Er war nicht unbedingt der Radio-Mann.

Q: Nein, aber im Vergleich... Manche Sachen, die über den Äther gehen bei uns...

A: Er hatte sich übrigens ein-zwei Gedanken gemacht. Dass er manchmal so einen Absatz brauchte, OK.

Q: Ich meine, im Vergleich... was wir sonst noch so haben. Jetzt, im Idealfall, im Idealfall, was ist jetzt deine Meinung? Sollte es Funkhaus Europa als, mit diesem Gedanken geben, dass man für eine bestimmte Gruppe sendet und wenn ja, im Idealfall, für wen sollte sie senden?

A: Das sollte Programm sein eigentlich aus dem Ghetto für das Ghetto, was dann einen gewissen eigenen Charme besitzt. Und dieser eigene Charme des Ghettos kommt nicht rüber. Das ist total un-sexy. Ich denke da zum Beispiel an so Zeitschriften der Schwarzen in Südafrika aus den Sechzigern, die intellektuell waren, sehr stylisch und ein eigenes Ziel hatten, dieses Programm hat kein Ziel. Sondern da kommt immer die Bum-Schakala-Fraktion und will mir erzählen, wie toll sie ist. Das brauche ich nicht. Das habe ich in Düsseldorf auf der Rathinger Straße samstags abends, ne, volle Kneipe. Das brauche ich nicht. Wenn ich das

so erleben will, muss ich da einfach hingehen und die Ohren aufmachen. Das ist Posing und Posing mag ich nicht. Da wollen sich Leute mit einem Mäntelchen gerieren (???) als ob, das ist OK, aber lass die Protagonisten wenigsten mit krummen Nasen. Und das geht mir so auf den Wecker. Das ist aber auch ein Geburtsfehler von Funkhaus Europa, dass man nicht gesagt hat konsequent, nicht jeder, der einen deutschen, Entschuldigung, nicht jeder der einen belgischen Schäferhund hat, ist automatisch multikulti, so a la, wie heißt der im ZDF, Lanz. Der ist Südtiroler und verkauft sich als super-multikulti, und wenn du weißt, wie es bei dem im Kopf zugeht, ist er deutscher als so mancher Oberförster. Das Mainstreaming ist in den deutschen Medien leider nicht existent oder es dauert eben ein bisschen. Die kritische Masse ist noch nicht erreicht. Du hast immer den Makel, dass du dich beweisen musst als besser als, und dieses Programm wollte immer sein als besser als. Lass es doch einfach Mittelmaß sein. Aber lass es einen eigenen Stil haben. Wenn du WDR4 die Moderation hörst, dann bist du sofort tot, aber es passt zur Musik. Wenn du super-stylische Musik hast, ich sage mal in Funkhaus Europa, dann kannst du da nicht Lieschen Müller haben. Das wurde systematisch immer runtergekocht, immer runter, runter, runter, runter. Und der aktuelle Trend, den du hast mit dieser Süpermercadisierung, ich habe etwas gelesen in einer lustigen Beilage von der SZ und das muss ich jetzt umsetzen, ist es auch nicht.

Q: Also, man hat es runtergekocht, das ist jetzt total unbedrohlich, und ja, harmlos. So, das ist der Punkt.

A: Du hast keine Kanaken-Themen.

Q: Da ist kein Edge.

A: Why should it. Ich stehe da immer vor und denke, ja, OK, und jetzt? Und ich muss auch ganz offen sagen, ich höre es nicht. Und ich frage mich, wer das hört. Einsamer Lastwagenfahrer? Weil diese urbane Klasse, die es ansprechen soll, ich finde es sehr witzig, was sozusagen die Konkurrenz macht von Deutschlandfunk und vom Deutschlandradio, ne, oder ZDF. Die investieren sehr viel Geld in Digitalradioprogramme, digitales Fernsehen, extra, neu, und das ist sogar manchmal cooler, als das was der WDR versucht und immer die Sache da sein muss, ja, aber es muss doch die breite Masse. Nein, es muss nicht, nein. WDR3 ist auch nicht für die breite Masse. Da ist Intelligenz.

Q: Ja, das wurde aber jetzt runtergekocht für die breite Masse.

A: Aber ich verstehe nicht, du hast ein Programm, was abends aus der ganzen Welt sendet und tagsüber soll es aber für Lieschen Müller sein, es geht nicht, das klappt hinten und vorne nicht. Das ist so eine Geschichte, ich stehe da immer davor und denke, von der Personalakquise, über die Programmgestaltung selber, über die Abendgeschichten, es soll immer gremienkompatibel sein. Und es wird in zehn Jahren eine Konkurrenz geben durch spezielle Sender, ich bin am überlegen, ob ich einen eigenen Sender aufmache.

Q: Kann man damit Geld machen?

A: Ja, mit einer anderen Positionierung, dass du sagst, ich verkaufe von mir aus die Mücke dazu, die kannst du über mich beziehen und du kannst über mich auch alle kulturellen Ereignisse, kannst du dabei sein, sozusagen als Abonnement, und dann macht es Sinn. Und das Radioprogramm nur als Zugabe, dass du ein bisschen Geplapper hast. That's the point. Und dass die bei Funkhaus Europa immer in der Nische sind als nur Nischenprogramm, kein Vollprogramm, ich behaupte, wenn du versuchen würdest Werbeplatz zu verkaufen über dieses Programm, das würde funktionieren und zwar eigenen. Aber das machen sie nicht. Da muss echt erst einer mit der Nase drauf stoßen. Oder dass sie Medienpartnerschaften suchen mit fremdsprachigen Medien hier, macht es doch einfach, es gibt doch die Menschen, stattdessen wird immer nur...

Q: Ich verstehe, ehrlich gesagt, nicht diesen Grundgedanken, wenn du sechs Programme hast, warum hast du so eine Angst vor der Nische? Weil, wenn das nicht so wäre, dann kannst du nur ein Radioprogramm oder zwei.

A: Oder drei, wie früher.

Q: Aber, wenn du sechs hast, dann heißt das, dass du sechs verschiedene Publikumssegmente bedienst. Was ist das Schlimme dran? Oder...

A: Wenn du sechs hast, dann musst du sechs bedienen.

Q: Ja, eben. Was ist das Schlimme an der Nische?

A: Die Kosten. Natürlich wäre es billiger WDR3 den Leuten, die CD nach Hause zu schicken. (laughter) Ja, täglich, das wäre billiger. Aber, this is the problem, this is the fucking problem.

Interview Uwe

Cologne, 25 July 2012

Q: Also, du bist jetzt vom Anfang an bei Funkhaus Europa dabei. Es geht, ich wollte sprechen über diese Medien für Migranten oder Medien und Multikulturalismus. Du bist vom Anfang an?

A: Na ja, vom Anfang an nicht, es gab einen Vorlauf, eine Planungsphase, da war ich nicht dabei, im April, ich bin im April 99 dazu gekommen und da waren im Grunde schon alle Claims verteilt, da gab es im Voraus auf der 103,3 schon eine Sendung ab 18 Uhr, davor lief WDR2, das, also als ich quasi dazu kam, waren schon die Rubriken, das war alles schon besetzt von denen, die schon da waren. Die kamen eben zum großen Teil eben aus den muttersprachigen Sendungen.

Q: Ja, warst du... du warst aber nicht der einzige Deutsche...

A: Elmar Pott damals, Jona...

Q: Michaela?

A: Ne, die war noch nicht da, die war noch nicht da. Oh je, da muss ich gucken, Anfangsmannschaft, damals war Consuelo noch Chefin, die war Teamleiterin.

Q: Und die Nadi war noch da.

A: Ja. Und Renzo Brizzi und, und... ja.

Q: Warum bist du eigentlich ins Funkhaus Europa gegangen?

A: Ich wollte weg aus dem regionalen, ich habe so 88 fest angestellt angefangen bei so einem WDR-Lokalradioprojekt, das war Kabel-Pilotprojekt damals, das ging bis 94, wurde dann eingestellt, dann ging das familiär nicht anders, das Kind war zu klein, ich konnte erst 98 nach der Einschulung der Tochter gucken, mich nach Köln orientieren, und dann habe ich geguckt, Stellen gab es bei WDR5, aber auch nicht viele, auch nur Zeitstellen, und dann eben Funkhaus Europa, da habe ich mich drauf beworben nach langer Zeit und. Das war einfach mal der Impuls, mal was anderes zu machen, richtiges Radio, ein Vollprogramm und nicht nur im regionalen irgendwelche Nachrichtenminuten zu schreiben oder Reporter als Zulieferer für die etablierten Wellen zu sein.

Q: Aber jetzt... es hat sich einiges geändert. Aber in dieser Anfangsphase, was war jetzt der, was war euer Ansatz, als ihr angefangen habt, da zu arbeiten? Also, inhaltlich? Oder was war jetzt euer Ziel oder euer Punkt?

A: Der Ansatz war dieser Spagat, den es eigentlich immer noch gibt, zwischen den Themen der Migranten, die im großen Teil in der Muttersprachensendungen stattfinden und stattfanden damals, und der europäischen Ebene, so einen Blick hinzukriegen, dass es auch miteinander zusammen hängt, dass wenn man zum Beispiel berichtet über meinenwegen Arbeitsmarkt in Spanien, damals war der Boom da, das natürlich ganz viel damit zu tun hat, dass in dem Land eine relativ junge Bevölkerung war, das es da Zuwanderung gab, da kamen die Rumänen nach Spanien, da waren da in den Gemüseplantagen nicht nur die Marokkaner, und dass man darüber berichtet und das eigentlich spiegelt mit dem, wie es in Deutschland läuft, dass wir eigentlich immer einen europäischen Blick hatten, vergleichen.

(Pause)

Also, Entwicklung in verschiedenen Ländern vergleichen und schauen, wo man Gemeinsamkeiten hat und wo dann doch die Unterschiede so stark sind. Und das war eigentlich auch ein sehr analytischer Ansatz und damals haben es die anderen Wellen nicht gemacht. Heute ist es Mainstream, zum Beispiel diese Korri-Ketten, das war damals im Funkhaus Europa was ganz neues, oder das man über das Vehikel Presseschau in andere Länder geguckt hat. Dass man gesagt hat, wir nehmen uns zwei Mal vier Minuten Zeit um, meinenwegen nach Kroatien zu schauen oder in die Türkei, um so auch einen Einblick in die Medien des anderen Landes zu kriegen, aber auch den holländischen Blick zum Beispiel, also einfach Vielfalt da zu dokumentieren.

Q: Das war also dieser analytische Ansatz war wichtiger für dich als diese Migranten-Geschichten?

A: Die Migranten-Geschichten waren zum Teil interessant, aber die wären mir alleine nicht ausreichend gewesen, weil ich denke, das was die Welle ausmacht, das war immer die Musik, über die, und auch eine gewisse Weltoffenheit und zu gucken, wie das miteinander zusammenhängt, ne. Also, damals war, das war die Phase 99-2000, da ging es Deutschland nicht so gut, wir hatten die Einheitslasten, Deutschland war damals der kranke Mann Europas, zumindest im Economist, dann war es immer ganz hilfreich zu schauen, ja, warum geht es den anderen besser, oder geht es ihnen wirklich besser und, auch dieses Abchecken, wo steht Deutschland, Deutschland auch mit seiner Einwanderungspolitik, diese unselige Geschichte

Postkarten-Verfahren gegen Doppelpass, all das, das waren natürlich hochpolitische Themen und die waren damals noch nicht so in den anderen Wellen präsent.

Q: Und damals, also war dein Hörer, den du dir vorgestellt hast, war so ein aufgeklärter, der sich, der über den Tellerrand guckt, oder was war das für ein Hörer?

A: Der Hörer war für mich einmal der türkische LKW-Fahrer, der viel Zeit hatte, Radio zu hören, aber auch der vielleicht der griechische Mediziner, der Zeit hat, Radio zu hören, also nicht nur die Intellektuellen oder die Studenten, für die man vielleicht Radio heute macht, sondern ich habe das damals ernst genommen und habe auch gedacht, na ja, man muss dann auch Themen machen, die einfache Leute angehen. Die Erfahrung hat aber gezeigt, dass die Hörergewohnheiten der unterschiedlichen Migranten sich von denen der Deutschen nicht groß unterscheiden, dass es eher nach sozialer Lage geht, nach Qualifikation, nach Wohlstand. Und heute muss man wohl sehen, dass wir viele von denen nicht erreicht haben, die wir erreichen wollten.

Q: Warum?

A: Na ja, wir hatten ja gedacht, gerade die zweite Einwanderer-Generation zu erreichen, weil die Eltern, die waren ja oft gut versorgt eine Zeitlang mit diesen abendlichen muttersprachigen Programmen, aber ich glaube, den Kampf um die heute 35- bis 50-jährigen der zweiten Generation, den haben wir eigentlich nicht gewonnen, weil wir vielleicht dann noch einen ganz anderen Zugang gebraucht hätten. Also, das war lange Zeit eine Qualität von Funkhaus Europa, in die Communities reinzuhören, raus zu gehen, viel zu machen, aber ich denke, wir sind da nicht dran geblieben. Es wäre, auch durch unsere Sendung, zum Beispiel die türkische Frühsendung, die eine Stunde war für mich, war eine wichtige Erfahrung, das hat uns auch viele Hörer gesichert, nicht nur die, die abends mal diese eine Stunde hören wollten. Als das dann alles zurückgenommen wurde, war das zugleich auch mit dem Absterben der anderen täglichen Programme, zum Beispiel griechisch, spanisch, war das eine Entwicklung, die einerseits logisch ist, ich glaube, im Zeitalter vom Satellitenfernsehen, muss man nicht noch irgendwie Nachrichten aus aller Welt in der jeweiligen Muttersprache aufbereiten, aber eine adäquate Form zu finden, die Migranten einerseits Musik und Sprache vorfinden, und Infos, und trotzdem in Deutschland leben, das ist vielleicht heute eher möglich mit diesen Stundenformaten, weil da ist mehr Platz, aber, also das sind eben Einschaltprogramme, aber was wir tagsüber nicht geschafft haben, ist vielleicht an den Migranten dran zu bleiben. Weil, ich kann mir vorstellen, die Programmumstellung, gerade

jetzt die auf die vier Stunden Frühprogramm, also nur deutsches Programm von sechs bis sechs ist in sich logisch, aber auch für die Ernteeinfahren, das ist die Frage, weil, ich kann mir vorstellen, dass die Migranten gar nicht wissen, warum sie uns tagsüber einschalten sollten, weil wir liefern zuverlässig nicht die Informationen, die sie vielleicht brauchen.

Q: Genau. Also jetzt ein Schritt zurück. Ich habe oft den Eindruck gehabt, das ist jetzt, das ist jetzt Standard bei uns. Aber früher noch, mit Jona und so, habe ich manchmal den Eindruck gehabt, dass wir uns so geschämt haben irgendwie, diese Migranten-Themen zu nehmen. Also, dass wir die im weiten Bogen manchmal umgegangen sind, wo andere, Mainstream-Programme diese Themen angepackt haben. Du hast echt den Eindruck gehabt, dass die machen: Nee, das ist zu sehr Migranten-Ecke. Meinst du, hast du dieses Gefühl?

A: Also, es war eine Zeitlang ja so, dass wir bei den eigenen Kollegen drauf geachtet haben, dass der Akzent nicht zu stark war, das hat die Kollegen in den Mainstream-Programmen eigentlich nicht so interessiert. Da waren wir vielleicht zu korrekt. Wir haben dann auch eine Zeitlang, nachdem wir eigentlich müde waren, immer wieder die gleichen Interviewpartner zu nehmen und deren Deutsch auch nicht so toll war, dann haben wir, das ist so leicht ausgeklungen, habe ich das Gefühl. Man hat sich davon verabschiedet, weil das mühselig ist, es sind immer die gleichen Themen, und das waren so reflexhafte Geschichten, ich erinnere mich an verschiedene Interviews und eigentlich ist es ein Radio, was immer um sich kreist, was eigentlich nicht, ich meine, man ethnisiert ein bisschen, man schaut auf das besondere, aber der Versuch, das Gegenteil zu machen ist eher gescheitert, glaube ich. Zu sagen, das ist alles normal, es gibt vieles verschiedene, dieses Internationale, dieses Globale, auch zu finden, dass die Leute sich da wieder finden, ich glaube, das ist schwieriger. Das ist auch viel zufälliger, wir sind nicht mehr zuverlässig, an den Verbänden oder an den dran, die sagen, wir sind aktiv. Also, ob das jetzt die Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland, das ist immer so genau so sporadisch wie das die Mainstream-Medien machen, da unterscheiden wir uns kaum. Das ist, glaube ich, ein Riesenproblem.

Q: Also, für mich ist dieser, für mich persönlich ist dieser globale Ansatz, dieses Kosmopolitische, das ist für mich genau die entgegengesetzte Richtung von der Anerkennung einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft, weißt du? Weil, das geht in diese Richtung ein bisschen einer Gleichmachung. Und dieses, ja, alles ist in so kleinen Häppchen konsumierbar und nett. Also, wir sind alle kosmopolitisch. Aber so ist es nicht, ich finde, das Publikum, diese Gesellschaft ist nicht so, ne? Also, ich finde es einfach an der Realität vorbei.

A: Also, wenn man das jetzt das Programm betrachtet, ist das eine Flucht in die Unverbindlichkeit. Das ist so. Weil man traut sich nicht, auch dieses klein-klein noch zu schildern, und macht das dann immer nur zu Anlässen, aber man könnte natürlich genau so Beiträge, die das dokumentieren, aber nicht tagesaktuell sind, einzukaufen und da was zu dokumentieren, aber das wird nicht mehr gemacht. Es ist ja ohnehin so, dass das Programm überwiegend jetzt aktuell mit Anlass gestrickt werden muss...

(Recording interrupted)

Interview Thomas

Cologne, 03 September 2012

Q: Es hat einige Veränderungen gegeben im Verständnis von dem Programm. Es gab diesen Markenkernprozess und so weiter. Jetzt, gut. Dieses Konzept vom ethnischen Multikulturalismus, also im Radio und was uns betrifft, das ist jetzt wohl überholt. Seit mehreren Jahren gehen wir in diese Richtung. Ist das, kannst du mir deine Gedanken dazu geben?

A: Ja, kann ich. Ich würde es nicht als überholt bezeichnen, was unser Programm betrifft, weil es ja zum großen Teil schon stattfindet. Es ist nur anders sortiert innerhalb des Programms. Wir haben ab 18 Uhr eine Schiene, wo genau das, nämlich ethnischer Multikulturalismus ja stattfindet, eine Sendung nach der nächsten für eine bestimmte Zielgruppe und das über die ganze Woche. Da findet das statt und ich glaube, das hat auch seinen absolut richtigen Platz in so einem Programm, wird auch noch auf lange Zeit Bestand haben. Und die andere Seite ist, wenn man auch einen Teil macht, der übergreifend sein soll, also multiethnisch dann, so zu sagen, dann muss man sehen den, nach meiner Überzeugung, nach Kriterien machen, die dann übergreifendes Vorgehen ermöglichen, also dass da wirklich verschiedene Ethnien, inklusive der deutschen Hörer, an so einem vielfältigen Programm dran bleiben. Deswegen haben wir eine stärkere Trennung vorgenommen. Wir machen nicht mehr innerhalb auch der einzelnen deutschsprachigen Sendungen, in dem Fall, ist ja so vertieft in die einzelnen Ethnien reingehen, das ist nur die jeweilige Ethnie, ne, nennen wir es Muttersprache, wie auch immer, da sind nur diejenigen interessiert, sondern auch andere darüber hinaus. Es ist ein Paradigmenwechsel, der nicht jetzt heißt, dass hinten raus die ethnischen, die muttersprachigen, die Nationalitäten-Formate völlig runterkippen.

Q: Aber was jetzt das deutschsprachige Programm betrifft, früher war das viel mehr so, jetzt ist es nicht mehr so. Und es gab eine Zwischenphase. Also, wir sind jetzt nicht, wir reagieren nicht mehr auf die Bedürfnisse der einzelnen Communities, oder der einzelnen Ethnien, also was das deutschsprachige Programm angeht.

A: Richtig, also wenn es nur, Bedürfnisse nur dieser einzelnen Community wäre, dann würde man eher sagen, hm, müssen wir das denn wirklich im deutschsprachigen Programm machen, wobei ich aber schon sagen würde, dass ja viele Dinge, die aus den Communities kommen, man auch so aufbereiten kann, und das es Themen sind, die auch übergreifend interessant sind, da müssen wir uns auch vor uns selber ein bisschen in Schutz nehmen, dass man nicht,

oder anders, dass man nicht das Kind mit dem Badewasser ausschüttet, also dass man nicht sagt, wir machen gar keine Community-Geschichten, das wäre völlig falsch, da würde dieser Suppe das Salz fehlen. Aber eben, man muss schon immer gucken, ob das Thema auch über die Community hinausgreift oder man es aufbereiten kann, dass es drüber hinaus greift. Das ist meine Meinung, ob wir es immer so hundertprozentig umsetzen, das ist die andere Frage.

Q: Aber es gibt ja diese Bewegung zu dem, was man kosmopolitischer Multikulturalismus nennen könnte. Ich nutze hier eine Terminologie, die übrigens, ich weiß nicht, ob du den Sender kennst, SBS in Australien, die sind supererfolgreich.

A: Ne.

Q: Vielleicht googlest du mal, weil die durch bestimmte Prozesse gegangen sind, die uns sehr ähnlich sind, mit dem Unterschied, dass sie Fernsehprogramm machen, also statt das Radio machen sie Fernsehprogramm, und sind der zweitgrößte öffentlich-rechtliche Sender in Australien, also sind riesig. Die gehen natürlich aus einem anderen politischen Kontext heraus, weil in Australien der Multikulturalismus sozusagen die Staatspolitik ist.

A: Eben, es ist so... Einwanderungsland, ja.

Q: Aber die machen so ungefähr dieselben Entwicklungen, und es gibt da auch Kritik. Dieser kosmopolitische Multikulturalismus ist ja viel, wie sagt man? Viel mehr... viel mehr Leute finden sich darin, aber ist es so ein bisschen... die Frage ist, ob es jetzt so eine Verharmlosung von dem Politischen ist, weißt du? Weil das so, diesen ganzen Multikulturalismus konsumierbar macht für die Mehrheit. Weißt du, was gemeint ist damit?

A: Ja... Sagen wir mal so, wenn die Fragen, ich habe, ich muss das so sagen, zumindest was meine Steuerung hier des Ganzen anliegen, den Dingen die unser Programm so gar nicht solche grundlegende Fragen zu Grunde, sondern eher einfach Mechanismen, wie Radio funktioniert, oder auch nicht funktioniert. Also, der ganze Überbau, vielleicht kann man drüber reden, aber der ist da für mich nicht so tragend und zielführend dabei gewesen, sondern einfach die Frage, wenn man zum Beispiel, mehr in die ethnische Richtung geht, wenn das Unterscheidungsmerkmal ist, die kosmopolitische Richtung und die ethnische Richtung. Bei der ethnischen Richtung ist es halt so, dass man in dem Moment, wo man zu stark in diese Richtung jeweils geht, man alle anderen immer ausschließt. Da kann man eine klare Entscheidung treffen, man kann sagen, man könnte so ein Programm wie dieses hier komplett so aufsetzen, man könnte sagen, da läuft jede Stunde eine Sendung für eine

bestimmte Gruppe und das wird dann wiederholt oder abends gibt es noch ein Update oder so. Dann wäre das den ganzen Tag, so wie wir es jetzt abends im Prinzip laufen haben. Kann man so machen, wenn man aber sagt, es soll auch ein übergreifendes Element geben, was sich an alle gemeinsam richtet, inklusive, bei Ethnien meine ich immer inklusive der deutschsprachigen auch, dann muss man es eben, finde ich, nach bestimmten Regeln des Radios machen. Und da ist es dann nicht ein politischer Hintergrund, sondern einfach der, wie kann ich Menschen für ein gemeinsames Thema interessieren.

Q: Wenn du jetzt diese Richtung und unsere Zielhörer und so weiter, wir haben ja diesen Prozess durchgemacht und er hat sehr konkrete Früchte getragen, wenn du das jetzt im Kontext von Deutschland siehst, meinst du... Oder, sagen wir, andersrum gefragt, für wen senden wir jetzt, deiner Meinung nach? So, ist die deutsche Gesellschaft soweit?

A: Ja, habe ich ein ganz klares Bild zu. Wir sind eh ein zweigeteiltes Programm. Ich klammere da jetzt Mal aus... (inaudible) ... die Abendsendungen, für jeweilige Nationalitäten. Im deutschsprachigen Programm, ein Teil der Gesellschaft ist so weit. Das sind längst nicht alle und von dem Teil, der so weit ist, ist auch nicht jeder daran interessiert, ständig mit einem Programm konfrontiert zu werden, was dann hauptsächlich um Vielfalt kreist, so eine Musik hat und so eine Ansprache. Aber ein Teil davon auf jeden Fall. Und das ist so der Versuch, für diesen Teil ein, ja, Lagerfeuer zu bilden, eine Öffentlichkeit zu schaffen, eine bestimmte weitere Weltsicht auch dazustellen. Mir ist gleichzeitig ständig bewusst, dass wir, jetzt gerade was unser Oberthema angeht, Vielfalt, meinetwegen Integration, also, Zusammenleben, dass wir natürlich ausgerechnet diejenigen, die es am nötigsten hätten, ob die jetzt deutscher Nationalität sind oder nicht deutsche Nationalität, die erreichen wir nicht mit unserem Programm, weil wir dazu eigentlich zu kompliziert, zu intellektuell, zu fordernd, was auch immer, sind. Also, wir greifen ja nicht in Problemmilieus, weder in, meinetwegen, rechte deutsche Problemmilieus, noch in bildungsferne, in Köln lebende Araber oder, die erreichen wir mit dem Programm so nicht, aber ehrlich gesagt, da sehe ich auch keine Möglichkeit, überhaupt keine, ein Programm, das so aufgestellt ist, das zu tun, da müsste man mehrere Wellen haben, die sich ganz speziell, ganz, ganz eng fokussiert an diese jeweiligen Zielgruppen richten, und selbst dann würde man es wahrscheinlich in bestimmten Bereichen nicht schaffen.

Q: Oder das Mainstream müsste mit diesem Leitgedanken...

A: Oder so, oder so, der Leitgedanke. Aber selbst, wir bezeichnen 1Live oder WDR2 als das Mainstream hier, selbst die greifen da ja nicht richtig rein. Willst du ein Wasser?

Q: Nein, danke, ich habe so ein Husten.

A: Selbst die greifen da ja nicht wirklich rein, da ist noch mal eine Welt daneben. Und das sind sogar Welten, wo du als Öffentlich-rechtlicher gar nicht richtig hingehen kannst, weil dann von der anderen Seite wieder kommen würde, ey, was macht ihr da eigentlich? Das ist sehr schwierig. Da sehe ich ganz klare Grenzen, insofern können wir eher, glaube ich, im Idealfall, die, ich bezeichne so die positive Seite, stärken, indem was sie tut, wie sie auftritt, wie sie konstituiert ist mit unserem Programm.

Q: Meinst du, wir, so wie alle Öffentlich-rechtlichen und überhaupt alle Medien stehen jetzt in verstärkter Konkurrenz zu allerlei Kanälen wie Internet und was weiß ich. Kann man so ein Programm, oder überhaupt, sagen wir mal, öffentlich-rechtliche Programme mit bestimmten Ansprüchen, kann man die nach marktwirtschaftlichen Modellen, also sprich nach Quote, überhaupt eigentlich jetzt wirklich messen? Oder, macht es Sinn überhaupt?

A: Auch eine Frage, die mich umtreibt, wie alle anderen Programme auch, insbesondere für die kleineren. Ich glaube, auch da wieder beides, also ich glaube, man kann schon ein Ziel formulieren, wir machen ein Kulturprogramm, wir machen ein Wort- oder Infoprogramm wie WDR5, wie machen ein Programm, was um Vielfalt geht, eben Global Sounds Radio. Das sind ja erstmal Überlegungen, die sich nicht grundsätzlich, weil da weiß man von Anfang an, dass da kleine Dinge sein werden. Man kann da trotzdem versuchen, ja innerhalb dieses Bereichs schon, man kann da ein Programm ganz und gar unzugänglich machen, oder man kann versuchen, es schon einer etwas breiteren Hörerschaft zugänglich zu machen. Das ist mein Bestreben zum Beispiel bei uns, aber das machen die Kollegen bei WDR5 zum Beispiel nicht anders, man überlegt ja schon, OK, wie schaffen es Akzeptanz zu haben, Menschen zu erreichen, Relevanz zu haben. Das sind für mich wichtige, mehr als Quote. Relevanz ist für mich wichtiger. Wenn ich ein halbes Prozent habe, dann habe ich keine Relevanz, wenn ich mit so einem Programm zwei Prozent, drei Prozent Tagesreichweite habe, siehe WDR5 mit vier Prozent, hat man Relevanz. Man ist dann, das sind dann, auch in bestimmten Kreisen, es sind Multiplikatoren, und das wird dann auch sofort, kriegt eine andere Qualität. Also, man muss ja gehört werden, wenn man Radio macht, man muss gekauft werden, wenn man Zeitungen macht, man muss eingeschaltet werden, wenn man Fernsehsender ist, sonst sendet man völlig ins Leere, das ist ein ganz andere Umgang mit der Quote für mich, als jetzt bei

1Live oder bei den wirklichen Massenprogrammen oder bei Privatsendern, die wirklich exakt dran hängen, dass es funktioniert. Das sehe ich bei uns nicht, deswegen, wir gucken ja nicht, wir gucken immer so, wo stehen wir, und geht's... ne? Und haben wir, tun wir alles, um wirklich Menschen... ich würde aber dann bei bestimmten Dingen, da können wir auch nicht, würden es auch nicht opfern, dann...

Q: So, wenn du jetzt, für dich, ne? Wenn du als Person, bio-deutsch und so weiter, bist zu diesem Programm gekommen. Jetzt machst du ein Programm, was du früher nicht gemacht hast. Was heißt das für dich jetzt? Also, wie machen wir vielfältiges Programm? Spiegeln wir diese Vielfalt, und wenn ja, welche sind unsere Merkmale? Also, Musik ist klar, aber...

A: Genau, also ich würde, es sind ja vier oder fünf Eckpunkte, die ich sehe, die Vielfalt für mich in dem Programm ausmachen. Also, viel zitiert, die Musik ist da ganz wichtig, ich nenne sie jetzt einfach mal deshalb zuerst, weil sie quantitativ halt viel einnimmt, etwa zwei Drittel einfach im Tagesverlauf, das ist eine Vielfalt, die es wirklich so nirgendwo anders gibt und auf die ich auch stolz bin, weil die Welten eröffnet und zwar auf eine leichte Weise. Das hört sich immer so, ja nicht so tiefgehend an, man sagt, Musik, wir spielen da Musik aus aller Welt, das ist ja wirklich ein Kulturgut, also ganz viele Dinge, von denen das wir machen, selbst im Pop-Bereich, ist für mich kulturell oder subkulturell wertvoll und das verkörpert für mich Vielfalt. Die zentrale Botschaft ist für mich die der Macher, also was sind das für Menschen, die so ein Programm betreiben, ist da diese Vielfalt hörbar und spürbar. Da geben wir uns Mühe, da sind wir aber längst nicht in allen Bereichen perfekt, manchmal wird's mir da schon zu normal, wenn man so will, und zu verwechselbar mit WDR2 oder EinsLive, oder wen auch immer, andererseits kann man auch kein Dogma daraus machen, das ist eine schwierige Geschichte. Das dritte ist die Themen, Community-Geschichten, also immer, die so woanders nicht stattfinden und damit bei diesen Themen, aber auch bei allen anderen, der Versuch ebenso einen Blick zu haben, eine spezielle Perspektive, wo bestimmte Einflüsse durchkommen, bis hin zu Menschen, Protagonisten, die sind ja in einer Fernsehsendung wie Markt sind die Protagonisten irgendwie immer Deutsch, weiß auch nicht warum. Wenn wir eine Straßenumfrage zum x-beliebigen Thema machen, etwas was gar nicht mit Vielfalt zu tun hat, muss es bei uns halt der Ansatz, ne, das soll das Ganze spiegeln. Das sind so die kleinen Versuche, wobei ein Teil davon, zum Beispiel das mit den Protagonisten aber auch mit den Moderatoren, oder, ist ja nur ein Reflex darauf, dass in den anderen Programmen das zu kurz kommt. Also, wenn die es auch alle machen würden, wenn die wirklich ein Querschnitt der Gesellschaft spiegeln würden, dann wäre dieser Teil bei uns schon ein

bisschen überholt, eigentlich, ne, also. Aber ich habe nicht, weder die Hoffnung noch die Befürchtung, dass es so schnell bei denen geht, selbst wenn da der eine oder der andere mal es schafft, ein muttersprachigen oder einen Moderator mit Migrationshintergrund, sie da noch nicht auf absehbare Zeit, die Bandbreite der Gesellschaft spiegeln.

Q: Ja, es gibt, das was du erzählst, natürlich gibt es diese Mainstreaming-Bestrebungen als Teil dieser Vielfalts-Politik, in der Medienpolitik schon seit langem. Die funktionieren aber nicht. Kann man so nicht sagen in den massenattraktiven Programmen

A: Jedenfalls nicht in der Breite. Punktuell ja, aber nicht in der Breite.

Q: Ja, wie siehst du das jetzt, wenn du, hast du eine Idee, oder wie siehst du die Entwicklung der deutschen Medienlandschaft, also die öffentlich-rechtliche zum Beispiel? Wie wird sich das weiter entwickeln? Wird, werden die mehr alle wie Funkhaus Europa, global, oder werden die Mainstream-Programme mehr mit Migranten bespickt?

A: Ich glaube schon, dass das so sein wird. Also, wenn ich die Entwicklung der letzten zwanzig Jahre sehe, inklusive uns, und man zehn-zwanzig Jahre nach vorne gucken, ich glaube schon, dass da was deutlich noch mal passieren wird. Das ist einfach vor allem eine Frage der Zeit. ich glaube selbst, dass sich so Musik, wie wir sie hier spielen, immer mehr so ihren Weg durchsickern wird. Es ist mir gestern Abend noch im Tatort aufgefallen, wo Leute getanzt haben zu so Musiktiteln, wo ich dachte, he, hallo? Das ist unseres, das war nicht irgendwie WDR2, EinsLive, das war Musik, die so bei Funkhaus Europa laufen würde. Ich glaube, es war keine ethnische Party, es war eine ganz normale Party, ja? Also, ich, da passiert etwas, verändert sich wirklich die Gesellschaft, die jüngere Mitte der Gesellschaft, es ist einfach eine Zeit-Frage. Aber ich bin ganz, ich würde jetzt Wetten abschließen, dass das in...

Q: Wieso haben wir dann so wenig, wie haben zu wenig Hörer? Eigentlich nach dieser Kalkulation, warum klappt es dann nicht?

A: Ah, Gott, das hat so viele Gründe, wir waren ganz, ganz lange Zeit sehr schwierig und doch schwer zugänglich, selbst wenn wir jetzt alles richtig machen würden, was ich nicht weiß, ob es so ist, dauert es lange, bis sich Hörerverhalten ändert ohne riesige Werbekampagnen und dazu kommt, dass wir trotz allem, was wir machen, dass wir eben nicht Mainstream sind und die Mitte, die hört ja WDR2 und EinsLive und Radio NRW, das werden die auch weiterhin lange, lange Zeit tun. Das ist... was man auf so einem Programm

hier kriegen kann, ist, glaube ich, wirklich so, in der Liga zwei, drei, vier Prozent, wenn's richtig toll läuft, mehr dann doch nicht, ohne den Charakter zu verlieren, oder sonst hat man irgendein Programm, was ab und zu mal ein Titel aus dem Ausland spielt, ja, das wär's aber nicht.

Q: Also, wenn man sich das Konzept Global Sounds Radio und so weiter liest und so, das ist alles sehr gut. Fragt sich aber, ob das so in der Realität so wirklich... jetzt für dich, so, du bist Teil dieses Programms, was für eine... Sagen wir so, es gibt diesen berühmten Satz von einem Kulturanalysten, Stuart Hall, ich weiß nicht, ob du ihn kennst, er hat viel über die Medien geschrieben und unter anderem, dass die BBC eine Nation geschaffen hat, vor allem in Kriegszeiten und nach dem Krieg. Also, die BBC hat sozusagen eine Nation-bildende Funktion auch gehabt und hat immer noch, nur weniger. Wenn jetzt, also nicht ganz so hochtrabend ausgedrückt, was, wenn wir Programm machen oder wenn du dieses Programm konzipierst, du bist schon leitend hier, was ist das für ein Volk, was du da, was du da, verstehst du, das du mit diesem Programm zauberst? Oder imaginierst? (laughter)

A: Ja, es ist ein Volk, was ich schon immer wieder wahrnehme, wenn ich hier jetzt auch in Städten wie Köln oder so unterwegs bin, eins was ich eben vor zehn-zwanzig Jahren so noch nicht festgestellt habe. Es ist eins, was davon geprägt ist, also, man hat mehrere Welten in sich und das werden immer mehr Menschen, die hier leben, die das haben. Und das ist nicht so eine kleine Kindheit wie meine, sondern eine weitere, positiv wie negativ, das kann auch Schwierigkeiten bedeuten und das, das kommt von der einen Seite zusammen mit, in Anführungsstrichen, ganz normalen bio-Deutschen, die aber trotzdem ja auch einen anderen Horizont inzwischen haben, weil sie ins Ausland gehen, weil sie jetzt über Facebook weltweit vernetzt sind. Die Welt wird einfach zumindest in der Aufgeklärten Schicht, internationaler, weltbürgerlicher, auch toleranter. So, das ist das Volk, was ich da imaginiere, ich weiß aber, dass das nur eine Teilschicht dieser Gesamtgesellschaft ist. Und, es gibt aber kein Radioprogramm, oder kein Fernsehsender mehr, der die gesamte Gesellschaft komplett erreicht. Wir sind da eher, stehen wir auch für diese Segmentierung, die inzwischen da ist. Gab es vor 30 Jahren auch nicht, da gab es dann zwei-drei Sender, die haben das unter sich aufgeteilt und das war's. Das ist lange nicht mehr, heute hat EinsFestival einen ein-Prozent Marktanteil, ja, das ist der Teil, und ZDF Neo noch einen, und der und der und der und da sind noch die Radios.

Q: ZDF hat jetzt auch kein klares Programm.

A: Ne, oder ARTE hat auch 1,2 Prozent, also, aber das ist so, ich denke immer ja, ein Prozent ist sogar gar nicht so schlecht, Arte hat auch ein Prozent und Arte ist so ein Name, also...

Also, ich glaube, in unserem Fall, wie auch bei Arte, wie auch bei WDR3, das sind Angebotsprogramme, da muss eine öffentlich-rechtliche Anstalt sagen, ja, das ist ein Ziel, was wir haben, das ist eine Idee, die wir, wo wir zu stehen, und die wir verkörpern, und dann machen wir das auch. Und dann finde ich, werden die Macher gefragt, dann aber zu überlegen, für wen, mit welchen Mitteln, wie kriegen wir Relevanz. Das sind so die...

Q: Du hast einen Stichpunkt, ein Stichwort angesprochen, Schicht. Wenn man sich den modernen Kulturorientierten oder so was als idealtypischen Hörer nimmt, das ist schon eine Schicht-Frage.

A: Ja, oder Milieu-Frage. Schicht? Milieus auf jeden Fall, eindeutig, das kannst du, kann man auch nicht wegleugnen. Also, und je nachdem, das hängt natürlich auch mit der größeren Auswahl zusammen, die inzwischen da ist. Je nachdem, wo man ein Programm hinlenkt, da ist man sofort da wieder welche los in einem bestimmten Milieu oder Schicht und kriegt dafür woanders her, was früher vielleicht nicht so gewesen wäre, weil das Angebot insgesamt einfach kleiner war, ohne Satelliten, ohne Privatrado, in den Zeiten, wo ich noch aufgewachsen bin. Wenn man da ein öffentlich-rechtliches Programm wie unseres gemacht hätte, wäre jetzt inhaltlich nicht so, aber, es wäre einfach deshalb, also wenn wir auch die gleiche Mediensituation hätten wie vor 30 Jahren, dann hätten wir deshalb schon weitaus mehr Marktanteil und so, weil es einfach nicht so viel gibt, gab, ja? Ist aber so. Jetzt ist es alles segmentiert, und man holt sich seinen kleinen Teil daraus.

Q: Was sind jetzt, zurück zur praktischen Arbeit und zu den Leuten, die hier arbeiten. Also, nicht die Protagonisten sondern die Macher, also Moderatoren, Redakteure, Autoren. Was müssen sie mitbringen? Also, es geht um diese Sprachenvielfalt. Wie hört sich das im Programm? Wie machst du das bemerkbar im Programm? Ist das jetzt ein Blickpunkt, oder ist es die Themenauswahl, was ist das? Oder ist es so eine allgemeine Einstellung zur Welt, oder?

A: Also, es ist im Idealfall, ist einmal Name-dropping einfach, dass jemand allein über seinen Namen verkörpert, dass er irgendwie Mehrwert hat, oder es auch in kleinen sprachlichen Dingen, der eine oder der andere Moderatoren, einfach mal es so einfließen lässt, so, was so mehr so nonchalant läuft. Da hat man also schon mal diesen Teil abgedeckt. Der zweite Teil ist für mich im Idealfall, dass man wirklich einen ganz anderen Blick hat, weil man den, wie

ich zum Beispiel so gar nicht haben kann, weil ich habe keine Eltern, die zugewandert sind und keine Familienfeste, die sich völlig von dem deutschen Mainstream abheben und, und, dass das halt im Programm zum Tragen kommt und klappt in manchen Fällen auch wirklich gut, dass wir solche kleinen Dinge einfließen lassen, oder dass auch die Macher, die wir da haben so Themen aus den Communities eben ranholen, die aber übergreifend interessant sind. Und das dritte ist wirklich dieses Weltbürgerliche, dass wir ganz weiten Blick haben, dass wir Toleranz im Sinne von, es gibt so viele unterschiedliche tolle Dinge in der Welt, damit auch in unserem Land, weil die Welt ja jetzt hier lebt, dass wir das hinkriegen, was nicht, was fast der schwierigste Teil manchmal ist. Ich sehe auch, eine ernüchternde Erfahrung, die ich da zum Beispiel gemacht habe, ist wie sich einzelne Migrantengruppen untereinander auch sehen, also gar nicht so mit der blauäugigen gutbürgerlichen deutschen Weltsicht oft, also, wir haben uns ja alle lieb, sondern das auch teilweise viel schwieriger.

Q: Und noch eine Frage: Du bist als WDR-Mensch gefragt. Migrantische Autoren oder MH-Autoren und Redakteure, wie siehst du ihre Rolle in den Mainstream-Programmen überhaupt? Kommen die gut voran oder sind es nur so Einzelfälle, oder...?

A: Es geht voran, aber auch da langsam, also ich glaube auch da, es wird sich raus wachsen, es wird normaler und mehr werden und das muss aber auch mehr werden. Ich erinnere mich gut an eine Veranstaltung ich hatte, vor einem Jahr ungefähr, es waren Kanadier, die waren hier, ich habe da für den WDR zum Anlass einen Vortrag gehalten und da kam auch, es ging um Diversity, und kam sofort die Frage nach, ja es ist ja schön und gut, was ihr da macht, aber wie viele Moderatoren mit Herkunft habt ihr denn in den Mainstream Media. Da sagte ich, ja, jetzt zum Beispiel in so einem jungen Programm, gerade keinen im Moment, und die sagen, es wäre unheimlich schwer jemanden zu finden. Dann sagte einer von denen, auf Englisch dann, Sie sind, aber, wie, also Sie haben eine Bevölkerung von 80 Millionen in Deutschland, und Sie wollen mir sagen, Sie finden keinen, der das kann, und der Mann hatte Recht. Ja, es ist eine Frage des Wollens, der Haltung dahinter, und da können wir helfen, diese Haltung noch mit ins Haus zu transportieren. Ich glaube, ich sehe an verschiedenen Stellen, dass es sehr erwünscht ist, inzwischen das auch verkörpert und sich fast damit schmückt, also das soll jetzt nicht in so eine positive Diskriminierung sein, aber in manchen Fällen ist es ja schon, bestimmte Stellen im Haus sagen, ah, das ist ja toll und können uns damit schmücken, andere sind da nicht so weit.

Q: Also, das habe ich gehört vor fünf Jahren oder länger her. Jemand hat mir gesagt, also, ist das wahr, dass man als Migrant besser jetzt, also dass man migrantischen Hintergrund haben muss, um im WDR weiter zu kommen. Und ich sagte, ja, schön wäre es. Aber, sagen wir so. Ich habe mit vielen Leuten gesprochen und so, mit Kollegen und überhaupt mit den Leuten, die ich kenne und die haben durch die Bank alle dieselbe Erfahrung, von der selben Erfahrung berichtet, dass die das überhaupt nicht wollten, aber dann irgendwie festgelegt wurden in diese migrantöse Ecke, ne, also auch Leute, die hier geboren sind und akzentfrei deutsch sprechen. Und dann fanden sie das erstens als eine Einschränkung, dann aber fanden sie, das war ökonomisch gar nicht so schlecht, weil sie dann irgendwie rausgegriffen wurden, jedes Mal als Experten, aber dass es letztendlich wirklich... ja, du wirst thematisch beschränkt.

A: Nehmen mir ein Beispiel, die Auswahl der Volontäre, wurde bis vor einiger Zeit unheimlich darauf geachtet, dass da Männlein und Weiblein, so dass die Geschlechter, und es ist schon ein ganz wichtiges Kriterium, dass es da keine Gruppe mehr stattfindet, wo nicht auch, in welcher Form auch immer, aber Migrationshintergrund auch mit dabei ist, auf jeden Fall.

Q: Das ist nicht mehr dieses „Wir begrüßen Menschen...“

A: Nein, nein, sondern das ist einfach dabei. Also, ich, das ist auch so, also es gibt Leute, ich glaube, hier in so einem Haus wie den WDR, klar, Ausnahme bestätigen immer die Regel, aber da ist ja keiner mehr *gegen* Vielfalt, oder so, also es gibt auch, den Großteil ist es egal, die interessiert das einfach nicht, die machen Regionalsendungen und dann denken die, was, was. Und es gibt einen Teil von Leuten und darunter auch Leute, die an Schnittstellen sitzen, wie jetzt Ausbildungsleiter Rainer Assion, die reden auch immer, dem das richtig so ein inneres Anliegen ist, im positiven Sinne, dass man sagt, nein, wir brauchen Vielfalt, wir haben auch den Integrationsbeirat jetzt, der das intensiv diskutiert. Es ist schon so ein wachsendes Einvernehmen da drüber. Deswegen bin ich optimistisch, dass es für die Zukunft, dass es normal und positiv wird, nicht exotisch, nicht künstlich herbeigeführt, sondern... und da ist der WDR auch einerseits Vorreiter und andererseits langsam. Also, ich glaube, dass da mancher Privatsender viel schneller auf so was reagiert, wenn ich jetzt im Fernsehprogrammen sehe.

Q: Die haben einfach kürzere Reaktionszeiten.

A: Genau, zack, zack, zack und die sehen, das geht und da hast du da auf einmal in Fernsehsendungen die Gesichter, denkste, eh, warum sind wir nicht so weit. Das ist schon so eine, aber das liegt an den Strukturen, weil da alles langsamer läuft.

Q: Wie wird Funkhaus Europa im Haus, jetzt nicht von den politischen Papieren her, sondern von der Stimmung, wie wird das Programm wahrgenommen? Weil wir, die hier arbeiten, wir haben sehr unterschiedliche Erfahrungen immer, was wir so von dem einen oder von dem anderen hören.

A: Würde ich auch so bestätigen, unterschiedlich. Es gibt Leute oder Kreise oder Einzelne, die sagen, ja, was soll das, wofür brauchen wir das, und es gibt andere, die sagen, wir haben da ein tolles Programm, dieses Kompliment kriege ich in letzter Zeit öfter für unser Programm, die eben seine Dynamik, seine Frische sehen und eine Zukunftsorientierung eigentlich auch. Also, das ist total gemischt, das kann ich nicht so, je weiter es nach oben geht, desto mehr kriegt man einfach auf die Schulter geklopft für dieses Programm.

Q: Und du? Bist du jetzt, ich frage das auch nicht im Sinne der..., bist du glücklich in diesem Programm, hier zu sein? Oder, gefällt dir das? Oder meinst du, das ist irgendwie doch nicht, keine Ahnung. Fühlst du dich wohl?

A: Ich finde, das ist eine super... eine Herausforderung hört sich immer so abgedroschen an, aber, es ist... ej, wo kann man so was hier machen? Ein Programm mit dieser Perspektive, mit dieser Musikmischung und auf diese, einerseits zutiefst öffentlich-rechtlich, indem man wirklich was macht, spezielles Angebot mit dem Auftrag dahinter und so, und gleichzeitig ist es wirklich modern und nach vorne und wenn ich mir unsere Facebook-Seite gucke und mir die Kommentare da ansehe von Leuten, wie begeistert die sind oder die E-Mails, finde ich super.

Q: Aber Druck gibt es nach wie vor, so ist es nicht. Ja, Druck, dass wir erfolgreich sein sollten.

A: Ah, du, also, ne. Also, nicht so, da weiß ich noch von meiner Zeit bei 1LIVE, ich weiß es auch von der Beobachtung unter der WDR4 oder WDR2 stehen, das ist ganz andere Druck, da sind wir völlig frei von, also. Falls ich hier Druck mache, das ist keiner den ich weiter gebe, bin ich selber, ne, nein. (laughter) Weil, natürlich gucken schon alle irgendwie, geht es vorwärts? Ja, und, aber, wenn wir jetzt in 0,1-er Schritten vorwärts kommen würden, würde es reichen, Hauptsache es geht ein bisschen vorwärts. Das ist so der, aber Druck, ich glaube,

ne, das ist er nicht. Wenn das Druck ist, dann ist Druck nicht schlimm. Ehrlich, da muss man woanders hingehen, da ist Druck, auch außerhalb unsere Anstalt, da ist ganz anderer Druck. Da können wir relativ frei... Der Druck ist auch nicht so, nehmen wir jetzt unter uns, ein Programm wie WDR3, wo die Kosten viel, viel höher sind, und wo man seit Jahrzehnten im Sinkflug ist, da ist der Druck auch viel höher, natürlich, das ist eine andere Form von Druck, wir sind da ein relativ kleines, relativ schlankes...

Q: Relativ billig.

A: Relativ billig auch, im Vergleich zu anderen. Durch so Bremer Geschichten und so, das ist, also so ein Vollprogramm muss man machen.

## Appendix 2

### List of figures

Figure	Page
Fig. 1 - <i>Roots – The story of your family / Roots – Die Geschichte deiner Familie</i> , Funkhaus Europa project, 2006	115
Fig. 2 – <i>10 Years Boundless Radio – 10 Jahre grenzenlos Radio –</i> Funkhaus Europa brochure, 2009	118
Fig. 3 - Scene from the Funkhaus Europa commercial, 2003	120
Fig. 4 – <i>Global Sounds Radio –</i> Funkhaus Europa brochure, 2012	123
Fig. 5 – <i>The Sound of the World – Der Sound der Welt –</i> screenshot of the Funkhaus Europa web page, accessed 1 Oct. 2018	125
Fig. 6 – <i>ARD Tolerance Week – ARD Themenwoche Toleranz –</i> screenshot of the web page, accessed 1 Oct. 2018	189
Fig. 7 – Posters of the ARD Tolerance Week, Press brochure of the Tolerance Week. ARD, 2014	200

## Curriculum vitae

Iva Krtalić Muiesan was born in Zagreb in 1969. She graduated in English and Spanish languages and literatures at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Zagreb in 1994. In 2008 she earned a Master of Arts degree in East European Studies at the Free University in Berlin. She worked as interpreter and translator and published several literary and other translations. From 1998 to 2000 she was employed as a journalist in the daily newspaper "Jutarnji list" in Zagreb, and continued to work for the paper and other publications as a correspondent from Germany. In 2000 she started working as a journalist for the radio station Funkhaus Europa at the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR) in Cologne, where she was employed as radio editor from 2004 to 2016. Since 2016 she is Commissioner for Integration and Intercultural Diversity at the WDR, dealing with an array of issues of cultural diversity in the media on the level of media policies, content and personnel of the biggest German public service broadcaster. During her doctoral studies of interdisciplinary humanities at the University of Zadar, she has presented her work at international conferences. Her thematic emphases lie on migration, cultural diversity, European politics and culture. In the context of her work on the topics of integration and intercultural diversity in the media, she regularly takes part in the work of expert conferences and panels in Germany and Europe, and is a member of several working groups dedicated to these topics on the level of political and media institutions, expert associations or media projects in Germany and in Europe.

### Papers:

Krtalić Muiesan, Iva. "WDR Funkhaus Europa - između programske niše i medijskog *mainstreama*". In *Izolacija ili integracija - Kako mediji pristupaju uključivanju manjina u javnu sferu*, edited by Milana Romić. Zagreb: B.a.B.e., 2011.

Krtalić Muiesan, Iva, and Senka Božić-Vrbančić. "The ARD tolerance week – politics of difference". Paper presented at Utopias, realities, heritages, Zagreb 2015.

---. "Creative cosmopolitanism on radio waves". Paper presented at MeCCSA 2018: Creativity and Agency, London 2018.

Vrbančić, Mario, Senka Božić-Vrbančić, and Iva Krtalić Muiesan. "Facing others: Contemporary culturalization of politics". Paper presented at Nationalism, old and new: Europe, Australia and their Others, Barcelona 2018.

## Životopis

Iva Krtalić Muiesan rođena je 1969. godine u Zagrebu. Na Filozofskom fakultetu Sveučilišta u Zagrebu 1994. godine stekla je zvanje profesora engleskog i španjolskog jezika i književnosti, te 2008. godine zvanje Master of Arts na studiju East European Studies na Freie Universität u Berlinu. Radila je kao prevoditeljica te je objavila više književnih i stručnih prijevoda. Od 1998. do 2000. godine bila je zaposlena kao novinarka u redakciji vanjske politike u Jutarnjem listu, a zatim je radila kao dopisnica iz Njemačke za Jutarnji list i druga izdanja. Od 2000. godine radila je kao novinarka na radio postaji Funkhaus Europa Westdeutscher Rundfunka (WDR) u Kölnu, a od 2004. do 2016. godine tamo je bila zaposlena kao urednica. Od 2016. godine radi kao povjerenica za integraciju i interkulturnu raznolikost WDR-a, te se pitanjima kulturne raznolikosti u medijima bavi na nivou medijskih politika, sadržaja i personala najvećeg njemačkog javnog medijskog servisa. U sklopu doktorskog studija interdisciplinarnih humanističkih znanosti na Sveučilištu u Zadru izlagala je svoje radove na međunarodnim konferencijama. Tematska težišta su joj migracije, kulturna raznolikost, europska politika i kultura, a u sklopu bavljenja temom integracije i interkulture različitosti u medijima sudjeluje na brojnim stručnim skupovima u Njemačkoj i Europi, te je članica više radnih skupina posvećenih toj tematici na razini političkih i medijskih institucija, stručnih saveza i medijskih projekata u Njemačkoj i Europi.

Popis radova:

Krtalić Muiesan, Iva. "WDR Funkhaus Europa - između programske niše i medijskog *mainstreama*". U *Izolacija ili integracija - Kako mediji pristupaju uključivanju manjina u javnu sferu*, ur. Milana Romić. Zagreb: B.a.B.e., 2011.

Krtalić Muiesan, Iva, and Senka Božić-Vrbančić. "The ARD tolerance week – politics of difference". Rad predstavljen na konferenciji Utopias, realities, heritages, Zagreb 2015.

---. "Creative cosmopolitanism on radio waves". Rad predstavljen na konferenciji MeCCSA 2018: Creativity and Agency, London 2018.

Vrbančić, Mario, Senka Božić-Vrbančić, and Iva Krtalić Muiesan. "Facing others: Contemporary culturalization of politics". Rad predstavljen na konferenciji Nationalism, old and new: Europe, Australia and their Others, Barcelona 2018.