

Conceptualization of time and space in fairy tales written during the Victorian period

Vidović, Ester

Doctoral thesis / Disertacija

2011

Degree Grantor / Ustanova koja je dodijelila akademski / stručni stupanj: **University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences / Sveučilište u Rijeci, Filozofski fakultet**

Permanent link / Trajna poveznica: <https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:188:541969>

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THE UNIVERSITY OF RIJEKA
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY IN RIJEKA

Ester Vidović

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TIME AND SPACE IN FAIRY
TALES WRITTEN DURING THE VICTORIAN PERIOD

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

Rijeka, 2011

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2. DOKTORSKI RAD

Naslov:	Conceptualization of Time and Space in Fairy Tales Written during the Victorian Period
Ustanova na kojoj je prijavljen i izrađen doktorski rad:	Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci
Broj stranica, slika, grafikona, tablica i bibliografskih podataka:	328 stranica, 10 grafikona i 150 bibliografskih podataka
Znanstveno područje: Znanstveno polje: Znanstvena grana:	Humanističke znanosti Filologija Anglistika
Ime i prezime mentora i komentora:	dr. sc. Marina Biti, red. prof., dr. sc. Victor Kennedy, red. prof.
Fakultet na kojem je obranjen doktorski rad:	Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci

3. OCJENA I OBRANA

Datum prijave teme:	14. siječnja 2010.
Datum predaje rada:	17. studenoga 2011.
Datum sjednice Fakultetskog vijeća na kojoj je rad prihvaćen:	30. siječnja 2012.
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Datum obrane:	22. veljače 2012.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my mentor, Prof. Marina Biti, PhD., for her invaluable advice, support and encouragement during the completion of my project. Her work in cognitive poetics and literary theory has been a source of eternal inspiration for me.

I would also like to thank my co - mentor, Prof. Victor Kennedy, PhD., for conscientiously reading my drafts and recommending useful reading. I admire his energy and enthusiasm.

My special thanks go to my family: my husband, children and parents. I am immensely thankful to my elder daughter Sylvia (B.A. in Cultural Studies) for providing insight into the complex area of cultural studies.

I also want to thank the staff of the National and University Library in Zagreb and the University Library in Rijeka, who continually helped me with my literature search.

1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Both the end of the twentieth century and the Victorian period witnessed huge changes in understanding the concepts of time and space (May and Thrift, 2003: 7). The common denominator of understanding temporality in the context of the 19th century as well as the 21st century is, beyond any doubt, speed. The acceleration of the pace of life was accompanied by a dissolution or breakdown of traditional spatial coordinates (May and Thrift, 2003: 7). The accelerated pace of living in Victorian Britain was primarily a result of the advancements in the area of transport, the new or perfected means of *transportation* which significantly shortened travelling time and distances such as trains, cars, electric trams and, later in the era, planes, while in the last few decades we have faced dramatic changes in the areas of *transmission*, especially related to radio, computer and satellite transmissions as well as *transplantation*, which leads to time compression with the help of xenotransplantation and nanotechnology (Matejo Kuljiš, private communication).

The effects of speed on humanity have been dramatic: the sociologist John Urry points out that we have been experiencing *instantaneous time* or, rather, have not been experiencing it since this kind of time is characterized by involvement of short moments which are totally out of human consciousness (Urry, 2000: 126). Paul Virilio warns of the dangers of dromospheric pollution caused by the invasion of technology on our lives (from Greek *dromos*, Engl. speed), the consequence of which is the disappearing of reality, which in turn leads to "chronoscopic time" rather than chronological time, a time in which humanity is no longer able to absorb the quantity of simultaneous information sources (Virilio, 1996: 178). As a result of this phenomenon, an increasing number of people nowadays wish for a slower and more peaceful pace of life. It is indicative that last autumn a group of young people were standing motionless

for an hour in the Dalmatian town of Zadar, sending a message to humanity that something should be done about the hectic pace of life we have all been witnessing as well as about the speed which takes a toll on all of us. The social geographers Jon May and Nigel Thrift note that a similar trend marked the end of the 19th century in Britain; during this period the British urban - based middle classes showed an increased interest in the paintings of John Constable, a famous artist whose works, painted as early as the beginning of the 19th century, depicted a slower and more peaceful life in the countryside (May and Thrift, 2003: 19).

The sociologist Judy Wajcman argues that speeding up of daily life has been addressed in a different fashion by diverse scholars (Wajcman, 2008: 58). Thus, claims Wajcman, theorists of information, knowledge and network attribute the process of acceleration solely to developments within the ICT field (Wajcman, 2000: 61), whereas sociologists are divided between those who are in favour of the standard sociological approach, opining that sociological relations exist prior to and beyond technological changes and those who collaborate with scientists from the area of STS (Social studies of science and technology, who support the notion that the "social" and the "technical" are not separate, but one single area of study (Wajcman, 2000: 66).

Wajcman poses a question with which she tries to resolve the paradox that has marked the modern era: why, despite technological acceleration, which presupposes less time needed for production, transport and similar, do we constantly report feeling short of time? Wajcman does not provide a straightforward answer to the question, but rather highlights some issues that have been in focus of diverse studies on time pressure that, she believes, have affected our pace of living as well as social relations: *effort intensification*, people working harder and at dealing with more complex tasks, *polarisation of*

working time between those who work long hours or overwork and those who work few or no hours, and *the prime - age women increasingly participating in the workforce*, the phenomenon that has significantly affected the institution of the family, resulting in the expression "quality time", that is rescheduled time both men and women spend with their children after having handled other obligations (Wajcman, 2000: 65).

Wajcman further argues that technological advances did not cause acceleration, but rather contributed to the social changes which resulted in the speeding up of our lives. She emphasizes that people have both been deprived of their free time and benefited from mobile telephony: on the one hand the boundary between "public time" and "private time" has disappeared, resulting in "on time" and "off time" but on the other hand our possibilities for multi - tasking, delaying, consolidating and programming tasks have increased (Wajcman, 2000: 71). Besides the "anytime" property mobile phones are also characterized by "anywhere" property: one is nowadays available in every imaginable place such as airport, golf court, concert and similar.

Wajcman's study inspires us to reflect upon the manners mobile telephony helps us to both compress and enlarge time and space: although we might be deprived of our private time, we can expand our time of availability, despite the fact that every imaginable place is potentially a place for conducting conversations on a mobile phone, the vastness of the globe might be overshadowed with the possibility of two very distant places being brought together with the aid of mobile telephony.

In a similar fashion the social geographers Jon May and Nigel Thrift argue that time and space were experienced both as compressed and enlarged in the Victorian period. Although at the domestic level distances were travelled

much faster with the improvement of road and railroad networks and, later in the century, the electrification of the tram system and the introduction of the underground railway, internationally the advancements in the area of communication such as the telephone and the telegraph "made people aware of events in ever more distant parts of the world" (May and Thrift, 2003: 8).¹ The understanding of time, argue May and Thrift, was twofold: on the one hand the speed of travel and communication was increased, but on the other people "began to pay attention to ever smaller fractions of time – as is evident with the increasing popularity of watches in the last decade of the nineteenth century" (May and Thrift, 2003: 8).

Despite the twofold effect of the advances in communication, technology and transport in both historical periods, the phenomenon of time - space compression seems to have marked both the last decades of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century as well as the Victorian era.

The purpose of this work is to study the issue of time and space from a cognitivist perspective. In my literary analysis of fairy tales written during three diverse subperiods of the Victorian era, the early, middle and late Victorian subperiods, I shall research stylistic attributes of three different authors: John Ruskin, George MacDonald and Oscar Wilde. The focus will be on the authors' use of conceptual metaphors in conceptualization of time and space. The genre of the fairy tale posed a challenge since it has been rather unexplored in the context of studying metaphors conceptualizing time and space and relating these two concepts to the spirit of a historical era.

¹It seems that the use of the telephone in the 19th century produced a similar effect to the one caused by the use of the mobile phone at the end of the 20th century; both created an impression of marked acceleration and shrinking of space on one side and of slowing down and enlargement on the other.

My work is based on cognitions from diverse human and social sciences including cognitive linguistics and semantics, neuroscience, philosophy, social history and cultural anthropology. Cognitivism, as a new orientation in thought, emerged in the 1970s and cast a different light on the processes of cognition. However, the beginnings of the cognitive approach to understanding abstract concepts can be traced as far back as the 19th century, when a number of scientists of phenomenological and hermeneutical orientation including Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau - Ponty, discovered *lived* space - time or the embodied character of these two concepts (Carr, 2007: 503).

This new, cognitive orientation in science, which was an immediate answer to the prevailing trend of objectification in science, encompasses such diverse areas of study as linguistics, psychology, anthropology, neuroscience, philosophy, computer science and many more.

Chapter One addresses the main principles of cognitive science as compared to "objectivist" and "subjectivist" approaches to language and cognition. The main cognitivist postulates include embodiment of cognition, the view that metaphors are figures of thought inasmuch as figures of speech and the perspective of our mental abilities as unconscious and arbitrary.

According to the first postulate we conceive the world around us through *interaction* with entities in it. The properties of these entities are not inherent, claim the cognitivists but interactive and subject to cultural conventions and physical environment. Such a view is radically different from the objectivist stance that properties belonging to entities are inherent and that cognition is, accordingly, objective. It also considerably differs from subjectivist positions, which look at cognition as a purely subjective phenomenon which is based primarily on our intuition. Our cognition, claim cognitivists, strongly relies on

image schemas or dynamic, preconceptual structures that our experiences are made of, which in turn make a foundation for the emergence of conceptual metaphors.

The second postulate supports the view that metaphors are a matter of thought and not just speech. Different metaphor theories are addressed, with an emphasis on those that viewed metaphors as powerful tools in the process of conceiving the world around us. These include the following theories: Giambattista Vico's cultural philosophy of metaphor, Christian von Ehrenfels's theory of Gestalts (unified, meaningful and coherent units which we rely upon in the process of cognition), Friedrich Theodor Vischer's theory of spheres (which were later to be developed into domains) and Wilhelm Stählin's notion of the selectivity of elements projected between domains. The more recent approaches, the interaction and the comparison approach focus on the elements that take part in metaphorical projections. The interaction approach, the principal advocate of which was I.A. Richards, specifies two elements taking part in the metaphorical process of projection: *tenor* and *vehicle*. Interactionists argue that elements taking part in a metaphor creation should be addressed as structures and not separate elements. The supporters of the comparison approach outline the importance of selecting analogies between the elements involved in the process of metaphor creation.

All these theories influenced the two approaches on metaphors that this work focuses on, namely George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's *Conceptual Theory of Metaphor* (CMT) and Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner's *Theory of Conceptual Integration* (TCI).

The first theory envisages a metaphorical process as a projection between two domains: the *source* domain and the *target* domain. Projections that take

place between these two domains are *selective*, only some elements or relations are projected and *unidirectional*, i.e. the projection is performed only from a source domain onto a target domain. Conceptual metaphors, which Lakoff and Johnson classify in three groups (structural, ontological, orientational), rely on image schemas. Abstract concepts are understood in terms of more concrete concepts they share an image schematic structure with. Thus with the help of the CONTAINER image schema we are able to conceptualize an argument in terms of war.

The second theory relies on Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces or partial constructions which we resort to in local understanding and action (Fauconnier in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 351). Mental spaces can rely on knowledge of many domains. Thus *Jack buys gold from Jill* can be connected with the domains of COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, TAKING A BREAK FROM WORK, GOING TO A PUBLIC PLACE FOR ENTERTAINMENT or ADHERENCE TO A DAILY ROUTINE (Fauconnier in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 352). Fauconnier and Turner envisage at least four different spaces taking part in a creation of a metaphor: at least two *income spaces*, each coming from a different experiential domain, a generic space, which contains structures that are common to both income spaces and a *blended space*, a space with a specific emergent structure in which it is at times difficult to recognize the income spaces it resulted from.

The third main principle of the cognitivist approach in science addresses the arbitrary and unconscious nature of cognition. Our automatic cognitive operations as well as our implicit knowledge reside in the *cognitive unconscious*, or the theoretical cognitive mechanisms above the neural level that we have enough evidence for, but do not have a conscious access to (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 13).

In *Chapter Two* I address the issue of conceptualization of space and time. These two concepts are seen by cognitive scientists as closely related to each other. The cognitive linguist/grammarians Ronald Langacker considers them basic domains for several reasons: they cannot be completely reduced to another domain, they are unbounded and are not confined to a scale (Langacker, 1987: 147 – 154). The cognitive semanticist and grammarian Leonard Talmy points out that the quality generically existing in space is "matter", whereas the corresponding quality existing in time is "action". Time is linguistically often referred to in terms of space, which is marked by the existence of two *spatial schemas*: the *ego - moving schema* (*We are approaching Christmas*) and the *time - moving schema* (*Christmas is coming*).

Time and space are embodied, i.e. people conceptualize them according to their experience of reality (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 243). Biti and Marot Kiš emphasize that we make space more concrete by linking it to the realia from the everyday world. We segment space with the help of objects of constructions and objects of material culture, thereby setting boundaries with which we create our private and public spaces. The spaces which are created by human intervention through segmenting, moulding and putting into functioning present *real* spaces, while those that are not created through our intervention are *abstract* spaces. *Heterotopias* are real places which present an alternative to the social ordering of a specific culture. In the past heterotopias presented alternative spaces of crisis, whereas today prevalent heterotopias include heterotopias of deviation such as prisons, rest homes or psychiatric hospitals.

I have explained the functioning of three construal operations which we consider relevant for conceptualization of space. These include the *trajector/landmark* alignment, the *Perspective* and its suboperation the *viewpoint* and the *Frame of Reference*. These operations are culturally and

linguistically bound and are subject to differing conceptualizations by members of diverse cultures. Thus in some cultures space is conceptualized from egocentric, anthropomorphic and relativistic perspectives, whereas in other cultures space is conceptualized via other, non - bodily coordinates, i.e. via fixed geographical - cardinal positions (Levinson, 2004: 41).

These operations depend on spatial image schemas, the most pervasive ones being the VERTICALITY and CENTRE and PERIPHERY schemas, which in turn pave a path for the emergence of orientation metaphors such as HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; HAPPY IS UP, SAD IS DOWN; CONSCIOUS IS UP, UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN and others. While some of these metaphors are physically based, other are socially/culturally based (HIGH STATUS IS UP, LOW STATUS IS DOWN; VIRTUE IS UP, DEPRAVITY IS DOWN and others).

The concept of time has been a challenge to scientists of different provenances. Measurements of time register *subjective* (related to human experience) and *objective* (measured by sophisticated machines) time. Other divisions of time include the dichotomy on *absolute* vs. *relative* time (the former measures time based on natural events or using arbitrary units while the latter compares duration or order of events of different events), *linear* (having a beginning and an end) and *cyclic* (events move to another place in a cycle), *static* (based on the notion of constancy) and *dynamic* (based on the notion of change) and *monochronic* (time is conceived as an exhaustable resource) and *polychronic* (time is not conceived as rigidly as in the case of monochronic time).

In the section on philosophical perspectives of time I provide an overview of different conceptualizations of time throughout history. In ancient Greece time was understood in terms of *becoming* (change) or *being* (permanence).

Isaac Newton introduced the notions of *absolute* (not related to external circumstances) and *relative* (measured by means of motion) times. Immanuel Kant assigned time the property of intuition, an instrument of mind, thus introducing the notion of *subjective* time. The idea was developed at the beginning of the 20th century by the French philosopher Henri Bergson, who differentiated between *duration* (the ego conceptualizes succession of time without mutual externality) and *spatialized* time (outside the ego, in space, there is mutual externality and no succession). Recent views of time as subjective, proposed by cognitive neuroscientists Vyvyan Evans and Antonio Damasio, support the notion that the origin of temporality is internal and subjective (Evans) and that we can utilize, through *core consciousness*, our momentary as well as past, present and future experiences, which we can utilize through *extended consciousness* (Damasio). Later in the century Samuel Alexander proposed the concept of space - time, thereby indicating at the connectedness between these two concepts.

The thesis further provides a comparison between Western and Eastern thoughts in the context of time conceptualization. Western thought has been influenced by Judeo – Christian philosophy according to which time is studied on three levels: *cosmic*, *historical* and *individual*. At the cosmic level time is conceptualized in the context of ordering events in the universe, while at the historical level it is based on a succession of events, the crucial being the birth, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. On the individual plane, time is conceptualized as life on earth and after death, with a definite beginning and end. The linear perspective of time advocated by the Christian religion was re - defined in the 18th century by Vico's notion of cyclic time and a perception of human history as a constant progress by French Enlightenment philosophers. Furthermore, findings in the fields of geology (related to the age of earth) and

anthropology (related to the origin of mankind) in the 19th century questioned Christian doctrines on the divine creation of cosmos, including humanity.

Eastern thought was significantly influenced by ancient Greek notion of time as cyclic. In China time was conceived as both cyclic (by Neo - Confucians) and dynamic (by the followers of the Mohist school). The Japanese understood time as dynamic and cyclic (the concept of Three times). In India time was, throughout history, perceived as static rather than dynamic. However, the prevailing notions of time gradually changed in these cultures and thus nowadays time tends to be perceived as linear and dynamic by members of those cultures.

Cognitions in the area of natural science, physics in particular (The Second Law of Thermodynamics as well as the developments within the field of quantum physics related to direction of time) put to question the notion of time as linear and irreversible. Recent, highly critical, theories of time will be discussed, including Paul Virilio's notion of *dromospheric pollution* (caused by speed, from Greek *dromos* - speed), the result of which is the feeling that we are living in the constant present and John Zerzan's anarchoprimitivist proposal for returning to a primitive way of life people led thousands of years ago.

Time is viewed by cognitive science as embodied; it is conceived through human interaction with the external world. It is often conceptualized via other concepts, in particular space. In Lakoff and Johnson's opinion two major conceptual metaphors aid in the conceptualization of time in terms of motion in space: the *Moving Time* metaphor and the *Moving Observer* metaphor. The first metaphor conceptualizes time as an entity moving towards the stationary object (human), whereas the other metaphor understands time as a stationary object related to the moving (human) agent. It should be noted that speakers of some

languages (Mandarin) resort to vertical terms when talking about time, whereas others (speakers of English) use horizontal terms for this purpose. Metaphors that do not include the ego's perspective and do not depend on deictic expressions include SEQUENCE IS RELATIVE POSITION ON A PATH (proposed by Kevin Ezra Moore) and *Time - Reference - Point* metaphors, as proposed by Nuñez, Motz and Teuscher).

Time conceptualized through events results in the notion of time as directional, irreversible, continuous, segmentable and measurable. Blends derived from iterations of time units such as days, hours, months and similar result in its *compression* (for example noons from input spaces of different days result in the blend of an abstract noon). Compressions of time emerge through vital relations, the most common being *identity*, *cause* and *effect*, *analogy* and *disanalogy*, *change* and *time*.

Time is also often conceptualized as a flowing substance and as a resource and money. The latter conceptualization is culturally determined since some cultures do not perceive time as money or resource.

The last part of Chapter Two focuses upon the connectedness of language and culture. These links have been recognized by many scientists including Wilhelm von Humboldt, Benjamin Lee Whorf and Edward Sapir. Sapir and Whorf advocate the idea of linguistic relativity in science and their thought has influenced the position of cognitivist scientists on the matter. The links between the language, culture and conceptualization are addressed from four main perspectives: 1) the role of conceptual metaphors in establishing cultural models, 2) individual vs. social cognition in language and culture, 3) universality /relativity in the context of conceptualizing abstract concepts and 4)

the differences in conceptualization of space in the context of utilization of diverse FoRs.

There seems to be a disagreement between cognitive linguists and anthropologists on the role of conceptual metaphors in studying cultural models (Kövecses, 2005: xi). Cognitive linguists support the notion that abstract concepts which cultural models are based on are inherently metaphorical, whereas cognitive anthropologists seem to advocate an opposing view; they consider that abstract concepts such as time and space can be understood literally through proposition - schemas (a form through which propositional knowledge may be cast).

Another area of disagreement between cognitive linguists and anthropologists is the issue of individualist/social character of cultural models. The cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Zoltán Kövecses support the notion that abstract concepts are conceived, with the help of conceptual metaphors based on universal image schemas, at an individual level and thus have a universal character, whereas cognitive anthropologists (Lutz, Wolf) tend to understand abstract concepts as culture - specific, thus supporting the relativist view in understanding cultural models.

Much has been written on the universality/ relativity in thought. The prevailing stance amongst cognitivist linguists and (partly) psychologists seems to be the view that the generic schema we conceptualize abstract concepts with seems to be common to most cultures. Each culture in turn fills the schema with details specific for each culture. Thus the CONTAINER image schema serves as the basis for conceptualizing anger in many cultures. The details related to the contents of the container (fluid/gas), sort of container (belly, the whole body),

dependence on heat (liquid is dependent on heat whereas gas is not) varies from culture to culture.

Finally, research related to the use of different Frames of Reference when conceptualizing time indicates that speakers of some languages in the world (Hopevale in Northern Australia, Guugu Yimithirr in Mexico) use absolute FoRs, while speakers of other languages (English, Dutch) use relative FoRs. Experiments indicate that the crucial factor in the shaping of non - verbal coding strategy appears to be the language (Levinson, 2004: 213).

During the Victorian period time and space were conceptualized in accordance with dominant philosophies of the time. These were shaped in particular by cognitions in the fields of geology and anthropology, which disputed the theory of mankind descending from the original couple and pointed out that the earth was much older than had previously been estimated while the arrival of man appeared to be more recent than had been estimated. The natural history of mankind, as pointed out by the anthropologist George W. Stocking, tended to be interpreted in terms of time rather than space (Stocking, 1987: 76). The contemporaries claimed that they lived in a period marked by speed, which was a result of accelerating developments in the fields of transport, industry and communication. Spatial and temporal borders were challenged, which resulted in diverse theories on time. While the advocates of the positivist and Millenarianist orientations in philosophy viewed time as cyclic and predicted the imminent end of civilization, John Stuart Mill and his followers believed a more prosperous era was yet to come.

Chapter Three initially provides an overview of the social and cultural history of Britain during the Victorian era, with a special emphasis on conceptualization of time and space. The Victorian period encompasses almost

seventy years, starting with the passing of the First Reform Act in 1832 and ending with the death of Queen Victoria in 1901. Most historians divide it into three subperiods: the first period (1832 -1848/1851), the second period (1851 - 1867) and the third period (1861 - 1901). Each subperiod was marked by specific features: the hectic early Victorian period was characterized by an accelerated development in industry, transportation and commerce and it gave way to a more tranquil period in the mid 1850s (The Age of Equipoise), to be continued by the late Victorian period, which witnessed a re - evaluation of the values which marked the previous subperiods. Such a unique period in history resulted in the formation of attitudes that were typical of the period, such as earnestness, optimism, which were usually affirmatively connoted, and hypocrisy, anti - intellectualism, dogmatism and rigidity, which were negatively connoted by contemporaries. Britain was at the time the most powerful nation in the world and a major colonial power on the globe. Trade flourished, mainly due to increased production and free trade, but there was a significant drop towards the end of the century, which was caused by overproduction and restrictions imposed by countries that imported British goods. The whole period underwent major social changes: migrations from the countryside to urban centres as well as from provinces, especially Scotland and Ireland, to England.

The living conditions in big cities were not favourable for the poorest and the deprived. There appears to be a connection between the conceptualisation of space and the hierarchical class system of Victorian Britain. Studies in social and human sciences indicate that there was a connection between residential distribution and the class system: nobility lived in the country, the upper middle class in their mansions in the suburbs, the lower middle class in terraced houses, while the working class was confined to cellars and in some cases, corners of a room. An indoors/outdoors dichotomy was also noticeable: the rich preferred to

stay within their four walls in order to keep their privacy, while the poor spent a lot of time outdoors.

In Victorian Britain time was conceptualized in diverse manners. Some philosophical orientations, such as determinism (and later Marxism) advocated the view that man does not have control over time. Others considered that eras alternate in cycles and believed that the Victorian era would mark the end of a cycle. They based their philosophy on an assumption that civilization had reached its peak at the end of the 19th century, which, they believed, did not leave room for further development. Other schools envisaged that the Victorian era would be followed by an even more prosperous period. There was, nevertheless, a general feeling that the Victorian period was unique in many aspects. The introduction of Germanisms *Zeitgeist* (Engl. *the spirit of an age*) and *Zeitanschaungen* (Engl. *the world picture*) reflected the idea that the Victorians lived in an unprecedented historical period. There was a general feeling that time and space were compressed. The sentiment was most likely based on the advancements in the fields of transport and communication such as trains, steamships, electric trams, the telegraph, the telephone, to name just a few. Thanks to a rapid development in these areas long distances appeared short (according to some scholars they seemed even longer because people became aware of distant places around the world), while at the same time it was hard for people to adapt to the speed brought by the advancements in transportation and communication.

The study focuses on the problem of time and space conceptualization in fairy tales of the Victorian period using a cognitive linguistic approach in literary analysis. The perspective of the social/historical momentum was taken, rather than the perspective of the writer and the reader (Freeman, 2002: 466).

The study relies on the cognitions of the multiple - world frame approach, which has significantly influenced the scientific thought in the past few decades. This approach is of an interdisciplinary character and encompasses cognitions from natural, social and human sciences. The main principle of this approach is that "our actual world is surrounded by an infinity of other possible worlds" (Doležel, 1998: 13). The concept of possible worlds originates from Leibnitz, who contemplated that possible worlds reside in a divine mind and are discovered either by imagination or an exceptional intellect (Doležel, 1998: 14). Contemporary scientific thought sees possible worlds, rather than constructs of a divine mind, as constructs of a human mind and hands (Doležel, 1998: 14).

The "possible worlds" approach to fictionality addresses the dichotomy between theories that are in favour of a "one – world " approach and those that support the notion of a "multi – world" approach. In his book *Heterocosmica* the narratologist Lubomir Doležel provides an overview of theories of both orientation. Thus the first set of theories support the notion that there is only one world of discourse, the actual world. According to Bertrand Russell's theory of description fictional entities originate from reality and imitate/represent entities existing in the "real" world. However, the problem arises when fictional terms do not have reference, but still have signification (saying *I met a unicorn* is significant although false since unicorns do not exist in the actual world). Gottlob Frege tried to solve this problem by differentiating between two aspects of meaning: reference (*Bedeutung*) and sense (*Sinn*). Fictional terms can, thus, be meaningful without necessarily having reference. Frege, however, differentiates between poetic language and the language of science: fictional sentences, although meaningful, lack reference and, consequently, truth – valuation, whereas scientific language achieves its goal, the pursuit of knowledge, as long as the reference is subjected to truth - valuation. Ferdinand de Saussure's view of the meaning of the linguistic sign is not confined to the

actual world but rather on the form of the linguistic expression, the *signifier*, which by convention obtains sense or the *signified* (Doležel 1998: 6).

Fictional semantics has, as pointed out by Doležel, heavily relied on the doctrine of mimesis. The main notion of this doctrine is the stand that fictional entities originate from the actual world; they imitate/represent actually existing entities. One of the major challenges this doctrine has faced is the issue of assigning an actual prototype to a fictional entity. However, while the matching of a prototype with a fictional entity does not present a problem in cases where a prototype existed in the actual world (Tolstoy's Napoleon - the historical Napoleon), difficulties arise when we do not know where to look for a prototype (it is not clear where to look for the prototypes of Raskolnikov, Hamlet or Julien Sorel). The answer to this problem was a redefinition of the mimetic function of fiction. Thus Erich Auerbach advocates the idea of universalist mimetic interpretation according to which fictional entities represent actual universals; the fictional Sancho Panza represents peasants from La Mancha (Doležel, 1998: 7). Some orientations in literary criticism (such as Ian Watt) advocate a view according to which fictional entities represent their equivalents in actual life, and actual sources are modelled upon their fictional counterparts.

As an answer to these theories, the possible - worlds model offers a different perspective of fictional worlds: fictional worlds have their own logic, which does not have to correspond to the logic of the actual world (Doležel, 1998: 19):

" Fictional worlds are not constrained by requirements of verisimilitude, truthfulness, or plausibility; they are shaped by historically changing aesthetic factors such as artistic aims, typological and generic norms, period and individual styles. The history of fictional worlds of literature is the history of an art. "

Fictional entities, therefore, do not depend on their actual prototypes in the possible - world model. They are, as pointed out by Doležel (1998: 15) part of a "higher - order, "emergent" structure, the fictional world." Fictional worlds are creative constructs of their authors and they were not available before their creative acts (Doležel, 1998: 23)

Both Doležel and Mikhail Bakhtin, a Russian narratologist of a formalist orientation, criticize exclusively mimetic readings of fictional texts. Doležel opines that mimetic reading is "one of the most reductive operations the human mind is capable of: the vast, open, and inviting fictional universe is shrunk to the model of a single world, actual human experience" (Doležel, 1998: x). Bakhtin also believes that there is a line between the "actual world as source of representation and the world represented in the work" (Bakhtin, 1981: 253). Moreover, Bakhtin is highly critical of "naïve biographism" (Bakhtin, 1981: 253), which presupposes both identification of author - creator of a work with the author as a human being as well as mixing up readers from different historical periods (Bakhtin, 1981: 253). However, both Bakhtin and Doležel emphasize the bidirectional character of the relationship between the actual world and fictional worlds. Doležel stresses the importance of the links between the actual and fictional worlds and the bidirectional exchange between the reality and the worlds of fiction: while a considerable amount of material in fictional worlds is drawn from actuality, the elements from fictional worlds strongly influence our understanding of actuality (Doležel, 1998: x). Bakhtin expresses similar ideas related to the mutual influence between the actual world and fictional worlds (Bakhtin, 1981: 254):

" The work and the world represented in it enter the real world and enrich it, and the real world enters the work and its world as part of the process of its creation, as well as part of

its subsequent life, in a continual renewing of the work through the creative perception of listeners and readers. ”

This bidirectional process is, according to Bakhtin, chronotopic in nature, since it ”occurs first and foremost in the historically developing social world, but without ever losing contact with changing historical space (Bakhtin, 1981: 254).”²

An important issue that arises from confronting ”one - world” theories and the ”possible - world” model is the problem of accession of fictional worlds. Due to the different ontological status of the realms of, on one side, the actual world and on the other side fictional worlds, the latter are, as pointed out by Doležel (1998: 20), accessed via semiotic mediation. These semiotic channels are bidirectional, multifaceted and prone to historical change (Doležel, 1998: 20). Therefore in order to cross the threshold between the actual world and fictional worlds the material coming from actuality has to undergo considerable changes. According to the Italian semiotician Umberto Eco, we, upon entering a fictional world, sign a sort of fictional contract with the author of the work: thus, when we start reading *Little Red Riding Hood*, we accept the fact that wolves speak in fairy tales, while at the same time we understand that in the actual world wolves are furry animals with pointed ears (Eco, 2005: 97).

Doležel takes Bradley and Swartz’s (1979) stand regarding the issue of (un)limited character of possible worlds and possible particulars (Doležel, 1998: 13):

” The universe of discourse is not restricted to the actual world but spreads over uncountable possible, nonactualized worlds. So it is logically and phenomenologically

² Bakhtin explains chronotopes as intrinsically connected temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature (Bakhtin, 1981: 84).

legitimate to speak of possible particulars – persons, attributes, events, states of affairs, and so on. ”

My aim in the following text is to focus upon Doležel and Eco’s orientation within the “possible worlds” model, the orientation that supports the notion that the number of possible worlds is unlimited, while the number of possible particulars is limited. Eco’s model of small worlds (2005: 104) envisages a fictional world as a small universe by itself, much more limited than the actual world. Eco explains the limited character of a small world with few characters³ that appear in it and the usually defined setting (Eco, 2005: 104). Fairy tales conform only partly to this principle since the time and space is usually undefined. However, Eco points out, small worlds can be regarded as bigger than the actual world, because they add new characters, properties and events to the actual world (Eco, 2005: 104).

I have studied fairy tales written by three different authors during diverse subperiods of the Victorian era. The fairy tales include *The King of the Golden River* by John Ruskin, written during the early Victorian subperiod, *The Princess and the Goblin* by George MacDonald, written during the middle Victorian subperiod and several fairy tales from the collections *The Happy Prince and Other Tales* and *The House of Pomegranates* by Oscar Wilde, which were written during the late Victorian subperiod. These fairy tales belong to the subgenre of “authored” fairy tales or *modern fanciful tales*, which are characterized by utilization of specific narrative techniques, detailed characterization and descriptions of places and time, stronger motivation of characters and an atypical ending. My aim was to explore the functioning of the conceptual metaphors that are utilized when talking about space and time. The

³ In regard to compossibility of characters, fairy tales are different from most other genres, since in fairy tales we meet characters from both actual and supernatural worlds, whereas in most other narrative forms there are constraints on the number of individuals that are compossible: Eco provides an example of Emma Bovary and a bewitched prince, who are not compossible and Emma Bovary and Rodolphe Boulanger, who are compossible (Eco, 2005: 21).

most productive spatial metaphors are based on the CONTAINER, PATH, UP and DOWN and CENTRE and ALTERITY image schemas. The focus of the study of metaphors that are utilized to conceptualize time was on the two concepts that are strongly related to the conceptualization of time, the concepts of life and death.

The study refers to several theories that propose viewing sequences of a text or the whole text in the terms of one big metaphor or image. These theories include Paul Werth's theory of *sustained* metaphors and *megametaphors*, Michael Kimmel's theory of *summary images* and Yuri Lotman's notion of *plot genes*. These are compatible with the cultural models of the Great Chain of Being and the Victorian self – model. The conceptualisation of time as cyclic by some of the prevalent philosophies of the period (in particular Positivism) as well as the folklore – based notion of *collective* time as proposed by Mikhail Bakhtin contribute to the conceptualisation of life and death in terms of seasons.

While in some cases whole texts can be understood in terms of a big metaphor, such as *The Birthday of the Infanta* in terms of the conceptual metaphor DEFORMITY IS CONTAINMENT and *The King of the Golden River* in terms of the conceptual metaphor TRAVEL IS A MENTAL JOURNEY, in other fairy tales a metaphorical understanding of some sequences of text can be proposed. Thus the image of the garden varies in different fairy tales written by the same author (there are variations even within the same story), which is the result of the functioning of the less salient structures that accumulate around the image. In that manner in Wilde's story *The Selfish Giant* the garden evokes positive connotations when observed in springtime due to events related to the awakening nature, while it evokes negative connotations during the winter due to the inactive state of the nature. In *The Nightingale and the Rose* the negative connotations prevail, which is the result of understanding love in terms of a void container (via the primary metaphor EMOTIONS ARE CONTAINERS). Sequences

that can be related to the social structure of the Victorian society are especially powerful, in particular its class - divided social system. Thus the arrangement of flowers in the King's garden and the animals that abide in it can be projected onto the Victorian class system, giving rise to the conceptual metaphors (IM)MOBILITY IS A SIGN OF CLASS and MOVEMENT IS VITALITY.

The study of conceptualization of space and time in fairy tales gives room to involvement of other areas of study in further research, as suggested in the conclusion. Apart from the social and cultural areas, future studies can incorporate findings from the field of political ideologies. In that way a new dimension can be added related to the (possible) political orientations of some authors and their influence on metaphorical readings of certain sequences of the works or even the whole works.

2. CHAPTER TWO: COGNITIVE SCIENCE: A NEW OUTLOOK ON HUMAN COGNITION

The beginnings of cognitive science reach back to the 1970s, when a number of scholars - first in the USA and, subsequently, in Europe - elaborated their views on human cognition. New findings from sciences as diverse as psychology, linguistics, philosophy, computer science, literary theory, neuroscience and many more cast new light on understanding cognitive mechanisms in the context of experiencing the world around us. The research in the aforementioned sciences is of an interdisciplinary character and it addresses the thousands - of - years old dichotomy between the mind and the body, cognition and perception, rationality and sensation (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 246). These new perspectives of human cognition emphasized the role of experience and perception on one hand, and culture and society on the other in the process of cognition as well as the manner these experiences are processed in the brain. This was a significant scientific breakthrough for several reasons.

2.1. Main Principles of Cognitivism in Comparison to Objectivism

Firstly, cognitivist ideas provided a new perspective on the nature of our thinking by stressing the role of the body in cognition, an element that had hitherto been largely neglected. Traditional schools have minimized the role of the body in cognition. Thus the two most influential orientations in philosophy, which have strongly influenced other sciences and have had a crucial role in shaping Western philosophy, Cartesianism and Kantianism (named after their founders Rene Descartes and Immanuel Kant), advocate "objective" theories of knowledge in which we encounter an absolute dichotomy between the mind and the body. This is a perspective that remained pervasive within the theories of the

majority of philosophers, linguists, psychologists and scientists from other fields of study for two thousand years⁴. In his article *Rehabilitiranje tjelesnog* the Croatian philosopher Zdravko Radman states that such views were a result of scientific progress and cultural development, as well as of the philosophical developments in the area of cognition (Radman, 1995: 355). He points out that the triumph of the ratio, which glorified man as a "rational animal", implied the suppression and even negation of the bodily (Radman, 1995: 355). The traditional outlook on the dichotomy between the body and the mind is also referred to as objectivism, because that "meaning is regarded as objective, because it exists only in the relation between abstract symbols and things" (Johnson, 1987: x). Traditional scholars have stated that mental faculties are abstract and transcendental because they are not bound to any individual organisms but are, instead, independent from the human body, perceptual or nervous system (Lakoff, 1987: xi). According to these orientations, only the mind, without the body participates in cognition.

Cognitivists, on the other hand, stress that the mind is bodily determined or *embodied* (Johnson, 1987: xiv). Cognitive science presupposes an experiential approach, i.e. it strongly emphasizes the role of experience in the process of cognition. However, there seems to be common ground between objectivism and experientialism, which the prominent cognitive philosopher George Lakoff points out in his book *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* (Lakoff, 1987: xv). In this respect, he enumerates the shared ideas between experientialism or, as he calls it, experiential realism on one side and objectivism on the other (Lakoff, 1987: xv):

⁴ Objectivist schools share the view that objects in the real world have properties independent of the actions and beliefs of people, and that there is a rational structure to reality, which is beyond human understanding. While Descartes pointed out that we are simply "extensions" of God's reason in transcending our "physical" embodiment by plugging into a transcendent rationality (Johnson, 1987: xxxvi), Kant distinguishes two components of cognitive faculties: the *formal*, conceptual and intellectual and the *material*, perceptual and sensory (Johnson, 1987: xxvii).

1. both views are committed to the existence of the real world,
2. both approaches are aware of the constraints that reality imposes upon concepts,
3. they share the view that a conception of truth surpasses internal coherence,
4. these two views are both committed to the idea that there is stable and consistent knowledge of the world.

The cognitive scientist Raymond W. Gibbs stresses the importance of the French philosopher Maurice Merleau - Ponty's words when addressing the body - world dualism: as early as 1962, Merleau - Ponty emphasized that the body exists prior to thought or a world we reflect upon, i.e. the world exists for us solely in and through the body. Furthermore, Merleau - Ponty claims that our knowledge of self cannot be fully comprehended unless we consider its interaction with our embodied existence. He illustrates his view on the example of our conception of time: we do not obtain an embodied concept of time if we perceive it as a river flowing through our lives and having no relation to our existence, but rather as a function which enables us to bodily interact with the world around us (Gibbs, 2005: 17).

Radman, who is another proponent of a cognitive approach to human cognition, states that the body actively participates in cognitive operations and emphasises its synergic character during these processes. He points out that all of the senses contribute in perception, which eventually results in synesthesia or the exchange of sensory information (Radman, 1995: 356). The body is, therefore, an active tool of the mind, and the two cooperate in cognitive processes.

Secondly, cognitivists point out that imagination is one of the main cognitive capabilities and thus of special importance when mapping one concept onto another. They stress that, in this process, we resort to various means such as metaphors, metonymies and mental imagery. These views were radically different from objectivist theories, whose proponents claimed rational thought involved manipulation with abstract symbols. These are, in turn, represented via conventional relations with entities in the real world (Lakoff, 1987: xi-xiii). However, Kant assigns imagination quite an important role in cognition. He considers it a transfer faculty somewhere in between the "lower - end" material faculties and the "higher - level" formal faculties. He believed that imagination helps process our experiences (or, as he calls them, "sense impressions") into an image that eventually results in a concept (Johnson 1987: xxviii). In a Kantian fashion, Johnson tries to explain the role imagination plays in forming concepts by giving the concept formation of a dog as an example: the process starts with various sense impressions while perceiving a dog (four legs, the feel of a fur, long teeth, a trunk, etc.), continues in a single perceptual experience, in other words a "unified image of a furry creature" and eventually results in its establishment in the form of the concept of a dog (Johnson, 1987: xxviii). Unlike objectivist schools, which regard imagination as belonging to neither rationality nor sensation, cognitive science sees it primarily as a component that plays the main role in both areas, connecting them in the unique process of conceptualization.

While objectivists state our mind operates through involving objectively true statements or propositions in our conceptual operations, cognitivist schools elaborate on the different material we utilize in our cognition in the form of counterfactuals, conditionals, etc. Cognitivists perceive the veracity of a particular statement depending on the given situation or the context of the sentence (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 179). Furthermore, from the cognitivist

perspective metaphors present crucial aid in the process of conceptualization, while objectivists claim that they cannot state truths directly, whereas in the cases when they do state the truth this is done indirectly, through non - metaphorical "literal" paraphrase (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 159).

Scholars of a cognitive orientation outline the importance of imagination in figurative and nonpropositional structures. The latter are the structures which are not necessarily based on truth conditions (the conditions objectivists insist upon), but rather on hypothetical or counterfactual conditions. In order to be able to understand figurative or nonpropositional structures we are in need of image schemata (or image schemas), recurring and mutually related patterns our experience is made up of. Objectivists do not acknowledge image schemata for several reasons, the most important of them being the fact that image schemata are subjective and bodily. On the same line objectivists claim that scientists of cognitive orientation perceive cognition as a highly subjective and individual process lacking a universal character. Cognitivists, on the other hand, refute those accusations on the grounds that image schemas make a foundation for cognitive processes based on them and their subsequent utilization in metaphor formation, emphasizing that these processes are both culturally and physically determined and therefore universal. A more detailed study of image schemas and their role in conceptualization will be provided in the subchapter on image schemas.

Thirdly, cognitivists, unlike objectivists, state that our mental activities are mostly unconscious and arbitrary. Thus, Lakoff and Johnson state that as much as 95% of our thought is unconscious, allowing the possibility that the percentage of unconscious thought is even higher (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 10 - 14). The authors claim that most of our mental operations or structures are unconscious, that we are, in other words, not aware of them, and as an example

give visual and auditory processing, which, as they say, defy our awareness of the neural processes going on in our cognitive apparatus. Lakoff and Johnson consider that our conceptual system is constituted of not only our automatic cognitive operations, but also all the implicit knowledge that makes up our conceptual system, and which mostly resides in, as they call it, the *cognitive unconscious* or the "totality of those theoretical cognitive mechanisms above the neural level that we have sufficient evidence for, but that we do not have conscious access to" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 13). As emphasized by Raymond W. Gibbs Jr. in his book *Embodiment and Cognitive Science*, the cognitive unconscious contains mental operations that provide form to and enable conscious experience to take place⁵, as well as "makes use of and guides the perceptual and motor aspects of our bodies"(Gibbs, 2007: 40).

It should be noted that objectivist and cognitivist perspectives differ in their understanding of the word *cognitive*. While objectivists relate cognitive meaning to truth - conditional meaning, referring it to entities in the outer world, cognitivists connect it with "any mental operations and structures that are involved in language, meaning, perception, conceptual systems and reason" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 12).

Finally, scholars of a cognitive orientation support the notion that our cognitive system is metaphorically structured. Thus Lakoff and Johnson perceive the essence of metaphors in "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another "(Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 5). The way we understand the world, act and function is closely connected with metaphors. Unlike objectivists, who persist that metaphors are used solely in poetry, Lakoff and Johnson consider that we are surrounded by metaphors and emphasize their

⁵ Gibbs points out that these thought processes and knowledge are unconscious, but deeply embodied due to the fact that our cognitive mechanisms and structures are related to patterns of our bodily activities and experiences (Gibbs, 2007: 40).

ubiquitous character. Metaphor is not seen as an exclusively linguistic phenomenon: metaphors can express thoughts nonverbally, e.g. on pictures and gestures (Grady, 2007: 189). Thus Victor Kennedy states that I.A.Richards's scheme, according to which the consistent parts of a metaphor are *the vehicle* (the metaphorical term), *the tenor* (metaphorical signification or subject) and *the ground* (the connection) is also applicable on visual metaphors. Kennedy provides examples of visual metaphors and metonymies by referring to the work of the American graphic artist Edward Gorey. The author points out that Gorey achieves irony by using a universally recognised vehicle and changing its original ground thereby creating an alternate ground, e.g. in Gorey's work *The Object - Lesson*, the bat is not any more a symbol of night/darkness but rather a herald of death, due to the fact that the ground brings together darkness and death (Kennedy, 1993: 181 - 193).

It can be concluded that we do not obtain knowledge solely through language. Scholars from the field of cognitive science point out that language is only one of many cognitive faculties we own. Moreover, language seems to be dependent on the information that it utilizes from other systems of cognition. Thus Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens point out that natural language acquisition also depends on information obtained from other cognitive systems (Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 6). This interrelatedness and co - operation between cognitive systems greatly contributes to the complexity of human cognition.

2.2. Subjectivism

The cognitive scientists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that, in Western culture, the sole alternative to objectivism has been subjectivism (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 223). The principles that subjectivist theories are

based upon originate in Romanticism, a period in which imagination was unconstrained and ran freely. The Romantic movement sprang up as an answer to the fast development of technology and industry and from the dehumanization that accompanied them (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 191). As stated by the authors, "those who identify with the Romantic tradition may see any victory over objectivism as a triumph of imagination over science - a triumph of the view that each individual makes his own reality, free of any constraints " (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 185).

The main principles of subjectivism include (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 188 – 189):

- 1) Our feelings, moral practices and aesthetic sensibilities together with spiritual awareness are of utmost importance in our lives and these are completely subjective.
- 2) In most of our daily activities we rely on our senses and intuitions, which are our best guides.
- 3) With the help of poetry and art we reach the only relevant realm, i.e. the realm of our feelings and intuitions. Awareness is obtained via intuition, not reason.
- 4) Metaphors aid in understanding of our unique and personal experiences. Meanings of words that have been agreed upon are not related to understanding.
- 5) Objectivism is wrong and dangerous because it favours the abstract, universal and impersonal at the expense of the concrete, personal and unique.

2. 3. The Third Option: an Experientialist Approach

Lakoff and Johnson claim that we have been led to believe that there are only two options to cognition: objectivism and subjectivism (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 192). They emphasize the role of the metaphor, which brings reason and imagination together. The authors point out that rationality is naturally imaginative due to the fact that human thought is largely metaphorical. Therefore, they point out, metaphors help us to at least partially grasp the categories that defy complete understanding, such as feelings, aesthetic experiences, spiritual awareness and moral practices (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 193). The third choice, an *experientialist synthesis*, as pointed out by Lakoff and Johnson, supports neither the notion that there are absolute truths about the world, as objectivism claims, nor the idea that we should rely only on our exclusively subjective intuition. Truths rely on our conceptual system, which is based on our own experiences as well as those of other people belonging to our culture and interacting with us and our physical environment (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 193).

The experientialist approach advocated by Lakoff and Johnson and their fellow scientists supports the notion of us understanding the world via our interactions with it. Thanks to our conceptual system, which is strongly based in our cultural and physical environment, and which is metaphorical by nature, we are able to comprehend one thing in terms of another. Therefore, as stated by Lakoff and Johnson, we cannot talk of either pure rationality or an absolute subjectivity but "an imaginative form of rationality" (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 194).

I would like to emphasize that the focus of my interest in this chapter will be the basic aspects of cognitive linguistics, due to the fact that language is the

basis of studying literature. My intention in this and even more so in the following chapters is also to explain the conceptualization mechanisms through the findings of cognitive linguistics and related sciences including philosophy, cultural studies, neuroscience, psychology and others. By outlining the link between language and thought, I hope to clarify the principal cognitive processes that take place in our mind. Special attention will be paid to diverse theories which perceive metaphor as a figure of thought. My intention is also to explain the main principles of two metaphor theories that have greatly contributed in casting light upon the origin and character of cognitive processes, as well as upon the importance of metonymies and metaphors in our lives: The Conceptual Metaphor Theory and the Theory of Conceptual Integration.

2.4. The Role of Cognitive Semantics

As emphasized by Milena Žic Fuchs, cognitive semantics has taken a prominent position within the field of cognitive linguistics, with its focus of interest in semantic structures which are not autonomous but are a reflection of a conceptual structure (1990: 103). The works written in the area of cognitive semantics have been diverse, and Žic Fuchs points at the difficulties in trying to classify them under a common denominator (Žic Fuchs, 1990: 103). The author states there is some common ground between those studies. According to cognitivists, if we are to understand the world in its wholeness, it is vital to include in our reflections the social and cultural aspects, as well as the elements of perception and experience. This is precisely the area where objectivist theories differ most from cognitivist theories. While traditional schools neglect the social and cultural aspects of language and concentrate mainly on syntax and, consequently, grammar, scholars of a cognitive orientation emphasize the role of the society and culture in linguistic and conceptual creation, which has recently been in the focus of cognitive semantics.

The cognitive scientists Dirk Geeraerts and Hubert Cuyckens particularly criticize the generativist school for focusing almost exclusively on grammar and syntax and neglecting semantics in the process (Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 12 – 15). According to these authors, one of the main reasons for generativists' principal interest in syntax lies in the fact that Noam Chomsky and his followers believe that language is primarily acquired innately. Their perspective, which supports the genetic origin of language, does not presuppose social or cultural influence on language. While the social interaction and formation of concepts and ideas about the world are connected with the meaning of linguistic expressions, generativists' interests lie in establishing universal aspect of language and creating formal linguistic rules, thereby neglecting meaning (Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 12).

2.5. Profiles, Bases and Construals

According to the "model of the conceptual world" (Dirven and Verspoor, 2004: 14) the process of conceptualization starts with a human conceptualizer who experiences the world through concepts or "a person's idea of what something in the world is like" (Dirven and Verspoor, 2004: 13). Concepts represent our understanding of the perceived realia or experienced entity in the world the process of perception takes place in. This concept is formed on the basis of the entity the conceptualiser perceives in the experienced world. On the basis of this experience he gives this concept a form or name, which is, in language, represented by words (in cognitive linguistics it is customary to use lower - case italics to represent the word form, and capitals for concept that underlines the word meaning). Words act like signs for concepts they stand for. The relations between an entity, a word and a concept are illustrated in the semiotic triangle (Dirven and Verspoor, 2004: 28):




Figure 2.1.

Since we all experience the world in our own specific ways, experiencing the same thing in the world is subject to different interpretations. The choice of each individual to choose amongst various options is called *construal*. Thus, as Verspoor and Dirven point out (Verspoor and Dirven, 2004: 15) a *horseshoe*, literally a "shoe for a horse" in English is *fer â cheval* in French, meaning "iron for horse" and *Hufeisen*, "hoof iron" in German. From the examples given, one can notice that different nations experience in different ways what is, in the experienced world, the same entity. While the English and the French have a holistic picture of the entity perceived, i. e. see the entire animal related to the contraption it wears on its hoofs, Germans relate the device only to the hoofs, or the part of the animal's body on which the contraption is placed. Furthermore, the French and the German focus on the material the device is made of (iron), while English uses the word *shoe*, and thus anthropomorphizes the device. The authors give several additional examples of construals (E *grand piano* - F *piano à queue* - G *Flügel*; E *pavement* - F *trottoir* - G *Bürgersteig*). The conclusion can be drawn that construals are culturally determined. This hypothesis will be elaborated on in Chapters Two and Three.

Cognitive linguistics makes a distinction concerning smaller entities such as *lemons, apples, oranges*, etc., referring to them as *concepts*, whereas these individual units organized in sets as a whole are called *conceptual categories*, thus in the stated example the conceptual category is "fruit." (Verspoor and Dirven, 2004: 17). The need for organising concepts has led scholars in the area of linguistics, as well as those from other disciplines such as psychology or artificial intelligence, to diverse proposals. The most influential proposal in the field of cognitive semantics has been the model of *frame semantics* elaborated by Charles Fillmore. In his model, Fillmore outlined what he believed to be the priorities of cognitive semantics; in other words, he "describes his frame semantic model as a model of the semantics of *understanding*, in contrast to truth – conditional semantics: the full, rich understanding that a speaker intends to convey in a text and that a hearer constructs for that text" (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 8). Following is Fillmore's definition of a frame (Fillmore in Geeraerts, Dirven and Taylor, 2006: 373):

"By the term "frame" I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available."

Croft and Cruse point out that Fillmore's view according to which understanding what a speaker is trying to convey to the listener is of utmost importance, whereas truth - value judgements, as well as the judgements referring to semantic relations between words (synonymy, homonymy and others) are theory - driven and peripheral (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 15). The authors explain Fillmore's understanding of words/ structures within a frame: upon hearing words or structures formulated in an utterance, a hearer invokes a *frame* in order to understand it. Thus Croft and Cruse take as an example Fillmore's explanation of the functioning of the word *Kathete* within the frame

of the RIGHT ANGLE. Thus in German *Kathete* denotes two sides of a right angle triangle other than *Hypothenuse*. Both German and English have a word for the latter (German *Hypothenuse*, English *hypotenuse*) but only German has the word *Kathete*. English speakers can nevertheless understand the concept KATHETE due to the fact that this word concept is related directly to the frame, in this case the RIGHT ANGLE. Croft and Cruse draw our attention to the fact that, unlike lexical (semantic) field theory, which groups words together based on experience and defines words in relation to other words in the same lexical fields, frame semantics defines words directly with respect to the frame (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 10). Thus, in lexical field theory, we would consider *large* in the area of sizes of packages of soapflakes as opposed to *jumbo*, *economy giant* and *family size*, that is to say to the words coming from the same lexical field. Unlike the lexical field theory frame, cognitive semantics perceives the word *large* as the smallest size within the SOAPFLAKES *frame*. However, a problem arises with the lexical field theory in cases where there are no neighbouring words, as was illustrated in the example of *Kathete*. In frame semantics, this does not present a problem since the word concept KATHETE is directly linked to the frame (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 10).

Fillmore organises concepts in *frames*, while other cognitive scientists have utilised different terminology: George Lakoff uses the term *domain* (Lakoff, 1987) while Ronald Langacker uses two terms paralelly: *domain* and *base* (Langacker, 1987: 2008). The concepts themselves are referred to as *profiles* by Fillmore, and can only be understood in the context of frames.

Fillmore gives an example of the relationship between the concepts RADIUS and CIRCLE, where the former cannot be understood without background comprehension of the latter (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 15). A conceptual structure that functions as a frame for other concepts can also

function as a profile of another frame. In that way the concept CIRCLE profiles against the SPACE frame.

Certain domains or frames can be directly experienced through human embodiment, and Langacker names them *basic* domains (such as TIME or SPACE), while others which are not rooted in directly embodied human experience are called *abstract* domains (Langacker, 1987:148)⁶. Langacker stresses the interrelatedness of basic domains, such as time and space, and disputes claims that time is mainly experienced in spatial terms: the author points out that time is a more fundamental domain than space due to the fact that, in order to conceptualize space, we resort to some operations that need time processing, i.e. scanning, while at the same time the manner we conceptualize space is closely connected with time - extended actions like movement and manipulation of objects (Langacker, 1987: 149).

Croft and Cruse elaborate on the issue of a concept belonging to more than one domain and give an example of a HUMAN BEING, who can be defined in relation to various domains such as physical objects, living things and volitional agents, not excluding some other domains such as emotions (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 25). The authors emphasize that, in certain cases, there is an entire array of domains that are presupposed by the same concept, and this combination of various domains profiling⁷ the same concept represent a *domain matrix*. We can, therefore, speak of a domain if there is a substantial number of concepts that are profiled against that semantic structure. However, if that is not

⁶ In order to be able to understand the complexity of the terminology utilised within cognitive linguistics, we shall provide Langacker's complete footnote with the terminology which the author states as equivalent for *abstract domain* (Langacker, 1987: 150):

" An abstract domain is essentially equivalent to what Lakoff (1982,1987) terms an ICM (for *idealised cognitive model*) and what others have variously called a frame, scene, schema, or even script (at least in some uses). I have referred to it as a functional assembly in previous works, but being both opaque and dispensable, that term should be allowed to die."

⁷ It should be noted that the term *profile* can also be used as a verb when describing the relation between word form and word meaning ,e.g." *radius* profiles a particular line segment in the CIRCLE base/domain/frame".

the case, we rather refer to these semantic structures as dimensions of a single domain (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 25 – 26).

2.5.1. Basic Construal Operations

The need for systematizing conceptualization processes, or *construal operations*, led to various classifications by cognitive linguists and, in particular, cognitive semanticists that share a cognitive approach to semantics. Two classifications stand out for their comprehensive character, and these are the classifications by Leonard Talmy and Ronald W. Langacker. In his latest classification, Talmy elaborates on *schematic systems* and distinguishes four basic construal operations (Talmy, 2000a):

1. Configurational structure
2. Deployment of Perspective
3. Distribution of Attention
4. Domain

The last category consists only of the domains of space and time, and will be elaborated on in the second chapter. Langacker, on the other hand, differentiates between the following *focal adjustments*, i.e. the equivalent term for Talmy's schematic systems (Langacker, 1987: 3.3):

1. Selection
2. Perspective
 - A. Figure/Ground
 - B. Viewpoint
 - C. Deixis
 - D. Subjectivity/Objectivity

The above classifications share certain construal operations, such as *perspective*, while Talmy's *distribution of attention* includes Langacker's construal operations of *selection* and *abstraction*. On the other hand, as pointed out by Croft and Cruse, Langacker's classification does not include the construal suboperations of *scanning*, *comparison* and the *entity/interconnection distinction* out of the stated classification (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 44). Perspective, as well as its suboperations, are of utmost importance in conceptualization of time and space, and our intention is to explicate them in detail in the following chapter.

Croft and Cruse's classification encompasses "four basic cognitive abilities in different aspects of experience" (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 45):

1. Attention/Saliency
2. Judgement/Comparison
3. Perspective/Situatedness
4. Constitution/ Gestalt

Croft and Cruse's classification differs both from Talmy's and from Langacker's, since it comprises a construal operation not recognised by the other two authors, i.e. Judgement/ Comparison (Langacker and Talmy classify the construal suboperations into the category Perspective). In the following text, I shall focus on one of the subcategories of the focal adjustment or construal operation of *Judgement/ Comparison*, more precisely - on metaphor.

2.6. Metaphors in Discourse

Metaphors are crucial for human cognition. Metaphor has traditionally been considered a figure of speech with the help of which we refer to one thing in terms of another. They are pervasive and are characteristic of different kinds

of discourse: they are frequently used in the language of literature but also in science. In his article *Metaforičko značenje u znanosti*, Radman focuses on the use of metaphors in scientific language. In this work, the author provides examples from the area of chemistry, where radioactive isotopes are grouped in "families" and the result of this grouping are "daughter", "parent" and similar groups of isotopes (Radman, 1991: 404). Similarly, we speak of daughter and parent companies in the field of economics. However, although we cannot dispute the fact that metaphors are ubiquitous, there has been strong resistance to the use of metaphors in the language of science.

These views have been based on a presumption that metaphorical language is deceptive or "erratic", and that precisely for these reasons it should be avoided in science. Thus Locke considers metaphorical language to be misleading, deeming it ought to be reserved only to the spheres of public and popular oracy, but definitely not to that of instruction and debates (Radman, 1991: 398). Nerlich and Clarke, on the other hand, point out that, despite Locke's view of metaphors as "perfect cheats", this prominent philosopher acknowledged the metaphorical character of language and the mind (Nerlich and Clarke in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 562).

Radman states that there has been strong resistance to the use of metaphors in science (he names Ernst Mach, Oliver Lodge and Pierre Duhem as opponents of metaphorical language in science), but emphasises that there are scientists who take a different stand on the use of metaphorical language in science, such as Michael Faraday or James Maxwell (Radman, 1991: 398). Thus in Duhem's opinion, points out Radman, the terminology in the field of physics has always been, and always will be, imprecise and indefinite (Radman, 1991: 401).

Furthermore, asserts Radman, metaphor adds a new dimension to cognition and conveys a strong message. Thus, when Descartes said that "blind people see with their hands", he drew our attention to the fact that visual perception is not only a matter of seeing, but of other senses, as well (Radman, 1991: 401). This example refutes Locke's negation of the instructive value of metaphors, since it is obvious that this "metaphorical lie" can be more enlightening than the literal truth.

Another argument in favour of the use of metaphorical language in every discourse pertains to the fact that people usually understand a metaphorical meaning as quickly and as easily as a literal meaning. Research has shown, as pointed out by Joseph Grady and Raymond W. Gibbs Jr., that the speed with which we comprehend the meaning of a metaphorical utterance is, in some cases, even higher than with a literal utterance (Grady in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 197). Thus the stages we intuitively consider as necessary to process metaphorical meaning: coming across a metaphorical meaning, trying to interpret it first as a literal meaning and then resorting to different interpretations after recognizing that the statement does not make sense if interpreted literally (Grady in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 197), may not be the explanation of our mental operations when encountering a metaphorical statement.

Cognitive science has taken a stand that metaphors do not deter cognition: on the contrary, many novel⁸ metaphors provide a new perspective to cognition and add a new meaning to understanding of metaphors. I shall present a historical overview of metaphor theories, with an emphasis on orientations in the

⁸ According to the level of entrenchment in language, metaphors can be classified into three categories: *dead metaphors*, which have ceased to function as metaphors and are not any more considered as metaphors, *conventional metaphors* or metaphors entrenched in language but the manner of whose creation can still be detected and *novel*, original metaphors which are being introduced into language.

field of linguistics that have influenced the views of metaphor by cognitive linguists.

2.6.1. A Historical Overview of Metaphor Theories

Historically, metaphor was comprehended by many commentators merely as a figure of speech, and not as a figure of thought. Metaphor has long been conceived as a figure of speech with the help of which we refer to one thing in terms of another. It has been attributed a merely decorative role in language, while its use was considered erratic - in other words, it was believed that metaphors did not project a real picture of the world. These views related to the beliefs that the process of cognition is only performed via the brain, without including the body. Traditionalists still believe that the use of metaphor is restricted solely to poetry, and refute the idea that it is used in everyday speech.

Recent developments in cognitive science have emphasized the role of embodiment in cognitive processes. From the cognitivist perspective, we utilize both the body and the mind in our cognition, and this is also reflected in metaphors since metaphors put together two or more different domains, thus forming structures that contain elements from all the domains partaking in the process of cognition. Furthermore, cognitivists point to the universal nature of metaphors: metaphors are ubiquitous and present both in literature and in other areas of life, such as science. A discourse in which metaphors do not appear can hardly be imagined.

Aristotle emphasized what he believed to be the three basic characteristics of metaphor. Firstly, in his opinion, metaphorical processes take place at the level of a word, and not a sentence. This stand led to a view according to which metaphors ought to be studied solely at a word level. Secondly, metaphorical

transfers are deviant in regard to the literary use of language, as they involve the transmission of a name onto an entity which, in fact, it does not belong to. Finally, metaphors are based on similarities between two elements, and these similarities make metaphorical transfers between two elements possible (Čulić, 2003: 12).

Although views of metaphor as primarily a figure of speech were prevalent well into the 20th century, there were initiatives to regard metaphors in a different light prior to this period.

Thus Brigitte Nerlich and David C. Clarke stress that, as long ago as the 18th century, the French philosopher César Chesneau Du Marsais pointed at the ubiquitous character of metaphors and their presence in ordinary, as well as poetic, language (Nerlich and Clarke in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 562). Moreover, Giambattista Vico's cultural philosophy of metaphor, elaborated in his work *Principles of a New Science* (1725), stressed the importance of imagination in cognition, thus supporting Kant's views and, what is more, assigning imagination a *central* role in the process of conception (Nerlich and Clarke in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 565).

A century later, William Dwight Whitney pointed to metaphors as aids in finding analogies and resemblances between words. At approximately the same time, a number of German philosophers emphasized the cognitive nature of language. Gustav Gerber, strongly disagreeing with Kant's representational view of language, pointed out that concepts are inasmuch *thought acts* as they are *speech acts*. He drew parallels between language and art, advocating a view according to which all words are pictorial (*bildlich*), in other words figurative, owing to the fact that lexicon and grammar are used as paint – brushes and a situational context as a frame (background). He also stressed the importance of

the co - text of a discourse and a context of a situation in understanding the lexicon (Nerlich and Clarke in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 566). In order to designate entities in the world, a blend of linguistic, as well as conceptual and situational knowledge is necessary. Gerber's term *area of meaning*, according to which meanings are fuzzy and strongly influenced by conception and situation, paved a path for Friedrich Theo Vischer's theory of *spheres* (equivalent of domains), elaborated further by Alfred Biese in his book *Die Philosophie des Metaphorischen*, in which he once more emphasized that metaphor is primarily a figure of thought and which, together with Gerber and Vischer's philosophy of metaphor, prepared ground for research in the fields of the linguistics of metaphor and psychology of metaphor by Bühler, Wegener and Stählin.

Wegener explained how metaphors obtain congruence through the processes of filtering and inference (inferences become absorbed in an incongruent word/sentence and are no more needed as support), which eventually leads to dead metaphors, like in the example *Der Krieg bricht aus* (Eng. *war breaks out*). Bühler and Wegener pointed at the relevance of the collaboration between speaker and hearer, stressing the importance of the *principles of charity* and *contextual clarification* for mutual understanding (Nerlich and Clarke in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 572). Furthermore, Christian von Ehrenfels elaborated the nature of perception and outlined the synthesis of the elements of a perceptive field by thought, thus forming a *schema* or *Gestalt*⁹. These were the beginnings of Gestalt psychology, which played an important role in explaining the mechanisms of cognition and, in particular, the relevance of image schemas for the process of cognition as seen by a number of scholars in the field of cognitive science.

⁹ Gestalts, as stressed by psychologists Ernst Mach, Theodor Eismann and Christian von Ehrenfels, heavily depend on relationships, on ground (background) and finding a constant in variation (Nerlich and Clarke in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 576). The role of Gestalts will be elaborated further in the text.

Wilhelm Stählin's work on metaphor and metonymy at the beginning of the 20th century shows a similarity with the findings of the cognitive scientists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Stählin emphasises that metaphor is founded on the integration of two separate domains, while metonymy focuses on studying relations within one domain. Bühler stresses that a blending of both linguistic, as well as non - linguistic knowledge takes place during the creation of a metaphor. Thus he asserts that, during the process of the integration of two domains of knowledge, we face the phenomenon of *under - summativity*, i.e. that only some features are selected and projected accross the domains. This makes Bühler's theory compatible with the findings within the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, advocated by Lakoff and Johnson, and also with Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner's Theory of Conceptual Integration. Furthermore, Stählin stresses a specific characteristic of the structure acquired through the process of blending (he names it *Verschmelzung*, Engl. *blend*, *fusion*), the process which he compares to problem – solving and which leads to a novel understanding of the target domain (Nerlich and Clarke in Dirven and Pörings, 2005: 582).

Inspired by Bühler's work, I.A. Richards presented his understanding of metaphor in his work *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1937). The author claims that metaphor is a figure of speech inasmuch as of thought, while pointing out the pervasive nature of metaphor and concluding that metaphors cannot be solely a part of "ordinary" speech. Richards is a representative of the interaction view on metaphor. The main principles of this view are as follows (Black in Ortony, 1998: 28):

1. the initial stage of the primary and the secondary subject's interaction
"is when the hearer selects some of the secondary subject's properties",
2. the hearer designs a parallel implication - complex that suits the primary subject,

3. parallel changes are reciprocally induced in the secondary subject.

One of Richards's main contributions to the study of metaphor was the introduction of terms for two elements taking part in the process of metaphorical transfer: *tenor* (primary subject) and *vehicle* (secondary subject). The terms subsequently proposed for the elements taking part in metaphor creation include *recipient field* and *donor field*, suggested by Eva Kittay and Adrienne Lehrer, and *topic* and *tenor* introduced by Andrew Goatley (with *grounds* referring to the similarities or analogies included in a metaphorical transfer). The former terms are especially important for cognitive linguistics, as they introduce the term *field*, which resembles the term *space* introduced by the principal advocates of the Cognitive Metaphor theory, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Lakoff and Johnson's terminology *source space* and *target space* denotes that the elements from a source space are mapped onto a target space.

In his 1981 study entitled *Metaphor*, another advocate of the *interaction* approach, Max Black, argued that metaphors are a means of cognition, and not only a means of expressing emotions. Metaphors transfer knowledge of a specific kind and different in nature from the knowledge passed on from truth – conditional sentences.¹⁰

Black is critical of the two approaches to metaphor that marked the 1980s, the *substitution* view and, as Black calls it, "a special case of the former", the *comparison* view (Black in Ortony, 1998: 27). While the substitution approach advocates the view that the function of metaphors is decorative, and that in the process of creating metaphors we substitute a literal term with a metaphorical term, the comparison approach insists on finding analogies or similarities between the two elements taking part in metaphor creation in the form of an

¹⁰ Kant, on the other hand, believed metaphors are only "reserved" for emotions, and not cognition.

ellyptic figure or simile. The Croatian cognitive linguist Zjena Čulić opines that Black views both the comparison approach and the substitution approach as inconclusive, as neither explains how we are able to select relevant similarities (Čulić, 2003: 15). By saying *Richard is a gorilla* we express our opinion that gorillas are wild and aggressive, although such behaviour has not been proven to be typical of gorillas. We can, therefore, conclude, points out Čulić, that metaphors need not be based on real characteristics of entities, but instead on the relations which are based on our beliefs about the entities in question, an element which is, as cognitivists point out, highly determined by culture (Čulić, 2003: 16).

Cognitive science is indebted to Max Black for another reason. In his interaction theory, which was founded as a reaction to both the substitution and comparison approaches, Black states that the elements taking part in metaphorical transfers share *a system of associated commonplaces*, in other words those elements (which he calls *principal* and *subsidiary* subject) should be addressed as systems, not as separate elements. In that way, metaphors select, accentuate or cover the features of the principal element encompassing the features which usually accompany the secondary element.

While Black's approach claims that people are able to understand metaphorical meaning without deriving it from literal meaning, the *theory of semantic fields* states that metaphorical understanding only takes place after a pragmatic anomaly has occurred. Another important development that resulted from the elaboration of Black's *interaction theory* is a shift from the view that one word is merely substituted for another towards the stance that an interaction between a logical subject and a predicate takes place, owing to the fact that the bearer of metaphorical meaning is no longer a single word, but the sentence in its entirety (Čulić, 2003: 19).

John Searle, an advocate of the *speech acts theory*¹¹ and a philosopher of language, reviews both the interaction and the comparison view (Searle in Ortony, 1998: 94 - 100). He is critical of the interaction model on grounds that there can be no discussion of any interaction between the "principal" subject and the "subsidiary" subject if the first element taking part in a metaphorical transfer does not have a relevant meaning. He illustrates his views with examples:

Sally is a block of ice .

Miss Jones is a block of ice.

The "principal" subject, Sally or Miss Jones, does not possess a meaning relevant for metaphorical transfer, that is, the fact that Sally and Miss Jones are proper names makes it difficult for us to notice any similarity between Sally or Miss Jones on one hand, and a block of ice on the other. In analyzing the metaphor *Richard is a gorilla*, Searle points out that interactionists mistakenly conclude that relations are based on beliefs, meanings, associations, etc. Thus the stated metaphor is based on our belief that gorillas are wild and uncontrollable and are, points out Searle, "unexplained relations of "interaction" between a literal frame and a metaphorical focus" (Searle in Ortony, 1998: 94).

Searle is equally critical of the *comparison theory*. One of the main principles of this approach considers metaphors shortened similes. Searle states (Searle in Ortony, 1998: 96):

"Thus, according to this view, the metaphorical utterance, "The man is a wolf" means "Man is like a wolf in certain unspecified ways", "You are my sunshine", means "You are like

¹¹ Roughly speaking, the theory of speech acts, which was established by J.L. Austin and later popularised by John Searle, is based on the way words relate to the world, that is, the social function of the language. By estimating the sincerity of intentions and their consequences, this theory differentiates between *utterance acts* (performed by uttering a word/phrase) and *propositional acts* (obtained by referring and predicating), while stating, questioning, commanding and promising results in *illocutionary acts* (Makaryk, 1995: 470).

sunshine to me in certain respects", and "Sally is a block of ice," means "Sally is like a block of ice in certain but so far unspecified ways."

The deficiencies of this approach lie in its neglect of the fact that we do not need any extralinguistic knowledge to understand similes, whereas the opposite can be said of metaphors. Statements of similarity have a literal meaning, and therefore do not share the same truth conditions as metaphors.

There are several other theories that have had an impact on the cognitivist approach to metaphor theory. The French scientist Paul Ricoeur insists that different ideas are genetically related, and that elements which were before considered distant become closer through *rapprochement*, i.e. semantic closeness, which is achieved between words expressing different ideas, an idea later developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Čulić, 2003: 39 - 40). Monroe Beardsley's *theory of verbal opposition* sees metaphor as relying on a system of *associated commonplaces*, stating that new analogies surface in our conceptual system during the process of metaphor creation. Therefore, in Beardsley's opinion, it is not necessary for two domains taking part in the process of metaphor creation to share similarities.

One of the most influential linguistic schools in the past fifty or sixty years has been the generativist school. This orientation in linguistics is significantly based on the findings of Noam Chomsky. Generativists' views mainly oppose those of cognitivists, but there is some common ground between them.

Chomsky stresses the genetic nature of natural language and proposes all linguistic knowledge is innate. In doing this, point out Geeraerts and Cuyckens, he totally "relegates the social character of language to the background" and

resorts to syntax rather than semantics in his study (Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 12-14). This is the consequence of generativists' views that natural language, due to its genetic basis, is not primarily social and therefore not influenced by social interaction. Thus, the focus of generativists' study is not semantics, because it studies meaning, which is highly dependent on social interaction, but rather grammatically based syntax (Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 12 –14).

Despite the views that collide with those of cognitive linguistics when it comes to factors determining the development of language, Chomsky and his generativist colleagues have made a contribution in language study by including the human factor in casting a light on diverse linguistic phenomena. However, it should be noted that they mainly limited their study to *parole*, and not *langue* ¹².

In spite of numerous opposing views regarding mechanisms of human cognition, cognitivists have managed to open up a new path in research on the mind. Nevertheless, cognitive science is indebted to the findings of other literary theories that have focused on metaphors. Thus, the German school with scholars such as Gerber, Vischer and in particular Biese and his theory of spheres, emphasized that metaphor is also a figure of thought and not only of speech, while von Ehrenfels paved the path for Gestalt psychology, which was to become a basis for elaborating the functioning of image schemas in metaphorical processes. Later in the 20th century, Bühler drew linguists' attention to the selective character of projection between the domains taking part in a metaphor creation. In addition to that, Stählin pointed at the specific nature of a structure (later to be named *blend* by the cognitive scientists Fauconnier and

¹² The Saussurean dichotomy distinguishes between *langue*, "a social system, a set of collective inventions, a common code shared by a community" and *parole*, "an individual, psychological activity that consists of producing specific combinations from the elements that are present in the code"(Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007:11).

Turner) obtained by combining elements from two domains. Interactionists emphasise the ubiquitous character of metaphors and particularly emphasize their importance in the process of cognition. Furthermore, one of the proponents of this approach, Max Black, draws our attention to the fact that the elements participating in metaphor creation should be addressed as *structures*, not separate elements. On the other hand, the comparison approach stresses the importance of finding analogies between elements taking part in metaphor creation, a view which was later to be developed by theoreticians of a cognitive orientation. In addition to that, Beardsley stresses that new analogies *arise* during metaphorical transfers, which represents another idea largely explored by cognitivists.

2.7. Image Schemas and Their Role in Conceptualization

Each of the above mentioned theories in a way contributed to the establishment of two cognitivist - based theories that have revolutionized contemporary thought on human cognition: Mark Johnson and George Lakoff's conceptual theory of metaphor, and Mark Turner and Giles Fauconnier's theory of conceptual blending (or conceptual integration). The conceptual theory of metaphor strongly relies on the image schema theory, elaborated in Lakoff and Johnson's seminal work *Metaphors We Live By* (2003).

The term *image schema* can be only in part related to the meaning of its components: schema and image. The first ones who used the word *schema* were the ancient Greeks and Romans. They used the term, as pointed out by Todd Oakley, to name linguistic devices that generate or embellish arguments (Oakley in Geraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 216). Schemas served as, in most cases, *static* templates that could generate new expressions. Likewise, Kant considered schemas "fixed templates superimposed onto perceptions and conceptions to

render meaningful expressions" (Oakley in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 215). In Kant's view, schemas were structures of imagination, a mental faculty that enhances the conceptualisation of various modes of representation (for example images, sensory percepts and others). Johnson, on the other hand, views schemas as mainly *dynamic structures* based on gestalts or "coherent, meaningful, unified wholes within our experience and cognition" (Johnson, 1987: 41). The author states that gestalts have an internal structure and assist in linking aspects of our experience with inferences on our conceptual system (Johnson, 1987: 44). Image schemas are only one kind of gestalt structures, with other gestalts including complex categorical structures, metaphorical projections and unified narrative patterns.

The difference between an *image* and *image schema* can best be illustrated with the example of the conceptualization of a particular experience, for example a human face. While images are abstractions that give room for an individual to provide various details related to his conceptualization of a new experience (in the context of conceptualizing a human face we can imagine every single detail related to a *particular* face), image schemas are templates which have a *generic* character and can be projected onto a different context (such as conceptualising the main features of a face: the mouth, eyes and nose and projecting them onto different situations). Image schemas are, therefore, *dynamic preconceptual* structures, the structures our experiences are made of. In his book *The Body in The Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason* (1987), the cognitive linguist Mark Johnson provides a list of the most important image schemas which include (written in small capitals as is a convention in cognitive linguistics): CONTAINER; BALANCE; COMPULSION; BLOCKAGE; COUNTERFORCE; RESTRAINT; REMOVAL; ENABLEMENT; ATTRACTION; MASS – COUNT; PATH; LINK; CENTER PERIPHERY; CYCLE; NEAR – FAR; SCALE; PART – WHOLE, MERGING; SPLITTING; FULL – EMPTY;

MATCHING; SUPERIMPOSITION; ITERATION; CONTACT; PROCESS; SURFACE; OBJECT; COLLECTION (Johnson, 1987: 126).

We shall refer once again to the dynamic character of image schemas. Johnson points out that, despite consisting of elements bound to definite structures, image schemas are flexible because they can adapt to similar but different situations thus indicating a repeating structure. Johnson gives the example of the PATH schema, which contains three elements (a source point A, a terminal point B and a vector creating a path between the source and terminal points) and a relation (a force vector moving from A to B). The PATH schema, being a recurrent structure, can be realized in various situations including " a) walking from one place to another, b) throwing a baseball to your sister, c) punching your brother, d) giving your mother a present, e) the melting of ice into water." The last example is interpreted metaphorically, with points A and B representing states of solid and liquid states of water (Johnson, 1987: 28).

Both the recurring pattern of image schemas, as well as the fact that they structure the *activities* our experience is organised through in an understandable fashion, make them dynamic.

2.7.1. The Role of Image Schemas in Metaphorical Transfers

Image schemas are preconceptual structures that play a crucial role in metaphorical transfers. They are based on recurring patterns which are realized in different situations. In order to illustrate the multiplicity of various occurrences image schemas take part in, let us give the CONTAINER image schema as an example. This image schema originates from our experience of physical containment. It is an ubiquitous schema of great importance in our lives. In most cases, we are bounded by three - dimensional containers such as the houses and

rooms we live in, the cars we drive, or other structures that envelop us (if the boundedness relates to a containment of a two - dimensional or one - dimensional kind, we are dealing with differentiation and separation, which is the case of a dot lying in a circle or in a line segment). On the other hand, our bodies also function as containers: we act as containers for the food and the drink we consume, the air we breathe, etc. Johnson points out that the experiential basis for an *in - out* orientation is spatial boundedness (Johnson, 1987: 21). The consequences of *in - out* schemata, or as Lakoff and Johnson call them *entailments* include (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 30):

- 1) protection from or resistance to external forces (ex. eyeglasses being protected in a case),
- 2) limiting and restricting forces within the container (ex. being in a room limits your movements),
- 3) as a result of restraint forces, the contained object obtains a fixity of location (for example a bird being located in a cage),
- 4) the relative fixity of location makes it possible for an object inside the container to be either accessible or inaccessible to an observer),
- 5) transitivity of the containment of an object, which results in the entailment that if A is in B, whatever is in B must also be in A (ex. if I am in the bath, and the bath is in the bathroom, I am in the bathroom).

Mark Johnson provides examples of sentences in which metaphorical projections of the OUT schema occur between a physical space and an abstract space. Following are some of the examples provided by Johnson (Johnson, 1987: 35):

I don't want to leave any relevant data out of my argument.

He'll weasel out of the contract, if he can.

If you want out, bow out now, before we can go any further.

It can be concluded that in the first example ARGUMENT is understood as a kind of a container which leads to a metaphor ARGUMENT IS CONTAINER. Johnson points out that this metaphor is one of the most ubiquitous structurings for our concept of ARGUMENT. In the second example being bound by a contract presupposes forces similar to those that keep you bound within a container. If you get out of it, you are no longer bound by these forces within the container.

Similarly, the IN schema indicates confinement within a container and suggests an inability to move out of the container because of the forces within, as can be observed in the examples *I'm in depression*, *She is in a difficult state*, and similar.

Taking into consideration what has been stated about image schemas, it can be concluded that they are pervasive dynamic structures that play an important role in our experience of the world around us. They connect different experiential domains and contribute to our understanding of the world. While so far we have been explaining the general characteristics of image schemas, in the following chapter we shall focus on image schemas for spatial and temporal orientation and their role in metaphorical transfers. Johnson draws our attention to the fact that these schemas are so pervasive and common in our everyday experience that we tend to overlook them and take them for granted in our reflections on meaning and understanding (Johnson, 1987: 31).

2.8. Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Two scientists from the field of cognitive linguistics and philosophy, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, devised a unique metaphor theory,

subsequently entitled *the Conceptual Theory of Metaphor or Conceptual Metaphor Theory* (further in the text the universally accepted acronym CMT will be used). Their theory marked a significant move from truth-conditional semantics because they pointed out that, in our construal operations, we establish counterfactual/hypothetical spaces.

2.8.1. Lakoff and Johnson's Classification of Metaphors

In their book *Metaphors We Live by*, Lakoff and Johnson classify metaphors into three main types: *structural, ontological and orientational*.

Structural metaphors structure one concept in terms of another, such as in the example ARGUMENT IS WAR (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 10). In this metaphor, we concentrate on those aspects of battle which help us structure our experience of arguments. A subtype of this kind of a metaphor is the "conduit metaphor" (named by Michael Reddy). Following are a few examples:

IDEAS ARE OBJECTS.

LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS.

COMMUNICATION IS SENDING.

All three metaphors outline the idea of objects (ideas, linguistic expressions, communication) being put into a container (words) and sent (through a conduit) to a hearer, who takes them out of containers (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 11).

Oriental metaphors, on the other hand, model one system of concepts onto another. They are related to spatial orientation: up – down, in – out, front – back, on – off, which in turn emerged as a result of the interaction of our bodies with the physical environment (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 14). The

construction of these metaphors also depends on cultural conventions. Thus most cultures in the world experience the concept HAPPY as being oriented UP, as is illustrated in the examples (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 14):

*I am feeling **up** today.*

*I am feeling **down**.*

However, the authors emphasize that orientational metaphors based on spatial orientation vary in different cultures. In that manner, the future is perceived as being in front of us in the Western culture, whereas in some other cultures it is seen as being in the back (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 15).

Ontological metaphors are "ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc. as entities and substances" (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 25). We can have an idea of how many purposes they serve by looking at the following examples:

*My **fear of insects** is driving my wife crazy.* (referring)

*There is **so much hatred** in the world.* (quantifying)

*I can't keep up with the **pace of modern life**.* (identifying aspects)

*He did it out of **anger**.* (identifying causes)

*He went to New York to **seek fame and fortune**.* (setting goals and motivating actions).

These examples serve, as the authors point out, a limited array of purposes and the majority of them are not even understood as metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 27). We provide some further elaborated ontological metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 27 – 28):

THE MIND IS A MACHINE

*My mind just **isn't operating** today.*

*I'm a little **rusty** today.*

*Boy, the **wheels are turning** now!*

THE MIND IS A BRITTLE OBJECT

*His ego is very **fragile**.*

*She is **easily crushed**.*

*His mind **snapped**.*

Each of the the selected metaphors from the first group (THE MIND IS A MACHINE) outlines a different aspect of mental experience (on - off state, a level of efficiency, an internal mechanism), while the second group of metaphors refers solely to psychological strength (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 28).

Ontological metaphors are so pervasive and common in discourse and are embedded in our culture to such an extent that most of us have ceased to perceive them as metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 28 - 29)¹³.

Prior to explaining the main principles of Lakoff and Johnson's theory, it is necessary to briefly refer to some other theories, closely related to CMT.

2.8.2. Johnson's Theory of Conflation

Christopher Johnson developed his theory of conflation in the mid 1990s as a result of a thorough study of metaphor acquisition amongst children.

¹³ In the appendix to the 2003 edition of their book, Lakoff and Johnson state that the classification into the stated three types of metaphors was artificial. This is how they explain their change of thought (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003:264):

"All metaphors are structural (in that they map structures to structures); all are ontological (in that they create target domain entities); and many are orientational (in that they map orientational image – schemas)."

Johnson found out that children adopt metaphors through the mechanism of conflation, i.e. lack of differentiation (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 46 - 49). Children do not distinguish the different domains that take part in the formation of a metaphor, e.g. children experience *warmth* and *love* simultaneously, as their subjective experience of affection is related to the sensory experience of warmth. Only at a later stage, the stage of differentiation, are they able to differentiate between a sensory experience (warmth) and an abstract experience (love). This theory introduces the notion of a source domain, which comes from a sensorimotor area and a target domain, related to a subjective experience, and is thus closely related to CMT, the principles of which will be explained further.

2.8.3. Grady's Theory of Primary Metaphor

Johnson's theory of conflation paved the path for Joseph Grady's theory of primary metaphor. Grady states that all complex metaphors are "molecular" and made up of "atomic" metaphorical parts, which he entitled *primary metaphors*. Primary metaphors appear unconsciously, automatically and naturally through the process of conflation, the result of which are cross-domain associations. Thus, early experiences in childhood result in conflations that are universal, which subsequently lead to conventional conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 46 – 49).

2.8.4. Narayanan's Neural Theory

Srini Narayanan's theory studies primary metaphors in the context of their neural processing. Narayanan shares Johnson's opinion that complex metaphors are made up of primary metaphors. The Neural Theory sees the process of formation of primary metaphors as equivalent to the previously mentioned theories; however, it puts emphasis on neural operations: it starts with a

conflation of a sensorimotor operation (for example determination of a degree or change of verticality) and a subjective experience or judgement (ex. judgement of degree or change of quantity) by simultaneously activating their neural networks. Thus complex metaphors are a result of conventional conceptual blending of primary metaphors, which during this process fit together into a larger whole - a complex metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 49).

Lakoff and Johnson further elaborated Narayanan's postulates and provided a list of 24 primary metaphors, illustrating how a complex metaphor emerges from primary metaphors. Thus the complex metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY is formed with the help of two basic metaphors: PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS. The journey, which is a sensorimotor operation, equals a purposeful life, a subjective experience, the traveller is the equivalent of a person living a life, the destinations correspond to life goals, whereas the itinerary is the equivalent of a life plan. Thus, besides incoming metaphors, (PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and ACTIONS ARE MOTIONS) there are two other elements in the process of mapping: the entrenched cultural belief that we are supposed to have a life purpose and the fact that a long trip to a series of destinations is a journey (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 62).

The authors especially emphasize the importance of cultural knowledge, in this case about journeys, which results in metaphorical entailments and, subsequently, guidelines about life. A proof of the theory that conceptual metaphors are understood beyond the conceptual level is the fact that the metaphor A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY defines the meaning of a document relevant for life called Curriculum Vitae (from Latin "the course of life"), which indicates how far have we gone on this life journey, whether we are on schedule or behind, etc. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 63).

The neural theory outlines a unidirectional neural flow from the sensorimotor domain to the domain of abstract subjective experience. The neural links between the two domains may or may not be activated (there is a possibility that they are not activated if another metaphor comes in the way), which depends on whether the domains are active or not. If both domains are active, images from the source domain establish a neural connection with the target domain. The more frequently these neural connections are established, the stronger the neural connections become, until they reach the stage when permanent connections are set up (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 57).

Lakoff and Johnson emphasize that both primary and complex metaphors are part of the cognitive unconscious. Primary metaphors are embodied in three ways: 1) through bodily experience in the world, which functions as a link between sensorimotor experience and subjective experience, 2) through source - domain logic arising from the inferential structure of the sensorimotor system, 3) through neural connections in the synaptic weights, which aid in storing primary metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 71).

When talking about the three levels of embodiment, as elaborated by Lakoff and Johnson (1999), it is necessary to bear in mind that they are interconnected and interdependent. Thus Raymond W. Gibbs Jr. asserts that we cannot solely rely either on our *neural structure* or on our *experiences and interactions with the world (the phenomenological level)*. Likewise, the third level of embodiment - the mental operations and structures of the *cognitive unconscious* - does not itself suffice to comprehend the functioning of the

human mind (Gibbs, 2005: 39 - 41)¹⁴.

Lakoff and Johnson also emphasize that all three levels are extremely important in the process of cognition (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 104). In order to be able to understand the functioning of the human mind, all three levels should be studied, while the authors stress that, in some cases, other levels ought to be consulted as well.

2.8.5. The Main Principles of CMT

According to this theory, the properties of entities depend on our interaction with them, rather than belonging *inherently* to them and meanings are *subjective* rather than *objective*. People conceptualize the world with the help of metaphors by projecting from one experience to another or, more specifically, from our physical experience, which is embodied and highly schematised, to abstract and non-physical experience. In this way, we strive to understand an abstract concept such as ARGUMENT in terms of a more concrete or more clearly defined concept such as WAR. We are able to comprehend the former concept in terms of the latter with the help of experiential Gestalts (gestalts were first introduced in psychology), or structured units of meaning. Čulić elaborates how the dimensions of the structure of the concept WAR make it possible for us to understand the concept of ARGUMENT, due to the fact that the consistent parts of the Gestalt WAR are better structured and specified than the structure of the concept ARGUMENT (Čulić, 2003: 27). These dimensions include: PARTICIPANTS (two people on opposing sides), PARTS (two positions, planning strategy, attack, defence and others, STAGES (one opponent attacks, the

¹⁴ Gibbs criticizes certain tendencies in cognitive science, especially in the field of cognitive psychology and neuroscience, which dismiss the findings of cognitive linguistics and phenomenological schools on the interrelatedness amongst the language, mind and the body. He emphasizes the need for interdisciplinary research that would unite findings from related disciplines such as psychology, linguistics, anthropology and computer science, but also literature, biology, the arts and others (Gibbs. 2005: 275 – 282).

other retreats), PURPOSE (victory). With the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, we therefore refer not only to the manner in which we discuss arguments, but also to the way we perceive arguments and conduct them in the context of our culture (Čulić, 2003: 27).

It is important to note that, in projecting upon abstract experiences, we select only some of the elements from the more concrete and/or physical experiences. While we project the elements which enable us to understand the elements of a certain concept more easily, we cover the remaining elements which we do not utilize in our projection. In this process, we project from our more concrete experience those actions and parts of the structure that are relevant for the abstract experience we are projecting onto. Likewise, we make similar projections with concepts that express emotions, for example LOVE, the structure of which is almost completely metaphorical, including metaphors such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY, LOVE IS ARGUMENT, LOVE IS MADNESS, LOVE IS PHYSICAL FORCE and many other metaphors.

In the process of metaphorical conceptualization, we distinguish two spaces, the *source space* and *the target space*. The projection from a source space onto a target space is unidirectional, in other words there is a one - way projection from a source space to a target space, and not the other way round. Thus one can refer to an affectionate person as *warm*, but one cannot speak of a cup of tea as *affectionate* (Grady in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 191). Metaphors based on temperature in the source space and (lack of) affection in the target space seem to be grounded. Although there is a lack of similarity between the spaces, cognitivists point out that temperature and emotion are grounded in our experience: intimate interactions may result in physical closeness, which subsequently lead to shared body heat (Grady in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 192). However, linguists of a non - cognitive orientation miss

out on this link and attribute the formation of such metaphors to our perceptions, language practice and sensibilities (Searle in Ortony, 1987: 267).

It is important to note that the *invariance principle* should be respected in the process of metaphorical transfer from a source space to a target space. This principle requires the structure of the target domain not to be disrupted during metaphorical transfers.

In some cases, there is no similarity as such between a source space and a target space. This is the case with the primary metaphor MORE IS UP, in which we recognise a connection between e.g. the height of a pile and the number of books on the pile. The metaphor is experientially based and there is a logic in the mapping between the spaces; however, the metaphor is not based on similarity (Grady, 2007: 192).

Lakoff and Johnson, as the principal advocates of CMT, are very critical of the main principles of the traditional approach, which they strongly criticize in their book *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought*. One of the principal tenets of the objectivist approach is that metaphors are only matters of thought. If that was the case, Lakoff and Johnson state, each different linguistic expression should present a different metaphor. Therefore the metaphors in the sentences *Our relationship is at the crossroads*, *We are going in different directions* or *Our relationship has hit a dead end* would be treated as separate metaphors, and not as cases of a single metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY. The authors point out that the examples are realizations of the same conceptual metaphor, and not instances of unrelated linguistic expressions (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 123).

Another objectivist principle is that metaphors are characteristic solely of poetry, and not of ordinary, everyday language. Lakoff and Johnson reject this tenet by stating that the expressions such as *This relationship is not going anywhere* and *We are at the crossroads in this relationship* illustrate to what extent these expressions are common in everyday speech.

Furthermore, the authors state that the use of metaphors is normal and natural, and by no means deviant. The examples, which include the target space LOVE, point to the fact that metaphors are a usual means of expressing thoughts and a pervasive figure of thought, as well as of speech.

The fourth objectivist tenet criticised by Lakoff and Johnson is the issue of dead metaphors. While traditionalists deny the existence of conventional metaphors such as *at a crossroads* and consider them "dead" metaphors, cognitivists point out that they are alive and functional. The origin of the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY is obvious after studying the cognitive mechanisms of its creation, more precisely its metaphorical transfer from the source space JOURNEY and the target space LOVE. The fact that this metaphor, as well as other metaphors stated earlier in the text, are so usual in everyday speech that they have become "entrenched" leads objectivists to the conclusion that they are dead metaphors. Radman explains the entrenchment of metaphors through the evolutionary changes each language goes through (Radman, 1995: 15). Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 125) point out that the objectivists' assumption is wrong, since we are still able to recognize the manner in which the entrenched metaphors have been constructed.

Thus Lakoff and Johnson provide an example of a "dead" metaphor (1999: 127): the word *pedigree*, which emerged as a result of cross - domain mapping including *ped de gris* as the source space (French *foot of a grouse*), and a family

tree diagram as the target space, where the two spaces shared the same general shape. This image metaphor was alive in the past but ceased to exist as an element of our conceptual system, and is not treated as an alive metaphor any more. While examples of dead metaphors are rare, other metaphors within the target space LOVE are very much alive and productive, constantly producing more examples.

2.9. Theory of Conceptual Integration

Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor set foundations for Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces and Turner and Fauconnier's *Theory of Conceptual Integration* or *Blending Theory* (later in the text TCI).

2.9.1. Mental Spaces

TCI relies to a great extent on the *Theory of Mental Spaces*, devised by Gilles Fauconnier. Following is a definition of mental spaces by Fauconnier (Fauconnier in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 351):

Mental spaces are very partial assemblies constructed as we think and talk for purposes of local understanding and action. They contain elements and are structured by frames and cognitive models.

While frames encompass wide arrays of knowledge, mental spaces are narrower and based on local knowledge. Mental spaces are common to our way of thinking and reasoning, and are a result of discourse producing a "cognitive substrate" (Fauconnier, 1999: 34) for these two faculties. Mental spaces are mapped, they are "linked up in a discourse" (Fauconnier, 1999: 12). The operation of mapping is common to many sciences, including cognitive

psychology and anthropology, and it has been the basis of mathematics, especially in the set theory (Fauconnier, 1999:13).

Unlike CMT, where metaphorical projections take place between two spaces, the source space and the target space, in TCI the operation of mapping is performed between at least two spaces: the space which serves as a source is called *base space*, and the spaces that elements and relations from the base space are being projected onto are *new spaces*. Mappings are "responsible" for diverse linguistic phenomena such as counterfactuals, hypotheticals, quantification, atemporal *when* narrative tenses and deictics, direct and indirect discourse (Fauconnier, 1999: 12).

Fauconnier shares Lakoff's opinion (Lakoff, 1987: Chapter 4) that mental spaces are structured by ICMs.¹⁵ Thus, in a sentence such as *Jack buys gold from Jil*, the ICM is a frame for "buying and selling", which includes elements such as a buyer, a seller, merchandise, currency and price as well as inferences referring to ownership, commitments, exchange etc. The relations between the mental space and the frame are illustrated as follows:




Figure 2.2.

¹⁵ An ICM (Idealised Cognitive Model) represents the central element in Lakoff's radial model of categorization.

Frames act as a "package" which organises the elements and relations of a mental space, as is illustrated in Figure 2.2. However, a single mental space may be established with the help of knowledge from many separate domains. Thus the example with Jack and Jill can be framed from domains such as COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS but also TAKING A BREAK FROM WORK, GOING TO A PUBLIC PLACE FOR ENTERTAINMENT, or ADHERENCE TO A DAILY ROUTINE (Fauconnier in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 352). Likewise, a mental space may be organised by a specific frame such as FIGHTING, or a more generic frame (COMPETITION).

Fauconnier points out that mental spaces are *internally* structured by frames and cognitive models, and *externally* linked by connectors, which include *space builders, names and descriptions, tenses and moods, presuppositional constructions and trans-spatial operators* (Fauconnier, 1999: 39 – 40). The function of connectors is to establish a relation between spaces, as well as to link structures across spaces. Fauconnier explains the function of connectors (Fauconnier, 1999: 39 - 40):

- 1) Space builders: their task is to set up a new space or move focus to an already existing space. They include diverse grammatical forms such as prepositional phrases, adverbials, subject-verb complexes, conjunctions and clause.
- 2) Names and descriptions: these include proper names such as John, Mr Jones, etc. and descriptions, for example *the vicious snake*, etc. They establish new elements or point to existing elements in the discourse construction.
- 3) Tenses and moods: their function is to determine the sort of space in focus, its connection to the base space, its accessibility and the situation of counterparts.

- 3) Presuppositional constructions: they encompass grammatical constructions such as definite descriptions, aspectuals, clefts and pseudo-clefts. They indicate that a structure within a space is introduced in the presuppositional mode, which makes it possible for the structure to be introduced into neighbouring spaces for the counterparts of important elements.
- 4) Trans-spatial operators: these are copulative verbs that act as connectors among spaces. These verbs include *be*, *become*, *remain*, *stand* and others.

Fauconnier provides numerous examples of mappings, while his theory has been widely utilised in the blending theory or the theory of Conceptual Integration, devised both by Fauconnier and Turner.

Unlike Lakoff and Johnson, Turner and Fauconnier distinguish at least four different spaces. Thus the authors emphasise that Lakoff and Johnson's two - domain model is "part of a larger and more general model of conceptual projection" (Turner and Fauconnier, 1995: 184), which they have entitled *many-space model*. They base their model on smaller units - mental spaces - which are designed for purposes of local understanding and action. Provided that there are at least two input spaces from different domains (source and target spaces), they stress that two more spaces, that is, two middle spaces, are formed in the process of conceptual integration. One is *generic space*, which contains elements that both input spaces share, i.e. the common features they possess. On the basis of this space, the fourth space, i.e. the *blended space* is formed, which, although it combines the elements from the input spaces, obtains a structure that is specific in character and which, in many cases, cannot be derived from the input spaces it originated from.

As in Lakoff and Johnson's model, only some elements from input spaces are projected. In order for conceptual integration to take place, several conditions have to be satisfied:

CROSS - SPACE MAPPING: the partial mapping of counterparts between input spaces I_1 and I_2 , as shown in Fig. 2.3:




Figure 2.3.

2) GENERIC SPACE: this space defines the cross - space mapping, it reflects structure and organization that is common to both input spaces:




Figure 2.4.

3) BLEND: The input spaces are partially projected on the blend.




Figure 2.5.

1) EMERGENT STRUCTURE: The blend obtains a specific structure not provided by the inputs (Fauconnier, 1999: 150):




Figure 2.6.

An emergent structure arises in three interrelated ways (Fauconnier, 1999: 151):

- 1) COMPOSITION: The projections from input spaces establish new relations, which did not exist in separate input spaces.
- 2) COMPLETION: The composite structure¹⁶ emerging from the inputs is enriched by knowledge of the background frames and of cognitive and cultural models, and is regarded as part of a larger self-contained structure within the blend.
- 3) ELABORATION: Cognitive processes occur within the blend due to the fact that the structure in the blend can now be elaborated.

In the diagrams shown above it is visible that, in the process of their projection onto the blend, the counterparts may be joined into one element or projected separately. An example that gives insight into a complex operation of blending is Koestler's riddle of the Buddhist monk :

Riddle of the Buddhist monk and the mountain: A Buddhist monk begins walking up a mountain at dawn one day, reaches the top at sunset, meditates at the top for several days, until one dawn when he begins to walk back to the foot of the mountain, which he reaches at sunset. Making no assumptions about his starting or stopping or about his pace during the trips, prove that there is a place on the path which he occupies at the same hour of the day on the two separate journeys.

Fauconnier and Turner provide an absolutely impossible and fantastic solution to the riddle. They strive to find a place in both inputs where the Buddhist monk would "meet himself", a place which the monk would occupy at the same time of day on two separate journeys:

¹⁶ In Figure 2.6. the square represents the emergent structure in the blend.




Figure 2.7.

However, since it is impossible to contemporaneously make two journeys on the same day, the monk cannot meet himself. Therefore, the riddle leads to a blend: in the process of blending, the features of the journeys up and down the mountain are combined, which provides an apparently affirmative answer to the riddle.

In the cross - space blending, day one (d_1) of the uphill journey maps onto day two (d_2) of the downhill journey, the monk's trip towards the summit from the first input space (a_1) maps onto the monk's trip down from the second input space (a_2).

In the generic space, common elements from both input spaces are included: a moving subject and his position, a path leading from the foot to the summit of the mountain, a day of travel (Figure 2.8.):




Figure 2.8.

Separate elements from the inputs, such as the two identical mountain slopes and two separate days of travel, get mapped onto a single mountain slope and a single day in the blended space, while certain counterparts from the inputs preserve their features from the input spaces, and for that reason are not able to be fused in the blend. In this manner, the positions of the individual on the path, corresponding to the time of day and the direction of motion along the path, are preserved as separate elements in the blend. In Figure 2.8., we can notice the individual features of the journeys, with Input 1 standing for the uphill journey and Input 2 representing the downhill journey (Fauconnier 1999: 153). The fact that, in the blend, there are two people instead of just one, as in the riddle, is the result of our "common sense" (Fauconnier 1999: 154), or a background frame, according to which two people on different paths will unavoidably meet at time t' of their journey (Fauconnier 1999: 154).




Figure 2.9.

Unlike a unidirectional projection between a source space and a target space, as elaborated in Lakoff and Johnson's theory, the projection can be reverse in the conceptual integration model - that is, from the blend to the inputs. Thus, in the case of the Buddhist monk, our "knowledge" of the blend, obtained from the mapping of the positions a_1 and a_2 being identical by definition in the frame of two people meeting, helps the establishment in the blend of their equivalents a_1' and a_2' :




Figure 2.10.

As stated above, some counterparts become fused in the blend, whereas others do not. This phenomenon is dependent on where the focus of our cognitive operations is. In the riddle with the Buddhist monk, we are focused on the meeting point and its counterparts in the inputs, which results in the "emergent structure" that does not appear in the input spaces: two moving individuals going on the same path but in opposite directions and unavoidably meeting each other (Fauconnier, 1999: 155).

2.9.2. Fantastic Blends

Blends such as this one are very common in our everyday thinking and are a consequence of our cognitive operations. Fauconnier and Turner illustrate how their theory functions on numerous examples of metaphors. Some of these metaphors involve a juxtaposition of elements that do not coexist in reality. Thus they have devised a blend in which two philosophers from different periods in history, a modern philosopher and Immanuel Kant, engage in a philosophical debate (Fauconnier and Turner, 1994: 113). Not only temporal but also geographical spaces become compressed in the blend. Temporal and spatial compressions will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, in which I shall focus on conceptualizations of time and space.

1.9.3. The Cultural and Experiential Basis of Conceptual Metaphors, as Illustrated on Examples of Metaphors Containing Up - Down Schemas

Metaphors are, from the perspective of cognitive science, a matter of cognition and not only of language. Metaphors are understood in the context of their structure, rather than the meaning of an individual word or sentence. The

manner in which we perceive the world and process this experience in our minds is determined both individually and culturally. Unlike objectivist orientations in sciences such as linguistics, philosophy, cultural studies and other related sciences, which neglect the sociolinguistic aspect of cognition, cognitive science stresses the role of the society and culture in the process of cognition and the construction of metaphors.

Our understanding of the metaphor MORE IS UP is based on the relation between the concepts of quantity and elevation. Thus we perceive a pile of books in terms of their quantity, i.e. the more books there are in a pile, the higher the pile is. Apart from the physical frame that both concepts come from (HEIGHT, QUANTITY), this image schema can be projected onto concepts derived from other frames. We can, therefore, project the structure of the input space derived from the physical domain and based on a corporeal cognition of height onto the more abstract structure within the frames of emotions, social status, etc. Since it is more difficult to comprehend a concept from an abstract domain due to the fact that it is not embodied, we need to utilise the structure of a basic domain which is, because of its embodied character, easier to understand, and implement it on an abstract domain.

The conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP is, therefore, strongly based on experience, i.e. on the up-down image schemas. The cognitive linguist John R. Taylor differentiates three major conceptual metaphors which include the up-down schema and refer to different domains (Taylor in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 339): MORE IS UP, LESS IS DOWN (the domain of quantity), GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN (the domain of evaluation) and POWER IS UP, POWERLESSNESS IS DOWN (the domain of control), as well as the two minor conceptual metaphors mapping the up-down image schema onto sensations of pitch and smell (the

examples of this include the expressions like the *high notes* of a piano and meat that *smells high*).

Taylor distinguishes between two uses of the metaphor MORE IS UP: one denoting position on a numerical scale (*high number, high price, high speed, high blood pressure, high pulse rate, high temperature*) and the other denoting the degree of intensity (*high technology, higher education, higher forms of life*). The conceptual metaphor GOOD IS UP maps the up - down schema onto a positive/negative evaluation, with the adjective *high* carrying a positive evaluation and the adjective *low* a negative evaluation (*high standards, high quality, high opinion, high moral values* as opposed to *low standards, low quality, low opinion, low moral values*), as well as onto enjoyment and liveliness (*high spirits, high life, high jinks*)¹⁷. The third conceptual metaphor, POWER IS UP, functions as the basis for expressions denoting power relations (*high society, high class, high-born, high status*), with positions of higher status evaluated more positively (Taylor in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 341).

All these conceptual metaphors are heavily based on experience. Further in the text, I shall elaborate in more detail on the mechanisms of the up-down schema influencing metonymical and metaphorical extensions (the conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP) in the domain of quantity (the example of *high prices*).

Similar to the domains of quantity, intensity, sophistication and complexity, which the conceptual metaphors MORE IS UP, LESS IS DOWN are applied to, the domains of enjoyment and liveliness, positive evaluation and power relations are also mapped upon by the conceptual metaphors GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN and POWER IS UP, POWERLESSNESS IS DOWN. Thus, a healthy

¹⁷ Taylor stresses that certain metaphorical uses of *high* seem to conjoin the conceptual metaphors of quantity and evaluation: *high technology*, which ranks high on a scale of sophistication and at the same time is positively valued compared to *low technology*.

person is up because of his upright position, which we usually associate with an individual whose organism is in a healthy state, while a sick person is down, because we normally connect sickness with lying in bed and feebleness. When we are in *high spirits*, we feel happy and full of energy, unlike being *low*, which indicates the state of depression, sadness and similar emotions. Similarly, if a person has gone *up* in society, he has succeeded, whereas a person who is *down and out* or, metaphorically speaking, at the bottom, is usually perceived as somebody who has failed in life.

It should be noted that such perceptions of the MORE IS UP metaphor are characteristic of mainstream Western thought, while subcultures may experience it differently due to an opposing system of values. In this manner, certain subcultures within the USA cherish virtues rather than material possession. Thus the metaphor VIRTUE IS UP ranks higher on the priority list of those subcultures than MORE IS UP, which in practice may be obvious in contemplating the option of buying a big car now and paying it off in installments later, or the option of buying a smaller car and not worrying about the future (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 23). An example of a subculture prioritising the value of LESS IS BETTER and SMALLER IS BETTER is the monastic order of the Trappists, who allow the possibility that MORE IS BETTER, however, only in the context of virtue (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 24).

In the Far East, the metaphor MORE IS UP is in certain cases perceived differently. Thus one of the most important notions of Eastern philosophy is modesty, as illustrated by the custom in which people lower their heads if speaking to a person whose social position is superior to theirs, or if one wishes to show respect towards a more knowledgeable person (personal communication). In this fashion, respect is shown to persons who are either higher on the social scale, more educated or at advantage in some other sense.

The lack of eye-contact may look unusual or even rude to a Westerner (I personally experienced mixed feelings while experiencing the same in communication with my students from Taiwan and South Korea, but was later told that this is the way they show respect for teachers).

2.9.4. Metaphors Based on Metonymy

Metonymy is, as is pointed out by Brdar, Brdar - Szabo and Buljan, one of the most pervasive linguistic phenomena, i.e. it is pervasive to such an extent that in most cases we do not even notice its occurrence (Brdar, Brdar - Szabo, Buljan, 2001: 72). Some cognitive scientists point out that certain metaphors are metonymically based. In their view, not only metaphorical, but also metonymical extensions have an important role in metaphor creation.

Metonymies have traditionally been viewed as figures of speech in which "the name of one entity e^1 is used to refer to another entity e^2 , which is contiguous to e^1 " (Taylor in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 324). In his article *Category Extension by Metonymy and Metaphor*, John R. Taylor explains the representational role of several types of metonymies. Thus it is possible for the name of a container to stand for the contents of a container, as in *The kettle is boiling*. Jill Matus provides an example of this type of metonymy in an extract from Harold Pinter's play *The Dumb Waiter*, where two characters are having an argument over the referring function of a metonymy (Matus, 1988/9: 306 –307):

Ben: What do you mean, I mean the gas?

Gus: Well, that's what you mean, don't you? The gas.

Ben: If I say go and light the kettle I mean go and light the kettle.

Gus: How can you light a kettle?

Ben: It's a figure of speech! Light the kettle. It's a figure of speech!

Gus: I've never heard of it.

Ben: Light the kettle! It's common usage."

In a similar manner, this "referring function" of metonymy (Taylor resorts to Nunberg's terminology) i.e. transferred reference, enables the name of a producer to refer to the product, as when we say *Dickens is on the top of the shelf.* or *Does he own any Picassos?* (Taylor in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 324). Finally, Taylor states several examples of synecdoche, a subtype of metonymy in which the whole is referred to via its salient, i.e. the most functionally active part, as in the examples *The Government has stated...* (the name of an institution stands for an influential person or group of people working in the institution), *negotiations between Washington and Moscow* (name of a place used instead of of persons associated with institutions) or *This jacket is our best-selling item,* where a token stands for the type (Taylor in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 324).

Thornburg and Panther, as highlighted by Brdar, Brdar-Szabo and Buljan, propose a typology of two basic types of metonymies, based on their function in discourse: *propositional* and *illocutional* metonymies. There are, furthermore, two subtypes of the former: *referential* (one metonymy standing for another, like in examples of a place or another geographical concept representing an institution, e.g. *London* instead of *the United Kingdom*) and *predicational* metonymy (predicational adjectives standing for a predicate denoting a linguistic event, cognitive or emotional process, for example *clear* for *make sure, decide, check* and similar). In the third, illocutional type of metonymy, one speech act (or a part of it) replaces the central part of a speech act (*Can you give me the time ?* meaning *What's the time?*). The authors propose the inclusion of definitions that would provide a context to entries in both bilingual and monolingual dictionaries. This is especially relevant in cases where some of the meanings for entries are metaphorical/metonymical. In this manner, dictionary users would be educated to comprehend the complex relations between words and their meanings, and eventually envisage further relations (Brdar, Brdar - Szabo, Buljan, 2001: 78).

Cognitive linguistics usually distinguishes between the concepts of metaphor and of metonymy, as pointed out by Lakoff and Turner (1989: 103), on the basis of the way they map: metaphor is usually determined as a mapping across two conceptual domains, whereas metonymy is defined as a mapping within a single conceptual domain.

John R. Taylor stresses that mapping elements from one domain onto another is possible due to the "co - occurrence of the domains within a particular area of experience" (Taylor in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 341 - 342). Thus the conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP is understood in the context of, for example, adding objects to a pile and the pile getting higher accordingly. Taylor points out that metonymy, rather than metaphor, occurs in the association of quantity and verticality through the metonymical extension of correlation¹⁸. He further asserts that the up - down schema becomes disattached from the piling - up image only in more abstract situations in which a process of addition takes place, as is the case with prices *getting higher* (Taylor in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 342).

In a similar manner, Günter Radden casts light on the process of forming a "literalness-metaphor-metonymy continuum" on the examples of compounds containing the attributive adjective *high* (Radden in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 409). He elaborates five stages of the development of this continuum: the literal stage, the "partially" or weakly metonymic stage, the fully metonymic stage, the stage that can be interpreted as either metonymic or metaphorical, and the metaphorical stage.

Thus, as stressed by Radden, the expression *high tower* is literal because it refers to solely verticality, that is, only one concept, that of verticality, is

¹⁸ The view that metonymies function as sources of metaphor creation is shared by Günter Radden, who enumerates four major metonymic sources of metaphor: a common experiential basis, implicature, category structure and cultural models (Radden in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 413-431).

experienced. The second, weakly metonymic stage (conflation stage), indicates a strong bond between the concepts of verticality and an increase in quantity (the example provided is *high tide*), which results in their unification into one concept. Radden underlines the correlation, simultaneity and inseparability of the two manifestations, i.e. the rise of the level and the increase in quantity, which is perceived by young children and consequently leads to uniting the two concepts into one. The third stage is, according to Radden, "fully" metonymic for one entity is substituted by another within the same conceptual domain: in the expression *high temperature*, the scale of verticality represents degrees of temperature, which is marked in the metaphor UP FOR MORE. Radden allows for the possibility that *high temperature* can also be understood in terms of EFFECT FOR CAUSE, where the warm temperature causes an increase of the mercury in the thermometer. The next stage is the stage of deconflation, as illustrated in the example of *high prices*. Here, two concepts are separated within the same domain, as is shown in the example of *high prices*. Radden stresses that the concepts of HEIGHT (of a price) and QUANTITY (of money) may be perceived in two different ways: some people may conceive these concepts as belonging to the same conceptual domain and understand *high prices* in the light of UP FOR MORE, while others may see them as belonging to two separate domains and therefore understand the expression metaphorically as MORE IS UP (Radden in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 409). Radden emphasises the reversible character of the fourth, deconflational stage, which he illustrates in the following examples:

Attendant: How much gas do you want?

Driver: Just fill her up.

The example indicates that the concepts of quantity and height are united into a single domain by metonymically referring to the height when talking of quantity (the level of the filled gas tank and the quantity of gas). The

reversibility of metonymical relationships (unlike metaphorical relationships, which are not reversible) is illustrated by an additional example provided by Radden (2003: 410):

Attendant: Shall I fill her up?

Driver: Yes, put in as much as she can take.

Finally, the fifth stage is the stage in which a situation is viewed as purely metaphorical, as is the case in *high quality*, where the concepts of verticality and evaluation are understood as belonging to two different domains, and via the metaphor GOOD IS UP.

As suggested by Radden and Taylor, in certain cases it is difficult to determine whether it is a metaphorical or a metonymic process that takes place in an idiom, i.e. whether mapping occurs within a single boundary or between different domains. Thus Louis Goosens highlights the fuzzy nature of domain boundaries, as well as the fact that metonymies and metaphors are often intertwined, for and introduced the term of *metaphtonymy* into cognitive linguistics for this purpose (Goosens in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 349).

2.9.4.1. Goosens's Theory on Metonymy and Metaphor Interaction

Goosens conducted a study of the interaction between metaphor and metonymy on the corpus of figurative expressions from three different source domains: *body parts* (109 items out of which 86 verbials, 12 adjectivals and 11 nominals) *sound* (100 verbal items) and *violent action* (100 verbials). The main source consulted was *Longman's Dictionary of Contemporary English*.

Four diverse patterns of interaction between metonymy and metaphor were determined: *metaphor from metonymy*, *metonymy within metaphor*,

metaphor within metonymy and demetonymisation in a metaphorical context. The first two patterns turned out to be the most productive, whereas for the last two only one example was provided respectively.

2.9.4.1.1. Metaphor from Metonymy

I shall briefly refer to the issue of the metaphorical or metonymic interpretation of an idiom. Goosens illustrates the problem on, as he states, a typical example of an item coming from the sound source domain and containing a metonymic ingredient, which is subsequently turned into a metaphorical extension:

"Oh, dear , "she giggled , "I'd quite forgotten ."

One interpretation is that she said it *while* giggling, in which case the expression indicates a metonymic, i.e. synecdochic relationship, while the other reading is that she said it *as if* giggling, thus suggesting a mapping between domains and, consequently, obtaining a metaphor. Goosens highlights that in the latter (metaphorical) interpretation, the conceptual link with the metonymic understanding is still present. As a result of these metonymical and metaphorical transfers, we derive a meaning that suggests light-heartedness or silliness in the manner of talking.

A significant number of verbials from the body part source domain indicate similar metaphorical and metonymic transfers. Thus the idiom *say something/speak/talk with one's tongue in one's cheek* (literally pushing one's tongue into his cheek while saying something he does not mean) gives room to both metonymic and metaphoric readings: in the first case, the meaning inferred obtains an ironic note while, in the second case, the reading indicates that the

speaker says something as if he had his tongue in his cheek, therefore insincerely.

The *physical violent action* subcorpus provided only few examples of the *metonymy from metaphor* pattern including *throw mud at* ("speak badly of, especially so as to spoil someone's good name unnecessarily") and *give a rap on/over/ the knuckles* ("attack with sharp words"). Goosens, however, states that we could debate whether these examples could in fact represent the metaphor–from–metonymy pattern (Goosens in Dirven and Pörings,2003: 358).

2.9.4.1.2. Metonymy within Metaphor

This pattern appears solely in the body part data, and refers to a metonymy built in a metaphor. The body part is a shared element in both the source and target domains, while at the same time persisting as a metonymy within the expression, like in the example of *bite one's tongue off* (meaning *Be quiet!*). It is unlikely that the source domain can be directly linked with everyday practice, due to the fact that it is improbable one would literally bite his tongue off, with an exception of a highly implausible form of self - punishment (Goosens in Dirven and Pörings,2003: 364). If we map the idiom onto the linguistic scene, we obtain the meaning "depriving oneself of one's ability to speak", in which the tongue metonymically stands for speech faculty as an entirety. The metaphorical reading indicates a person regretting having said something foolish/rude or similar.

Several more examples (*shoot one's mouth off*, *catch somebody's ear*) indicate that the shared body part has a different function in the source and target domains than within the source/target domain, where it metonymically stands for something else. Thus in the example *shoot one's mouth off* ("talk

foolishly about what one does not know about or should not talk about”) the donor domain is metaphorised, i.e. the use of a gun is mapped onto unpremeditated linguistic action, while the meaning of using one’s mouth foolishly is obtained in the target domain. *Mouth*, however, metonymically stands for speech ability (Goosens in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 264). The second example, *catch somebody’s ear* (“catch someone’s sympathetic attention or notice”), induces a metonymic reading, i.e. refers to the process of getting someone to listen, which in turn triggers the metaphorical interpretation of drawing the person’s attention.

2.9.4.1.3. Demetonymisation inside a Metaphor

Goosens provides only one example of this pattern: *pay lip service to* (“support in words, but not in fact; give loyalty, interest, etc.”). The author further emphasises that the element of *paying* evokes a scene of *discharging someone’s debts*, while *lip service* represents *speaking*. In order to make the idiom functional, as pointed out by Goosens, we need to expand the paraphrase for *lip service* into “service with lips solely” (Goosens in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 366), thus dissociating with the whole and, consequently, getting “demetonimised”.

2.9.4.1.4. Metaphor within Metonymy

As in the previous pattern, only one figurative expression is provided. Goosens hypothesises that the expression *be/ get on one’s hind legs* (“stand up in order to say or argue something, especially in public”) can be looked upon as a metonymy (if leaving out the word *hind*), meaning “standing up in order to say something in public”. The additional word *hind* implies animal imagery and emphasises a greater effort to speak in public and say something due to the fact

that we interpret the expression in terms of an animal getting up, which leads us to a metaphorical reading within the metonymy. Goosens stresses that the entire expression can be interpreted as a metaphor, although he considers it more appropriate to regard it as a metaphor embedded into a metonymy (Goosens in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 366).

2.9.4.2. Final Notes on the Metonymy-Metaphor Interaction

It can be concluded that the interactions between metonymies and metaphors are highly complex and subject to diverse construals: it is quite plausible for two different scholars to consider one idiom as either the result of a dominant metonymical extension, or a dominant metaphorical extension. These differences are based on the diverse manners in which projections are conceptualised, i.e. whether the projection of elements and relations takes place within a single conceptual domain or between two separate domains. In the first case, we can speak of metonymical extensions, whereas the second is associated with metaphorical extensions.

Nevertheless, most cognitive scientists agree that metonymies play a significant role in conceptualisation. Although their presence may be difficult to detect within a discourse, they are ubiquitous and fulfill diverse functions. Both metonymies and metaphors are unavoidable in the process of cognition, a fact that was illustrated in the example of the functioning of conceptual metaphors based on up-down schemas, in which both metonymies and metaphors aid in the comprehension of projections within / between conceptual domains.

2.9.5. Differences between CMT and TCI

There are a few aspects in which Lakoff and Johnson's conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) and Fauconnier and Turner's theory of conceptual integration or blending (TCI) differ. In CMT, selected elements from both spaces are involved in the process of mapping, while in TCI it is possible to detect counterparts from both inputs in the blend; however, in some cases the structure of only one of the inputs is contained in the blend. Such is the case of the idiom *digging one's (own) grave*, where the imagery related to *death and burial* in the source space is the counterpart to *people causing harm to themselves* in the target space. While digging a grave does not cause death in the source space, in the target space people are faced with failure, which is a result of their own (badly planned) actions. It is evident that the blended space includes the causal structure of the target domain, but not of the source domain (Fauconnier and Turner, 1998: 136).

Fauconnier and Turner stress that projections between spaces in TCI are not unidirectional, as they are in CMT. We have already illustrated that CMT theorists support the idea that projections are possible only in one direction, i.e. from a source space onto a target space. TCI, however, allows the possibility of multidirectional projections, not only from input spaces onto a blended space via a generic space, but also from a blended space back onto input spaces, as can be observed in the example of the Buddhist monk.

Furthermore, blended spaces can function as future input spaces for more complex blends. Such is the example of the parable¹⁹ provided by Mark Turner,

¹⁹ The word parable is of Greek origin and refers to the action of "tossing or projecting of one thing alongside another" (Turner, 1998: 7). Turner understands parable not only as an inventive literary genre which combines story and projection but also as "a general and indispensable instrument of everyday thought that shows up everywhere, from telling time to reading Proust." (Turner, 1998: 7). Thus, besides functioning as a literary story, parable also operates as an instrument of the mind.

where the story of a lazy donkey is projected onto the situation of Shahrazad, the vizier's daughter (both stories come from the literary classic *Arabian Nights*).

The former tells the story of a donkey, who was a privileged animal on a wealthy farmer's farm: he rested in the barn all day long and had plenty to eat. One day the ox, who had to do all the hard work related to ploughing, lamented to the donkey about his toils and the donkey told the ox that he should pretend to be ill in order to be spared from hard work. The following day the ox did precisely what he had been advised, but the farmer took the donkey to plough instead. The latter is the story of Shahrazad telling her father, the Great Vizier, that she is willing to be the next bride of King Shahriyar, the Sassanid king who, disappointed in love, takes a new virgin bride every day to have her killed the next morning.

Prior to the projection between the two stories, the result of which Shahrazad is put into the role of the donkey, we encounter the blend of a talking animal in the first story. This is a common blend in fables and fairy tales, encompassing input spaces from the domains of the animal world (the selected elements are the characteristics of certain animals as conceived by humans, e.g. a fox is seen as a sly animal, whereas a lamb/sheep is perceived as gullible) and the human world (the element selected for projection is the human ability to talk) and the generic space of an agent who normally does not talk and suddenly obtains the ability to talk. Thus, in the story of the lazy donkey, the animal's alleged laziness from the first input space and the ability to talk from the second input space result in the blend of the talking donkey. Furthermore, the story of the lazy donkey is projected onto the situation of the vizier's daughter Shahrazad.

Finally, it seems that one of the biggest flaws of CMT lies in the fact that it has difficulty explaining where the main premise of a metaphor comes from (Brdar in Stolac, Ivanetić and Pritchard, 2003: 126 - 127). The conceptual blending theory has rectified this problem by introducing a fourth mental space, i.e. a blended space in which selected elements from input spaces appear, whereas the new blended space has an inherent, unique structure. Thus in the example *This surgeon is a butcher*, the elements from the first input space of butchery (the role of a butcher, knife as an instrument) come into the forefront, while only the element of purpose is preserved from the second input space, the one of surgery (using a special kind of knife - a scalpel - to perform operations on human bodies and thus saving a person's life). Brdar points out that, due to the incompatibility of these two elements - a butcher cuts flesh in order to kill, while a surgeon cuts it so that he can save lives - in the blended space we obtain the main idea of the metaphor, and that is that the surgeon is incompetent (Brdar in Stolac, Ivanetić, Pritchard, 2003: 127).

1.10. *Summary*

Chapter One focuses upon the importance of cognitive science and, in particular, cognitive linguistics in understanding human cognition. Cognitive linguistics and related sciences such as neuroscience, cognitive psychology, philosophy and anthropology have cast new light on cognitive processes, in which both the mind and the body take part. Scholars of a cognitive orientation in natural and social sciences as well as in humanities emphasize the interactive role our bodies play in the process of cognition, a process in which we establish relations with the entities we perceive in the real world and which are accordingly processed in our brain. Besides on the body and on the mind, we also rely on cultural conventions and physical environment in our conceptualisation and understanding of the world.

Revelations within the area of cognitive science represent a scientific breakthrough due to their viewpoints, which are completely different from those of previously dominant philosophies such as objectivism and subjectivism. While objectivism stresses that our thoughts are rational and formed as a result of perceiving inherent properties of entities, i.e. properties that are contained within the entities themselves and are not in any fashion dependent on people's interaction with them, subjectivism points out that our thoughts are completely subjective and private, while stressing that we ought to rely solely on our intuition in understanding the world. Unlike objectivists and subjectivists, cognitivists advocate an experientialist approach to language and cognition, and emphasise that our thinking is basically arbitrary, unconscious and metaphorical.

Cognitive linguistics assigns a significant role to metaphor, which is regarded both as a figure of thought as well as of speech. Metaphors are ubiquitous and occur in every kind of discourse. Metaphorical transfers are complex and highly dependent on cultural conventions. The creation of metaphors strongly relies on image schemas, which are dynamic experiential patterns our life is made up of. Thus the CONTAINER schema is based on physical containment within and outside of our bodies. This image schema results in metaphorical transfers like in the example *I'm in depression*, where the body is perceived as a container for an abstract psychological experience. Two main metaphor theories developed within the field of cognitive linguistics: Lakoff and Johnson's conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) and Turner and Fauconnier's theory of conceptual integration or blending theory (TCI).

CMT is focused on explaining metaphorical projections based on two spaces: the source space and the target space. Only some elements from the source space are projected onto the target space, for example the concept

ARGUMENT can be understood in the context of the concept WAR if the elements of two opposing sides, stages of "battle" and, finally, victory are taken into consideration. Since the source space WAR is more concrete and better structured than the target space ARGUMENT, the abstract target space can be, in a way, understood in terms of the source space.

According to the principles of TCI, mapping takes place amongst four spaces: two input spaces, which are equivalent to a source space and a target space from CMT, a generic space and a blended space. Generic spaces involve elements that are common to both input spaces, while blended spaces or blends emerge as completely unique structures that cannot be derived directly from input spaces, but can be projected onto them later on.

A special part of the chapter deals with metonymic and metaphorical transfers between which it is at times difficult to differentiate. There appears to be a consensus amongst cognitivists that with metonymic transfers mapping takes place within a single domain, while with metaphorical transfers mapping occurs between two or more separate domains.

While in CMT metaphorical projections are unidirectional, i.e. they occur only from a source space to a target space, in TCI the projections are multidirectional: projections take place from source spaces via target spaces to blends and the other way round, i.e. from the blend to inputs, as illustrated in the example of the riddle of the Buddhist monk. Blended spaces also provide opportunities for further, more complex blends (e.g. the blend of a talking animal further mapped in the parable of the lazy donkey and Shahrazad's offering herself as King Shahriyar's next bride).

3. CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SPACE AND TIME

Space and time are the two main characteristics of the world man inhabits. We measure our perception of physical existence in four dimensions, the first three being spatial (length, width and depth), which provide with a location of an object or event in the universe, while the fourth one, time, provides events and objects with a classification of "when". Time and space are the structures that constitute our lives as well as deaths. Furthermore, we are preoccupied with the passing of time to such an extent that we resort to various means to defy it. Thus we opt for esthetic surgery in order to preserve our youth, we strive to lengthen our lifespan (Zerzan, 2004: 119), while some of us (those who can afford it) even arrange for their bodies to be frozen after death with a hope that one day we will be revived.

3.1. A Cognitivist Perspective of Time and Space

The cognitive linguist Ronald Langacker argues that time and space are basic domains since they share the properties that characterize domains : 1) the possibility for a domain to be reduced to other, more fundamental concepts, 2) dimensionality and 3) distinction between locational and configurational domains. Time and space are both "primitive representational fields", in other words the domains that cannot be completely reduced to another domain. The author emphasizes the interrelatedness of the two concepts, which is reflected in referring to time using spatial terms and applying construal operations specific for the conception of time when referring to space (Langacker, 1987: 149). Furthermore, in the context of conceiving these two domains through one or more dimensions, asserts Langacker, they are both unbounded, i.e. they are not

perceived through a particular *range* of dimensions (as is, for instance, temperature). Finally, the domains of time and space are not localized or confined to a scale, rather they are extensional and perceived through extrinsic sets of coordinates (for example dissection of time onto units such as day or hour and creation of borders to limit space), compared to domains that are calibrated inherently (e.g. a pitch is diverse in quality from another). The named properties contribute to the perception of time and space as basic domains (Langacker, 1987: 147-154).

Leonard Talmy, also a cognitive linguist, allocates time and space to a separate schematic category of Domain, i.e. considers them as two member notions of the construal operation of domain. Talmy further specifies these two concepts in the context of cognitive grammar, claiming that the quantity existing generically in space is "matter," compared to "action", the equivalent quality existing in time (Talmy, 2000a: 42 - 43). The specific features of time and space are also emphasized by the social geographers Jon May and Nigel Thrift, who understand time as "the Domain of dynamism and Progress", while space is confined to the realm of stasis (May and Thrift, 2003: 2).

The cognitivists Langacker and Talmy undoubtedly understand time and space as two major notions which greatly contribute to our cognition of the world and see them as crucial categories that help us to shape the realm we exist in. The interrelatedness of these two concepts is perhaps most prominent at a linguistic level, so that even scholars of a non - linguistic provenance outline this feature. Thus the philosopher A. Cornelius Benjamin emphasizes the fact that the vocabulary describing the concepts of space and time is shared, which is an indicator of a resemblance between these two concepts (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981:3). Benjamin further states that recent developments in linguistics and philosophy suggest that the way we perceive the world is strongly influenced by

the language we use, the result of which is that nations speaking different languages have different conceptions of time (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 4). The cognitive scientists Lakoff and Johnson argue that in many cultures temporal expressions are represented by spatial ones. Time is, according to these authors, in many cases conceived with the help of two spatial schemas: the *ego - moving schema*, where the observer on an imagined time - line moves towards a certain point in the future or the *time - moving schema*, in which it is the time that is moving in the direction of an observer (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 141 -148).

3.1.2. Compression of Time and Space

Time and space are seen as interdependent in the view of natural sciences, in particular contemporary physics (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 3). New cognitions in the field of physics at the outset of the 20th century marked the beginning of a different conceptualization of time: time is no longer necessarily perceived as irreversible and linear²⁰, while the notion of the past, present and the future existing simultaneously is not alien to us any more. Due to complex inter - relationships of time and space new terminology was introduced in social and natural sciences as well as humanities, which outlines the strong connection and interrelatedness between the two concepts, *TimeSpace* (May and Thrift, 2003:5) and *space - time* (Brala - Vukanović and Gruić - Grmuša, 2009:12) respectively.

Despite different understanding of the concepts of space and time in sciences as diverse as the natural, social sciences and humanities, there is no doubt these two concepts are interrelated and that they strongly affect each other. The period between 1850 and the First World War witnessed a new

²⁰ The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary defines linear as "going from one thing to another in a single series of stages." (OALD, 2001: 748)

phenomenon for the first time in history: compression of time and space. Due to the accelerated development in the fields of technology, industry and especially transport and communication, time and space were "condensed", in the opinion of some scholars even "annihilated" (May and Thrift, 2003: 7). Compression of time and space has become so common that we do not even notice it any more: geographic and temporal distances are affected by the use of the Internet, mobile phones, television and other gadgets of modern technology. The paradox of the world becoming a "global village" due to the disappearance of spatial and temporal boundaries, is the observation that we have become more alienated than ever, bound to our armchairs while watching TV or to our computer screens while maintaining a "virtual" connection with the rest of the world.

My intention is to commence this chapter by explaining different historical and cultural views of understanding the concepts of time and space, with an emphasis on the way time and space are seen by scholars of cognitive provenance. I shall explain the role of spatial image schemas in understanding space as well as time and address the following theories: Lakoff and Johnson's elaboration of spatial and temporal metaphors (together with Kevin Ezra Moore's and Nuñez, Motz and Teuscher's variants of temporal metaphors) and Vyvyan Evans's and Antonio Damasio's understanding of subjective time. I also intend to address the developments in the area of natural sciences from the beginning of the 20th century, in particular physics, which treated the concepts of time and space in a different way, i.e. as one single concept of TimeSpace. Special attention will be paid to the theories studying the relation between language and culture, especially in the context of the role of conceptual metaphors in understanding abstract concepts, the issue of individualist/social and universalist/relativist nature of conceptualization as well and the differences in the application of frames of reference in spatial conceptualization.

3.2. Conceptualization of Space

The concept of space has been studied by many scientists of cognitive orientation, including cognitive and cultural linguists, cognitive anthropologists, psychologists, philosophers and many more. One of the main reasons for an increased interest in the patterns of space conceptualization lies in the fact that the structure of space domain is perceived by these scholars as being more concrete than the structures of more abstract domains, resulting in the structure of the space domain being mapped onto abstract domains. The cognitive linguist and cultural theoretician Jordan Zlatev points out that some cognitive scientists go to great lengths to declare that space is the basis of all conceptualization and that understanding the patterns of space conceptualization enables us to comprehend human conceptualization in general (Zlatev, 2007: 319).

As pointed out by Marina Biti and Danijela Marot Kiš in their book *Poetika uma*, people conceptualize both space and time according to their experience of reality, but also in accordance with their hierarchical system of values, prejudices and perceptions (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 243). Like time, space cannot be experienced through perception, but we can make it more concrete by linking it with realia from the everyday world. For that purpose we segment it by setting boundaries, thus adapting it to our needs. The anthropologist Patrick Colm Hogan argues that the initial stage of spatial cognition commences with our differentiation of diverse "place" schemas: we bond each space with some sort of human agency in the way that we organize scenes according to their purposes, e.g. spaces in which people can live, sleep, walk, swim, etc. (Colm Hogan, 2003: 126). Spaces are further differentiated into outdoor and indoor spaces, public and private spaces, followed by urban outdoor and rural outdoor and so on (Colm Hogan, 2003: 126).

A spatial organization like this would not be possible without boundaries, assert Biti and Marot Kiš, which are considered to be the principal means of human organization and understanding of the category of space and have been utilized in segmenting space into smaller parts, thus fulfilling our individual as well as collective needs (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 244). In this way we create our private spaces in order to protect ourselves or have privacy, whereas collective spaces are limited by socially agreed upon boundaries, thereby creating hierarchically diverse spaces in which functioning of a social community is guaranteed (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 244). Through conceptual transfers spatially determined objects, i.e. organizations represented by material objects, become metonymies of social institutions or organizations functioning within those objects, such as schools, courts, governments, etc. Biti and Marot Kiš emphasize the metonymic value of our understanding of institutions, which we identify with the corresponding social institutions, in shaping history. Thus, claim these authors, it is indicative that most revolutions and coups started with taking over (usually by force) spaces such as government buildings, embassies, national televisions and similar institutions (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 244).

Segmenting space via boundaries has a twofold effect: on the one hand setting boundaries reflects the innate human tendency for classification by introducing order to its existence and functioning, thereby creating a hierarchically organized system with material strongholds as symbols of conquering space, while on the other hand spatially determined boundaries offer (a suggestion of) safety by defending our private space from the unknown and potentially harmful, thereby creating an illusion of a protected space (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 245). Biti and Marot Kiš further emphasize that segmenting space through boundaries primarily aids people in their effort to make an abstract category such as space concrete by dissecting it into perceptually

comprehensible segments. This segmentation secondly reflects people's needs for safety and protection, achieving the latter by encapsulating and protecting themselves within the limits of the familiar and thus understandable and perceptually close (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 245).

Space seems to operate on a less abstract level than time, owing to the possibilities to determine and delimit it via constructions and objects of material culture. In that way we assign shape to the category of space, which we also perceive through different, primarily visual and tactile senses (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 244)²¹.

2.2.1. Real and Abstract Spaces

Humans have not defined space solely by moulding it via constructions and objects of material culture, they have also created abstract spaces. Thus, besides real spaces, which we define by our perceptual experience and interventions into their segmentation and functioning (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 246), we also design abstract spaces. Biti and Marot Kiš emphasize the omnipresence of such spaces: they do not belong only to the realm of literary fiction but are a result of everyday human experience of the world (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 247). In the previous chapter we provided a few examples of abstract (counterfactual) spaces, i.e. blended spaces, or completely new structures obtained via the process of blending two or more input spaces.

The ubiquity of abstract spaces can best be illustrated if we think of virtual games that millions of people play daily accross the globe. We take part in these imaginary games, thereby ignoring the spatial - temporal categories of

²¹ Biti and Marot Kiš distinguish two manners spaces are conceptually bounded: 1) spaces that are naturally determined by geological constructions such as seas, rivers, lakes, mountain ranges, islands and others and 2) spaces that have been organized through human intervention (settlements, parks, monuments, roads, etc.).

here and now (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 248) and participating in imaginary worlds with imaginary family members, friends or contestants. A space becomes abstract, as pointed out by Biti and Marot Kiš, when we try to understand it without the help of a perceptively attainable materiality (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 247). Thus the main criteria in distinguishing concrete and abstract spaces becomes our intervention in the process of comprehending the concept of space: the spaces that are segmented, moulded and put into functioning by our intervention are conceived as concrete spaces, whereas those that are not created through our intervention in them are understood as abstract spaces.

3.2.2. Utopias and Heterotopias

Utopias can be considered abstract spaces (from Greek *ou* not and *topos* place, space). They are not connected to any real places: the French philosopher Michel Foucault defines utopias as "sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real Space of Society."²² Utopias portray society either in an idealized form or society with values turned upside down.

Heterotopias (from Greek *heteros* other, *topos* place) are, unlike utopias, real places; they are, as stated by Foucault, "counter - sites", utopias realized in practice. They represent, contest and invert all real places that exist in a certain culture/cultures. Foucault illustrates the relation between utopias and heterotopias through the example of a mirror experience: the mirror itself is a utopia or a placeless place since it opens as a virtual place behind the surface but at the same time it is a heterotopia because it exists in real life and makes the place where one stands and looks at himself in the mirror real.

²² <http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html>.

Both Foucault and the social theoretician Kevin Hetherington emphasize that heterotopias have been historically determined and specific to the Western culture (Hetherington in May and Thrift, 2003: 53). Foucault points out that heterotopias had a different function in the past than they have today; in the so called primitive societies there was a dichotomy between secular and sacred or forbidden places, with the latter being devised for those that were, "in relation to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis"²³, while in our times "heterotopias of deviation" are dominant over heterotopias of crisis. Heterotopias of deviation are, according to Foucault, heterotopias that are reserved for society members whose behaviour is considered deviant when compared to the norms imposed by a particular society such as rest homes, prisons or psychiatric hospitals, while retirement homes could belong to either category.²⁴

However, the criteria of who a heteropia is designed for is, as pointed out by Foucault, only one of the principles according to which we can differentiate between numerous realizations of heterotopias. Other principles include *juxtaposition of several spaces in one real place* (e.g. the theatre or the cinema), *performing a function/ functions within a society* (e.g. the cemetery, whose function changed when death started to be considered an "illness", a threat for the living, therefore they were moved outside city borders), *(lack of) access to* (in most cases, e.g. prison, barracks, one must have permission to enter the premises) and *performing a function opposite related to the remaining space* (the function of illusion, e.g. brothels or the function of compensation, e.g. Puritan colonies on the American continent).

²³ Foucault provides examples of crisis heterotopias including spaces designed for adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly and similar. He states that a few remnants of crisis heterotopias can be traced today (e.g. boarding schools, military service). More information is available at <http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html>.

²⁴ Foucault argues that retirement homes can function both as a heterotopia of crisis, since old age is often regarded as a crisis and a heterotopia of deviation due to the fact that in modern society idleness is a kind of deviation.

Foucault further distinguishes amongst heterotopias that are linked to temporality, which he refers to as *heterochronies* i.e. the heterotopias that offer a break with traditional time. Heterotopias of this sort either indefinitely accumulate time (museums or galleries) or are linked to time in a manner of festival (fairgrounds, or Polynesian villages that for a short period of time offer an escape to a completely different way of life for urban inhabitants).

Hetherington also well emphasizes the temporal dimension of heterotopias. He argues that in modern societies *new* spaces appear, which propose an alternative expression of social ordering to the one which prevails at the moment. These new heterotopias are characterized by *orientation to the future* on one side and the *uncertainty* on the other, and it is specifically this uncertainty that gives them the status of "other" places (Hetherington in May and Thrift, 2003: 51).

The main difference between utopias and heterotopias is, therefore, the fact that utopias are abstract, imagined places, whereas heterotopias are real places that present an alternative to the social ordering of a particular culture. Furthermore, heterotopias are realized in diverse forms and perform various functions in modern society.

3.3. A Brief History of Space Conceptualization

As proposed by Foucault, the character as well as human understanding of heterotopias has changed throughout history. In order to be able to understand better the present views of the concept of space in general, a short history of different understanding of the category of space throughout history is provided.

3.3.1. Western Thought

In his book *Space in Language and Cognition* Stephen C. Levinson provides a brief overview of spatial cognition in the Western tradition (Levinson, 2003: 6-23). In ancient Greece a dispute amongst philosophical schools went on for centuries regarding the nature of the concept of space. Some schools and philosophers supported the view that space should be viewed materially (the school of Parmenides and Melissus as well as Plato), whereas other schools and individuals believed space was an empty infinity (Epicurean atomists, Zeno). Plato was the first to consider that space should be looked upon as a three - dimensional substance, while Aristotle revolutionized the philosophical thought of space reflecting upon the issue of setting directions, which in his opinion could be established both relatively (in terms of the orientation of the human frame), and absolutely (in terms of the cosmos), thereby setting foundations for the study of *frame of reference*, a construal later to be elaborated by cognitivists.

Aristotle's understanding of space alongside Euclid's geometry of the plane and Ptolemy's celestial projections strongly influenced Western thought up to the 17th century. During the Renaissance, the view which regarded space as a three – dimensional void prevailed and was subsequently built upon by the physicist Isaac Newton, who distinguished between *absolute* and *relative spaces* (Levinson, 2003: 7; Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 18). Newton understood the former as external, immovable and unchanging, while he conceived the latter as a moveable dimension of absolute spaces. He further claimed that we could not sense absolute space and for that reason use relative spaces instead.

Newton's view of space was the dominant theory until the end of the 19th century, when things started to change, under the strong influence of Immanuel

Kant's philosophy, which favoured egocentric and anthropomorphic manners of spatial conceptualization, resulting in space being conceptualized from egocentric, anthropomorphic and relativistic perspectives (Levinson, 2003: 9). Thus man was the measure for spatial conceptualization and it appeared that bodily experience of space was universal and that it provides a basis for spatial thinking. Such a view was supported by scientists from as diverse fields of study as psychology, anthropology, psychology, linguistics and language acquisition and other sciences (Levinson, 2003: 11 - 13). However, research conducted by the cognitive psycholinguist Stephen C. Levinson indicates that not all languages use bodily coordinates to conceive space, a notion which will be addressed in more detail.

3.3.2. Conceptualization of Space by Non - Western Cultures

Unlike Westerners, whose conceptualization of space is egocentric or body/object - centred, members of some non - Western cultures including Tamil, Tzeltal and Guugu Yimhirr cultures conceptualize space with the help of static coordinates, in many cases determined by geographic features. The specificities of the conceptualization of space by members of these cultures will be addressed later, in the final section of this chapter, which talks about the differences in space conceptualization based on the application of diverse Frames of Reference.

3.4. Construal Operations in Spatial Semantics

Cognitive linguists, including Talmy, Langacker and Croft and Cruse, refer to a number of construal operations connected with conceptualizing space. We will focus on four construal operations which are of great relevance in conceptualizing space and, consequently, time: *trajectory* and *landmark*,

viewpoint, perspective and *frame of reference*. These construal operations help us understand cultural differences since they contribute to diverse manners of understanding the concepts of space and time.

3.4.1. Trajector and Landmark

Although theorists are not unanimous about terms and definitions referring to the position of one object (*Figure/trajector/referent*) relative to another object (*Ground/landmark/relatum*), they do seem to agree on the character of these concepts. The notions of *Figure* and *Ground* originate from Gestalt psychology and were introduced into cognitive linguistics by Leonard Talmy, while Roland Langacker has been using the terms *trajector* and *landmark* as well as George Lakoff and Jordan Zlatev (Zlatev, 2007: 327). It is of interest to note that many authors classify the trajector and landmark organization under different construal operations: Langacker considers trajector and landmark a suboperation of the focal adjustment (or construal operation) of Perspective (Langacker, 1987: 120), while Talmy puts the Figure and the Ground under the category of the schematic system of Attention (Talmy, 2000a: 184).

3.4.1.1. Trajector

The term trajector defines “the entity whose (trans)location is of relevance” (Zlatev, 2007: 327). Talmy emphasizes that the Figure is the entity that is in the focus of attention and outlines the characteristics which are of primary concern (Talmy, 2000a: 13). Like Talmy, Langacker draws our attention to the fact that it is the trajector which is the prominent entity that the scene is set up for in the trajector - landmark organization (Langacker, 1987: 120).

A person, an object, and an event can function as a trajector and it can be static or dynamic, as illustrated in examples of sentences provided by Zlatev (Zlatev, 2007: 326):

She is at school. (person, static)

She went to school. (person, dynamic)

The book is on the table. (object)

She is playing in her room. (event)

Zlatev points out that, unlike trajector, the terms Figure and referent do not usually apply to events but to object - like entities (Zlatev, 2007: 327).

3.4.1.2. Landmark

Zlatev defines the landmark as a "reference entity in relation to which the location or the trajectory of motion of the trajector is specified" (Zlatev, 2007: 327). Unlike the trajector, it is not in the focus of attention but rather in its periphery (Talmy, 2000a: 13). In some situations there is more than one landmark in a sentence (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 56):

The Isaac CDs (figure) are between Compère (ground) and Josquin (ground.)

Greg (figure) drove from San Rafael (ground) to Trinidad (ground) in five hours.

Talmy (2000a: 315-316) states the following properties (in the domain of spatial relations) of objects that favour the trajector - landmark alignment:

<i>Figure</i>	<i>Ground</i>
location less known	location more known
smaller	larger
more mobile	more stationary
structurally simpler	structurally more complex
more salient	more backgrounded
more recently in awareness	earlier on scene/memory.

Scholars' opinion differs when it comes to the categorization of this construal. Croft and Cruse claim that in the trajector/landmark construal the focus is on the comparison between two elements in a scene; thus these authors classify it as a subtype of the Judgement - Comparison construal operation (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 58). This is particularly significant, assert Croft and Cruse, in non – spatial domains, where events function as trajectors and landmarks, which the authors illustrate on the following examples (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 57):

I read while she sewed.

I read and she sewed.

The first sentence is an example of a symmetrical event relation in which it is not noticeable or relevant which event functions as a trajector and which as a landmark, while the second example illustrates an asymmetrical relation between the events, namely the trajector (*I read*) and the landmark (*she sewed*), with the conjunction *while* emphasizing the contrast between the two events.

Contrary to Croft and Cruse's categorization, in Langacker's taxonomy of focal adjustments the trajector - landmark construal can be found under the

construal operation of Perspective (Langacker, 1987: 120). The notion of Perspective will be addressed later, where we shall focus on construal operations in narratology. Langacker, however, admits that it is possible to look upon this construal in the context of comparison, but outlines several other factors that influence the trajector/landmark alignment, in particular motion and the focal adjustment of Prominence (Langacker, 1987: 120). Langacker assigns the importance of motion to the fact that we are likely to choose an entity that is changing its position against the rest of the scene as the trajector (Langacker, 1987: 120). In one of his later works, in *Cognitive Grammar: a Basic Introduction* Langacker categorizes the trajector/landmark construal under the focal adjustment of Prominence (Langacker, 2008: 66). He explains his stand with the notion that "anything selected is rendered prominent relative to what is unselected, and a foreground is salient relative to its background" (Langacker, 2008: 66).²⁵

Talmy categorizes the Figure and Ground construal under the schematic system of Distribution of attention (Talmy, 2000a: 76). He, nevertheless, emphasizes the functioning of motion and the PATH image schema²⁶ in the alignment (Talmy, 2000a: 290):

"The Figure is a moving or conceptually movable entity within the scene, whose path, site or orientation is conceived of as a variable of which the particular value is the relevant issue and that is characterized with respect to the Ground. The Ground is a stationary reference entity within the scene with respect to which the Figure's site, path or orientation is characterized."

²⁵ Langacker points out that an entity in the foreground is more prominent and therefore more easily perceived than a participant in the background because it is closer to the viewer.

²⁶ The PATH image schema refers to the trajectory of actual or imagined motion of the "trajector" in respect to the "landmark".

Talmy further proposes a schematic structure defining the Figure and Ground construal which incorporates the four factors relevant for the alignment (Talmy, 2000a: 290):

[Figure + Fact – of – Motion + Path + Ground]

The views of these scholars on the elements of relevance in the trajector/landmark alignment are in accordance to a great extent. Although some of them emphasize certain factors more than others, it can be concluded that the construal operations including Distribution of Attention (Talmy) and its equivalent Prominence (Langacker) as well as Perspective, alongside motion and the PATH image schema, should be taken into consideration when addressing the issue of the trajector/landmark construal.

3.4.2. The Role of the Trajector - Landmark Alignment in Conceptualization of Time

Time is often conceived in spatial terms. In that way the trajector - landmark construal is of utmost importance in time conceptualization, i.e. in ego - based metaphors. These are the Observer - Moving Metaphor and Time - Moving metaphor, where the observer is conceived as a trajector and the time as a landmark, or the other way round. These two types of metaphors as well as their variations will be explained further in this chapter.

2.4.3. Perspective

According to Croft and Cruse, the best way to define perspective is via its closest property and that is the philosophical notion of situatedness in the world in a particular location (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 58). However, one should keep

in mind that this specific location needs to be construed in such a way to include not only spatial location but also temporal, epistemic and cultural context. It is very important for a location to include the stated contexts since, as emphasized by Croft and Cruse, we base perspective on our spatiotemporal location as well as our knowledge, belief and attitudes (Croft and Cruse, 2007: 58).

We experience the world, says Antonio Damasio, directly and literally through experiential perspective and this concrete and literal experience is supported by abstract and metaphorical concepts, which arise on the way and help us to understand the same world (Damasio, 2005: 146).

3.4.4. Viewpoint

Biti and Marot Kiš point out that the concept of viewpoint²⁷, which Langacker and Croft and Cruse classify as a suboperation of perspective (Langacker, 1987: 122 - 126; Croft and Cruse, 2004: 59), encompasses a dichotomy between the material/concrete and the metaphorical experience of an object, but stress that this division actually brings these two experiences together due to the fact that a concrete perceptive experience is a prerequisite for creating ideas, beliefs, stands and assumptions (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 224). Furthermore, Seymour Chatman hints at multiple meanings of the entry *viewpoint* in dictionaries, emphasizing that the two most frequently used definitions refer to a place from which something can be seen and the mental attitude of the viewer (Chatman, 1986: 189). The first dictionary definition refers to a concrete, physical viewpoint and expresses a literal meaning of the word, whereas the second meaning is metaphorical and is a result of metaphorical and metonymic transfers. The result of blending of the two

²⁷ Langacker proposes a subdivision of the construal viewpoint into vantage point, a foreground – background alignment, i.e. the spatial relation in question is dependent on the speaker's situatedness and orientation, which refers to the vertical dimension and is related to a person's canonical position (Langacker, 1987: 122-126).

viewpoints, the material and the mental, is a blend in which the concept of perspective obtains the properties of thinking, which includes the concepts of a worldview and system of values (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 225).

Chatman states three components of the process of observation²⁸: an observed object, a place from which the observation takes place and the process of observation itself. These components may have, besides literary, also metaphorical meanings and the different meanings can conjoin, thereby creating a complex concept of viewpoint, which is, in Biti and Marot Kiš's opinion, the basic factor in shaping our image of the world (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 224).

Chatman provides examples of statements in which he illustrates the connectedness between perceptual experiences of an object in the real world and the system of values and knowledge, shaped through a network of mediated information. Thus the sentence *From my viewpoint, the Transamerica Building is an architectural travesty* is meaningful outside its immediate surrounding: while the Transamerica Building remains a perceptible material object, the process and the place of observation reflect a metaphorical view of the situation. Thus, as pointed out Chatman (1986: 190), the process of observation refers to a concrete act of perception occurring at an indefinite time in the past. This act, assert Biti and Marot Kiš, undergoes metaphorical and metonymic transfers and obtains properties of other mental activities related to expression of concrete or abstract ideas, beliefs and stands (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 224). Chatman further stresses the fact that the property of the viewpoint can be assigned to entities who participate in events referring to them but are not yet capable to articulate it, as illustrated in the sentences *From the viewpoint of the unborn fetus, the abortion was an act of murder*) or who even do not possess the

²⁸ In his article *Characters and Narrators: Filter, Center, Slant and Interest - Focus* Chatman gives an example of an imaginary viewer observing a city from the top of a high building.

abilities needed for the articulation, such as speech, as in *From the dog's viewpoint, the water hose spelled trouble* and *From the redwood forest's point of view, the sound of chain - saws was apocalyptic*. Chatman names the entailments of these statements the *components of interest*, which refer to the involvement or a right for a say of all beings (including in a figurative sense some things) in actions or events that concern them (Chatman, 1986: 190). The concept of viewpoint is also applicable to ideologies, even of people who are no longer alive (e.g. *From Franklin Roosevelt's point of view, Reagan considering himself a successor is ludicrous*). The last example indicates that the construal of the viewpoint involves a temporal component: a mental attitude of a deceased person is taken into consideration, thereby suggesting that the deceased person's beliefs, attitudes and values are still familiar to those who are living in a different historical period.

Chatman further points out that the term *point of view/viewpoint* or its equivalent *focalization* is subject to different construals in another field of study, namely narratology. He addresses the issue of who a story is seen by through questioning the roles of the narrator and (one of) the characters. In Chatman's opinion the narrator can report events but is not able to "see" them since he does not participate in them (Chatman, 1986: 193). Chatman distinguishes between the narrator, who inhabited discourse time and space before and the character, who presently inhabits story time and space, concluding that "what the narrator expresses can only be memories of perceptions and conceptions internal to the story, not the perceptions and conceptions themselves" (Chatman, 1986:94). In this aspect Chatman disagrees with Mieke Bal, who supports the notion that the narrator performs the function of the "focalizer" in cases no characters perform it (Chatman, 1986: 95). The narrator, concludes Chatman, can "present the story as "through" the perceptual, conceptual, and other mental equipment of a character" (Chatman, 1986: 95).

The cognitive linguist Zoltán Kövecses emphasizes the different manner of viewpoint preference expression by diverse cultures around the world. Thus, he asserts, the English understand the sentence *There is a rock in front of the tree* from an *ego - opposed* perspective, i.e. they conceive the rock to be between the viewer and the tree, whereas the Hausa interpret the sentence from an *ego - aligned* perspective; their understanding of the scene suggests that the rock is on the other side of the tree, farther from the viewer (Kövecses, 2005: 253). Different construals of the scene are possible because trees do not have inherent fronts, so that people belonging to different cultures and speaking different languages attribute a front to the tree in diverse manners (Kövecses, 2005: 252).

3.4.5. Frame of Reference

There is a considerable diversity in definition of this spatial concept, however, as pointed out by Zlatev, an FoR defines one or more "reference points" as well as a coordinate system of "axes" and "angles" (Zlatev, 2007: 329). Reference points and coordinates serve as a basis for determining FoRs; thus Stephen C. Levinson, who probably offers the most detailed definition of FoRs, distinguishes three frames in linguistics (Levinson, 2004: 41 - 50):

1. *Intrinsic*: an object - focused coordinate system in which the coordinates are determined by the "inherent features" of the object, which is itself used as the landmark as the main reference point (e.g. *in front of the house*)
2. *Relative*: a real or imagined viewpoint the coordinate system is based upon acts as a reference point, with the coordinate system depending mainly on the planes of the human body (e.g. *in front of the wall*)

3. *Absolute*: the coordinate system is based on the fixed geo - cardinal positions (e.g. *North of the border*)

People speaking diverse languages and living in different cultures around the world use different FoRs. The Western conceptualization of space favours the relative intrinsic FoRs, whereas there are many non - European cultures in which people talk about space using primarily the absolute FoR. It is interesting to note that in many cases users of the absolute FoR live very close to users of the relative FoR.

Research has indicated, points out Stephen C. Levinson (2004: 94), that children who are raised in cultures with an intrinsic Frame of Reference acquire spatial concepts earlier than children raised in cultures with the predominant absolute FoR (six months compared to four years of age). It might be concluded that the intrinsic FoR is innately available to children, unlike the absolute FoR.

3.4.6. The Relevance of Trajector/Landmark, Perspective, Viewpoint and Frame of Reference Construal Operations for Spatial and Temporal Conceptualization

We can conclude that the construal operations of perspective, viewpoint and frame of reference are important operations which we all resort to when conceptualizing space. Perspective and viewpoint also have a strong temporal component, which offers diverse possibilities for bringing together the concepts of time and space in our mental operations. The notions of trajector and landmark enable us to understand the concept of time via the concept of space, aided by the operations of motion, comparison and prominence. These operations are subject to different understanding of space, but also of time, depending on the way these construal operations are used by speakers of

different languages and belonging to different cultures (viewpoint, FoR) or on the diverse manners of a scene perception (trajector and landmark).

In order to better understand the differences in spatial and, to some extent, also in temporal conceptualization, a short overview of physical and social and cultural basis of spatialized metaphors follows.

3.5. Physical and Social/Cultural Bases of Spatialized Metaphors

Although cognitive scientists of diverse provenance seem to agree that image schemas are the basic foundation structures which shape our sensory - motor experience, the role of image schemas in embodiment has been perceived differently. Thus cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists, in order to elucidate findings related to the role of image schemas in language, focus on human cognition, i.e. on the computing faculties of the brain, whereas advocates of the "cultural cognition" approach emphasize the role of the socio - cultural context in language and cognition (Hampe in Hampe, 2005: 5). Proponents of the first approach take a "universalist" stance to cognition, proposing that cognitive operations in our brain are of an individual character, while those in favour of the second approach advocate a relativist view on conception of the mind, thereby supporting the notion that body as well as mind and specific culture play a role in cognition, which often results in cultural specificity and conceptual and linguistic relativity.

Numerous image schemas aid in our spatial conceptualization of the world and are experientially based. In that way the VERTICALITY schema, which is a result of our ability to stand erect despite the gravitational force of the Earth, helps us understand the experiences of standing up, rising and falling down, while the CENTER and PERIPHERY schema enables us to concentrate on

experiences that are in the centre of our conscious awareness, leaving the peripheral experiences fade off (Johnson in Hampe, 2005: 20). Orientational metaphors are connected with our orientation in space and the manner in which our bodies function in our physical environment (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 14). In this way we stand erect when we are healthy and lie down when we are sick, which leads to expressions such as *He 's in **top** shape. He 's at the **peak** of health. Lazarus **rose** from the dead*, all being examples of the orientational metaphor HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP, whereas the sentences *He is **sinking** fast. He came **down** with the flu. and His health is **declining*** illustrate the opposing spatial concept and are instances of the orientational metaphor SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 15). Other orientational metaphors with a physical basis include HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN; CONSCIOUS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN; MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN and many more.

However, a number of orientational metaphors have both a physical and social/cultural basis. Thus the sentences *She 'll rise to the top* and *He 's at the bottom of the social hierarchy* illustrate two ideas at different ends of social and physical power and lead to the orientational metaphors HIGH STATUS IS UP and LOW STATUS IS DOWN (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 16). Some orientational metaphors are a result of a combination of two metaphors, thus VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN originates from the metaphors GOOD IS UP, which outlines the physical foundations of well - being including happiness, health, life and control and its opposite BAD IS DOWN as well as from the metaphor SOCIETY IS A PERSON, where an individual is identifying with his/her society. Thus VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN are both physically and socially based due to the fact that virtuous deeds are related to social well - being, both from an individual's and societal point of view (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 17). Lakoff and Johnson also provide an example of orientational metaphor with a physical

and cultural basis, namely RATIONAL IS UP; EMOTIONAL IS DOWN. This metaphor is connected with our conception of "civilized" people having a dominant status over "less civilized" people, whose actions are determined mostly by their emotions rather than their ratio and thereby occupy a lower position in the cultural system of The Great Chain of Being (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 211).

It must be noted that experiential bases of orientational metaphors are of different character. Thus the metaphor UNKNOWN IS UP; KNOWN IS DOWN expresses the notion that it is easier to comprehend something if it is in your reach than if it is unattainable, as is shown in the examples *That's **up** in the air* and *The matter is **settled*** (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 21). Two diverse concepts can be recognized, the concept of physical closeness and the concept of comprehensibility. On the other hand, the metaphor MORE IS UP conveys the notion of the two interdependent inputs of quantity and verticality, which through metonymic extensions conflate into one inseparable concept (Radden in Dirven and Pörings, 2003: 409).

I have been discussing the relevance of image schemas and construal operations for the conceptualization of space. My intention in the next section is to illustrate the functioning of some spatial construal operations while conceptualizing time. Mental operations that are specific for time conceptualization will also be addressed. I shall commence talking about time, as we did when space was discussed, with ways of understanding time and a historical overview of time conceptualization.

3.6. Conceptualization of Time

Time is such a complex category that many eminent scientists including the physicists Richard Feynman and Albert Einstein, when asked what time is, required not to be asked that question or pointed at its apparitional character respectively (Zerzan, 2004: 96). Likewise, St. Augustine wrote in his 11th book of *Confessions* that he felt confused when asked to explain time (Carr, 2007: 501).

Time, the category which can neither be seen nor touched, is a human construct. For several thousand years people have been organizing time with an aim to provide meaning to it. Specifically for that purpose diverse cultures have developed their own models, which have affected their perspective of time.

3.6.1. Measurements of Time

The complexity of the issue of time is emphasized by the fact that there are no instruments which can measure its passage. Over time people started using objects such as watches to measure time, but these measurements were based on the occurrence of events, rather than measuring time itself. Initially people relied on the observable natural cycles, in particular the astronomical or global events that occurred regularly: the day is the interval²⁹ between the rising and the setting of the sun; the month is marked by the moon repeating one of its cycles; the year is the time when the seasonal cycles repeat. The Babylonians are credited for the seven - day week systems, with the days representing the sun, the moon and the five visible planets, while the segmentation into hours is

²⁹ Evans defines an interval as a result of a succession of events, namely the period between the two boundary events, the onset (the beginning event) and the offset (the ending event). He emphasizes that the human lifespan is bounded by an onset, birth, and an offset, death. The interval of a lifespan can be further dissected into other intervals, such as those representing the beginning and ending of primary or secondary school, matriculation at and graduation from university as well as starting a job and retiring from it (Evans, 2004: 108 - 109).

usually connected with the Sumerians (who employed a base - 12 counting system and based their counting on the 24 segments on the eight human fingers excluding the thumbs). The Babylonians, in turn, subdivided hours into smaller units - minutes, again implementing base - 12 factor, and further into even the smaller units - seconds. In order to keep track of days, calendars were developed, first in Mesopotamia and then in ancient Greece, where a standard form of measurement was based on the motion of the moon around the earth. The Romans devised their own solar calendar, with revisions including synchronizing the lunar and solar circles, rearranging monthly lengths and month delineation. The calendar was standardized by Julius Caesar (we refer to it as the Julian calendar) and it became the basis of the modern calendar as we know it today.³⁰

3.6.1.1. Subjective and Objective Time

The division between subjective and objective conceptualization of time is related to human experience of time measurement (mental time) and measurement of time performed by sophisticated machines (physical time). This dichotomy is based on experiments which marked differences in reaction times (Frith, 2007: 153). Thus participants in the experiment pushed a button when they heard a bell ringing, but the interval between the occurrence of the bell ringing and its marking is shorter when the measurements are performed by sophisticated computer mechanisms than by participants in the experiment.

³⁰ Further reading on the variations of the Julian calendar in history is available at http://www.sage-reference.com/time/Article_n576.html.

3.6.1.2. Absolute and Relative Time

Another perspective of time includes the dichotomy on *absolute* and *relative* or *relational* (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 6) time. Absolute time is measured quantitatively, using units that are arbitrary (seconds, minutes or weeks) or based on natural events (e.g. planetary motions). Newton, however, saw absolute time (he also refers to it as true, mathematical time) as flowing equably regardless of the external world). In his opinion absolute time is, as asserted by the cognitive scholar Vyvyan Evans, fixed and eternal, providing the background for events to be measured and given temporal value (Evans, 2004: 237 - 238). On the other hand, relative time is measured by comparing events, namely their duration or order of occurrence. This is the case of geologic timescale, which helps geologists to determine the timing of an event based on the sequence of eras, eons and smaller units. The time, being divided into increasingly specific units, results in the eras differing in length, due to the fact that the commencement and the ending of a unit is determined by most significant geological events.³¹

From the philosophical perspective, as stated by Benjamin (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 8), the issue of absolute and relative time is connected with the problem of time being *relational* or absolute. In case of relational time, time relies on happenings or things *in* time. Benjamin asserts that, while we may perceive time as "flying" or "slowing down", we have to take into consideration the fact that there has to be some objective time in terms of which we can recognize diverse times. This time that goes by at an even rate and is content - independent is characterized as *absolute* time. Benjamin stresses we need to reconcile the relational and the absolute time if we are to comprehend time (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 8).

³¹ Eras are further divided into eons and smaller units (http://www.sage-ereference.com/time/article_n598.html).

3.6.1.3. Linear and Cyclic Time

We can conceptualize time as linear or cyclic. The mainly linear perspective in Western culture is based on the Judeo - Christian philosophy of the universe having a beginning (divinely created) and an ending some time in the future. Galileo Galilei first symbolized time by marking a line at regular points, thereby bringing together the categories of time and space. The physicist Isaac Newton contributed to this view by representing time mathematically with a line, emphasizing its absolute character ("...time flows equably without relation to anything external")³². Newton defined motion in terms of distance travelled per unit of time and thus exploited time as a primitive with which motion was to be understood (Evans, 2004: 238).

According to the linear perspective of time, there is an orderly and continuous sequence of events. Time flows constantly in one direction, forward, and we do not have a control of its passage.

Cyclic time is based on the iteration of natural phenomena, such as the rising and setting sun. This perspective of time advocates a view according to which events in time are not lost, they are only moved to another place in the cycle. While new events follow older events, things go back to the original state. As will be argued later in the text, many ancient Greek philosophers perceived time as circular, and this perspective is not uncommon in Buddhism and Taoism.

The philosophical perspective distinguishes two ordering characteristics when determining the stated perspectives on time: the *before - after* relationship and the *past - present - future* relationship. The former refers to the characteristic of time in which two instants have a sequencing character, one

³² <http://www.sage-ereference.com/time/Article_n598.html>.

happens earlier and the other later, either instant x is earlier than y or y is earlier than x and "once the choice between these alternatives has been made, the passage of time can never change it"(Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 6). The latter is related to the fact that the present must always be between the past and the future.

3.6.1.4. Static and Dynamic Time

Another dichotomy defines time as dynamic or static. Understanding of time is, asserts Benjamin, strongly dependent on notions of change and constancy (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 7). Change would not make any sense if there were not a constant background; in other words, as pointed out by Benjamin, "whatever changes, retains a generic permanence" (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 7). Therefore, if a green light changes into a red light, the light is retained, but the colour changes.

3.6.1.5. Monochronic and Polychronic Time

Monochronic time is divided into precise units of time, while events are organized and tasks performed individually. According to this view, time is an exhaustable resource and should be saved, which is illustrated in the metaphor TIME IS MONEY. Moreover, time is often experienced as tangible and talked about in terms of saving or spending it. The monochronic perspective of time is characteristic of North American and northern European cultures, while this viewpoint might seem unflexible and overly scheduled to members of cultures perceiving time in a different way³³.

³³ <http://www.sage-ereference.com/time/Article_n598.html>.

Polychronic time is, on the other hand, understood as less rigid than monochronic time. Predetermined schedules are considered less important than completion of tasks, while there is a laxer attitude to lateness. Accordingly, members of cultures as diverse as Latin American, Native American and Middle Eastern use polychronic time, as well as other cultures that conceptualize time as cyclic. Members of cultures that use monochronic time may, upon encountering cultures that follow polychronic time, feel stressed because they might perceive the polychronic view as being disorganized and unruly.

3.7. An Overview of the Philosophical Perspectives of Time throughout History

Time, as one of the most complex categories people have had to deal with, led humanity to elaborate various manners of time organization. Thus, in order to understand time, people belonging to different cultures devised different models in hope of assigning meaning to this mysterious category.

3.7.1. Early Greek Philosophers

Amongst early Greek philosophers the main controversy related to time was the issue of *becoming* (*change*) or *being* (*permanence*). Thus Heraclitus chose fire as a symbol of the eternal flux because it eternally undergoes change. In his opinion only becoming and flux were real, while permanence and constancy are apparent (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 9). Unlike Heraclitus, Parmenides and Zeno believed that only the permanent (being) were real: they thought we cannot say of anything that it becomes, because that would imply it comes from nothing, which is impossible (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 9).

Plato found a similarity between the problem of being and change and the problem of the one and the many and tried to solve these issues with his theory

of the universe. He believed an ordinary object contains two parts: a "form" ("idea", "essence") and "matter" ("individuality", "sensible manifestation"). Forms are, claimed Plato, absolute, eternal and not subject to change, while objects or matter change, are temporary and relative. If projected onto the structure of existence, the world of forms (the intellectual world) is real and permanent, while everyday objects undergo change and their character is only of appearance (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 11). This classification corresponds to the objectivist dichotomy on mind and body.

Less than a century later Aristotle stated that time is motion or something very closely related to it, but later modified his view, claiming that time is both changing and permanent, in other words, time as well as motion "imply something that proceeds", therefore they must be unchanging (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 14).

3.7.2. Locke, Newton and Kant

John Locke proposed the ideas of *succession* and *duration* in understanding time (the former refers to our reflection of the appearance of ideas in succession and the latter to our reflection on the distance between parts of this succession). A few decades later the physicist Isaac Newton introduced the notions of *absolute* and *relative* times (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 18):

"Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by another name is called duration: relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year".

On the same line with Newton, Leibniz differentiated between potential and ideal time and on the other actual and real time (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 20). Time and space are imaginary and ideal and potential, while actual time and space exist thanks to created things (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 21). Leibniz understood time as the order of succession (while space was the order of coexistence) and considered succession the main characteristic of time (Benjamin, 1981:21).

A century later, Kant could not determine whether time is the form of our external or internal sense. He believed that representing time in space by a straight line stretching into infinity suggests time could require the use of our external senses. On the other hand, while dreaming or imagining, the contents undergo change and take place in succession, thereby suggesting that time is a form of our internal senses.

Kant's perspective of time differed from both Newton, who believed that time exists by itself, and Leibniz, who thought ideal time inheres in things and that it is presupposed every time we observe those things. In Kant's view time is a property of an instrument of the mind, a form of intuition with the help of which we perceive things (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 21).

3.7.3. Henri Bergson

The French philosopher Henri Bergson's thought greatly influenced understanding of time in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Bergson believed time is exemplified most efficiently in man's overlapping of mental states and their transition into succeeding states.

Bergson differentiated two conceptualisations of time, depending on processing of our conscious states: 1) *duration (durée)*, or a form of time obtained by our conscious states after ego "refrains from separating its present state from its former states " (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 24) and 2) *spatialized time*, the conception time acquired when we perceive our states of consciousness simultaneously, when we express time in terms of space, thereby projecting duration onto extensity and formulating succession in terms of a chain. We cannot measure *durée* due to the fact that within the ego we find succession without mutual externality, whereas outside the ego (in space) there is mutual externality and no succession (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 25).

3.7.4. Samuel Alexander

In his book *Space, Time and Deity* Alexander stated that the solution to the vital problems in philosophy depend on the solution to the issue of time and space and their mutual relation (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 25). In Alexander's opinion time and space are the basic stuff the universe is made up of. Alexander advocated the notion of interrelatedness of space and time and the concept of integrated space - time, claiming that time is in its character spatial and space temporal (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 27).

In Alexander's opinion the relationship between space and time could be understood in terms of the dichotomy between the body and the mind, with body corresponding to the spatial and the mind to the temporal (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981: 29).

3.7.5. Western thought vs. Eastern Thought

According to James L. Russell, the main difference between Eastern and Western philosophies regarding conceptualisation of time is that the latter have admitted that temporal existence is an illusion, whereas the former have not (Russell in Fraser, 1981: 59). Dominant religions have played a crucial role in conceptualization of time in these cultures, which, however, was modified under the influence of scientific discoveries in diverse fields of study.

3.7.5.1. Western Thought

Western thought, highly influenced by Christianity, has attempted to find answers to many crucial questions including the issue of arbitrariness vs. divinely planned nature of time, the goal - oriented nature of time and many more (Russell in Fraser, 1981: 59).

Time in Christianity has been studied on three levels: cosmic, historic and individual. While the focus of studying time at the cosmic level is on ordering events in the universe, the historic level is limited to human society. At an individual level, the same questions can be asked: "Does the life of an individual reflect a single purpose, are the stages in one's life organized and ordered and unified into a pattern?" Russell therefore suggests that in Christianity studying time at the aforementioned three levels has always been influenced by religion. Christian religion claims to be based on a succession of events which indeed took place in history, the central of which was the birth, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, who was an actual person.

The Old Testament prepares the Chosen People for the coming of Christ. Human life is seen as consisting solely of hard work, suffering and death, which

humanity have to deal with as a consequence of man's fallen state after Eve had eaten the apple in God's paradise. God nevertheless helped humanity by sending them a Messiah, who was to be the saviour of Jews as well as all the mankind. The crucial point of time in the Old Testament is the Incarnation, indicating the new order of things and comprehending the past, present and future in its light (Russell in Fraser, 1981: 62).

The focus in the New Testament is, on the other hand, on the Second Coming of Christ. It is suggested that there is a Christian pattern in history. Thus St. Paul states history has direction and meaning and is part of God's divine plan (Russell in Fraser, 1981:64). The Hebrew cultural background is reflected in the New Testament, with time pictured as having a linear character with its beginning at the creation of the world and its ending at the Second Coming of Christ and between these two points in time a divinely created period of unspecified length. The purpose of human life is to withstand all life difficulties and strive for salvation in the second life on Heaven.

Time in an individual's life is perceived in Christianity in two ways: as his life on earth and after death. The former view sees an individual as a mortal, whose life on earth has a definite beginning and end, whereas the latter perceives him as immortal, who will rise again upon the Second Coming of Christ and whose life will go on forever in Heaven or Hell (Russell in Fraser, 1981: 65).

The findings of geologists in the 17th century indicated that earth is much older than seven thousand years, as claimed by the Old Testament. These findings, together with the cognitions that human race, as well as the universe, had existed much longer than previously expected, questioned the Greek infinitivist view (its principles were reflected in the Old Testament). The

scientific breakthroughs in the areas of geology, astronomy, anthropology and other sciences refuted the Judeo - Christian finitist view that the end will come through the intervention of God: from a scientific point of view life on earth will definitely come to an end but it will be caused by other factors as long - term changes in the sun or by a man - made or a natural catastrophe (Russell in Fraser, 1981: 72). However, there was no agreement between the scientists when it came to a historic view of time: Jacques Bossuet advocated a linear theory of history while G.B.Vico proposed a cyclic theory in his *Scienza Nuova* of 1725, according to which civilizations rise and decline in a succession of stages. The linear perspective of time as well as a perception of human history as a constant progress towards a perfect society was proposed during the French Enlightenment period in the 18th century. This view collided with the Christian view; both Catholics and Protestants believed there would be no significant improvement in society due to the fact that man was totally corrupted by the Fall. The 19th century witnessed a particularly harsh criticism of scientific cognitions, especially Darwin's findings regarding the evolution of species. Christians criticized Darwin's theory on two grounds: 1) his theory of natural selection excluded design and purpose from the physical world and 2) Darwin's views on the evolution of man apparently reduced humans to the level of animals, leaving no possibilities for the immortality of the soul.

Nowadays, as asserted by Russell, most Christians accept the idea of evolution, although it has not been integrated into the Christian doctrine. It can be concluded that mainstream Western thought mainly advocates the unidirectional view of the human history, but at the same takes into consideration the findings of modern science (Russell in Fraser, 1981: 74).

3.7.5.2. Recent Views

One of the harshest critics of the pace of modern life has certainly been Paul Virilio. According to Virilio, apart from the well - known modes of pollution such as atmospheric, hydrospheric and others, humanity has been facing another form of spatial pollution: *dromosperic* pollution, from the Greek word *dromos* meaning speed. Virilio emphasizes a tendency to reach ever higher and higher speed with electromagnetic waves as well as sophisticated means of transport (subsonic, supersonic and yet to come hypersonic), all resulting in annihilation of space. Our geophysical surrounding has suffered the optical loss of landscape depth due to the accessible means of communication and transport, causing a dichotomy between the apparent horizon and our collective consciousness (Virilio, 1996: 177).

Virilio illustrates this phenomenon with the example of a parachute jump: we base our decision on when to pull the lever in order to open a parachute on our estimate of the height we are at and the choice of the right moment to open the parachute. Our visual impression is radically different at the height of 2000m from the height at 600m; at 2000m we do not see the Earth coming, however, at 600m we face a frightening feeling of the Earth first "coming" and soon after "opening" or rather split opening in front of us. Our accelerated perception of the Earth transforms from a full dimension at the beginning of the fall to a "dotted dimension" or a fractal vision, which is a result of the adaptation of our vision and high speeds. At that moment it is the perspective of the time left, strongly depending on the gravitation force, that a jumper is more concerned with rather than the perspective of space.

However, the perspective of time does not necessarily depend upon the gravitation force, since people have defied gravitation by utilizing light speed.

Thus time becomes stopped on our TV sets, whose videoscopic information constitution depends on the speed of light. Moreover, thanks to the frequencies of photonic waves and the consequential alteration of timespace of photosensitive matter, the time of coming to surface or the exposition time has overridden linear time. This is obvious in photographs, where the surface of a photograph stops the instant of time, whereas with videocassettes time does not stop any more, showing sequential time (Virilio, 1996: 183).

All these changes in communication, technology and transport result in the loss of psychological time and lead to one of the principal issues in current anthropology: the problem of nomadic and sedentary lifestyle. Virilio addresses another issue: the loss of trajectivity, i.e. moving from one place to another, which has characterised the human race since the beginning of time, the consequence of which is the loss of the "external world" and its endotic (this feature has resulted in the loss of external spatiality and temporality) rather than exotic character (Virilio, 1996: 178). People are immersed in the "eternal present", in which the slow and steady flow of time that our forefathers experienced not so long ago, has disappeared. The past has gone and even more so the future: people feel anxiety about the uncertainty that the future brings, perceiving the future as a threat of a nuclear catastrophe, global warming or entropy of the universe.

Virilio's view of the loss of material space which unavoidably leads to the reign of time over everything and everybody is shared by John Zerzan, an anarchoprimitivist. Zerzan claims that humanity is ruled by time and that this phenomenon eventually leads to alienation and dissatisfaction (Zerzan, 2004: 120). Thousands of years ago, he asserts, before people started measuring time, mankind led an idyllic life free of frustrations that time measurement brings along. However, Zerzan claims that these so - called primitive people did have a

consciousness: their consciousness of memories and purposes was more complex and at a higher level of rationality than the consciousness of modern man. The fact that people around the world who still live in tribally constituted communities do not mark the passage of time in the form of calendars or watches does not make them unconscious of what is going on around them (Zerzan, 2004: 101). Despite the fact that they do not record the passage of time, asserts Zerzan, primitive people were (and still are) much happier than civilized people, who have lost track of a natural way of living and base their existence on mathematical, linear time. Zerzan therefore proposes a future in which there will be no watches and no technological gadgets that we all rely upon in our lives, a future where humanity will return to, he says, genuine values of the times before the agricultural revolution (Zerzan, 2004: 102).

In summary, according to the Western view, time is linear and irreversible, materialized, mathematically calculated and marked by events. Furthermore, Western perspective of time sees it as monochronic rather than polychronic: exactness is in general of extreme importance in the West.

3.7.5.3. Eastern Thought

Eastern thought differs in some aspects from the Western perspective of time, while at the same time shows certain similarities with it. The conceptualisation of time as cyclic in ancient Greece influenced both the Eastern and the Western view of time, even more so the former; therefore I shall commence this section of the text by explaining the main principles of time conceptualisation in ancient Greece.

3.7.5.3.1. The Ancient Greeks

Plato believed that processes on Earth were determined by the configuration of heavenly bodies: the same configurations of planets reappear at constant intervals. The period between such returns Plato called the Great Year, equivalent to an ordinary year but on a vaster scale (Benjamin in Fraser, 1981:67).

Plato, as well as the Stoics and Neoplatonists after him, believed that the history of the earth is repeated in each cycle: every event in the universe is repeated for an indefinite number of times. The ancient Greeks, therefore, conceived of time as cyclical, but also indefinite in both directions: there was no beginning and no end for the human race. While they believed in God's eternity, the purpose of human existence was to be born, to procreate and to die (Russell in Fraser, 1981: 69).

Aristotle likewise conceived of time as cyclic, with times in art and science fully developing, disappearing and returning to its beginning, while Eudemus, Aristotle's disciple, "envisaged a complete return of time so that once again, or many times again, he would be sitting talking with his students" (Needham in Fraser, 1981: 129).

The ancient Greeks, therefore, experienced time (cosmic and historic time) as cyclic and infinite in both directions. The cyclic view of time, influenced by an accelerated growth of industry, technology and transport, which was by some perceived as an ultimate peak of civilization, inspired many philosophies of the 19th and 20th centuries to predict the arrival of a new era.

3.7.5.3.2. China

The conception of time as cyclic was advocated in China by Taoist speculative philosophers and Neo - Confucianists (the latter believed in a renewal of cosmic, biological and social evolution after periodical "nights" of chaos, alternating cycles of construction and dissolution). Needham stresses that cyclic conception of time by the Chinese is related to their preoccupation with cycles of living organisms (a time for being born, a time to die, a time for founding or supersession of a dynasty and similar) as well as with natural cycles encompassing the meteorological water cycle and the circulation of the blood and pneuma in human and animal bodies (Needham in Fraser, 1981: 98). However, the author states that the elements of temporal linearity were always present in Chinese outlook on time (Needham in Fraser, 1981: 135). Moreover, the conception of time as linear and irreversible has been prevalent in China since the times of scientific revolution and the accelerated industrial development, with the Chinese using mechanical clocks earlier than Europeans (Needham in Fraser, 1981: 106).

The Mohist school, the followers of Mo Ti (between 479 to 381 B.C.), conceived time as constantly changing and therefore dynamic: time was unstoppably passing from one moment to another as well as from one location to another. Needham emphasizes the fact that the Mohists understood the concepts of time and space similar to the way modern physicists perceive the space - time continuum (Needham in Fraser, 1981: 95).

3.7.5.3.3. Japan

Japanese thought envisaged time as dynamic: the essence of all things is mobile, therefore it is in essence of water to run or of a tree to bloom (Nakamura

in Fraser, 1981: 87). The Japanese put emphasis on singular events, which they perceive intuitively, supporting the notion that phenomenal reality is at the same time the ultimate reality (Nakamura in Fraser, 1981: 85).

Although admitting the transient, irreversible nature of time, the Japanese viewed the flow of time as a positive rather than negative phenomena. According to this view it is not important how long we live, but what we make out of our lives.

The doctrines (sūtras) spread by most Buddhist sects in Japan advocate the concept of Three Times or periods following the demise of Lord Buddha: The Period of the Perfect Law (when Buddha's ideas were perfectly practiced), the Period of the Copied Law (the period during which the religion of Buddha was only partly practiced) and the Period of the Latter Law (the period of open degeneration). The idea of the Latter Law became deeply entrenched in Japan and various sects preach that the current, degenerate age will be replaced by the age of the Perfect or at least the Copied Law (Nakamura in Fraser, 1981: 90). We can, therefore, conclude that in Japan ideas of time as a cyclic phenomena exist alongside the conceptions which perceive it as linear.

3.7.5.3.4. India

The conception of time in Indian thought is static rather than dynamic: although it is admitted that the things of this world are always changing, the essence of things is seen as static (Nakamura in Fraser, 1981: 77). The static conception of time in Indian thought is also reflected in the language, namely in the classical Indian languages there are no words equivalent to the concept "to become". Thus the verb derived from the root *bhū* can be translated both as "to become" and "to exist" (Nakamura in Fraser, 1981:77). Moreover, the aspects of

"to become" and "to exist", which in Western thought are conceived as antithetical, are not differentiated in Indian languages.

In Indian thought action is considered static rather than dynamic. This attitude to action is due to the Indian philosophy according to which the Absolute is explained as a Being beyond all temporal appearances. While the latter change in time, the Absolute is in its nature basically static (Nakamura in Fraser, 1981: 79). This view is similar to Plato's, who considered the true essence of reality as containing changeless and timeless forms.

As a result of such views on temporality, the use of tenses in Sanskrit, Hindustani and many other languages spoken in India reveal a non-differentiation amongst past and present tenses. Thus *kal* in modern Hindustani means both "yesterday" and "tomorrow", while *parson* refers both to "the day after tomorrow" and "the day before yesterday" (Nakamura in Fraser, 1981:81).

It should be noted, asserts Nakamura, that in general the Indian people conceive time as transient and changing (Nakamura in Fraser, 1981: 83). They are aware that all things are subject to decay and destruction and that sooner or later they vanish. This manner of time conceptualization is in a way similar to the Western view of time (Shakespeare, Sonnet xviii: "...And every fair from fair some time declines...").

It can be concluded that, unlike Western thought, which conceptualizes time as dynamic, linear and irreversible, in Eastern thought there are variations with regard to understanding the concept of time. Indian culture understands time statically, which is also reflected in the languages that are spoken on the Indian subcontinent, whereas in Japan and China time is conceived as dynamic.

The ancient Greeks, Chinese and Japanese had a cyclic understanding of time, while today time is mainly conceived as linear in those cultures.

3.7.6. Controversies Related to the Western Conceptualization of Time

The previous century witnessed revolutionary breakthroughs in natural sciences, particularly in physics, as well as neuroscience, which cast a new light upon the conceptualization of time. These findings challenge the still prevalent notions of time as irreversible, linear and objective. Four main controversies will be addressed: the controversy of time marked by events, the controversy of the linear and irreversible character of time, the controversy of absolute vs. relative time and the controversy of subjective vs. objective time (the last controversy will be discussed after the section about embodied time so that two opposing stands can be contrasted).

3.7.6.1. The Controversy of Time as Marked by Events

Mainstream Western thought conceives of the passage of time as being marked by events, which help form *historical time*. The philosopher Mirko Polić, however, emphasizes that if there are no events, there is no time. He further stresses the importance of another component (besides events themselves) that should be taken into consideration when discussing historical time and that is understanding events that shape historical time. Polić warns that time is often distorted in a chaotic, unlawful and unpredictable way because social groups of different orientations have a different view of events and therefore form different values, which eventually results in various shaping of time (time is shaped both by events and values).³⁴

³⁴ <http://www.radionicapolic.hr/filozofija/predavanje15.pdf>

However, Polić questions the notion of the irreversibility of time since, according to physicists, there are no physical laws which prevent us from travelling into the past or the future.³⁵ In four - dimensional or a mathematically shaped space - time continuum, which is dependent on cause and effect relation, points out Polić, there is no significant difference between the coordinates of space and time. This is because in a highly determined system only what is necessary is possible, and it is necessary because it already is; therefore past, present and future events represent only dots on one of the existing coordinates of space - time. Polić concludes his polemic by stating that linear time is theoretically reversible like movement in continuous space. This brings us to the issue of (ir)reversibility of time, which has been the subject of many controversies, debates and polemics.

3.7.6.2. The Controversy of the Linearity and (Ir)reversibility of Time

For a little longer than a century we have been faced with a controversy: Is there such a thing as a linear, irreversible time or do we live in eternal present, where the past, the present and the future exist simulataneously?

John Zerzan refers to recent developments in physics in order to answer this question. Theoretical physics perceives time as a flat line, thus conceptualizing it in accordance with the cultural history of time (Zerzan, 2004: 114). However, continues Zerzan, the reknowned physicist Stephen Hawking states that the laws of science do not differentiate between the past, the present and the future. In Hawking's opinion human consciousness is of crucial importance in time conceptualization, thus all irreversible phenomena are a

³⁵ There are speculations that time travel could be realized via worm - holes (the shape of which could be visualized if we imagine an empty hard - shell taco with an hourglass shaped tube), which could act like bridges between two ends in the universe. Another way of travelling in time could be to create a tear in time. Timetravel, if put to practice, can cause paradoxes such as the Grandfather paradox.

result of a specific nature of human cognition (Zerzan, 2004: 114). The prevalent perspective of time (especially in Western thought) has been that time is irreversible and linear and this kind of view has certainly influenced the scientific thought. Nevertheless, observations in the area of thermodynamics, especially the Second Law of Thermodynamics, according to which all systems show a tendency towards entropy and lawlessness put this view in question. Moreover, quantum physics does not identify a specific direction of time. The principle of indeterminacy, according to which movement of particles is a matter of probability, has reviewed the notions of sequence of events and causality (Zerzan, 2004: 116). This theory has revolutionized the scientific thought and paved the path to an atemporal conceptualization of time.

In Zerzan's opinion scientists have made a compromise to the entrenched understanding of time, which is evident in Nobel Prize Laureate's Ilya Prigogine's claim that it is impossible to study time beside the principle of irreversibility, although previously having stated that all levels of existence were marked by non - linear time (Zerzan, 2004: 118). Zerzan explains Prigogine's stand in terms of the possibility of a chaos which, according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, we all might be approaching. This anxiety, it seems, has moulded scientific thought in the form of altering its principles in accordance with the current political thought.

3.7.6.3. The Controversy of Absolute and Relative Time

The neuroscientist Vyvyan Evans addresses in detail the issue of absolute and relative time in his book *The Structure of Time: Language, Meaning and Temporal Cognition*, referring mainly to Einstein's theory of relativity and its consequences on understanding time. The Newtonian view of time as absolute, claims Evans, prevailed in the natural sciences up to the developments in the

electromagnetic theory in the middle of the 19th century. Scientists gave uniform speeds and assigned relative motion for propagation of electromagnetic radiation, including the speed of light, which implies that the speed of light varies according to the speed of the observer relative to the beam of light (Evans, 2004: 238). Evans emphasizes the importance of the experiment conducted by Michelson and Morley at the end of the 19th century, the aim of which was to assess the speed at which the Earth travelled through the "aether". This experiment showed that the speed of light was invariant in regard to the motion of frame of reference (Evans, 2004: 238).

Einstein tried to resolve the problem of reconciling relative motion with its inapplicability to electromagnetic radiation. He set foundations to his theory of special relativity, in which he asserts that the speed of light is constant regardless of the speed of the observer, claiming that time and space are themselves relative. Time is, therefore, dependent on the speed of a particular observer, with each observer occupying a unique frame of reference. Consequently the notion of simultaneity according to which two observers in two systems of reference, one at motion and the other one at rest, experience particular events simultaneously had to be abandoned (Evans, 2004: 240). Instead, Einstein reached the conclusion that every reference - body has its own particular time, which he supports with the example of a long moving train and two observers simultaneously observing lights occurring at points A and B on the embankment, with one observer on the train and the other one on the embankment (the observer on the train is located at point M' and the observer on the embankment at the equivalent point M): the observer on the train notices the flash from point B prior to the flash from point A, while the observer on the embankment sees two simultaneous flashes.

Furthermore, experiments with particle accelerators and atomic clocks have shown that the closer one approaches the speed of light, the slower the passage of time is, relative to a frame of reference at rest. Thus an experiment was conducted in 1971 with four atomic clocks flown on commercial airlines. Although small (approximately a microsecond per day's flying), time dilation effect was observable on the atomic clocks, while on the clock at rest, which had been synchronized with the atomic clocks, no time warp was registered (Evans, 2004: 242).

Evans points out that Einstein's relativity theory advocates the view that time dilation is observable on clocks, but that it can also be applied on biological mechanisms (Evans, 2004: 242). This led physicists to speculate on the phenomenon entitled the Twins Paradox. The paradox explores the possibility of two observers, two twins, observing time from different places: twin A from the Earth and twin B from a rocket in space, with the times of reference A' for the twin who is propelled into space and B' for the twin who stays at home. To both twins A and B it would appear that his twin brother/sister aged more slowly than him/her during B's absence from Earth, and to both of them time ran more slowly in the other twin's situation (Evans, 2004: 242). However, while twin A has experienced absolute motion, which involves accelerating away from the Earth, breaking, de- accelerating and re- accelerating towards the Earth, twin B has undergone uniform motion. We can, therefore, conclude that twins A and B experience different intervals of time between the identical events, i.e. A's departure from and return to Earth (Evans, 2004: 243).

For the purposes of our study the fourth controversy, i.e. the controversy between the subjective and objective time will be addressed after the cognitivists' stance of embodied time has been explained.

3.7.6.4. Embodied Time

Scientists of cognitive provenance stress that the transience of human existence is projected upon our conception of time, therefore time is conceived as irreversible (the present is where we are now, the past is in the back, the future is in front) and transient. As pointed out by Biti and Marot Kiš, marking the flow of time enables us to get by in dealing with an abstract category such as time (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 229).

As pointed out earlier in the text, a predecessor of cognitivism, the French philosopher Maurice Merleau - Ponty, understood time as *embodied* or, in other words, as existing in interaction with our embodied existence. Thus we conceptualize time as a river flowing throughout our lives, which makes our body interact with the surrounding world (Gibbs, 2007: 17).

Further in the text we shall discuss the manners of conceptualizing time through other concepts such as space, events, motion, resource and substance. All the named concepts contribute to our understanding of time as an interactive agent in our lives.

3.7.6.4.1. Time Conceptualized Through Other Concepts

In their book *Philosophy in the Flesh: the Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* Lakoff and Johnson claim that people conceptualize time with the help of other concepts such as events, motion and space. Furthermore, assert these authors, time is mainly understood not in its own terms but metaphorically or metonymically (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 137).

3.7.6.4.2. Space - Time Metonymies

Lakoff and Johnson stress that metonymies occur in literal motion - situations when the correlations between the target and source domains and elements mapped between them bring them together into a whole. In such correlations one thing metonymically represents another, as illustrated in the following examples:

San Francisco is half an hour from Berkeley.

I slept for fifty minutes while she drove.

While in the first example time duration, the time it normally takes one to travel from San Francisco to Berkeley (*half an hour*), metonymically stands for distance, in the second sentence distance is juxtaposed for time, i.e. the distance of *fifty miles* stands for the amount of time spent sleeping (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 137).

Metonymical transfers are closely connected with metaphorical transfers, which will be discussed in further text.

3.7.6.4.3. Time in Terms of Events

Lakoff and Johnson emphasize that our conceptualization of time is connected with iterations of events and, consequently, the main literal properties of our concept of time result from the properties of events (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 138):

- 1) Time is directional and irreversible because events are directional and irreversible; events cannot "unhappen".
- 2) Time is continuous because we experience events as continuous.
- 3) Time is segmentable because periodic events have beginnings and ends.
- 4) Time can be measured because iterations of events can be counted.

It can be concluded that time is perceived through embodied events. Thus movements of the hands on an analog clock depend on the iterated motions of pendulum or the motion of wheels driven by a release of a spring, which in turn depend on the movements of the sun. Likewise, the alteration of numbers on a digital clock depend on regular repeated release of subatomic particles, which are also dependent on sun movements (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 138).

3.7.6.4.4. Compression and Objects of Material Culture

As pointed out by Biti and Marot Kiš, we need objects of material culture as crutches for time conceptualization, the operation of which is made possible through the process of blending (Biti and Marot Kiš: 2008, 230). Fauconnier and Turner stress that we utilize sundials, watches, gauges, compasses and similar objects for that purpose (Fauconnier and Turner, 2003: 195).³⁶ In that way the model of noon is a blend resulting from diverse input spaces, namely the corresponding times in distinct days, so that a noon of yesterday, today,

³⁶ All devices for measuring time are referred to as *timepieces*. The importance of time has been increasing throughout centuries and people have measured it in different cultures around the world. Although the concept of time was not recognized by prehistoric humans, who measured time relying on natural changes they could observe, the first artificial timepiece, the sundial, was introduced with the development of agriculture, which measured time by the sun's movements. An increased emphasis on time measurement, linked with social, commercial and scientific developments, led to turret clocks followed during the Renaissance, which stroke every hour and the spring and the pendulum in the 15th and 17th centuries respectively, making timepieces more portable. More sophisticated and accurate timepieces, introduced in the 20th century, designed primarily for domestic use, include battery - driven clock and the more accurate quartz crystal in watches (http://www.sage-reference.com/time/Article_n604.html).

tomorrow become one single noon in the blend (Fauconnier and Turner: 2003, 195). This is possible due to the generic space, in which, due to the periodic nature of time, noon in each input space is conceptualized as the same abstract noon. While in inputs as well as the generic space a single day runs only once, in the blend the day continually runs through identical stages: dawn, morning, noon, afternoon, evening, night, the phenomenon which Fauconnier and Turner have entitled the *Cyclic Day* network (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 196).

Similar operations run for other units of time, such as day, week, month, year, and in each of these networks the time from input spaces runs only once, whereas in the blend the same units of time are iterated, they repeat again and again. While in the inputs time is linear and "divided into equal segments" (Fauconnier; Turner, 2002: 196), the result in the blend is cyclic time. The fact that one single day, month, week or a year represent corresponding time units that run in succession infinitely is possible due to the process of *compression*, in which outer - space analogies from input spaces are fused in a blend into a uniqueness, a single inner - space temporal unit.

Fauconnier and Turner provide more examples of compression, which we comprehend with the help of conceptual relations, named *vital relations* by the authors. These relations play a vital role in the process of blending, which will be shown on a few examples.

The result of the Buddhist Monk riddle are two monks in the blend, while in the inputs each monk is identical to his counterpart in the other blend, although one of them is a few days older (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 95), thereby utilising the vital relation of *identity*, in which we refer to the personal identity of one and the same monk.

Other vital relations are of equal importance in blends, in which usually more than one vital relation is in operation. In that way we notice the functioning of several vital relations in the statement *Birds have evolved from dinosaurs*, namely the vital relation of *cause and effect*, which refers to the development of the stated species through genetical evolution, *analogy* (one dinosaur resembles another) and *disanalogy*, in which in generation-to-generation differences are outlined (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002: 93). In the blend we obtain a unique dinosaur who has undergone a series of changes in the process of evolution from a dinosaur to a bird.

A similar example includes our comprehension of human evolution: every phase of evolution is represented by a different picture representing a different stage in human evolution. Although we are aware of the fact that no single man has undergone all these changes, thanks to the process of compression in the blend we have one human being undergoing all the phases of evolution, from an ape to a modern man sitting at his computer in a bent position (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2008: 237). Furthermore, this blend suggests that the linear process of evolution has obtained a reverse pattern: the last stage illustrating a bent man over his computer reminds us of the bearing of the second phase in the blend, namely the humanoid ape. Thus in the blend a new quality emerges: it is criticism of our sedentary lifestyle as well as accelerated and dehumanised pace of contemporary life, in which various gadgets of modern technology bring what was once *homo erectus* to the initial phases of the blend, an ape moving on its front and rear legs. In the stated blend the functioning of several vital operations can be noticed: *cause and effect* (genetical evolution), *change* (the being in each stage changes into a "more developed" being), *analogy and disanalogy* (similar reasons as the previous blend), but also *time* (developments occur during a period of time).

In the Human Evolution blend as well as the Buddhist Monk blend the vital relation of time is of utmost importance since the inputs separated in time are brought together in the blends.

3.7.6.4.5. Spatial Time

Apart from understanding time through events, Lakoff and Johnson emphasize another usual conceptualization of time, pervasive in diverse world cultures: understanding time in terms of motion in space (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 139). Vyvyan Evans points out that equating time and motion seems to be a cross – linguistic phenomenon, stressing that such a pattern is common to the languages as diverse as English, Japanese, Chinese, the Niger – Congo language, which makes this linguistic phenomenon universal (Evans, 2004: 14).

According to Lakoff and Johnson, the most efficient and most usual manner to comprehend the time concept (as with other concepts) is through metaphors. The authors point at the basic metaphor for time and that is The Time Orientation Metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 140). The authors stress that there is an observer in the present who is facing the future in front of him and has left the past behind him (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 140):

The Time Orientation Metaphor

The Location of the Observer → The Present

The Space In Front Of The Observer → The Future

The Space Behind the Observer → The Past

In that way most cultures perceive the past as being behind us, the present as the location where we are now and the future in front of us. However, some languages such as Aymara, a Chilean language of the Andes, perceive the past

as being in front and the future in the back. Their reasoning is based on a notion that one can see the results of what he has done in front of him (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 141).

Lakoff and Johnson distinguish two variations of the Time Orientation Metaphor: *the Moving Time Metaphor* and *the Moving Observer Metaphor*. The difference between the Moving Time and the Moving Observer metaphors can best be illustrated on a set of apparently similar sentences. In the sentence *We're coming up on Christmas* the observer (We) is moving towards the future point, that is Christmas, whereas the sentence *Christmas is coming* conceptualizes a point in the future (Christmas) as approaching the stationary observer (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 148)³⁷. Both Moving Time and Moving Observer metaphors conceptualize the passage of time in terms of motion between the observer and times that are conceptualised in terms of space. However, there is an important difference between the two in the function of the trajector and the landmark: in the Moving Time Metaphor there is a stationary observer and times, understood as objects moving past it, are moving, while in the Moving Observer Metaphor times are locations towards which an observer moves. In these two metaphors the trajector and the landmark are reversed and this phenomena is known in cognitive linguistics as duality, while pairs of metaphors similar to the stated examples are called duals (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 149). The mappings between the source space (space) and the target space (time) can be illustrated as following (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 142):

³⁷ Lakoff and Johnson point out that a sentence such as *Let's move the meeting ahead a week* is ambiguous because the expression *move ahead* can be applied to both metaphors. In the Moving Time metaphor, in which the future time is approaching the present, the meaning of the sentence implies moving the meeting ahead of the time at which it is set, in other words, closer to the present. Contrary to this, in the Moving Observer metaphor, in which the observer is moving towards the future, moving the meeting a week ahead is understood as moving it ahead from the point in the future where the observer will be, namely, moving it further into the future. Thus the sentence can be interpreted in two opposing ways, depending on which metaphor is taken into consideration. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 148).

The Moving Time Metaphor

Objects	→	Times
The Location of the Observer	→	The Present
The Space in Front of the Observer	→	The Future
The Space Behind the Observer	→	The Past
The Motion of Objects Past the Observer	→	The "Passage" of Time

The Moving Observer Metaphor

The Location of the Observer	→	The Present
The Space in Front of the Observer	→	The Future
The Space Behind the Observer	→	The Past
Locations On Observer's Path of Motion	→	Times
The Motion of the Observer	→	The "Passage" of Time
The Distance Moved By the Observer	→	The Amount of Time "Passed"

Raymond W. Gibbs emphasizes that subjects, when given a set of temporal statements, respond differently depending on the consistency of schemas contained in temporal statements. Thus, during one experiment the participants were given a set of temporal statements that were consistent with one of the schemes (the Moving Observer scheme and the Moving Time scheme) or alternated between the ego - moving and the time - moving schemes. They were given a time - line of events (e.g. past... New Year's Day...future) for each statement (ex. *Christmas is six days before New Year's Day*) and were asked to place an event on the time - line. The study showed that it took participants more time to place events on a time - line when the temporal

statements switched between the two ego - based metaphors than when the temporal statements were consistent with one scheme (Gibbs, 2007: 188).

A similar study on understanding time expressions was performed at an airport, when people were asked a question in either the ego - moving form (e.g. *Is Boston ahead or behind in time?*) or the time - moving form (e.g. *Is it earlier or later in Boston than it is here?*). After the participants had answered the question, they were asked the target question "So should I turn my watch forward or back? ", which was consistent with the Observer - Moving form. The response times to the target question indicated that it took the participants less time to answer consistently primed questions than to answer questions the sequence of which switched schemes (Gibbs, 2007: 188).

These studies showed the role the two ego - based schemes have in sequencing events of time and in providing evidence for the psychological entrenchment of these two distinct temporal schemes (Gibbs, 2007: 188).

3.7.6.4.6. Vertical or Horizontal Conceptualization of Time

The participants' response time also varied in another experiment, which indicated that the way people conceptualize time strongly relies on the language they speak. The study was performed on English and Mandarin speakers by psychologist of cognitive provenance Lera Boroditsky, who conducted the experiment with a group of university students whose first language was either English or Mandarin (Boroditsky, 2001: 1). It must be noted that English speakers mainly use horizontal terms when talking about time, while Mandarin speakers use both vertical terms and horizontal terms, i.e. the spatial morphemes *shàng* and *xià* are mainly used to talk about the event order, which the Chinese conceptualize vertically with earlier events conceived as *higher* or *above* the

later events, while the morphemes *qián* and *hòu* are used in spatial and temporal senses (Boroditsky, 2001: 4).

The subjects were asked to answer false/ true sentences about time (e.g. *March comes earlier than April*). Prior to that, they were shown horizontal and vertical spatial primes. The study, in which some English speakers were trained beforehand to use vertical terms for talking about time, while a significant number of Mandarin speakers had spoken English for at least 10 years, had an interesting outcome. Overall, Mandarin speakers responded more swiftly after vertical spatial primes, while English speakers were relied more on horizontal representations of time and therefore were faster answering questions after horizontal spatial primes. Furthermore, the Mandarin - speaking participants who started learning English at an early age showed a tendency to respond faster after the horizontal spatial primes. Similarly, the results of English speakers who had had a brief training in conceptualizing time through vertical terms were statistically almost undistinguishable from the results of Mandarin speakers (Boroditsky, 2001: 12). It can be concluded that habits in thought are encouraged by language function no matter which language a person is currently thinking in (Boroditsky, 2001: 12).

3.7.6.4.7. SEQUENCE IS RELATIVE POSITION ON A PATH metaphor

The cognitive scientist Kevin Ezra Moore distinguishes another, perspective - neutral temporal metaphor, which he named SEQUENCE IS RELATIVE POSITION ON A PATH (or shorter SEQUENCE IS POSITION). This metaphor is not relative to ego as in the Moving Time or Moving Observer (Moving Ego) metaphors. Like Lakoff and Johnson, Moore points at the crosslinguistic pervasiveness of the mapping structure and relations from space

to time by providing examples in English but also Wolof (a Niger - Congo language spoken in Senagal and The Gambia) and Japanese.

Unlike Lakoff and Johnson, who understand motion metaphors in the context of the abstract concepts of MOTION and TIME, Moore comprehends these metaphors through the interplay "of spatial and temporal aspects of specific scenarios of motion" (Moore, 2006: 201). He does not conceive the ego - based metaphors or the SEQUENCE IS RELATIVE POSITION ON A PATH as mappings of structures and relations from the domain of SPACE to the domain of TIME, i.e. he does not perceive SPACE and TIME as two distinct domains, but rather as metaphors based on the frames of ORDERED MOTION mapping on the frame of SUCCESSION (SEQUENCE IS RELATIVE POSITION ON A PATH metaphor) or RELATIVE MOTION mapping onto EGO - CENTERED TIME (Ego - based metaphors)³⁸.

Moore sees SEQUENCE IS A RELATIVE POSITION ON A PATH as a metaphor in its own right and not as Moving Time metaphor (like most other scholars of cognitive provenance). In fact, Moore proposes the division of temporal metaphors (in)dependent of ego on Ego - centered Moving Time metaphors and SEQUENCE IS RELATIVE POSITION ON A PATH metaphors. While in the Moving Ego metaphor, the ego (experiencer of time) moves relative to stationary times or the times move relative to ego as in the Moving Time metaphor, SEQUENCE IS RELATIVE POSITION ON A PATH is neutral in regard to ego's perspective. The author illustrates this feature in the following example:

A reception followed the talks.

³⁸ One of the reasons for not differentiating these frames Moore sees in the historical usage of the words *in front* and *behind* meaning *before* and *after*, which were more prominent and productive in the past than they are now. Thus the sentence *She rode before/ after him.* was understood as *She rode in front/ behind him.* According to Moore *before* and *after* motivated SEQUENCE IS POSITION early in the English language and are deictically neutral.

Two times in the metaphor have been marked with italic letters and they are regarded as independent of ego's perspective. Unlike SEQUENCE IS A RELATIVE POSITION ON A PATH, The Moving Time or Moving Ego metaphors have an ego - based frame of reference in common, namely all spatial relations (in the source frame and temporal relations in the target frame) are determined relative to ego (Moore, 2006: 204), thus "here" maps onto "now", "behind" to "before" and "in front of" to "later". In a similar way, when an event approaches *now* (Time Moving metaphor) or an observer approaches an event (Ego Moving metaphor), we speak of co - location, i.e being in the same place, which maps onto simultaneity (Moore, 2006: 203), as in the examples *He has reached his 25th birthday*. (Observer Moving metaphor) or *Christmas has arrived* (Time Moving metaphor). Furthermore, the latter example is also an example of simultaneity, where the trajector (Christmas) and the landmark (observer, ego) occur at the same moment. Simultaneity is, however, not depicted in SEQUENCE IS RELATIVE MOTION ON A PATH metaphors, since the relationship between the temporal Figure and Ground does not alter. Thus ego - based metaphors are supported by deictic expressions or "expressions whose reference is anchored in the situation in which they are uttered (or in an imagined counterpart situation) in such a way that the meaning of the expression depends crucially on that situation" (Moore, 2006: 205). Unlike ego - based metaphors, SEQUENCE IS RELATION ON A PATH metaphor is not determined by deictic expressions and the way we conceptualise a sentence containing a SEQUENCE IS RELATIVE MOTION ON A PATH metaphor does not alter whether the sentence contains a deictic expression or not. The temporal relations are not *past*, *present* or *future* as in ego - based metaphors, but *earlier than* or *later than* (Moore, 2006: 225).

Furthermore, Moore points out that the distance and therefore the times in ego - based metaphors are shortening, whereas in SEQUENCE IS RELATION ON A PATH metaphors they remain the same, no matter which perspective the motion

is observed from (Moore, 2006: 226). This quality makes the SEQUENCE IS RELATION ON A PATH metaphors perspective neutral and compatible to both deictic and non – deictic expressions (Moore, 2006: 207).

Finally, Moore asserts, in the example *A reception followed the talks*, the mental images of SEQUENCE IS A RELATIVE MOTION ON A PATH metaphors are not determined by spatial imagery. Thus the author proposes that the verb *follow* suggests a temporal event (reception) which sequenced another temporal event (talks). In this aspect they differ from ego - based metaphors, in which a mental image cannot be formed without spatial imagery (Moore, 2006: 225).

3.7.6.4.8. Time - Reference - Point Metaphors

Another classification of temporal metaphors is offered by Núñez, Motz and Teuscher. The authors differentiate Ego Reference - Point metaphors, the subtypes of which are Moving Time and Moving Ego metaphors, and Time - Reference - Point metaphors (Núñez, Motz, Teuscher, 2006: 133). They base this division on "the role of reference points in ascribing orientation rather than on the identity of a moving entity, i.e. Ego or Time" (Núñez, Motz, Teuscher, 2006: 133). In the former case of metaphor the ego's location, which always specifies the present, determines the movement of either an observer or time, as shown by Lakoff and Johnson. In contrast, in Time - Reference - Point metaphors, there is no obligatory determination of Now (or the present), i.e. the metaphor is perspective - free, but rather the events are interdependent in the sense that earlier events in time are "in front" of later events.

The authors address the issue of moving next Wednesday's meeting forward two days and speculate whether the participants of the stated psychological research opted for the "Monday" answer because they conceive

the meeting as having been moved towards the present or themselves (Ego) or because the meeting has been moved towards the front of the sequence of days (Monday is earlier than Wednesday)³⁹. Thus the sentences *Spring follows winter* and *The wedding is coming* have different reference points: in the first sentence the focus is on the intrinsic relationship between the two events, namely spring and winter, whereas in the second sentence Time is moving towards the Ego.

The main characteristics of Time- Reference - Point metaphors include:

- 1) Spatial language for time is not always dynamic, as illustrated in the sentences *His appointments are too close* or *They were born a year apart*.
- 2) In cases when time is construed as moving, the Ego is not always a reference point:

Wednesday follows Tuesday.

February comes before March.

In the first sentence, the authors assert, it is the temporal event, namely Wednesday that is moving, whereas Tuesday is the location. In the second sentence February acts as the moving reference point for the location of March (Núñez, Motz, Tauscher, 2006: 135).

- 3) In expressions similar to the examples in 2) it is not necessary to specify either the present time (Now) or the future or past.

³⁹ It must be noted that "front" from the source domain, namely one - dimensional space, is the result of another conceptual mapping, in which people relate an orientation of object to their prototypical direction of motion, such as the front of a car or the frontal part of an animal body (Nuñez, Motz, Teuscher, 2006: 136).

The authors do not classify Ego Reference Point metaphors and Time – Reference Point metaphors according to what moves, that is Ego or Time, but rather according to the static or dynamic reference point.

Another issue raised by the authors is researching the role of the Ego in questions relative to the deictic semantic categories Future and Past, as in the sentences:

*Next Wednesday's meeting has been moved forward and
Last Wednesday's meeting got moved forward.*

Two experiments were conducted, the aim of which was to research whether the answer "Monday" as the interpretation for forward is related to showing an Ego - free display on screen.

In the first experiment the participants were shown a graphical array of coloured boxes containing two small balls within each, which moved horizontally at constant speed. In order to reduce the possibility for an observer to interpret motion relative to himself, in the second phase of the experiment the two balls contained in the box moved from their original box to another, either forward or backward.

The priming material consisted of five written questions and their aim was to stress the orientation of the objects:

*What is the colour of the frontmost box?
Did the black ball move forward or backward?*

The target question was either *On what day will the meeting take place?* and *On what day did the meeting take place?*

The answer showed that 64 out of 66 participants identified the box farthest along the path of motion. The responses to the target questions indicated that the examinees were more likely to interpret that the meeting was moved to Monday rather than Friday, i.e. the results showed that in situations when objects are moving relative to one another participants tend to interpret "forward" as "earlier". The direction of the motion of the boxes did not appear to change the effects; thus 66.7% participants answered "Monday" when the stimulus moved to the right compared to 67.6% of the examinees who provided the same answer when the stimulus moved to the left.

A similar experiment was performed with an array of squares that moved from right to left or remained fixed in the centre of the screen (control group). Firstly the participants were asked priming questions *What is the colour of the square with the white dot?* and similar questions about the priming stimuli to make sure the examinees were paying attention to the screen.

Subsequently the examinees were asked the target questions, which included the two questions from the first experiment plus two more questions:

Tomorrow's 12.00 p.m. (noon) meeting has been moved forward 2 hours. At what time will the meeting now take place? and

Yesterday's 12.00 p.m. (noon) meeting got moved forward two hours. At what time did the meeting take place?

The examinees showed a tendency to interpret "forward" as "earlier" both when asked about the "last Wednesday's meeting" (59.6%) and the "next Wednesday's meeting" (67.6 %) and therefore reported the meeting was moved to Monday, whereas a minority interpreted "forward" as "later" and stated the meeting was moved to Friday. The results indicated that the change of direction of the motion of the cubes did not have a significant effect on the participants' answers.

In the second experiment the participants were shown a graphical array of coloured squares. The squares were either moving horizontally across the screen or remained fixed in the centre of the screen (control group). While being shown the squares on the screen they were asked a priming question to ensure they were paying attention to the display on the screen.

The results were similar to those of the first experiment. Thus when asked about the past, 70.8% of the primed participants replied "earlier" and 71.4% answered likewise for the future, compared to 28.6% of the "later" answers for the past and 28.6% for the future. There was also consistency in the answers: the participants who replied "Monday" also answered "10 p.m." (92%) and those that replied "Friday" likewise answered "2 p.m.".

The results of the two experiments indicated that "earlier" answers are given irrespective of whether the target questions refer to the future or past.

The results of these two experiments indicate that people conceive time through conceptual metaphor; however, this metaphor draws temporal inference from an Ego - free spatial sequence. This conceptual metaphor, the time Reference Point metaphor, as stated by the authors, "maps locations that are in front or ahead of others in the sequence with "earlier" events" (Núñez, Motz,

Tauscher, 2006: 143). Unlike Ego - based metaphors, in which an Ego always specifies the present Now and consequently deictic semantic categories Future and Past, the Time RP metaphor does not necessarily include Ego and does not necessarily specify the present time Now. The Time RP metaphor rather differentiates posteriority (referring to one time as being later in a sequence than another) and anteriority (referring to one time as being earlier in a sequence than another). In this respect moving "forward" signifies moving "earlier" and draws its inferential organization from the intrinsic front - back relationship of the spatial sequence, that is anteriority and posteriority.

3.7.6.4.9. The Time Substance Metaphor

A variation of the Moving Time metaphor is the metaphor in which time is perceived as a flowing substance rather than in terms of multiplicity of objects moving in a sequence (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 144). We often conceptualize a linear *flow of time* in the form of a river as a usual linear moving substance. Due to the fact that the quantity of a substance can be measured, i.e. we deal with a lot or a little substance, so can the amount of time, which consequently leads to the following metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 145):

The Time – Substance Metaphor

Substance	→	Time
Amount of Substance	→	Duration of Time
The Size of the Amount	→	The Extent of the Duration
Motion of Substance Past	→	The "Passage" of Time

Lakoff and Johnson stress that we often conceptualize similar variations between a multiplicity and a mass (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 145) and consequently establish a systematic relationship between them. This

phenomenon is called *multiplicity - to - mass image schema transformation* (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 145). This transformation is founded on one of the most common experiences of our daily lives, the one of a group of similar individuals standing near each other and thus resembling a mass when looked upon from a distance (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 145).

3.7.6.5. The Space - Time Continuum

Lakoff and Johnson draw attention to the fact that Albert Einstein utilizes the metaphor Time is Space in a unique manner. This conception of time as seen by the advocates of general relativity theory excludes the moving observer and absolute simultaneity aspects, but rather conceptualises time as a space - like dimension, a location in which time is one of the four dimensions of this space - time continuum (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 160). Space - time is comprehended via gravity, which is, according to the principles of general relativity theory, a curvature in the space - time continuum. This curvature produces black holes, which attract all objects orbiting them. The shape of a black hole can best be visualized if we imagine a stretched rubber sheet and a heavy ball on it: the result is a circular sinking effect. The faster an object circularly moves towards a black hole, the closer it gets to it (due to the gravitational force), until it eventually disappears in it. Cosmologists believe that it is possible for a black hole to pull so much energy and matter and consequently grow in size and force to such an extent as to engulf other black holes and, eventually, the whole universe. As a result time in the universe would come to a standstill, which would in turn cause a discharge of enormous amounts of energy, thereby causing another Big Bang and creating a similar universe. Some physicists believe there is a variable force in space called Lambda, which seems to emit a force which aids universe to expand, with new energy and matter coming into existence every trillion years and starting a new universe cycle. However, this

theory remains speculation since there is still not enough proof for it (Matejo Kuljiš, private communication).

In the space - time continuum the past, the present and the future exist at the same time and this theory thus advocates determinism in which there is no free will and probabilistic events occur at random (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 160). The idea that time started with the Big Bang presents a formidable problem for cognitive theory, which proposes the view that all events happen *in* time. Accordingly questions such as *How is it possible that something occurred before time?* and *What happened before the Big Bang?* make us reflect upon this problem. Lakoff and Johnson's conclusion infers that, according to the relativity theory, the Big Bang could be regarded as the commencement of time (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 159). Whether another Big Bang, alike the first one, is going to be the end of it is yet to be seen.

3.7.6. 6. Time as a Resource and as Money

In the culture of the West time is frequently conceptualized as a resource and money. These metaphors are based on a conceptual schema specifying the nature of a resource and containing elements and a scenario that clarifies the relationship amongst the elements.

3.7.6.7. Time as a Resource

The elements of the resource schema include: the user of the resource, a purpose requiring an amount of the resource, the value of the resource and the value of the purpose (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 161). The scenario that constitutes the schema is made up of a *background, action and result* (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 162):

Background:

The User wants to achieve a Purpose.

The Purpose requires an amount of the Resource.

The User has, or acquires the use of, the Resource.

Action:

The User uses up an amount of the Resource to achieve the Purpose.

Result:

The portion of the Resource used is no longer available to the User.

The Value of the Resource used has been lost to the User.

The Value of the Purpose achieved has been gained by the User

3.7.6.8. The TIME IS A RESOURCE Metaphor

The elements and the scenario of the schema from the source domain (RESOURCE) map onto the target domain (TIME), resulting in TIME IS A RESOURCE metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 162).

The Resource	→	Time
The User of the Resource	→	The Agent (The User of Time)
The Purpose That Requires	→	The Purpose That Requires Time
The Value of the Resource	→	The Value Of The Time
The Value Of The Purpose	→	The Value Of The Purpose

Due to the mapping from the source space of RESOURCE onto the target space (TIME), vocabulary originating from the source space, for example *waste*,

save, *worth* and *spare* obtain a meaning in the target space as well, which in turn results in a general acceptance of the TIME IS A RESOURCE metaphor in the Western culture (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 163). This metaphor, as pointed out by Lakoff and Johnson, has been reified by many institutions. One example is paying people according to the amount of time they work, which is calculated by the hour, week or year. Other examples include making appointments based on the envisaged amount of spent time as well as deadlines, which indicate that time is a limited resource (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 164).

3.7.6.9. The TIME IS MONEY Metaphor

The concept of MONEY, when taken as a special instance of a RESOURCE, results in the TIME IS MONEY metaphor. In that way the vocabulary from the domain of money is adopted and used in the context of time (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 163).

The TIME IS MONEY metaphor

Money	→	Time
The User of The Money	→	The User of Time (The Agent)
The Purpose That Requires	→	The Purpose That Requires Time
The Money		
The Value Of The Money	→	The Value Of The Time
The Value Of The Purpose	→	The Value Of The Purpose

As stated earlier, the fourth controversy of understanding temporality, the controversy between understanding time as objective and subjective, will be addressed after the understanding of time as an embodied concept has been

discussed. Our purpose here was to contrast the controversy more effectively after the stance of some major cognitive linguists such as Lakoff and Johnson has been explained.

3.7.8.1.1. Evans's Understanding of Subjective Time

Neuroscientists claim that we possess an inherent sense of timing due to the fact that our brain receives an electrical impulse forty times per second. According to this theory neural firings in our brain are regulated by this pulse and so are other rhythms of the body. Since we have this "internal" clock inside our bodies, we are able to relate to other bodily rhythms, while at the same time providing us with the intuitive sense of time (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 138).

The subjective character of time conceptualization is discussed by Vyvyan Evans in his book *The Structure of Time: Language, Meaning and Temporal Cognition*. Evans, a cognitive scientist of phenomenological provenance, emphasizes that the origin of temporality is highly subjective and therefore internal and phenomenological (Evans, 2004: 7). His view that temporality is genuinely internal is based on three main hypotheses (Evans, 2004: 32):

- 1) In the outer world there is nothing physical that can, without any doubt, be identified as time. Evans is critical of theories that base their understanding of time on matching temporal measurements with temporality without elaborating where temporality comes from.
- 2) Relational approaches to temporality fail to recognize that we are aware of the subjective nature of temporality (he strengthens his position on grounds that research on the subjective nature of time shows we are aware of certain faculties of time such as prolonged time). We sense the

passing of time both when we are interacting with the external world or not, which he proves with research undertaken by Flaherty, where the subjects were aware of the passing of time although in solitary confinement.

3) Subjective experiences of temporality can be observed in neurological mechanisms.

Evans points out that our experience of time cannot be regarded as either equal to objectively real entities in the outer world or to external experience of the senses. In his view our perceptual processes precede event perception and comparison, so that these processes enable us to perceive and compare. Furthermore, Evans denies that temporal concepts are abstract and therefore in need of "more concrete" concepts in order to be defined. He provides various findings from neuroscience, psychology and linguistics which propose that time may originate from basically subjective experience. He allows the possibility that this experience derives from perceptual processing, which are in turn the results of pre - conceptual experiences (Evans, 2004: 9).

Unlike Lakoff and Johnson on one hand and James Gibson, an ecological psychologist, on the other⁴⁰, who support the notion that time as an abstract notion is not directly perceived but rather originates from comparison of external events inhering the world, Evans insists that time inheres from other (possibly subjective) experiences and maintains that it is possible for time to be directly perceived or experienced (Evans, 2004: 15).

Evans states that the temporal features humans perceive directly include duration and simultaneity. He supports his claims by findings from neuroscience

⁴⁰ Gibson advocates the approach according to which events are perceived but time is not. The concept of time derives from comparing events and other operations that result from abstracting relations between events and is therefore an "intellectual achievement" (Evans, 2004: 15).

and psychology. Thus Evans points out that research on the interconnectedness between complexity of tasks and experience of duration indicates that the more complex tasks the subjects were exposed to, the longer time they seem to take. This subjective perception of the subjects' time is due to the "amount of storage space in memory required for a particular stimulus array" (Evans, 2004: 18). In other words the storage space in memory increases proportionally to an increasing number of stored events or the complexity of events and as a result of these processes the experience of duration lengthens (Evans, 2004: 18).

Furthermore, Evans asserts, an experiment performed by the social psychologist Michael Flaherty specified the instances when human brain experiences *protracted duration* as well as the situations when it experiences *temporal compression*. In order for an experience of time to be judged as one of protracted duration or of temporal compression, a durational experience has to be assessed as abnormal. Flaherty has named this experience *synchronicity*, which refers to a temporal experience which is "acquired via interpersonal interactions which are temporally coordinated" (Evans, 2004: 19). Whether we experience protracted duration or temporal compression depends on the density of conscious information: in cases when it is high, we experience protracted duration and in instances when it is low, we perceive temporality as compressed. The experiences which trigger higher density of information processing and during which time appears to pass more slowly include "intense emotions, suffering, violence and danger, waiting and boredom, concentration and meditation, and shock and novelty" (Evans, 2004: 20). We can conclude that the more stimulus array we attend to, the more memory is required to store and process and, as a result, we experience the duration of time as being more protracted. Opposite to protracted duration, lower density of information and, accordingly, less memory to store and process what is been attended to, leads to temporal compression, i.e. we experience time passes more slowly. Situations

inducing temporal compression can be related to routine complexity, those potentially complex experiences which have, through routine, led to a very low level of stimulus complexity. It seems that we attend less to habitual, routine activities and, consequently, less memory is required for storage, resulting in temporal compression (Evans, 2004: 21).

Evans emphasizes that the results of these experiments indicate that experience of duration is purely subjective and that it is a result of our attending to more or less stimulus than normal (Evans, 2004: 21). Evans further elaborates that these findings indicate that time is not inferred from objective properties of events and the relations amongst them, but is rather "subjective response to such events" (Evans, 2004:21).

3.7.8.1.2. Damasio's Theory of the Selves

The view that the nature of cognition is subjective is also outlined by the neurobiologist Antonio Damasio. He points out that an organism develops consciousness with the help of an object he perceives, i.e. the relations between an organism and a perceived object make up the contents of the knowledge named consciousness (Damasio, 2005: 31). Damasio distinguishes two kinds of consciousness: *core consciousness* and *extended consciousness*. The first type of consciousness enables an organism the sensation of himself in one moment, namely *now* and in one place, i.e. *here*. No future and no past is involved in it, Damasio asserts, except for the moment in the past that directly preceded the present moment (Damasio, 2005: 28). Unlike core consciousness, extended consciousness makes it possible for an organism to experience an elaborate sensation of himself; the person is completely aware of the lived past and foreseen future and has clearly conceived the surrounding world (Damasio, 2005: 29). When defining the kinds of consciousness Damasio deliberately uses

the term *organism*, since he is convinced that core consciousness is possessed by both humans and some animals such as cats and dogs (Gibbs, 2007:21), whereas extended consciousness is reserved exclusively for humans, although he allows the possibility that some animals have extended consciousness in a simpler form (Damasio, 2005: 29).

The named types of consciousness relate to two levels of selves: the *core - self* and the *autobiographical - self*. The former, claims Damasio, is created every time brain interacts with an object, while the latter is connected with the idea of identity and corresponds to an array of facts and modes of being that characterize a person (Damasio, 2005: 29 - 30).

The third level of selves is the *proto - self*. Unlike core self and autobiographical self, we are not conscious of the proto - self, because it is a product of various cerebral structures whose main task is to represent the state of a living organism via its numerous dimensions and to help it survive (Damasio, 2005: 34).

Damasio further elaborates the functioning of the proto - self with the example of the experience of a person seeing a bus approaching: from his *perspective* the person undergoes a series of adaptations such as establishing balance with the help of the vestibular system in the inner ear, through the adaptation of the eye, head and neck movements, controlled by the upper colliculi up to the accelerated reaction of his heart and skin as a result of the experienced emotion of fear. As stated earlier in the text, these named functions help us survive and act upon our proto - self.

These three selves are, as pointed out by Gibbs, neurally interdependent: while the core self involves the operation of diverse parts of the brain such as

the cingulated cortex, the thalamus, parts of the prefrontal cortex and the superior colliculi⁴¹, autobiographical memories are kept in cortices and subsequently are activated by convergence zones situated in the temporal, frontal and subcortical areas, or in other words the parts of the brain that are relevant for experiencing and recollecting the nature of experiences in the past (Gibbs, 2007: 23)

Furthermore, the three selves are cognitively dependent as well: while the proto - self is reconstructed every moment during the process of interaction between an organism and an object, the core - self emerges from the proto - self in a secondary non - verbal overview after it has been altered by the object and is further fortified by the autobiographical - self, i.e. an overview of memorised facts such as when you were born, who gave birth to you and similar facts. While the core - self is constantly being reproduced in the same form, the autobiographical - self is prone to a constant change caused by new experiences (Damasio, 2005: 173).

Core consciousness is, in Damasio's opinion, not necessarily related to the development of speech. In this manner his theory is specific because he believes that besides people certain animal species have extended consciousness, namely all species that are capable to think logically possess core consciousness. He supports his theory with the notion that non - verbal, visual narration is as consistent as the verbal narration (Damasio, 2005: 184). The role of the language is, as stated by Damasio, to translate our thoughts into words and sentences, to express distant abstractions or envisaged constructions by one

⁴¹ It is important to note, Damasio asserts, that different sets of neural maps take part in processing the interaction between an organism and an object: while the consequences related to an object and organism are mapped in primary neural maps, secondary neural maps create an overview of the causal relation between an object and organism.

efficient word as well as to classify knowledge in a fast and efficient manner (Damasio, 2005: 115).

Furthermore, Damasio states, our brain shows a natural tendency to tell stories (without words) on what goes on in an organism immersed in the environment (Damasio, 2005: 187). Damasio further asserts that it is possible to retain core - consciousness in cases when a person's extended consciousness is damaged. His claims are supported with a number of case studies, probably the most striking being the case of the patient named Earl (Damasio, 2005: 125). This patient had had a radical excision of the whole of the left hemisphere of his brain due to a fast growing tumor in it. The gravest consequence of the operation was a total loss of speech, since the cerebral sections responsible for speech are situated in the left hemisphere. However, Earl, although aware he is not able to verbalize his answers, was still able to reply to questions he was asked with exclamations and one - syllable expressions.

Although one could retain core consciousness after having lost extended consciousness, the contrary is not possible: a permanent loss of core consciousness results in an inevitable loss of extended consciousness. Remembering how certain experiences feel, which is enabled by our autobiographical memories in the brain, makes it possible for people to interact with similarly embodied creatures. This faculty, although possibly not unique for humans, makes use not only of our experiences of the very moment in the present, but also of our past experiences as well as those envisaged in the future and help us conjoin the past, present and future.

3.8. Final Notes on the Relationship between Language, Cognition and Culture

In the following pages I intend to address the issue of interrelatedness between language, conceptualization and culture. My aim is to focus in particular on these links in the context of the conceptualization of abstract concepts, above all the concepts of space and time.

3.8.1. The Interconnectedness of Language and Culture as Seen by Scientists of Diverse Provenances

Studies of the interconnectedness between language and culture have a relative long history and date back to the 19th century, as pointed out by the cultural theorists René Dirven, Hans - Georg Wolf and Frank Polzenhagen, when Wilhelm von Humboldt recognized the inseparability of tradition, language, thought and culture (Dirven, Wolf and Polzhagen in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 1203). Von Humboldt pointed out, assert these authors, that thought (*Geist*) and language bidirectionally influence each other so that thought is articulated in language, while language in turn moulds thought. According to Humboldt language reflects the cultural will of a people, thereby transferring the "real world" into *Geist* (Dirven, Wolf and Polzenhagen in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 1203).

The Humboldtian view strongly influenced the relativity hypothesis held by Benjamin Lee Whorf and Edward Sapir, who emphasized the mutual correspondences between culture, behaviour and semantics of a particular society (Dirven, Wolf and Polzenhagen in Geerhaerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 1204). These authors support the notion of linguistic relativity (also known as *Sapir - Whorf Hypothesis*). Sapir And Whorf's theory is based on a presupposition that languages are relative, that they differ in their expression of

concepts in "a noteworthy way" (Pederson in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 1012). Eric Pederson points out that this formulation may vary significantly from scholar to scholar, thus a particular variation may appear minor to one linguist, but significant to another (Pederson in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 1012). Another important notion to linguistic relativity is that the linguistic expressions of concepts have a role in influencing conceptualization in cognitive domains. The character of language control over general cognition is usually divided into "strong" and "weak" hypotheses. The former (also known as *linguistic determinism*) advocates the idea that "variable categories of language essentially control the available categories of general cognition" (Pederson in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 1012). Pederson emphasizes that the "strong" hypothesis, as put this way, is mostly rejected as untenable. The latter hypothesis claims that linguistic categories may influence cognitive categories but are not essentially restrictive. Pederson stresses that the "weak" hypothesis is typically considered trivially true (Pederson in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 1013).

Sapir and Whorf strongly influenced the theorists who advocate the notion of linguistic relativity within the field of Cognitive Linguistics, an orientation of thought that seem to have prevailed in recent Cognitivist thought (Dirven, Wolf and Polzenhagen in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 1204).

A number of cognitive scientists have drawn our attention to the interrelatedness of language and culture. Thus Leonard Talmy in his book *Toward a Cognitive Semantics* argues that language and culture are specially bonded. Talmy proposes the idea that the cognitive systems underlying language and culture developed parallelly and were, during this process, strongly influenced by other cognitive systems such as perception, motor control, memory, attention and inferencing (Talmy, 2000b: 377). However, Talmy

asserts that, of all the named cognitive systems, only the cognitive systems of language and culture demonstrate the pattern of a universal structure, which is abstract in nature and serves as the basis of diverse instances of cultural variation (Talmy, 2000b: 377). Furthermore, Lakoff and Johnson emphasize the link between these two conceptual systems by asserting that cultural knowledge is encompassed in metaphorical idioms in the form of conventional images (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 69).

The links between language, culture and conceptualization will be addressed from four main perspectives: 1) the role of conceptual metaphors in establishing cultural models; 2) the issue of individual vs. social cognition in language and culture; 3) the problem of the universality/relativity in the context of conceptualizing abstract concepts, in particular the concepts of space and time and 4) the issue of the differences in conceptualization of space in the context of the utilization of diverse frames of reference.

3.8.1.1. Conceptual Metaphors and Cultural Models

Cognitive linguists and cognitive anthropologists both agree that metaphors take part in defining abstract concepts. They, however, implement different approaches to studying metaphors. The cognitive linguist Zoltán Kövecses specifies these differences in his book *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation* (Kövecses, 2005: xi):

"Whereas scholars in cognitive science tend to ask, "What is metaphor? " and "How does it work in the mind? " scholars in the social sciences tend to focus on the issue of "What does metaphor do in particular social – cultural contexts? ".

A great number of cognitive anthropologists, Kövecses claims, hold that cultural models⁴² for abstract concepts including the concepts of time and space, can be comprehended literally, while a significant number of cognitive linguists assert that cultural models for abstract concepts are inherently metaphorical (Kövecses, 2005: 193). Cultural models are, as defined by the cultural anthropologists Naomi Quinn and Dorothy Holland (Holland and Quinn, 1987: 4):

"...presupposed, taken - for - granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behaviour in it."

Roy D'Andrade, another anthropologist, also stresses that cultural models are shared between subjects (D'Andrade in Holland and Quinn, 1987: 112):

"A cultural model is a cognitive schema that is *intersubjectively shared* by a social group."

The cognitive linguist Zoltán Kövecses understands cultural models in a similar way (Kövecses, 2005: 193):

"Cultural models are best conceived as any coherent organizations of human experience shared by people."

Furthermore, the anthropological linguist Gary P. Palmer defines cultural models as "cognitive models that are culturally specific" (Palmer in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 1045).

⁴² The terms that have been used alongside cultural models include *cognitive models*, *folk models* and *folk theories* (Dirven, Wolf and Polzenhagen in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007:1204).

Kövecses differentiates between four manners of understanding cultural models in the context of conceiving abstract concepts: 1) the *Ungrounded Literal Emergence View*, 2) the *Grounded Literal Emergence View*, 3) the *Internally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence View* and 4) the *Externally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence View* (Kövecses, 2005: 203 - 223). The first view advocates the idea that metaphors do not play any role in constituting abstract concepts, which emerge literally. The second view supports the notion that metaphors reflect rather than constitute abstract concepts, which in turn can be understood in a literal way. According to the third view concrete concepts help us understand the metaphorically emerging abstract concepts, while the fourth view emphasizes the physical - cultural basis of understanding abstract concepts (Kövecses, 2005: 204). Kövecses in particular criticises the Grounded Literal Emergence View, which he believes, is advocated by the cognitive anthropologists Naomi Quinn and Dorothy Holland. According to this view, Kövecses claims, cultural models are based upon basic preconceptual experiences, which in turn *select the fitting conceptual metaphors* (Kövecses, 2005: 222).

Quinn comprehends the concept of marriage through proposition - schemas, a form in which knowledge (propositional knowledge) may be cast. Proposition schemas also determine concepts as well as relations between them (Quinn and Holland, 1987: 25). Quinn defines the concept of *marriage* through following proposition schemas (Quinn, 1987: 176):

MARRIAGE IS ENDURING
MARRIAGE IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL
MARRIAGE IS UNKNOWN AT THE OUTSET
MARRIAGE IS DIFFICULT
MARRIAGE IS EFFORTFUL
MARRIAGE IS JOINT

MARRIAGE MAY SUCCEED OR FAIL
MARRIAGE IS RISKY

In Quinn's view (Quinn, 1987: 175 - 180) the cultural model of marriage is primarily constituted by propositional schemas and only secondarily by the conceptual metaphors that support them (including metaphors like MARRIAGE IS A JOURNEY, MARRIAGE IS A JOINT ENTERPRISE, MARRIAGE IS A DURABLE BOND BETWEEN PEOPLE, MARRIAGE IS AN INVESTMENT and others). According to Quinn and Holland's understanding of the function of propositional schemas in comprehending cultural models, metaphors aid in "filling" the causal assumptions that are linking propositions. In that manner the people sharing the same knowledge can complete the missing information which is needed for a thorough understanding of a cultural concept. This process of intersubjective sharing of knowledge through familiar proposition - schemas makes the communication between subjects fast and accurate (Quinn and Holland, 1987: 25).

Quinn and Holland, however, admit that abstract concepts such as ARGUMENT owe their structure to a source domain, in this case WAR. The authors emphasize that *war is to a great extent already culturally defined* in terms of physical occurrences such as cross - fire, troop advances, body counts as well as in terms of physical space including demilitarized zones, battle lines or battlegrounds (Quinn and Holland, 1987: 28), thereby implying the literal character of abstract concepts. The authors argue that understanding of abstract concepts such as ARGUMENT is based on our relying *on the conception of a more concrete concept*, i.e. WAR, as well as on the *cultural definition of the concept of ARGUMENT* (Quinn and Holland, 1987:28). Quinn and Holland further elaborate their views (Quinn and Holland, 1987: 30):

" The classes from which speakers select metaphors they consider to be appropriate are those that capture aspects of the simplified world and the prototypical events unfolding in this world, constituted by cultural models".

Although at first sight it appears that Kövecses strictly criticizes the Grounded Literal Emergence view, he allows a possibility that these authors have a point. Kövecses argues that in many cases metaphorical expressions result from "a prior understanding of the target as a (metaphorically constituted but literally taken) cultural model" (Kövecses, 2005: 224). The literal understanding of cultural models arises from the automatic and unconscious character of the mappings between the inputs, which in turn leads us to believe that the appropriate metaphors are selected by literal models of the concepts (Kövecses, 2000: 224). Specifically for these reasons, Kövecses points out that we take the expressions such as *heads* of states, the *heart* of a culture or an *ailing* company to be literal rather than metaphorical.

Unlike Quinn, Kövecses advocates the *Internally* and the *Externally Grounded Metaphorical Emergence* views, giving a priority to the latter stance, according to which abstract concepts arise metaphorically and are additionally culturally and physically based (Kövecses, 2005: 201). Kövecses illustrates the principles of this view by comparing Quinn's and his own understanding of the concept of marriage. Quinn, asserts Kövecses, supports the notion that the concept of marriage is structured by the cultural conception of love. However, Kövecses asserts that Quinn understands the structure of love to be based on the infantile experiences of love between a child and its mother, the structure which, as pointed out by Kövecses, cannot characterize the concept of love between adults (Kövecses, 2005: 208).

Kövecses understands the concept of romantic love by the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A UNITY OF TWO COMPLEMENTARY PARTS and provides examples that support this idea such as *Theirs is a perfect fit*, *They are inseparable*, *They broke up* and other expressions. The stated metaphor developed from the primary metaphor NONPHYSICAL (FUNCTIONAL) UNITY IS PHYSICAL (FUNCTIONAL) UNITY, which functions as a base for many "unities" such as political (*the unification of Europe*), psychological (*a union of minds*), religious (*a deep spiritual union with God*) and others (Kövecses, 2005: 209).

Kövecses stresses that the concept of marriage cannot be simply explained through the infantile experience of love, as proposed by Quinn, but by understanding two parts joined into one whole, with a preexisting fit between the parts and the function of the whole extending beyond the functions of the individual parts (Kövecses, 2005: 221).

3.8.1.2. Individualist/Social Character of Cultural Models

Cognitive scholars of different orientations have studied the interrelatedness between language, cognition and culture. A growing number of cognitive linguists have emphasized that abstract concepts and the metaphors that structure them are both individually/internally and culturally conceived. However, this view has been challenged by some cognitive anthropologists, who support the idea that understanding of abstract concepts is culturally and socially specific. These two opposing views of the conceptualization of abstract concepts will be addressed in further text.

The importance of cultural models is stressed by the cognitive psychologist Raymond W. Gibbs Jr., who allows the possibility that cognitive models for some abstract concepts might be more limited than their cultural

models due to the fact that cultural models express widespread cognitive models which are intersubjectively shared by members of a speech community (Gibbs, 1999: 154). Gibbs claims that cognitive scientists could have a better insight into, for instance, the conceptual system underlying the speech of idealized native speakers by researching the social/cultural basis or interpersonal foundations of metaphor rather than solely concentrating on studying metaphors in the context of them constituting *internal* mental structures (Gibbs, 1999: 154).

Gibbs further claims that our embodied experience of anger, apart from being structured through autonomic arousal and cardiovascular answer to it in the form of heated fluid pressurized within the bodily container, also in the context of social situations involving an offending event, an offender and an attempt to look for retribution (Gibbs, 1999:155). Thus, alongside metaphorically conceptualizing anger through feeling heated and under pressure, we experience it on the basis of the estimate of the situation we find ourselves in when somebody, for instance, intentionally kicks us in the leg (Gibbs, 1999: 156). Our reaction in this case, claims Gibbs, is defined culturally in a series of steps, which he names the *anger script* (antecedent conditions, behavioural conditions and self - control procedures). The structure resulting from the script metaphorically corresponds to the structure of our thinking/experiencing anger as fluid in containers which are heated or put under pressure (Gibbs, 1999: 159), the notion which will be addressed with more details further in the text. Gibbs, therefore, advocates the idea that metaphors for structuring concepts are both internally and culturally determined (Gibbs, 1999: 162):

"...metaphor is as much a species of perceptually guided adaptive action in a particular cultural situation as it is a specific language device or some internally represented structure in the mind of individuals."

Gibbs's claims that the difference between the cognitive and the cultural is not as big as we tend to believe (Gibbs, 1999: 162). Kövecses as well points out that conceptual metaphors are "just as much cultural as they are cognitive entities (or more exactly processes)", emphasizing the unity of the cognitive and the cultural in one single conceptual whole (Kövecses, 2005: 162). Furthermore, the cognitive linguist Leonard Talmy asserts that each cognitive system (language, visual and kinesthetic perception, reasoning, affect, attention, memory, planning and culture) shares at least some basic structural properties with other cognitive systems while at the same time possessing structural properties that specify only the cognitive system in question (Talmy, 2000b: 377):

"The general finding is that each cognitive system has some structural properties that may be uniquely its own, some further structural properties that it shares with only one or a few other cognitive systems, and some fundamental structural properties that it has in common with all the cognitive systems."

Talmy has named this model of cognitive organization, which shares fundamental structural properties amongst diverse cognitive systems, the *overlapping systems* model of cognitive organization (Talmy, 2000b: 377). As stated earlier, Talmy holds that only the cognitive linguistic and cultural systems possess a universal structure, which serves as a basis for future variations. Talmy, however, emphasizes that the principles of organization of these two systems are specific due to the fact they are innately determined and therefore, he asserts, these two cognitive systems are to a great extent independent from each other (Talmy, 2000b: 411).⁴³

⁴³ In Talmy's opinion significant parallelism between a linguistic and cultural system of a society lies mainly in the use of some grammatical categories, as illustrated in Mparntwe Arrente, a language of the Australian Aboriginal group. Thus the sentence *The little boy cried as they walked along*, gives room to different uses of the verb *walk along*, depending on whether the boy belongs to the social group represented by the pronoun *they* or not (Talmy, 2000b: 409 - 410).

Things, nevertheless, seem to look slightly different from the anthropologists' perspective. Thus Catherine Lutz in her study *Goals, Events and Understanding in Ifaluk Emotion Theory*, in which she focuses on the way the Ifaluk⁴⁴ treat emotions, points out that emotions are understood by this community as *social* rather than *individual/private* (characteristic of Western thought) matters. Emotions are understood in the first place in the context of events and situations in which they take place and vary in the level of generality, starting with more specific (*Someone gets drunk and comes to your house every night, The pig eats your food*) to more general (*Something happens that we want to happen, There is something we don't know*), with the level of generality depending on the comparisons and contrasts been drawn in each specific case. Furthermore, Lutz claims, individuals are able to cause an emotion in another person, e.g. in the statement *He is needy* can literally be understood as *He causes me to feel compassion*, an element which is neglected in the studies of scholars that emphasize primarily the individual character of cognition (Lutz in Holland and Quinn, 1987: 292). Thus the interpersonal function of emotions in the Ifaluk cultural model is, as pointed out by Roy D'Andrade, more prominent than in the Western cultural model (D'Andrade in Holland and Quinn, 1987: 144).

The principles of the "social" view are best illustrated in the following paragraph from Quinn and Holland's article *Culture and Cognition* (Quinn and Holland, 1987: 3):

"Such culturally constituted understandings of the social world point up not only the degree to which people impose order on their world but also the degree to which such orderings are shared by the joint participants in this world, all of whom behave as though

⁴⁴ Ifaluk is an atoll in the Western Pacific.

marriage, lying and dating exist. A very large proportion of what we know and believe we derive from these shared models that specify what is in the world and how it works.”

Hans - Georg Wolf focuses on social group awareness in his book *English in Cameroon*. Thus, asserts the author, relationships between community members are conceptualised in terms of kinship relations, thereby utilizing the conceptual metonymy COMMUNITY FOR KINSHIP/KINSHIP FOR COMMUNITY (Wolf, 2001: 279 –280):

I greet my fathers.

My child, the daughter of all people.

The family head of the Bakweri community.

In that way members of all sorts of communities are conceptualised as family members; CHILDREN, DAUGHTERS, BROTHERS, FATHERS, etc. (Dirven, Wolf and Polzenhagen in Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007: 1215).

On the same line with Gibbs and Talmy, the cognitive anthropologist Roger M. Keesing criticizes his fellow anthropologists for emphasizing solely the social nature of cultural models, thereby not taking into consideration their individualistic nature (Keesing in Holland and Quinn, 1987: 378):

“What we want to study, I think, ultimately is how individuals cognize and use models they (partly) share with others, models that are common coin in the community. That will require that we see folk models *both* as collective and social *and* as “mentally held principles and recipes” (original emphasis).

It can be concluded that cognitive scientists of different orientations address the issue of individual/social character of cultural models from a different perspective. Thus a number of linguists (Lakoff and Johnson,

Kövecses, Talmy) tend to support the notion that abstract concepts, including the concepts of time and space, are conceived with the help of conceptual metaphors at an individual level. Conceptual metaphors in turn heavily depend on image schemas, which these authors consider as universal, iterative patterns we all resort to in our mental processes. Such a view, understandably, creates room for a universalist approach. These authors also emphasize the role of culture in the process of understanding abstract concepts. Cognitive anthropologists, however, see the problem differently: concepts such as emotions (Lutz) or kinship (Wolf) are not understood as having a universal character but are rather seen as culture - specific, thus supporting the relativist view in understanding cultural models.

3.8.1.3. Universality and Relativity in Thought

It seems that there are trends in sciences as diverse as cognitive linguistics, psychology and anthropology to study the issue of universality/relativity of thought from a different angle. Thus some cognitive linguists and psychologists (Kövecses, Lakoff and Johnson, Gibbs, Boroditsky) emphasize that cognition relies not only on experience and mental processes in the brain but also on culture. These scholars argue that the conceptual metaphors they have studied are *near - universal*, thereby admitting that there exist differences between cultures.

Kövecses points out that, for example, the primary metaphor THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER is based on a universal human experience since it relies on the CONTAINER image schema. In fact, experiments performed by Gibbs in 1992 and 1994 indicated that human experience of the target domain, anger, significantly depends on understanding the image - schematic structure of the source domain, a pressurized container. The

examinees first had to answer three questions related to pressurized containers: *What would cause the container to explode? Does the container explode on purpose or does it explode through no volition of its own? Does the explosion in the container occur in a gentle or a violent manner?* The answers were very similar: there was a concensus that the explosion occurs as a result of internal pressure caused by heat of a fluid inside the container; that the explosion was unintentional; that the explosion happens in a violent fashion. As the examiners predicted, when the subjects were asked the same questions about idioms for anger including *blow your stack*, *flip your lid*, *hit the ceiling*, the answers indicated that the subjects conceived the loss of control was linked to a certain internal pressure, that the loss of control was unintentional and that it happens in a sudden and violent way (Gibbs, 1992: 485 - 506).

Furhermore, research on the stages of experiencing anger by the members of four different cultures and speaking four significantly different languages, i.e. English, Hungarian, Chinese and Japanese has been undertaken, revealed that anger is experienced in a similar way in the named four languages and, accordingly, cultures. Kövecses, therefore, proposes a five - stage model for these four languages and cultures (Kövecses, 2005: 196):

"(1) cause → (2) existence of anger or its counterpart (in the form of a force) → (3) attempt at control → (4) loss of control → (5) expression."⁴⁵

The differences between the named four cultures related to the stages in experiencing anger refer mainly to the control and expression aspects. Thus, Kövecses pointed out, the Japanese conception of the control aspect of *ikari* (anger) encompasses the emotion initially appearing in *hara* (the stomach/bowel area), subsequently increasing to *mune* (chest) and eventually to *atama* (head),

⁴⁵ The arrow, as stated by Kövecses, indicates temporal succession and causal sequence.

in which case the angry person is unable to control anger. In Chinese there are two functional cognitive models, differing in only the last two stages: according to one model anger is released by showing angry behaviour, while in the other model anger is diverted to diverse parts of the body resulting in the self showing somatic effects in the form of stomachaches, headaches and the like; the differences between the two models in the fifth stage include the discharge of the excess anger in the body and the subsequent restoration of balance in the first model compared to compensating the self by a pleasing event, where the compensation balances the intensity of the offense in the way that the body rids itself of anger, thereby relieving the somatic effects (Kövecses, 2005: 197). These differences in the conceptualization of anger can be attributed to differential experiential focus, concentrating on some aspects of bodily functioning while ignoring/downplaying others (Kövecses, 2005: 245). Thus the Chinese prioritize the *pressure* element and not the *heat* element (in English both elements are equally important), despite the fact that the increase in skin temperature as well as heart pressure are universally felt by individuals who experience anger (Kövecses, 2005: 247). It can be concluded that the universality of experience does not necessarily result in the universality in conceptualization. Furthermore, different cultural context should not be neglected: as pointed out by Kövecses, the Euro – American conceptualization of anger strongly relies on the medieval model of four humours (phlegm, black bile, yellow bile and blood) regulating the essential processes in the human body. This humoral notion strongly influenced the Euro – American conception of anger as fluid in a pressurized container (Kövecses, 2005: 235). The Japanese cultural model of *hara* (anger) differs significantly from the humoral model: *hara* contains of *honne*, which stands for truth, real intentions and the true self and stands against *tatemae* (or a social face of an individual). In that way when a Japanese person controls his/her anger, (s)he conceals his/her true self and shows instead a social face, which (s)he is expected to display in cases when

certain standards of behaviour, such as restraint from showing emotions publicly, are expected. The Chinese concept of *nu* (anger) depends on the notion of *qi*, the energy that flows through one's body, which is in turn in harmony with the two complementary forces of *yin* and *yang*. These two forces need to be balanced in order to keep the harmony in the universe and whenever *qi* increases, there is a rise in *nu*, which further imbalances *yin* and *yang*. As soon as the *qi* settles down, *nu* subsides as well and the balance is restored.

Kövecses points out that the CONTAINER spatial image schema is also productive in the conceptual metaphor HAPPINESS IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, which is realized in the English sentence *He is bursting with joy* and its equivalents in Hungarian and Chinese. Kövecses attributes the ubiquity of this metaphor, its existence in such diverse languages as English, Hungarian and Chinese to the mappings that constitute the metaphor and are based on universal experiences and perceptions (Kövecses, 2005: 38) including the emotions being inside our body container; the emotions being related to body fluids, such as blood; and the control keeping the substance inside the container (Kövecses, 2005: 38). Another pervasive spatial conceptual metaphor seems to be HAPPINESS IS UP, which is based on the UP and DOWN spatial image schemas. As explained earlier, this metaphor has a strong experiential base: when we are happy, we tend to be up and active rather than down and inactive. Jon Tolaas points at the universality of the UP - DOWN, FRONT - BACK, CENTRAL - PERIPHERAL image schemas we all face from the moment we were born (Tolaas, 1991: 206). Thus, claims Tolaas, we perceive everything that happens in the world from the lying perspective of a baby. Tolaas argues that the people who are relevant in a baby's life demonstrate love and affection towards the infant by smiling and care, which leads to the spatial emotional concept, WELL-BEING AND HAPPINESS ARE UP (Tolaas, 1991: 207). The emotional experience of relevance, in turn results from our perception of our parents and other people

of significance being in focus of our vision, thereby appearing and eventually leading to the conceptual metaphor BIG IS UP and BIG IS IMPORTANT (Tolaas, 1991: 207).⁴⁶ Kövecses concludes that, besides primary metaphors, certain complex metaphors exist in widely diverse languages and cultures due to their reliance on mappings which are founded on universal shared experiences and perceptions (Kövecses, 2005: 38).

Lakoff and Johnson argue that certain metaphors with which we conceptualize time are nearly - universal. They emphasize that we all conceive time as both static and dynamic. Thus the future is understood as being in front of us, the present as being by us, and the past as being behind us. Such an understanding of time results in the TIME ORIENTATION conceptual metaphor, where, as explained earlier in the chapter, the location of the observer maps onto the present time, the space in front of the observer onto the future and the space behind the observer onto the past (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 140).

Such a conceptualization of the future, the present and the past is found in many languages of the world including Chinese (Yu, 1998: 92 - 95), Hungarian, and the language of Puri Indians (Kövecses, 2005: 48), although there are cultures such as Hopi Indians (Whorf, 1956: 65) wherein the past is conceived as being in front, thus emphasizing that the results of our past actions are felt in the present.

The dynamic view of time results from our conceptualization of its "passage" in some form. Time is conceptualized as something moving, which makes room for the MOVING TIME METAPHOR and the MOVING OBSERVER metaphor, as illustrated earlier in the text. These two metaphors, when combined

⁴⁶ In his article *Notes on the Origin of Some Spatialization Metaphors* (1991) Tolaas talks about the spatial image schemas we encounter from the moment of birth. These image schemas help us conceptualize space and lead to the creation of spatial conceptual metaphors.

with the TIME ORIENTATION metaphor, result in conceiving time as motion, either motion *by time* (with a stationary observer) or motion *by the observer* (with stationary time). These two metaphors seem to be near - universal since, as pointed out by Kövecses, they appear in languages as diverse as English, Chinese, Hungarian, Hopi Indian and many others (Kövecses, 2005: 52).

The experiential basis for time metaphors is our notion of time as closely correlated with motion (Kövecses, 2005: 53), which results in elements from two different domains, time and motion, standing metonymically for each other in the unified TIME - MOTION frame. The examples that illustrate such metonymical transfers include *I slept for **fifty miles** while she drove* (DISTANCE FOR TIME DURATION) and *San Francisco is **half an hour** from Berkeley* (TIME-DURATION FOR DISTANCE). Metonymies are, argues Kövecses, yet another step in the emergence of conceptual metaphors (Kövecses, 2005: 54). Kövecses emphasizes that in many cases the whole process of possibly universal physiological processes through conceptualised metonymy and metaphor, eventually result in cultural models (Kövecses, 2005: 199).

3.8.1.3.1. Physical Origin of Some Spatialized Metaphors

Earlier a comparison was drawn between cognitive linguists' and anthropologists' stances in relation to the individualistic/social character of cultural models. Linguists of cognitivist provenience support the notion that cognitive processes are essentially individualistic but also universal due to the physical bodies we have (Kövecses, 2005: 43; Tolaas 1991: 204). In his study of spatialized metaphors entitled *Notes on the Origin of Some Spatialization Metaphors*, Jon Tolaas argues that we are all able to grasp metaphoric as well as literal meaning in a spatial setting due to the fact that we are all born in a gravitational field and with a central nervous system. However, Tolaas points

out that the specific meaning of a metaphoric or literal concept is the result of a "process understandable in terms of our biological structure developing in gravitational and cultural space (Tolaas, 1991: 205). Thus, he claims, spatialization metaphors based on the concept MORE IS UP, LESS IS DOWN give room to different conceptualizations of our emotional experiences (Tolaas, 1991: 205) by members of different cultures, a notion that was studied in particular by Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 23), who point to cross - cultural differences as well as within - culture differences in understanding spatialization metaphors. In fact, Kövecses claims, metaphors are a product of universal physiological experience, which he illustrates on the example of the complex metaphor THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER (Kövecses, 2005: 68). This metaphor, he asserts, operates at universal level since it does not specify things such as what sort of container is used, what substance fills the container, the fact whether the container is heated or not, etc. The metaphor makes up a generic schema, which is filled out by details by each culture that uses the metaphor. Kövecses names the metaphors which are filled out in congruence with the generic schema *congruent metaphors*. Once the generic schema is filled out, he argues, it is culturally moulded at a specific level (Kövecses, 2005: 68).

Kövecses points out that the metaphor THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER obtains cultural content depending on the conceptualization of the *sort of container* (in Japanese there is a significant number of expressions involving the concept of *hara* (belly), resulting in the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS IN THE HARA), the *content of the container* (the Chinese conceive the excess *qi*, the energy flowing through the body as gas and not liquid, which is characteristic of the Western model), *dependence on heat* (unlike the Western model, in the Chinese cultural model gas is neutral to heat, but is still capable to exert pressure on the body container). He further claims

that the reasons for the specific content of generic - level metaphors are diverse and can be grouped into the following categories: awareness of context, different memory, differential concerns and interests and various subcases pertaining to the named categories (Kövecses, 2005: 232).

3.8.1.3.2. (Near) Universality of Some Complex and Primary Metaphors

In Kövecses's understanding the conceptual metaphor THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER is, therefore, nearly universal, with specific realizations in diverse cultures relating to the substance in the container such as ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER (the Western model) or ANGER IS A GAS IN A CONTAINER (the Chinese model). He explains the process of the formation of complex metaphors on the example of the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER. Thus the metaphor results from a joint functioning of several primary metaphors, such as INTENSITY IS HEAT ("There was a *heated* debate about the issue."), INTENSITY IS QUANTITY ("I care *a lot* about you"), INTENSITY IS SPEED ("*sudden* growth in economy," "a *sluggish* economy") and INTENSITY IS STRENGTH ("The country was *hit hard* by the flood). Although primary metaphors in general tend to be universal due to the fact that they are based on universal human experiences (Kövecses, 2005: 64), Kövecses points out that there are examples that contradict this statement. One is the statement *Our fears are fuelled by acts of terrorism*, in which the feeling of fear, although usually based on cold, atypically relies on the metaphor INTENSITY IS HEAT (Kövecses, 2005: 28).

Kövecses points out that we usually base our thinking in cultural contexts on complex metaphors rather than primary ones due to the fact that "...in a way, primary metaphors often look "lifeless" in comparison to culturally embedded complex ones "(Kövecses, 2005: 11). Nevertheless, as explained, both primary

and complex metaphors can be (near) universal, with specificacies added by diverse cultures.

3.8.1.4. Relative and Absolute Frames of Reference

There is another distinction between cultures in the context of spatial conceptualisation: the differences in opting for Frames of Reference (abbreviated FoRs). In his book *Space in Language and Cognition* the cognitive psycholinguist Stephen C. Levinson focuses upon two FoRs, the relative and absolute FoRs. Levinson supports the notion advocated by Benjamin Lee Whorf that space is experientially perceived in a universal manner, although the concept of space varies to a certain extent amongst diverse languages (Whorf, 1956: 158). Thus, Levinson argues that people speaking a language that favours a specific FoR think in the equivalent FoR and use a corresponding coordinate system in verbal as well as non - verbal cognition (Levinson, 2004: 20).

Levinson contrasts these two FoRs mainly on the basis of the location of coordinate systems (Levinson, 2004:28): fixed cardinal directions (allocentric systems) are, therefore, characteristic of absolute FoRs, whereas relative FoRs are body or object-centred (egocentric systems). Thus speakers using the relative FoR understand the sentence *The cat is behind the truck* as "The truck is between the speaker and the cat", whereas the users of the absolute FoR would probably opt for something like *The cat is north of the truck* (Levinson, 2004: 3).

Levinson argues that human conceptualisation of space is strongly influenced by culture, which in turn relies heavily on language (Levinson, 2004:19). Experiments, the aim of which was to check the consistency in use of FoRs, were conducted, in which the participants were subjects from two

different cultures using predominantly the absolute FoR. The subjects were Hopevale (residing in Northern Queensland, Australia) speakers of Guugu Yimithirr, and speakers of Tzeltal, who reside in Tenejapa, a highland part of Mexico. The results of the experiment indicated that participants from both cultures retained the ability to keep fixed bearings at all times (Levinson, 2004: 168). The initial hypothesis that the coordinate systems used in language are congruent with the systems utilized by memory and inference proved to be right in both cases. However, the experiments showed that the spatial language of the speakers of Guugu Yimithirr is characterized by the sole application of the absolute FoR, while Tennejapan differentiates between congruent objects, which are defined by the relative (intrinsic) FoR and objects separated in space, which are treated in the absolute system (Levinson, 2004: 154).

The issue of the determinedness of non - verbal spatial coding was addressed by diverse experiments. It is interesting to note that experiments conducted by Eric Pedersen (1993, 1995, 1998) with the two groups of Tamil - speaking participants (with one group speaking a rural dialect and the other an urban dialect) from the Madurai District in Tamiladu, indicated that the factors connected with material culture are of no significance for non - verbal coding (Levinson, 2004: 191). Further experiments showed that gender, literacy and cultural conservatism did not play a big role in determining the non-spatial verbal coding. The crucial factor in shaping non - verbal coding strategy appears to be language (Levinson, 2004: 213).

3.8.1.5. The Interrelation between Language and Culture: Conclusion

It seems that a number of cognitive scholars (Lakoff, Johnson, Talmy, Kövecses) point out that some primary and complex conceptual metaphors are of near - universal nature. However, at the same time they emphasize the

language -specific patterns of conceptualization of abstract concepts including time and space by diverse cultures, which does not make them universalists in a classical sense of the word. Frames of Reference are also, according to the neuropsychologist Stephen C. Levinson, prone to diverse conceptualizations of time and space. Thus the orientation which advocates linguistic relativity in thought appears to have prevailed over universality in cognitivist thought.

3.9. *Summary*

Space and time are two basic concepts with which we understand the world around us. The interrelatedness between these concepts is in particular manifested on conceptual, cultural and linguistic planes. Both the Victorian historical period and the period encompassing the last few decades of the 20th and the first two decades of the 21st century are characterized by major changes in the areas of transport, technology and communication. Accelerated developments in these areas of life have resulted in time and space compression, which is manifested by the erasure of spatial and temporal borders and creation of blended spaces in which time and space become "condensed".

The second chapter deals with the issue of "embodied" time and space. We understand real spaces through our interaction with them, namely via realia in the material world, while we conceptualize abstract spaces via blended spaces, which do not result from direct human interaction with the material world.

I have provided a concise historical overview of the manners of space and time conceptualization throughout different historical periods and by diverse cultures. Western understanding of this concept has presupposed an egocentric, anthropomorphic and relativist perspective. Unlike such an understanding of space, some cultures resort to an absolute Frame of Reference when

conceptualizing space (absolute FoRs are determined by static coordinates, mostly geographical features).

The construal operations of Trajectory and Landmark, Perspective, Viewpoint and Frame of Reference aid us to comprehend this complex category. In the process of space conceptualization we heavily rely on spatial image schemas such as CONTAINER, UP and DOWN, CENTRE and PERIPHERY, VERTICALITY and PATH. These image schemas are interwoven into some orientational as well as structural and ontological conceptual metaphors, which have a physical, but also a social/cultural base (HIGH SOCIAL STATUS IS UP; LOW SOCIAL STATUS IS DOWN).

Time is, like space, a human construct. Throughout history people devised different devices for time measurement. The flow of time is based on the occurrence of events. Isaac Newton differentiated between *absolute* time (its flow is independent from the outer world) and *subjective* time (it is dependent on the order, duration and relation amongst events). This dichotomy paved a way for two diverse conceptualizations of time amongst cognitive scientists: while some scholars support the notion that time is *objective* and that it can be conceptualized through other concepts, in particular space (Lakoff and Johnson), others advocate the idea that we experience time *subjectively* thanks to our "internal clock", which is determined by the interconnected neural actions in our brains (Evans, Damasio). Time is also understood as *linear* (it has its beginning and end) or *cyclic* (events move to other places); *static* (constant) or *dynamic* (prone to change); *monochronic* (time is an exhaustible resource) or *polychronic* (time is not conceived as a resource).

Western conceptualization of time is based on Judeo - Christian understanding of time as linear and irreversible, although it is sometimes

perceived as cyclic (change of seasons). Cognitions in the areas of natural sciences, physics in particular (Einstein's theory of relativity, the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the developments in quantum physics) have challenged the mainstream understanding of time. Chinese and Japanese cultures understood time primarily as a cyclic and dynamic phenomena (in India time was understood as static). However, these cultures approached the Western view of time in the previous century.

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson consider that time is "embodied", that it can be understood through other concepts (space) or events and motion. They envisage time as a moving agent or a goal an observer moves towards. Such an understanding of time results in the creation of *Time Moving* and *Observer Moving* metaphors (*Christmas is approaching; We are approaching Christmas*). Some scientists of cognitive provenience propose variants of these metaphors, in which an egocentric perspective or deictic markers are not included (*Sequence is a Relative Position on a Path* and *Time – Reference – Point metaphors*).

There are differences amongst cognitive scientists in understanding the role of metaphors in forming cultural concepts. Thus the cognitive linguist Zoltán Kövecses supports the notion that metaphors play an important role in the establishment of cultural models, while cognitive anthropologists Naomi Quinn and Dorothy Holland tend to downplay their role in cultural models. Another area of disagreement is the nature of metaphors that lie in the foundation of cultural models: while some scientists believe that the metaphors cultural models are built upon are experienced at an individual (and universal) level (Lakoff, Johnson, Talmy, Kövecses), others consider that they are conditioned by specificacies of particular cultures. Special emphasis is put on the comparison of different manners of time and space conceptualization by members of diverse cultures and languages (understanding of future as being

ahead and past being behind us and opposite; vertical and horizontal conceptualizations of time; understanding space via the CONTAINER image schema).

4. CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TIME AND SPACE IN FAIRY TALES OF THE VICTORIAN PERIOD

This final chapter brings together theories from diverse sciences that research the concepts of space and time. The initial part of the chapter focuses on the social history of Britain during the Victorian historical period. Social history is a relatively new science, which concentrates on a wide array of topics including the history of labour, popular movements, life in urban settlements, patterns and ideas of a culture, class and social structure, and has been open to a definition from other fields of study (Hobsbawm in Best, 1971: xi).

Special attention will be paid to the relationship between class and social structure on one hand and conceptualization of space on the other. I shall try to show the connection between residential distribution and conceptualization of space in Victorian Britain. These are in turn strongly related to the cultural models of the Great Chain of Being and the Victorian self - model. According to the first cultural model all forms of being are characterized by their specific behaviour and attributes, which increase in number and complexity as we move up within this hierarchical model. An extended model of the Great Chain of Being, which is based on Western conceptualization of a divinely created cosmos, includes, besides properties and behaviour that specify each level of the Great Chain of Being, the element of dominance. The aspect of differentiation between forms of being will be addressed in the context of a class - divided Victorian society.

The second cultural model addresses the residential dichotomy on indoor/outdoor spaces. While the upper class tended to stay within their four walls and thus minimize contact with the outer world so that they could keep their privacy, the working class spent a lot of time outdoors, a result of bad

living conditions in cramped rooms where they usually took lodgings. Projected onto a metaphorical plane, the self - model advocated pulling - together and restraint from demonstrating passions (Kimmel, 2003: 387).

The corpus of my study have been fairy tales written by three authors: John Ruskin, George MacDonald and Oscar Wilde. The studied fairy tales include Ruskin's *The King of the Golden River*, MacDonald's *The Princess and the Goblin* and several fairy tales from Wilde's fairy tale collections *The Happy Prince* and *The House of Pomegranates*. These fairy tales belong to the subgenre of modern fanciful tales, which are characterized by specific narrative techniques such as detailed characterization and descriptions of places and time, stronger motivation of characters and an atypical ending (the principle of a happy ending is not necessarily applied in modern fanciful tales).

In my study I have opted for a cognitive linguistic approach in literary analysis. Based on the role of embodiment in cognition, a cognitive approach to literature allows different approaches to literary analysis, depending on which perspective is taken, the perspective of the writer, the reader or the historical/cultural momentum (Freeman, 2002: 466). In my work I have taken the historical/cultural perspective, with only brief references to the perspective of the writer or the reader.

Historically and culturally motivated preoccupation with boundaries in Victorian Britain corresponds to the conceptualization of space with the help of the CONTAINER image schema, both in the context of the self - schema and the Great Chain of Being model. Another productive spatial schema is the PATH image schema, with the help of which we can understand life in terms of a journey. The CONTAINER and the PATH image alongside the UP and DOWN and CENTRE AND ALTERITY schemas contribute, as pointed out by Lakoff and

Turner, in the creation of basic metaphors such as EMOTIONS ARE CONTAINERS; BIG IS UP; CONTROL IS UP; LIFE IS A JOURNEY, only to be further developed in novel metaphors with which we can conceptualize the social structure of the Victorian society and in particular its division on classes.

In Victorian Britain time was often conceptualized in accordance with Western understanding of time as linear, irreversible and moving. Time was personified and understood in terms of a moving agent. Conceptualization of life and death was (inspired by the the Positivist and Milleniarist orientations in philosophy) related to a cyclic understanding of time. In the stories I address the most frequent metaphorical conceptualizations of life and death including LIFE IS A JOURNEY; LIFE IS SPRING, DEATH IS WINTER; DEATH IS A MOVER AND MANIPULATOR, DEATH IS SLEEP and other metaphors.

This chapter refers to Lubomír Doležel's theory of "possible" worlds. According to this theory we are surrounded by fictional worlds ruled by their own principles. By entering the fictional world of a fairy tale we are prepared to deal with the principles of that particular fictional world (for example with the character of a talking animal). Furthermore, I have consulted Paul Werth's theory of *sustained metaphors* and *megametaphors* and explored the possibilities of understanding certain sequences or the whole work in terms of a *sustained* metaphor (a kind of metaphor which subtly leads to a metaphorical reading of a text) or a *megametaphor* (a major metaphor which results from sub – themes of primary and conventional metaphors). I have also referred to Yuri Lotman's notion of a *plot gene*, a narrative device with the help of which we remember a literary work, a poem or a painting and a related theory of *summary images*, as proposed by Michael Kimmel.

4.1. Victorian Historical Period and Its Subperiods

The Victorian era, according to most historians (Chapman, 1970: 2), spans a period of nearly seventy years, from 1832, the year of the First Reform Act up to the death of Queen Victoria in 1901. Although Victoria accessed the throne in 1837, the First Reform Act is regarded as the commencement of the Victorian period because of its significance in several areas of life: the Act was the first step towards gradual domination of money and industry over nobility and agriculture as well as the city over the countryside (Bićanić in Kogoj - Kapetanić and Vidan, 1976: 157).

The historian David Newsome points out that the period marked by Queen Victoria's rule was characterized by a constant flux of dominant ideas but also of attitudes towards religion and social issues (Newsome, 1998: 8) and is accordingly divided into three subperiods: the politically and socially turbulent *first period* (1837 - 1848/1851), the rather stable *mid - Victorian period*, or the *"Age of Equipoise"* (1851 -1867) and the *third, post - Darwinian period* (1867-1901), marked by re - examination of current ideologies and values.

Raymond Chapman, on the other hand, divides the period into *two* subperiods (based on prevailing ideas, attitudes and beliefs): *the first period*, starting with the Queen's accession to the throne until the sixties, which witnessed a fast technological development and a re – evaluation of the individual's relationship to the state and *the second period*, commencing with the seventies and ending with the Queen's death, which was characterized by growing criticism of the age and the people who were content with current developments (Chapman, 1970: 2).

The division into three subperiods seems to prevail amongst scholars (Bićanić in Kogoj - Kapetanić and Vidan, 1976: 157); therefore; we can divide the Victorian period into three subperiods. According to such a division the Victorian period, generally speaking, underwent a hectic development in technology in the 1830s and 1840s, a relative optimism and a praise for the practical until the late sixties, when people started feeling the consequences of fast development, while optimism started turning into dissatisfaction, indifference and eventually decadence during the last decades of the 19th century.⁴⁷ Holbrook Jackson, however, points out that the Eighteen Nineties or the *fin de siècle* period was not so decadent and hopeless as it seemed to contemporaries. In his opinion, the proclaimed decadence was a pose as much as a fact and people often mocked themselves for an exaggerated attitude towards the period, labelling anything "which savoured of freak and perversity *fin de siècle*" (Jackson, 1950: 18).

Jerome Hamilton Buckley considers that the change of attitude was felt as early as 1861, in the year of Prince Albert's, Queen Victoria's husband's death (Buckley in Wright, 1961: 3)⁴⁸. Philip Davis, however, emphasizes that controversies marked the entire period of Queen Victoria's rule (Davis, 2002: 11):

"Victorianism's own struggle between old and new has become replicated in the history of its reception - between modernists and traditionalists, between the politics of left and right. "Realism" is *the* Marxist literary mode, or it is a form of bourgeois falsification; Modernism is anti - Victorian, or Victorianism is proto - modern; "Victorian society" is a study of oppression or the story of developing democracy. "Victorian Values", Victorian sexuality, morality, class,

⁴⁸ Buckley provides an opinion of a contemporary, Frederic Harrison, of the difference in the worldview between the period ending in the seventies and the period that followed it: "...early Victorian life, he felt sure, must have been pleasanter than existence in the seventies, for certainly Dickens and Thackeray " tell us of a livelier, jollier age than that recorded in *Middlemarch* and *Fors Clavigera*" (Buckley in Wright, 1961: 7).

and imperialism (though the story of this last really belongs to the last quarter of the century) - all these at the least continue to provide the ground for vibrant controversy."

4.1.1. *Victorian* and *Victorianism*

The word *Victorian*, as pointed out by Newsome, was not used to refer to the stated historical period until 1851, the year of the Great Exhibition, which took place fourteen years after the Queen's accession to the throne (Newsome, 1998: 1). Philip Davis states that the word was first introduced in 1850 in order to "register the securing of new self – consciousness" (Davis, 2002: 10). Although bearing the name of the ruler the population of the country was particularly connected to⁴⁹, the age "has been subject to diverse and divided judgement" (Buckley in Wright, 1961: 4). Thus, as stated by Davis (2002: 10), a number of intellectuals from the period were anti - Victorian, they rebelled against the imposed values and attitudes that people were expected to live by:

"... Mathew Arnold against complacent materialist philistinism, or Charles Dickens in exposure of religious hypocrisy or Ruskin on the unfeelingness and uncreativity of his time."

David Newsome stresses that the shrewdest observers and critics of the mid Victorian period such as Thomas Carlyle, Matthew Arnold and John Ruskin, often resort to didacticism in their work, as they felt that their moral duty was to teach (Newsome, 1998: 9). During the later Victorian Age the strictest critics were Oscar Wilde and George Bernard Shaw (Briggs in Ford, 1992: 14). All these named critics help us comprehend the historical period from today's perspective, since, as pointed out by Asa Briggs, we know a particular

⁴⁹ The Royal Family itself was a pattern people modelled their family life upon (the pattern of a big family with many children and parental authority within the family) and Queen Victoria was a paragon of an ideal woman (Chapman, 1970: 3; 24).

period in history best "through its critics, not through its enthusiasts" (Briggs in Ford, 1992: 14).

Although the word *Victorian* was not in fact used much during the Victorian period, the term gradually obtained negative connotations. By the last decade of the 19th century the term was derogatorily used for "the generation that was spending lavishly of its pounds and poetry to celebrate Victoria's Diamond Jubilee" (Buckley in Wright, 1961: 4). After Queen Victoria's death, the trend to disparage or mock everything and everybody that could be classified as *Victorian* was even more obvious (Davis, 2002:11). Jerome Hamilton Buckley emphasizes that the 20th century witnessed an ambiguous definition of the term *Victorianism*, which the conservative used as a protection, whereas for the modernists it was a target for criticism (Buckley in Wright, 1961: 4). Nevertheless, it appears that, as pointed out by Buckley, the strictest critics of the period were the Victorians themselves (Buckley in Wright, 1961: 7):

"Victorianism" was undoubtedly, at least in part, a monster created by rebellious spirits and bequeathed to a posterity which all too frequently is content to regard the spirits as the monster's children."

Davis points out that the term underwent controversial treatment and is in that respect symptomatic of the period itself, as claimed by John Stuart Mill in his essay on Coleridge in 1840 - "the noisy conflict of half - truths angrily denying one another", resulting in an oscillation between these two extremes" (Davis, 2002: 11).

4.1.2. Victorian Attitudes

Many intellectuals of the Victorian period strongly criticized imposed values and attitudes that characterized this period in history. In the following text I shall address these in the way the scholars of the 20th century interpret them (based on the observations of intellectuals of the Victorian period). Although certain attitudes induced mainly positive or negative connotations amongst the scholars of both the 19th and 20th centuries, critics of the Victorian period outline both positive and negative aspects of every principal attitude that characterized the era.

William E. Houghton's book *The Victorian Frame of Mind* (1985) provides a thorough study of emotional, intellectual and moral attitudes of the Victorian time. The author points out that the attitudes that most scholars perceive as positive included *optimism* (mostly the result of rapid growth in the fields of technology, industry and economy, which produced the feelings of faith in progress), *earnestness* (strongly connected with the praise of hard work, a desire for constant self – improvement and devotion to religion) and *enthusiasm* (produced by moral education with an aim to educate young people to praise everything and everybody that is lovely, admirable and hopeful and attain an optimistic view of life, humanity and the world). Related to these attitudes was "the overbalance of commercial spirit" and the tendency in the middle classes for snobbery (Houghton, 1985: 183). Finally, all the stated attitudes resulted in the cult of a *hero* or a belief that the world has to be ruled by great men possessing the previously named positive attitudes (Houghton, 1985: 325).

However, there was another side to these attitudes. Some aspects of earnestness were not perceived affirmatively. In her paper *Class, Caste and Self - Help in Mid-Victorian England* Anne Baltz Roderick addresses the problem of

lack of self - indulgence in the 1850s. The general feeling amongst the members of the self - help societies, which were emerging rapidly in the 1820s and 1830s, was that a mere exposure to culture was not enough to acquire knowledge. Thus some members of these societies, the aim of which was to raise collective consciousness of the need to perfect oneself in the areas of intellectual achievement and moral rectitude, understood that owning a library, for example, constituted learning (Baltz Roderick, 2001: 42). The mid Victorian period was marked by the existence of class - marked self - help societies: some societies were attended by young men belonging to the lower - middle class (in some cases the working class was also allowed to attend), while others allowed only the members of the upper - middle class. This dichotomy, argues Baltz Roderick, contributed even more to the establishment of sharp boundaries between classes, since, for example, the members of the lower - middle class aspired to a status which would distinguish them not only from members of the working class, but also from the members of their own class who were not, in their opinion, ardent self - helpers (Baltz Roderick, 2001: 45). Baltz Roderick further claims that the division between improvers and non - improvers was soon overshadowed by new incomes, especially by new women members. The emphasis of the meetings was, in the new circumstances, put on amusement rather than intellectual debates. The mission of collective self - improvement was imperilled and gave way to individual self - improvement in the late Victorian period. Baltz Roderick emphasizes on the one hand the importance of these societies for the 20th century foundations of the city and state and on the other the inconsistency in pursuing goals.

Furthermore, putting emphasis on the importance of hard work, argues Haughton, in many instances resulted in *anti - intellectualism*, which derived partly from the Puritan scepticism of novelties and partly from a prevalent hands

- on approach to things, which favoured practice over theory (Houghton, 1985: 113).⁵⁰

Apart from anti - intellectualism, the attitudes that were criticized most severely by the intellectuals of the Victorian period were *anxiety*, *rigidity*, *dogmatism* and *hypocrisy*. The feeling of anxiety was related to several causes: the fear of revolution (most of Europe was struck by revolutionary events in the fifth decade of the 19th century), illnesses, moral degradation, failure (in business) but above all atheism (Houghton, 1985: 54 - 89). Faced on one hand with the findings in diverse sciences, above all anthropology, geology and sociology, which projected a different, evolutionary view of the world and on the other the principles of the dominant Anglican or Catholic church and different orientations within the Protestant faith, which advocated the view that humanity descended from one original couple, the Victorian man was sure of nothing. The anxiety was doubled by rigidity, an inability to follow more than one line of thought (Houghton, 1985: 161) and dogmatism, the commitment to "the concept of absolute law" (Houghton, 1985: 145), which governed all areas of life.

Houghton argues that the Victorians would have pleaded guilty to only one of all the criticism brought against them: *hypocrisy*. He stresses that hypocrisy consisted of several components, namely of conformity, moral pretension and evasion. The Victorians conformed to the customary in order to avoid social stigma, and religious conformity made a great majority of the people frequent church, although many of those people considered themselves agnostics (Houghton, 1985: 396). Houghton further emphasizes that Charles Kingsley, a sage of the period, pointed out that the moral pretension of the

⁵⁰ Houghton provides examples of three great inventors from the period of the Industrial Revolution, James Watt, George Stevenson and James Hargreaves as well as of a renowned inventor from the Victorian period, William Arkwright, whose inventions were empirically based (Houghton, 1985: 113).

Victorians resulted in their declarative worship of one god, the Creator of all beings, and concrete dedication to another, the god of money, *Mammon*⁵¹ (Houghton, 1985: 405). Furthermore, Houghton asserts (1985: 413) that the desire to be fervid Christians led the Victorians to self - deception: the areas of life where evasion was most obvious were sex, the suffering of the poor and deprived and human nature, with some of these areas addressed with fear (sex, religion) or "shallow and insistent optimism" (human nature, the living and working conditions of the poor). Hypocrisy was particularly attacked by intellectuals including John Stewart Mill and Thomas Carlyle, who repeatedly drew public attention to the necessity of being true to oneself and, accordingly, avoid evasion, moral pretension and conformity (Houghton, 1985: 426). However, even as resolute a man as John Ruskin turned to scepticism when faced with the dilemma which path to take, which Houghton illustrates by quoting Ruskin's final words of a lecture delivered in 1864 (Houghton, 1985: 157):

"For the rest, respecting religions, governments, sciences, arts, you will find that, on the whole, you can know NOTHING (original emphasis), - judge nothing; that the best you can do, even though you may be a well - educated person, is to be silent, and strive to be wiser every day...The thoughts even of the wisest are very little more than pertinent questions. To put the difficulty into a clear shape, and exhibit to you the grounds for indecision, that is all they can generally do for you!"

It can be concluded that the Victorian period, generally speaking, underwent hectic development in technology, a relative optimism and praise for the practical until the late sixties, when the people started feeling the

⁵¹ Mammon is a term derived from the Christian Bible and it means "dishonest gain". The term is used generally to describe greed or material wealth, in most cases personified as a deity (Wikipedia)

consequences of the fast development, while optimism started turning into dissatisfaction, indifference and eventually decadence.⁵²

4.1.3. The Spirit of an Age

Newsome emphasises that the Victorian period can rightly be named "transitional" due to the fact that, as stated by Thomas Arnold, the headmaster of Rugby and a contemporary, the population "lived the life of three hundred years in thirty" (Newsome, 1998: 1). During the entire period the people witnessed major technological achievements and a rapid development of industry. As pointed out by Chapman, people were "alternatively excited and dismayed...by the rapid progress of science, the technological revolution, the speed at which men and ideas could move around the world" (Chapman, 1970: 1).

It had been unprecedented that so many changes took place during such a short period of time, the result of which was a dynamic pattern of living. The element of the speedy pace of living will be studied in more detail in the subchapter related to the Victorian conceptualisation of time.

A new expression gained popularity in Victorian England - *Zeitgeist*⁵³/ "the spirit of an age". For the first time in history there was a need to compare an era with former periods and with a notion of what was to be expected in the future. Related to *Zeitgeist* is another Germanism, *Zeitanschaungen*, and its

⁵² Chapman proposes a notional subdivision of the Victorian period into two subperiods, while at the same time stressing the two periods were conflicting inasmuch as overlapping (Chapman, 1971: 2).

⁵³ It should be noted that Matthew Arnold substituted the expression "the spirit of an age" with *Zeitgeist* approximately thirty years after the former had been introduced. *Zeitgeist*, as pointed out by Newsome, cannot be treated as a complete synonym of "the spirit of an age", since it adds the dimension of a culture during a historical period that is being controlled and determined by a force (Newsome, 1997: 3).

closest English equivalent, *world picture*, which Newsome considers as the best expression for denoting "observations of one's times" (Newsome, 1998: 5).

4.1.4. Technological Advancements and Industrialization

The period was marked by many changes in different areas of human life. Industry in England was developing very quickly, which can best be illustrated by the example of the change of heat - energy sources in the late 18th century, the shift from wood and charcoal to coke and coal, consequently leading to a rapid economic development due to the mass production of iron and steel during the Victorian period (Davis, 2002: 3). On the other hand, the revolution in manufacture of textiles owed its rapid development to steam - powered machinery inventions (Newsome, 1998: 20).

In order to present British industry as the most advanced and thus leading in the world, The Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations was held in 1851. The exhibition was initiated by Prince Albert, Queen Victoria's husband, who was also the President of the Royal Society of Arts. Technological achievements from areas as diverse as mechanization, meteorology, electricity, engineering, transport and communications and many more were on display (Davis, 2002: 5).

Because of the rapid changes in these named fields, the older generation, who witnessed a much slower pace of life at the beginning of the century, had difficulty in adjusting to new life conditions. This sudden contact of the ancient and modern led to a number of diverse ideologies that marked the Victorian way of thinking.

4.1.5. Dominant Ideologies

The Utilitarian ideology, devised by Jeremy Bentham at the beginning of the 19th century, was still very influential during the Victorian period, especially throughout the first half of the century (Cockshut in Pollard, 1987: 10). The Utilitarians' main principle of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" implied immersion in pleasure, while also emphasizing pragmatic use in all aspects of life; the only knowledge worth having was "useful knowledge" while the sole purpose of the government was to provide a "useful" end (Newsome, 1998: 52). However, initial hedonism and egocentrism of the early Victorians gradually changed into social awareness and solidarity for the poor in the 1850s (Cockshut in Pollard, 1997: 2).

Social issues were interwoven into the principles of a number of influential philosophies during the second half of the 19th century. Thus the *determinist* philosophy of Emile Durkheim and his followers stressed that history (especially revolutions and convulsions) takes its course no matter the particular human agent. Similarly the principles of Karl Marx's *Socialist* theory envisaged a historically determined and irreversible process of class conflict, which would eventually lead to the establishment of a socialist political order (Newsome, 1998: 174). Another influential philosophy was the *Positivism* of the French philosopher Auguste Comte, the reflections of whose philosophy can be traced in the theory of the British sociologist Herbert Spencer. Comte's teaching was unique because it compared the history of Western civilization with the stages of human life: childhood requires dogmatic instruction (as provided by theologians), the adolescence is equivalent to the historical stage at which reflections upon metaphysical issues take place, while manhood corresponds to the stage of getting to know the world through experimental science (Newsome, 1998: 176).

Awareness of social problems was also felt in the philosophies that were dominant at the end of the 19th century. As early as 1848 the members of the Pre - Raphaelite Brotherhood, including Dante Gabriel Rossetti, John Ruskin and John Millais, inspired by the *Zeitgeist* of the *Middle Ages* and the *Romantic movement* from the beginning of the century, strived for simplicity and naturalness in their work (Newsome, 1998: 185). Furthermore, the art critic and writer John Ruskin attacked the mechanistic, rational and ordered pattern of living during the Victorian period, a pattern which limited creativity and craftsmanship in production (qualities which, in his opinion, the Middle Ages encouraged) and favoured automatism and unoriginality (Newsome, 1998: 186).

The last decades of the 19th century were marked by philosophies oriented towards the self: Mammonism, which encouraged egocentrism, the race for material values and lawlessness (Newsome, 1998: 242) and *aestheticism*, an orientation in art/literature, which proposed distancing of the artist/poet from his public in order to produce a work of art which was to satisfy primarily its author (Newsome, 1998: 249). These orientations in philosophy and art and literature led to decadence⁵⁴, which was, most likely, exacerbated by the decline of the British economy at the end of the century (known as the period of "the Great Depression"). As a result of disillusionment, which was a consequence of observation of their times, many people fell ill with a mental condition named "neurasthenia" by the American doctor George Miller Beard (Newsome, 1998: 89). As pointed out by Newsome, this illness became the *mal du siècle* (illness of the century) of the *fin du siècle*.

4.1.5.1. Emergence of New Sciences

⁵⁴ Holbrook Jackson names the main characteristics of the decadence: 1) Perversity, 2) Artificiality, 3) Egoism and 4) Curiosity (Jackson, 1950:629). These contradictory features best illustrate the complexity of the fin de siècle period.

The 19th century witnessed important breakthroughs in sciences including geology, anthropology, ethnology and sociology. The Victorian period also marked the birth of new sciences including anthropology and sociology.

Sir Charles Lyell's *Principles of Geology* from 1833, based on a thorough examination of the geological strata in the earth's crust and animal fossils, showed that the earth was significantly older than it had been previously assumed and that the appearance of humans on earth was recent (Cockshut in Pollard, 1997: 18).

Research in social sciences focused upon the origin of man and led to diverse conclusions. What was common to all these sciences was that they re-evaluated the biblical tradition, according to which humanity descended from one original pair, Adam and Eve, who had been designed by God as the ultimate act of Creation (Stocking, 1987: 44). Thus Dr. James Cowles Pritchard proposed the idea that all races originated from Southwest Asia, which he illustrated by the visual metaphor of a tree, with major racial branches stemming from the trunk and further divided into twigs, or tribes (Stocking, 1987: 53). Pritchard's ethnological theory was later in the century supported by the German scholar Friedrich Max Müller, who suggested the Aryans, a community living in the identical place Pritchard had suggested, were the ancestors of all modern civilized European nations (Stocking, 1987: 59). Unlike Pritchard's and Müller's theories, which proposed the idea of monogenism, the notion that all peoples descended from one original community, phrenologists advocated polygenism or the theory of peoples' descent from various communities (Stocking, 1987: 65)⁵⁵. Phrenology gave rise to Anglo - Saxon racialism, which did more than positively define the national identity. In that way the Germanic

⁵⁵ Phrenologists led by the Swedish anatomist Anders Retzius, based their findings on the research of the cephalic index, and eventually came up with the theory of two races: *dolichocephalic* (narrow – headed) and *brachycephalic* (broad - headed).

nations were perceived as self - controlled, self - reliant, liberty - loving and thus superior in "moral energy" to the rest of humanity (Stocking, 1987: 62).

Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (1859) further put biblical anthropology to test. Although Darwin described himself as a Theist, in fact as an agnostic (Newsome, 1998:204), his theory of "progress through struggle", later to grow into "Social Darwinism", propagated by Darwin's disciples, was in the line with Comte's theory of evolution (Newsome, 1998: 176). Darwin's theory of evolution addressed once again the problem of the origin of mankind and supported the idea of monogenism, claiming that humanity originated from primates and gradually developed into modern man, *homo erectus*. During the course of natural evolution, claimed Darwin, only the fittest survived the process of natural selection. However, Darwin's theory was challenged by the parallel existence of "savage communities" and civilized populations, which he solved by explaining the existence of the former with the theory of the "missing link"⁵⁶.

Simultaneously, Herbert Spencer laid the foundations of another social science, sociology, by proposing the idea of *evolution of society* from simple to complex, claiming that there had been a gradual change from instinctive to rational behaviour (Stocking, 1987: 237).

George W. Stocking states that there were three intellectual orientations in the mid 19th century related to the origin of mankind: "ethnological", which claimed (based on collected ethnographical data) that mankind had a common root, "anthropological", which based its conclusions on findings obtained from studying physical characteristics of people, and "evolutionary", which addressed

⁵⁶ According to Darwin's theory in the beginning there were no psychological differences between white savages and black savages. However, during the process of cultural evolution white savages acquired superior brains while black savages' culture and capacity did not progress significantly from the initial stage, thus confining them to the status of missing link in the evolutionary chain (Stocking, 1987: 185).

ethnographic and archeological data in the context of Darwinian theory of evolution (Stocking, 1987: 269).

4.1.6. Consequences of Fast Technological and Industrial Development

Lack of space for living due to overpopulation was a major issue in big cities and a result of several factors. The population rise was primarily caused by declining death - rates and rising birth rates, particularly by 1871, which were a result of the gradual improvement of the conditions that caused mortality prior to the Victorian period and the introduction of birth control methods (Newsome, 1998: 17 - 18).

Secondly, urbanization of cities was in its full swing during the Victorian period: the estimates propose that in 1865 the urban population exceeded rural by 50%. Apart from an accelerated industrial and technological advancement, the main reason for urbanization at such a large scale were private Enclosure Acts, carried out by landlords, whose aim was to turn former common land and open field as well as uncultivated land into private sections and thus enlarge their farms and, accordingly, their profit, which drove farm workers to big cities (Newsome, 1998: 24). Furthermore, Geoffrey Best emphasizes the fact that the cities attracted young people partly for entertainment and partly for a bigger choice of marriage partners (Best, 1971: 10).

Thirdly, immigration, especially from Ireland, where the potato crop failed in the mid 1840s, the consequence of which was emigration of its population who fled famine to other countries, contributed as well to the increase of the population. Furthermore, there was a significant long - distance migration from other provinces, especially Scotland and Wales (Best, 1971: 13). As a result of all these factors, the population of Great Britain rose from

approximately sixteen million in 1831 to twenty - one million in 1851, twenty - six million in 1871 and eventually to thirty - seven million by the turn of the century (Chapman, 1970:16 - 17).

Life in big cities on the one hand provided work for the working class, but on the other hand implied bad living conditions. R. H. Mottram (Mottram in Young, 1934: 167) provides some statistics on the living conditions in the city of Leeds at the end of the 1830s:

"Five hundred and sixty - eight streets were taken for examination: 68 were paved; 96 were neither paved, drained, nor cleaned; one of them, with 176 families, had not been touched for fifteen years. Whole streets were floating with sewage; 200 were crossed with clothes - lines. Over 500 cellars were in occupation... The death rate in the clean streets was 1 in 36, in the dirty streets 1 in 23."

It is no surprise that "filth diseases" such as cholera, diarrhoea, typhoid fever, scarlet fever, typhus, diphtheria and many more flourished amongst "undernourished, ill - cleansed and overcrowded bodies" (Best, 1971: 55). The illnesses struck in particular the youngest, with the years of 1846, 1847 and 1899 being most lethal to infants under one years of age (Best, 1971: 56).

4.1.6.1. The Class System

The main reason why there were no revolutionary uprisings in Britain like in many other European countries (1848 was the revolutionary year in Europe) was the fact that the class system was tacitly accepted by everybody. The Victorians, as Walter E. Houghton points out, deferred to the opinions of "elders and betters" rather than re - evaluate these opinions by themselves (Houghton, 1985: 103).

The Victorian period was a politically stable one, although more turbulent towards the end due to trade unions' demands, fight for suffrage and women's rights (Newsome, 1998: 250). There was harmony amongst classes, with people complying with the role "providence" assigned to them. The key terms in describing the mid - Victorian social order, introduced by Walter Bagehot, an observer of the period, were *deference* and *removable inequalities*. The first term referred to accepting one's position in society, whereas the second expressed the idea that there was a possibility for everyone to climb on the social scale. The fact that inequalities were taken for granted allowed putting emphasis on the first member of the compound, *removable*, implying that an individual can raise himself in the vertical hierarchy with good conduct and exertion of moral and intellectual features (Best, 1971: 233).

The members of the fast - growing middle class were people of different professions: engineers, doctors, lawyers, clergy, architects, civil servants, accountants, soldiers, teachers and others. They all strived to be "gentlemen", but some of them, namely socially adaptable and well - mannered, were more likely to be considered as such (Best, 1971: 247). However, aristocracy ruled the country politically as well as administratively: the nobility held executive positions in banks, railway companies and were successful businessmen (Best, 1971: 243).

The feelings of deference weakened in the last three decades of the century, followed by farm labourers joining trade unions and their representatives getting seats in the Parliament (Best, 1971: 256). The result of the working class becoming more involved in running the country as well as a gradual but steady rise of the middle class resulted in softening of the former strict division amongst classes in Britain.

The interconnectedness of the class system and the conceptualisation of space in Victorian Britain will be discussed further.

4.2. The Conceptualization of Space and Time in Victorian Britain

Developments from the century before contributed to the specific understanding of time and space in the Victorian period. May and Thrift point out that the diffusion of gas lighting from the end of the 18th century forever affected the distinction between day and night, blurring the boundary between them, which was previously determined by natural rhythms of the diurnal cycle (May and Thrift, 2003: 11).

Furthermore, Kevin Hetherington asserts that in the second half of the 18th century *the factory* with its particular network was an important *new site* and therefore presented a heterotopia, since it offered an alternative to the manner in which work was organized in the period. The prevailing domestic system of production, also known as "putting out" was replaced by new ideas of production, the ones "based upon the principles of the division of labour, time - management, sophisticated accounting technologies and the marketing of well - made, fashionable products." (Hetherington in May and Thrift, 2003: 53). The factory as a heterotopia involved also a temporal dimension: the function of the factory led to the notion that society progressed through the improvement of place, which in turn triggered moving forward in a linear social time (Hetherington in May and Thrift, 2003: 53).

These developments in the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century had a significant role for understanding the concepts of time and space; however, it seems that the focus of study in natural as well as social sciences and humanities was time rather than space. According to anthropologist George W. Stocking,

research in natural sciences primarily concentrated on the concept of time (Stocking, 1987: 76). Stocking states that the emergence of a new science in the 19th century, anthropology, shifted the focus from the issue of human unity, which had been the focus of ethnology, to the problem of the origins of human civilization (Stocking, 1987: 76). Stocking emphasizes that, roughly speaking, the natural history of mankind, instead of being interpreted in terms of movement in *space*, namely the westward movement of nations throughout history, started to be looked upon in the context of movement in *time*. In that way anthropologists started conceiving time as a phenomenon of "repeated events governed by lawful processes regularly producing the same effects from the same causes" (Stocking, 1987: 77), although the study of migration and diffusion was not neglected either.

The situation was similar in social sciences and humanities: numerous theories sprang that focused on interpretation of time. Fast development in industry and technology produced a sentiment that humanity reached its peak, with many theories predicting an unavoidable cataclism or, contrary to that, a new, even more prosperous era.

4.2.1. Space

Research in various sciences, particularly in social history and social geography, point to the interconnectedness between the conceptualisation of space and the hierarchical class system in Victorian Britain. Karen Chase and Michael Levenson thus argue that notion of boundedness within one's own walls originated from the wish to divide the home from the street. The richer classes protected their privacy by home walls, while the poorer classes were kept outdoors. Every entry by poorer classes such as servants, governesses or grooms into the homes of the rich was perceived as social disturbance or even

intrusions of the turbulent outdoor world on the occupants' safety and privacy (Chase and Levenson in Tucker, 1999: 428).

Many opinion makers in the Victorian period, as noted out by Chase and Levenson, defined the family in architectural as well as biological terms (Chase and Levenson, 1999: 431). They emphasize that the Registrar General of the Census expected that every family should own a house, pointing at the use of the word "house" in the sense of "family" in many languages (Chase and Levenson, 1999: 431). Those who did not own a house were perceived as "spilling their privacy outdoors", which marked them as savages (Chase and Levenson, 1999: 431). The richer people were, the bigger houses they had: the aristocracy owned mansions in the countryside, while the poor squeezed in single rooms.

The poor had to sleep somewhere and in most cases their dwellings were confined to a corner of a room in a house/court or lodging houses. The living conditions were extremely bad: poor people's lodgings were overcrowded, filthy and, consequently, numerous infectious diseases thrived.

Apart from the indoor/ outdoor social division, claim Chase and Levenson, there was another spatial indicator of class: vicinity to the city centre. The nobility lived in the country, while the middle classes mainly resided in the suburbs, the lower middle classes, such as artisans in their terraces, while the poor lived in their single rooms (Chase and Levenson in Tucker, 1999: 435).

Some scholars, nevertheless, argue that the study of *residential differentiation* or the interrelation between the conceptualisation of space and the hierarchical class division of Victorian society encounters diverse problems. One of the issues appear to be the fact that scholars from different fields of study

do not focus on the same aspects of this differentiation, i.e. social geographers are primarily concerned about the patterns of the processes causing the differentiation and its effects on the social stratification of the society, while scholars in the fields of economics and politics base their research on the "significance and meaning of differentiation for Victorian society" (Pooley, 1983: 131).

Another problem that arises relating to the topic of differentiation is the scarcity of evidence that could support the claim that residential distribution of the population of Britain in the 19th century Britain (the term population primarily applies to the residents of big towns) and the class system are interrelated (Pooley, 1983: 132). Thus a number of scholars of different orientations have recognized the difficulty that arises when accounts of the people living during the Victorian period are taken into consideration, in particular their understanding of the differentiation. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Pooley, when sporadic sources such as individual official and unofficial accounts, newspaper reports, personal diaries and contemporary literature are matched with other sources including conventional census, rate books and directory sources, a more complete picture of the residential differentiation in the context of the Victorian society can be drawn (Pooley, 1983: 142).

In conclusion we can state that the issue of residential differentiation appears to be a complex one due to different scientific approaches to the problem. However, at the same time it acts as an immense potential for further interdisciplinary studies in the future.

4.2.2. Time

During the Victorian period time was conceptualised in many different ways. All the diverse views shared one common characteristic: the time the Victorians lived in was unique in its character. The Victorians became aware of the fact that time was of essence as early as the 1851 or the Year of the Great Exhibition. New means of transportation including trains, steamships, and, later in the century, electric trams, accelerated the pace of living, forcing the older generation, who was used to a more peaceful way of living, to cope with an unprecedented *speed*. Precisely for these reasons, the year 1851 appeared to these people as "an extraordinary chronological frontier", or a "precipice in Time", as stated by Thomas Hardy (Stocking, 1987:1).

One of the most influential philosophies of the Victorian era was the *Positivism* of the French philosopher Auguste Comte, which understood the history of the Western civilization in terms of the stages of human life (Newsome, 1997: 176). Inspired by Comte, Thomas Carlyle perceived time as alterations of cycles, during which eras of growth are followed by eras of decay and opposite (Newsome, 1997: 166).

The Liberal Anglican school of historians shared the positivist view that time is cyclic, what is more, they considered Doomsday was approaching as the most prosperous era, which in their opinion was the Victorian period, was soon to end, giving way to destruction and Apocalypse (Newsome, 1997: 171). These ideas reflected the revival of Millenarianism⁵⁷ ideology, according to which the world and religion could only be saved by Christ's Second Coming (Newsome, 1998:37). Jackson argues that the old northern faith played a role in the

⁵⁷ *Millenarianism/Millenarism*: the belief by a religious, social or political group or movement in a coming major transformation of society, after which all things will be changed, based on a one-thousand-cycle (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millenarianism>)

establishment of a similar theory, namely the doctrine of the Dusk of Gods (Jackson, 1950: 17). The cataclysmic view survived the end of the nineteenth century, e.g. its elements can be traced in William Butler Yeats' s poetry, i.e. in his poem *The Second Coming*.⁵⁸

Unlike these catastrophic predictions, John Stuart Mill and his followers envisaged the Victorian period was an *ouverture* to a yet more prosperous era, thus supporting the "doctrine of the indefinite progressiveness of the human mind" (Newsome, 1997: 173).

A significant number of historians of the second half of the Victorian period had a *deterministic* view of time: they advocated the idea that mankind does not control time but quite the opposite, that time rules humanity. One of the sages of the time, Thomas Carlyle, whose conception of time shifted from positivist to determinist, emphasized in his works that our existence is based as well as built on time (Newsome, 1997: 166). The intellectuals of the later Victorian period were strongly influenced by German Romantics, especially by Goethe, Fichte, Herder and Novalis, who supported the notion that mankind was controlled by a higher force, possibly Providence or *Zeitgeist*, which determined what nation was to be a prosperous one and which nation was to fall, allowing the possibility that the status of a nation could change overnight (Newsome, 1997: 166).

⁵⁸ The poem was written in 1919, while humanity was still healing the wounds from World War 1. In it Yeats articulates a theory of history focused on two conical spirals which are situated one inside another, with a set of spirals around them. In this diagram the widest part of one cone occupies the same plane as the tip of another cone and vice versa. Yeats asserted that this image of a *gyre*, i.e. a spiralling from of swirling vortex, reflects contrary motions inherent within the process of history, and further divided each gyre into different regions, which stood for different historical periods as well as the phases of an individual' s psychological development. Yeats believed that in 1919 humanity was on the verge of an apocalyptic event, because history approached the end of the outer gyre and began moving alongside the inner gyre.

More information is available at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Second_Coming_\(poem\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Second_Coming_(poem)).

The idea that humanity was ruled by some controlling force such as Zeitgeist contributed to historians treating it as if it was a human being, or a personification of time (Newsome, 1997: 165). Newsome illustrates this with a passage from Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland*, in which Alice is trying to solve a riddle to which there is no solution (Newsome, 1997: 165):

"I think you might do better with the time... than waste it..." "If you knew the time as well as I do" said the Hatter, "you wouldn't talk about wasting *it*. It's *him*."

The term Zeitgeist itself suggests the idea that time is, if not human, than at least a kind of controlling spirit which determines the destinies of nations (German *Zeit* – *time*, *Geist* – *spirit*).

As a conclusion I can state that time was conceptualised in diverse manners during the Victorian period: as cyclic, cataclysmic, progressive, providential, positivist, deterministic. However, orientations that influenced the most the philosophies in the new century were the cyclic conception of time (e.g. W.B. Yeats) and the deterministic view, in particular as advocated by Marxist philosophy.

4.2.3. The Controversy of Time and Space Compression

Stephen Kern points out that the invention of moving pictures at the end of the 19th century presented diverse temporal phenomena including time expansion, compression, reversal and others, which played with the entrenched understanding of uniformity and irreversibility of time (Kern, 2000: 28).

Advancements in the areas of industry and technology, and especially transportation and communication, unavoidably affected the conceptualisation of space and time in the Victorian period. As pointed out by May and Thrift, the invention of the telephone made it possible for people to be, in a way, in two places at the same time, while the distances were travelled five times faster by train than a hundred years before (May and Thrift, 2003: 7). Space was, as suggested by contemporary accounts, "annihilated by time" (May and Thrift, 2003: 8). Due to geographical and temporal compression, argue these authors, spaces became on the one side closer owing to the developments in communication and technology, but on the other side more distant, since people could learn about events in ever more distant corners of the world, the colonies of the Empire (May and Thrift, 2003: 8).

Furthermore, new findings in biology in the 1890s indicated that different organisms lived at different speeds, thereby concluding time was relative, which disputed Newton's theory of absolute time and space (May and Thrift, 2003: 11).

May and Thrift conclude that it is difficult to be certain from today's perspective how people living in the Victorian period conceptualised time and space since, they assert, the sources basically consist of few rather elitist texts (May and Thrift, 2003: 13). It cannot be disputed, though, that the whole period of a little less than seventy years witnessed huge changes in diverse areas, particularly in transportation and technology, which resulted in an accelerated pace of living and, consequently, the way the concepts of time and space were understood. Although the stated advancements in technology, industry, transportation and communication contributed to the feeling of compression of time and space, it seems that many longed for a slower, quieter pace of life far from the hectic rhythm of urban areas. That was, in May and Thrift's opinion, the

main reason why John Constable's paintings, which portrayed a slower, quieter life in the countryside, were so popular amongst middle classes at the end of the century (May and Thrift, 2003: 9).

Fairy tales written during the Victorian period as well evoked a feeling of distant times and places. In the following text we shall present a short overview of the history and development of the fairy tale as a literary genre. I shall as well argue that fairy tales could be understood as a medium for social criticism. The studied fairy tales written by John Ruskin, George MacDonald and Oscar Wilde attack Victorian attitudes that produced negative connotations and popularized, in the authors' opinion, wrong values. While MacDonald in his *The Princess and the Goblin* makes a parable between a class - divided system in the fairy tale and the class - ridden Victorian society, the author of *The King of the Golden River*, John Ruskin, focuses upon the values that marred the Victorian period, i.e. greed and obsession with material values. In his fairy tales, published in two collections (*The Happy Prince and Other Tales* and *The House of Pomegranates*), Wilde expresses his worries about the influence of Utilitarianism on his contemporaries' way of thinking (*The Nightingale and the Rose*). He also harshly criticises vices such as insensitivity, coldness (*The Selfish Giant*, *The Birthday of the Infanta*, *The Nightingale and the Rose*) and obsession with appearance (*The Remarkable Rocket*, *The Star - Child*), which he considered to be as a peril to the society. The study will also focus on conceptualization of time, especially in the context of understanding two concepts that are firmly connected with the notion of the passage of time, namely the concepts of life and death.

The genre of modern fanciful tale, which was established by Hans Christian Andersen, flourished in Victorian Britain and each of the named

authors left his special mark in the context of literature for children as well as adults.

4.3. Fairy Tales as Compared to Other Types of Literature

The genre of fairy tale was popular in the Victorian period and stories for children were in many cases not aimed solely at the youngest audience.⁵⁹ Oscar Wilde wrote of his stories that were published in his first collection of fairy tales, *The Happy Prince and Other Tales* (1888), that they are "meant partly for children and partly for those who have kept childlike faculties of wonder and joy" (Hodgkiss in Wilde, 1994: XVI). Similarly, George MacDonald declared (Davis, 2002: 338):

"For my part I do not write for children, but for the childlike, whether of five, of fifty, or seventy - five."

Fred Inglis, a prominent scholar in the field of children's literature, wrote in his *The Promise of Happiness* that "the association of children and fairy – stories is an accident of our domestic history... Children... neither like fairy – stories more, nor understand them better than adults do" (Inglis, 1981: 76).

Peter Hunt, another renowned scholar, focuses on the issue of the status of children's literature in the context of "serious" literature. Hunt emphasizes that literature for children is not inferior in quality to other types of writing, but rather different from them (Hunt, 1994: 11). Perhaps the following quotation from C. S. Lewis's work *On Three Ways of Writing for Children* best expresses

⁵⁹ Karol Visinko, a theoretician of children's literature, emphasizes that *priča* (story) is the umbrella term for three different genres of shorter narrative forms (Visinko, 2005: 34), i.e. of *bajka* (fairy tale), *fantastična priča* (fantasy) and *pripovjetka* (short story).

the idea of the unfoundedness of prejudices held by some scholars related to children's literature (C.S. Lewis, 1973: 234):

"When I was ten, I read fairy tales in secret and would have been ashamed if I had been found doing so. Now that I am fifty I read them openly. When I became a man I put away childish things, including the fear of childishness."

Many authors who wrote fairy tales during the Victorian period were more renowned for their other works: during the first half of his active life John Ruskin wrote essays about art, Charles Dickens and William Makepeace Thackeray wrote domestic and social novels, George MacDonald was first a minister and later a writer and a lecturer, while Oscar Wilde was a prolific playwright and essayist.

I will focus on the fairy tales written by three authors during diverse subperiods of the Victorian era. My study encompasses the analysis of John Ruskin's *The King of the Golden River* (1841), George MacDonald's *The Princess and the Goblin* (1872) and Oscar Wilde's *The Birthday of the Infanta*, *The Young King* and *The Star Child* (from the collection *The House of Pomegranates* of 1890), and *The Selfish Giant*, *The Remarkable Rocket* and *The Nightingale and the Rose* (from the collection *The Happy Prince and Other Tales* of 1888). My aim has been to explore to what an extent these fairy tales share image schematic structures and to compare the use of conceptual metaphors in which these image schemas are incorporated. My objective has also been to research whether schematic imagery could combine with cultural models, especially the cultural model of The Great Chain of Being and the Victorian cultural model of the self. In order to achieve that, I have relied on cognitions in the fields of social history and cultural studies. Because the stories were written during the early Victorian period (*The King of the Golden River*),

the mid Victorian period (*The Princess and the Goblin*) and the late Victorian period (all stories by Wilde), I expected the shared cultural models would vary in their structure. Finally, I have strived to show that fairy tales, alongside other literary genres, were a powerful tool to raise public consciousness about the issues that marked the Victorian period and its subperiods.

4.3.1. Main Characteristics of Fairy Tales

Fairy tale as a literary genre is characterized by a typical beginning and ending (*Once upon a time there was/there lived... ; ...and they lived happily ever after*), formulaic expressions, the occurrence of numbers three, seven, twelve and some other numbers, a happy ending, repetition, variation of the same motifs, recognizable characters and the existence of two intertwined worlds, the real world and the world of the supernatural, which do not stand in the way of each other (Visinko, 2005: 37).

The semiotician Umberto Eco points out that simply by reading the beginning of a fairy tale, *Once upon a time ...*, we are signalled to opt for a reader's model, which is the model of a child or someone who is willing to accept a text bordering with common sense (Eco, 2005: 19). Thus, upon entering a fictional text, continues Eco, we are prepared to sign a fictional contract with the author. We are, therefore, prepared for the character of a talking animal, such as a wolf, although we can conclude (based on our knowledge of the real world) that Little Red Riding Hood is dead after the wolf has eaten her and are pleasantly surprised when we learn that she is not. The real world is, therefore, the background the world of fiction is built upon, namely it functions as a scaffolding to the world of fantasy. Fairy tales are, points out Eco, specific in terms of the ratio between the real and the invented: whatever the text does not

explicitly specify as different from the real world complies to the laws of the everyday world that surrounds us (Eco, 2005: 102).⁶⁰

4.3.2. Conceptualization of Time and Space in Fairy Tales

In her book *Umjetničke bajke: teorija, pregled i interpretacije* the literary theoretician Ana Pintarić states that the categories of space and time in fairy tales are undefined. The characteristic beginnings *Once upon a time there was/lived...* indicate that the historical period in which a fairy tale is set is of no essence. The time that serves as a background in fairy tales is full of fantastic elements, which leads the reader to believe that the miraculous world exists parallel to the actual world. Stories are in a similar fashion set in distant places and in as "impossible" places as the sea or on the clouds (Pintarić, 2008: 20).

The carrier of action in a folk tale is the plot⁶¹ rather than characters, as pointed out by Jerome Bruner, a psychologist of literature (Bruner, 1986: 20):

"Perhaps the greatest feat in the history of narrative art was the leap from the folktale to the psychological novel that places the engine of action in the characters rather than in the plot."

In modern fanciful tales, which indirectly developed from folk tales over a long period of time, this principle is no longer applied. In that manner authors of modern fanciful tales such as Hans Christian Andersen and Oscar Wilde put

⁶⁰ Eco emphasizes that we accept a portrayal of the real world in a different way than we accept a portrayal of a fictional world. The main difference is in the level of confidence: only when we read a fairy tale we accept the fact that wolves talk, otherwise we act in accordance with the description of wolves as provided by the last International Congress of the Zoological Society (Eco, 2005: 110).

⁶¹ Bruner refers to the formalist dichotomy on *fabula* and *plot/sjuzet* and defines the former as "basic story stuff, the events to be related in a narrative", while defining the latter as "the story as told by linking the events together." (Bruner, 1986: 19).

emphasis on characterization of the protagonists, whose motivation is more complex than the motivation of the main characters of folk tales.

Despite Bruner's criticism of Vladimimir Propp's theory of a highly constraining structure of narrative, he points out that the character, as well as the setting and action, are inseparable in narrative thought (Bruner, 1986: 39). Pintarić points out that despite the process of deconstruction of fairy tales, which was commenced by Andersen and continued by Wilde, there is a unity of the elements within fairy tales (Pintarić, 2008: 11).

4.3.3. A Short History of the Fairy Tale

Literary theoreticians support the idea that *folk tales*⁶² strongly influenced the development of fairy tales. The latter are, according to some estimates (Arbuthnot, 1964: 255), thousands of years old. Annie E. Moore stresses that people's everyday lives served as an inspiration for folk tales, namely "historic characters, social customs, and deep lying human experiences and relations such as birth, death, marriage, the chase, warfare, conquest, bondage, and all the rites and ceremonies that attended these exciting and profound events" (Moore, 1934: 79).

Folk tales could have developed from one or multiple sources. May Hill Arbuthnot (1964: 253) argues that the theories of multiple origins of folk tales (*polygenesis* theories) prevail amongst anthropologists over speculations that they originated from one single source (*monogenesis* theories). According to Moore a minority of theoreticians believe that the common root of folk tales was in the East and that folk tales subsequently spread westwards with the dispersal

⁶² Annie E. Moore emphasizes that some of children's literature support the notion that folk tales are basically shrunken remnants of myths (Moore, 1934: 79).

of the Ayrian race (Moore, 1934: 80). However, Arbuthnot argues that most scholars differentiate between two main origins of folk tales, i.e. Indian and Celtic. The main contribution of Indian folk tales to the genre of the fairy tale was in the form of the character of the talking animal, while Celtic folk tales acted as a source of the elements by which we nowadays best recognize fairy tales, namely fairies and witches, spells and enchantments as well as the existence of two parallel worlds, i.e. the real world and the world of fantasy (Arbuthnot, 1964: 256). Folk tales underwent a major development in the 13th century, attaining the form by which we recognize them today.

As folk tales spread orally from generation to generation, at some stage incentives to write them down appeared in different parts of the world. The most famous collectors of folk tales include Charles Perrault (France), the Grimm brothers (Germany), Joseph Jacobs (Britain), Patrick Kennedy (Ireland) and A.M. Afanasiev (Russia), while some collectors remain anonymous (*Arabian Nights* collection). The named collectors adapted folk tales and established the genre of *literary fairy tale*, the main characteristics of which are the unity of the real and imagined worlds, a stereotypical composition, the conflict between the Good and the Evil (typically the Good wins), typical characters from the real world as well as the world of fantasy including kings, queens, woodcutters, shoemakers, but also giants, fairies, dragons and other features (Pintarić, 2008: 9).

Literary fairy tales paved the way for *modern fairy tales* or *modern fanciful tales* (Arbuthnot, 1964: 326). The Danish author Hans Christian Andersen established the genre, while the Irish playwright, essayist, author of stories for children and a man of wit Oscar Wilde perfected it (Pintarić, 2008: 10). They are called modern, argues Moore, because they are not the old traditional tales, but the authors' own original creation (Moore, 1934: 352).

Moore further claims that the term "fanciful" determines stories "which in subject or treatment or both, are imbued with magic and touched by the supernatural in contrast to "true" or "realistic" stories which depict figures, events, and situations as they appear to the senses and to a mind awake in a rational world" (Moore, 1934: 353). Modern fanciful tales are characterized by enriched narrative techniques, more detailed descriptions of characters, places and time and stronger motivation of characters, while a deserved reward or punishment is often missing (Pintarić, 2008: 10). While in traditional and literary fairy tales we cannot talk of a plot, only of a story, the semiotician Umberto Eco emphasizes (Eco, 2005: 47), modern fanciful tales do not comply to this principle. Thus Oscar Wilde, following an *in medias res* beginning, resorts to analepsis in his stories *The Birthday of the Infanta*, *The Young King*, *The Happy Prince* and *The Star - Child*, which informs the reader about the events that preceded the depicted events. Both Ruskin and Wilde provide detailed descriptions of places and characters, while McDonald engages in long dialogues. These techniques, Eco emphasizes, are usually utilized when authors want to adapt the reading time to the rhythm which the authors consider to be necessary for readers to thoroughly enjoy the text (Eco, 2005: 76). Wilde, being a founder of the genre of modern fanciful tale (he is, alongside Hans Christian Andersen, credited for the establishment of this genre), often assigns a different role to a reward and punishment.

Modern fanciful tales are very popular worldwide, both amongst children and adults, and their authors include respectable names including Hans Christian Andersen, the brothers Čapek, Ivana Brlić Mažuranić, Oscar Wilde, James M. Barrie, Božena Nemcova and many others.

4.3.4. Fairy tale in Britain

The 1840s witnessed a revived interest in fairy tales⁶³ in Britain, which most likely pleased the Victorian children who, as pointed out by Avery in Pollard (1987: 287), must have led an "encapsulated life." This isolation was probably predominantly experienced by the children of middle and upper classes, whose upbringing advised children to stay indoors and keep their privacy within the walls of their houses, as pointed out earlier in the text. They played only with their brothers and sisters and had little or no contact with their peers (Avery in Pollard, 1987: 287). The influence of folk tradition was relatively weak in England due to the fact that, as pointed out by Avery, the tradition of folk tales, unlike Germany, France and Italy, had been rather poor in England (Avery in Pollard, 1987: 288).

Moralistic fairy tales from the beginning of the eighteenth century, with authors including Sarah Fielding and Francis Paget, and Christina Georgina Rossetti, Mrs Molesworth and Alice Corkran in the following century, were deeply didactic and conveyed a message that children should be disciplined, even punished for their disobedience to parents and elders in general (Avery in Pollard, 1987: 288). These moralistic fairy tales at times included a significant dose of violence and blood, as was the case of George MacDonald's *The Wise Woman*, where the main characters were cruelly punished for disobedience (Avery in Pollard, 1987: 289).

Edward Lear and Lewis Carroll popularized nonsense in children's literature of the 19th century: Lear with his witty limericks⁶⁴ and Carroll with "word – play, puns, and ideas that are pursued to a logical conclusion" (Avery in

⁶³ Avery states that by 1840s fairy tales were banished by rationalists, who did not consider them instructive and moralists, who did not approve of fairy tales because they thought they were not true (Avery in Pollard, 1987: 287).

⁶⁴ A limerick is a "humorous short poem, with two long lines that rhyme with each other, followed by two short lines that rhyme with each other and ending with the long line that rhymes with the first two (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2001:747)

Pollard, 1987: 295). Carroll wrote fantasies, a specific genre of children's literature, whose main feature is a sudden shift from the real world into a fantastic world and the other way round, thereby disrupting the coherence of the real world (Pintarić, 2008: 43).

Ruskin and MacDonald considered, as Philip Davis points out, the fairy tale "one of the simplest, most accessible forms of writing, close to the primal infancy of art" (Davis, 2002: 336). Furthermore, the Romantic poet William Wordsworth asserted that rustics as well as children and mothers were closer to the real essence of life and basic simplicities of human nature, while another Romantic poet, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, stated that fairy tales "habited the mind to love of the great and the whole." (Davis, 2003: 337). In Davis's opinion the Romantics assigned childhood the ability of accessing a world of feeling and imagination, a realm significantly different from the world established by the onset of values such as jadedness, aging and skepticism, which marked the whole of the Victorian period (Davis, 2003: 338).

Although aimed primarily for children, fairy tales written during the Victorian era addressed important issues, which in turn obtained different dimensions (Davis, 2003: 338). Fairy tales were increasingly entertaining and less didactic (Avery in Pollard, 1987: 299), which was probably the influence of Lear's nonsense poetry and Carroll's fantasies. Moral stories were presented in a subtler tone and could be read between the lines. In that way Gluck's altruism in Ruskin's *The King of the Golden River*, which he shows by sharing the whole amount of holy water with the thirsty creatures that he meets on his way to the mountain top, wins a moral victory over his disobedience to the King of the Golden River to keep some of the water for himself in order to bring back life to Treasure Valley.

William Makepeace Thackeray's fairy tale *The Rose and the Ring* (1855) introduced irony in the genre (Davis, 2003: 343). Burlesque in form, Thackeray's story presents charm, attractiveness and popularity as illusions. Such an approach was strongly criticized by Ruskin, who declared that "of all writers whatsoever of any people or language", he would most strictly forbid Thackeray to young readers of both sexes (Davis, 2003: 343). Thackeray keeps an ironic tone throughout his story, but it is especially harsh at the point when ladies-in-waiting promise their queen that they will look after the queen's daughter after her death, but eventually break their promise.

At the end of the century Oscar Wilde deconstructs the fairy tale in a similar fashion by inverting the principle of reward and punishment. Thus in *The Nightingale and the Rose* it appears that the Nightingale sacrifices her life for nothing. Helping the Student to get hold of a red rose in winter by colouring it with her own blood, she dies after completing her mission. The Student, disappointed by his beloved's refusal to take the red rose as a symbol of his love for her, throws the rose into the gutter.

To sum up, fairy tales were a popular genre during the Victorian period. The subgenre of the modern fanciful tale was perfected by a number of authors who wrote these stories during the Victorian period and in particular by Oscar Wilde. Modern fanciful tales written during the stated period often addressed relevant issues that concerned all layers of the society. In the following text I shall relate the way time and space are conceptualised in the studied fairy tales to the conceptual metaphors that rely on several image schemas, i.e. the CONTAINER, PATH, UP and DOWN and CENTRE and ALTERITY schemas. I shall further indicate at correspondences between these metaphors and the cultural models that marked the Victorian period. Possibilities to understand sequences of these literary works or even the whole works in terms of megametaphors or to

recollect them on the basis of a plot gene or a summary image will as well be explored.

4.4. The Ascent of a Mountain as a Mental Journey

Space contributes to understanding John Ruskin's fairy tale *The King of the Golden River* at different levels. Firstly, space dominates over the plot, which is not surprising since *The King of the Golden River* is an "authored" fairy tale and thus does not comply with the principles of narration which are characteristic of literary fairy tales, namely the principles according to which the plot dominates the narration. The conquest of the mountain can be understood as the brothers' mental journey, a quest for what they think are real values in life.

The expression *mental journey* is a blend which takes the noun (*journey*) from the source space and the adjective (*mental*) from the target space. Mark Turner supports the notion that this blend is less conventional and, consequently, less entrenched than the blend *intellectual progress*. He asserts that both blends developed from the basic metaphor THE MIND IS A BODY MOVING IN SPACE, which they share the linguistic structure and the conceptual projection with (Turner, 1996: 88). According to Turner, it is easier to notice the generic space and the blend with less conventional projections and expressions. This would mean that a generic space, which involves an agent engaging on a voyage with all its pertaining elements such as a start, obstacles, a goal and similar, should be noticeable in *mental journey* but not in *intellectual progress*. Indeed, upon consulting several monolingual dictionaries, it appears that the source category *journey* has not in practice been extended to involve a journey of the mind. However, most dictionaries provide the extension of the source category *progress* referring to *intellectual progress*: 1) "improvement or development,

getting nearer to achieving and completing something, with the provided examples of *economic/scientific/technical progress*, all of which presuppose a dose of intellectual progress" (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2001: 1012); 2) "change towards a better society because of developments in science or fairer methods of social organisation: *the great march of progress*" (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 1995: 1128); 3) "increased proficiency" (Cassel Concise English Dictionary, 1995: 1059).

4.4.1. NARRATIVE IS TRAVEL conceptual metaphor

Kai Mikkonen points out that in Western culture a narrative is perceived as a journey and thus understood through the concepts of space and time due to the shared structures between the concepts of a narrative, space and time (Mikkonen, 2007: 286). Thus diverse stages of a journey such as departure, voyage, encounters during the travel and return provide temporal and spatial elements to the narrative, which has resulted in a ubiquitous metaphor NARRATIVE IS TRAVEL. According to Mikkonen, voyage connotes recognition of experience of narrative as well as its logic, while image schemas provide necessary material for narratives to function (Mikkonen, 2007: 288).

Furthermore, in his study of novelistic plot patterns Mikhail Bakhtin outlines the role of the chronotope of the road and its linguistic realization, the metaphor "the path of life", for the adventure novel of everyday life. The features of the chronotope of the road, which Bakhtin perceives as transhistorical, not unique to particular historical periods, and the metaphor "the path of life" are based in folklore, where a road "is almost never merely a road, but always suggests the whole, or a portion of, "a path of life" (Bakhtin, 1981: 120). In this metaphor, Bakhtin points out, the departure point corresponds to somebody's birthplace, returning home is a high point in one's life or a moment

of maturation (becoming a man), while an intersection projects onto life choices/ a turning point in one's life, with road markers indicating one's fate (Bakhtin, 1981: 120).

Lakoff and Johnson studied the common components of "travel", "movement" and "journey" metaphors and have concluded that abstract concepts such as time, love or argument are metaphorically structured in terms of more concrete concepts like journey (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 42 - 45, 93 - 96). These structural metaphors, in which one concept is structured in terms of another, encompass metaphors such as TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT, or TIME IS STATIONARY AND WE MOVE THROUGH IT; LOVE IS A JOURNEY and AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 92 - 96).

The pervasiveness of the travel metaphor resulted, Mikkonen points out, in our understanding of mental development as a voyage as well as a narrative (Mikkonen, 2007: 287). In Ruskin's story there is another element which contributes to our understanding of the narrative as a travel and that is causality. Two literary theoreticians of different provenance, the Russian formalist Boris Tomashevsky and the poststructuralist Tzvetan Todorov, have emphasized that sets of events in narratives strongly rely on (human) mediation of their temporal order (Mikkonen, 2007: 291). Ruskin projects the concept of journey onto the mental development of the characters through caused and temporally ordered sets of events: Hans and Schwartz's refusal to help the thirsty is met by a harsh answer from nature, while the opposite can be said of Gluck. These events eventually lead to the moral and mental fall of two characters (Hans and Schwartz) and the moral ascent and self - cognition of one character (Gluck). The author uses the stylistic figure of gradation to illustrate the mental journey of the main characters: while Hans and Schwartz become ever more selfish and greedy by refusing to share their supply of water with the creatures that they

meet on their way to the mountain top and treating them with an increasing amount of cruelty, Gluck addresses the same creatures with more kindness and generosity.

4.4.2. Human Relationship with Space

In their paper *Prostorno kodiranje značenja: "Planine"* Petra Zoranića Marina Biti and Danijela Marot Kiš point out that people understand space on the basis of their relationship with it, their perception on "inner" and "outer" space, which is in turn based on the conceptualization of their own bodies as containers situated in another container, namely space (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2010: 226). This interaction between human bodies and space results in the formation of the core self, which is itself an instinctive and pre - linguistic product of core consciousness. Spatial instinct, they assert, is one of the human basic instincts, which helps us delimit space around us (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2010: 228). On the other hand, due to the linguistically - aided extended consciousness, we are able to look at our bodies and the world we find ourselves in as objects of cognition and self - cognition (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2011: 226).

4.4.3. The Role of PATH Image Schema in Conceptualizing Space

In the fairy tale *The King of the Golden River* space is conceptualized with the help of image schemas, above all the PATH and CONTAINER image schemas. The three main characters, three brothers named Hans, Schwartz and Gluck, individually commence their ascent to the mountain summit from the valley in which they abide in order to cast three drops of holy water into the Golden River, which, as prophesized by the King of the Golden River, will bring prosperity to the valley. However, the brothers' motives are different: the

two elder brothers, Hans and Schwartz,⁶⁵ strive to conquer the mountain for their own benefit, to get rich, whereas the youngest brother, Gluck, begins the journey to the mountain top for altruistic reasons, to save his brothers, who did not return from their journey to the mountain summit.

The ascent of Hans, Schwartz and Gluck can be understood not only as their "conquest" of the mountain but also as a mental journey of each of the brothers. According to Mark Turner, the primary metaphor A THINKER IS A MOVER makes it possible for us to understand a "journey of the soul" in terms of movement through space (Turner, 1996: 44). Turner names literary works where the stories of spatial journeys can, with the help of parables, be projected onto stories about journeys of the mind. The most well - known examples include Dante's *La Divina Commedia*, John Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* and Joseph Conrad's *The Heart of Darkness* (Turner, 1996: 44).

In Ruskin's story the mappings between the source and the target space include a traveller, who is mapped onto human soul, the vertical ascent of the mountains, which corresponds to the mental process, and the change of locations and its equivalent, the change of mental states. Thus Gluck's ascent of the mountain contributes to his mental growth, the higher he climbs, the more creatures he helps by giving them water to drink from his bottle. He helps those creatures despite the risk of not being able to save his brothers and turn the Treasure Valley into fertile land. Although already a good person at the beginning of his ascent, during his climb he becomes even more conscious of the importance of helping others and is eventually rewarded for his good deeds by the King of the Golden River.

⁶⁵ In fairy tales the stereotype of three brothers in a family include two eldest brothers being selfish, insensitive and mean towards the youngest brother, who is their total opposite.

Hans and Schwartz fail to understand the warning signs in the space they interact with, the mountain slopes: the higher the two elder brothers go, the graver their sins, which results in the ever more violent character of the changes in nature. The first to experience these is Hans (Ruskin, 1947: 31):

"He opened the flask, and was raising it to his lips, when his eye fell on an object lying on the rock beside him; he thought it moved. It was a small dog, apparently in the last agony of death from thirst. Its tongue was out, its jaws dry, its limbs extended lifelessly, and a swarm of black ants were crawling about its lips and throat. Its eye moved to the bottle which Hans held in his hand. He raised it, drank, spurned the animal with his foot, and passed on. And he did not know how it was, but he thought that a strange shadow had suddenly come across the blue sky.

The path became steeper and more rugged every moment; and the high hill air, instead of refreshing him, seemed to throw his blood into a fever."

The gravity of Hans and Schwartz's sins are also reflected in darkening of colours in nature (in fairy tales it is a common practice to associate dark colours, especially black, with bad and evil), while the two villains are warned in advance of their gruesome fate (Ruskin, 1947: 32):

"Another hour passed, and he again looked down to the flask at his side; it was half empty, but there was much more than three drops in it. He stopped to open it, and again, as he did so, something moved in the path above him. It was a fair child, stretched nearly lifeless on the rock, its breast heaving with thirst, its eyes closed, and its lips parched and burning. Hans eyed it deliberately, drank and passed on. And a dark gray cloud came over the sun, and long snake – like shadows crept up along the mountain – sides."

Apart from showing no pity for the dog and the child, Hans is equally cruel towards an old man dying of thirst. This time dark colours completely take over while the sun sets behind the mountain, indicating the imminent end of the

emotionless Hans, who is eventually punished by being turned into a black stone⁶⁶ (Ruskin, 1947: 33):

"And a flash of blue lightning rose out of the east, shaped like a sword: it shook thrice over the whole heaven, and left it dark with one heavy, impenetrable shade. The sun was setting; it plunged toward the horizon like a red – hot ball."

Schwartz ends up in the same way as Hans. Quite the opposite occurs with the youngest brother, Gluck (Ruskin, 1947: 38):

"Then Gluck looked at him, and when he saw that he was pale and weary, he gave him the water...", "...the path became easier to his feet, and two or three blades of grass appeared upon it, and some grasshoppers began singing on the bank beside it; and Gluck thought he had never heard such merry singing."

Upon generously offering the child his flask of water, the rocks become covered with lively - coloured flowers and butterflies flutter merrily (Ruskin, 1947: 39). The King of the Golden River rewards Gluck for his unselfish behaviour by turning the Treasure Valley into fertile land, thus bringing happiness and prosperity to its inhabitants.

Kevin A. Morrison points out that sublimity was perceived by Ruskin as an elevation of the mind. Ruskin, Morrison asserts, gave priority to the visual experience of the mountains since he believed it is our vision that contributes most to our understanding of the world (Morrison, 2009: 501). Thus the visual changes in nature that the protagonists of the story witness contribute to their moral fall (Hans and Schwartz) or rise (Gluck). This is in accordance with Ruskin's religiously nuanced apprehension of the mountains: he believed that our understanding of the sublime depends on our imagination, which in turn

⁶⁶ In Wilde's story *The Happy Prince* the main character is, in a similar fashion, turned into a statue as punishment for his lack of emotions and selfishness during his life.

results from our ability to perceive objects around us (Morrison, 2009: 501). Hans and Schwartz do not understand the alterations that take place in nature during their ascent, they are unable to see the changes which are a consequence of their corrupt souls, which results in their moral condemnation and punishment by the Almighty. Gluck is, however, in harmony with nature and is eventually rewarded.

Our apprehension of God being up and devil being down results in the conceptual metaphor GOD IS UP, DEVIL IS DOWN, while our perception of God being in control of everything and everybody leads to the conceptual metaphor POWER IS UP (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Kelland Friesen, Schjeldahl, 2007: 699). Such an understanding of God is also in accordance with the extended version of the cultural model of the Great Chain of Being, where God occupies the hisghest position in the hierarchy. Meier, Hauser, Robinson and Kelland Friesen further assert that metaphors for the divine consistently utilize descriptions of vertical space in both Christian and non - Christian cultures (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Kelland Friesen, Schjeldahl, 2007: 699).

4.4.4. Time as Space

The difficult nature of the ascent is also emphasized by the amount of time each brother spent on climbing the mountain:

"Then Schwartz climbed for another hour, and again his thirst returned." (Ruskin, 1947: 36); "Another hour passed, and he again looked down to the flask at his side; it was half empty, but there was much more than three drops in it." (Ruskin, 1947: 32); "Yet, when he had climbed for another hour, his thirst became intolerable again" (Ruskin, 1947: 39).

Time is conceptualized in spatial terms, the conquest of the diverse sections of the path leading to the mountain summit correspond to a particular section of time. Biti and Marot Kiš argue that sections of time that repeat in cycles (days, hours, minutes, seconds and similar) are metaphorically conceived as a sort of space, *space in time* (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2010: 228). Thus Wilde begins his sentences in the same manner when referring to the Star - Child's quest for his mother, which lasted for several years ("For the space of three years he wandered over the world", Wilde, 1994: 192 –195).

In Ruskin's story the ascent to the mountain top increases in difficulty with time and distance: the longer the ascent lasts, the more difficult it gets. The ever darkening colours that match each stage of Hans and Schwartz's journey indicates that the journey the brothers are taking lead to the darkest bottom of their souls: their refusal to give water to the thirsty creatures they meet on their way to the mountain summit as well as their cruel words with which they address these creatures result in them being turned into black rocks. Hans and Schwartz's journey to the rock bottom indicates that they cross over the barriers that define the self and become totally lost in the enormity of the dark and the unknown. On the other hand Gluck, who by giving water to the tired and thirsty to the same creatures his brothers had refused to give water to, risks running out of the holy water and, consequently, failing to bring happiness and well – being to the Treasure Valley, is eventually rewarded by the absolute recuperation of the Valley.

4.4.5. Ruskin as a Social Critic

Although the vices that are attacked in this story, primarily greed, selfishness and insensitivity towards the needs of the poor have been criticized in various works for children, some elements indicate that a critical note can be directed towards the vices that marred the Victorian period in particular. These include a condemnation of blasphemy, which is evident in Hans and Schwartz's obtaining unholy water, which they thought would, just like holy water, bring them wealth, and a harsh criticism of the preoccupation with the accumulation of material possessions, which is felt throughout the whole of the story.

Kevin A. Morrison opines that Ruskin seems to praise what he thought was a virtue. The motif of "climbing a mountain" in the Victorian period, asserts Morrison, confirmed one's strength, "an affidavit of pluck, and potency, an assurance of resourcefulness, self - sustenance, and manhood" (Morrison, 2009: 510). Ruskin's conception of God occupying the highest level in the hierarchy, designed by the extended cultural model of the Great Chain of Being, definitely indicates the importance he assigned to religion. If the story had been written during the second half of his long life, after the 1860s, when Ruskin started re - examining his stance to religion, the religious undertones would have probably been less noticeable.

4.4.6. Religious and Fantastic Discourse in the Story

The role of space and time in Ruskin's story is of crucial importance. These two concepts act as main carriers of meaning which help us to understand the story on a metaphorical level. Ruskin combines *religious* and *fantastic* discourse in his work. Thus the culturally and religiously determined metaphors MORE IS UP, LESS IS DOWN are in function throughout the story and are most pronounced at its end when the divine exerts its power when the protagonists reach the mountain top. Only the youngest brother, who is morally uncorrupt,

manages to conquer the summit and cast three drops of holy water into the stream, while his villain brothers remain lower on the mountain slope, after having been turned into black stones by the King of the Golden River. The character of the King of the Golden River corresponds to the figure of God as conceived in Christian religion: he abides on the topmost part of the mountain, close to heaven. This manner of conceiving a deity resulted in the conceptual metaphor GOD IS UP. God is also powerful and exerts control over everybody (POWER IS UP) and rewards the good (Gluck), who manages to climb the mountain (GOOD IS UP) and punishes the bad (Hans and Schwartz), who remain in lower positions on the mountain path (BAD IS DOWN). Gluck's mental journey terminates upon his descent (Ruskin, 1947: 42):

"...he obeyed his friend the dwarf, and descended the other side of the mountains, toward the Treasure Valley; and, as he went, he thought he heard the noise of water working its way under the ground. And when he came in sight of the Treasure Valley, behold, a river, like the Golden River, was springing from a new cleft of the rocks above it, and was flowing in innumerable streams among the dry heaps of red sand. "

Gluck does not recognize the value of the reward at first. Instead of the river being turned into gold, as the King of the Golden River initially promised, the valley becomes fertile again. The symbolic ending of Ruskin's fairy tale resembles the ending of the folk tale *The Farmer and his Sons*, where the young farmers are rewarded by a rich harvest instead of wealth in the form of gold, precious stones and similar (Ruskin, 1947: 42):

"And thus the Treasure Valley became a garden again, and the inheritance, which had been lost by cruelty, was regained by love."

The fantastic discourse is noticed in the episodes in which the three brothers meet a fantastic creature in the form of a strange - looking dwarf, who

first visits them in their own house and then encounters each of the brothers on his way to the mountain top. The dwarf is eventually transformed into the King of the Golden River, but before he attains this final form he undergoes several other metaphorical transfers, firstly into a moving pot and subsequently as the Southwest Wind.

4.4.7. The Role of the CONTAINER Image Schema in Conceptualizing Space

The journey to the mountain top and back results in conceptual integration of two input spaces. The elements in the input spaces include the traveller, his journey to the top of the mountain and back, the time of the travel and the objective of the journey (the brothers' salvation). Biti and Marot Kiš point out that the elements that are common for each input space result in a new space, namely a generic space in which structures such as "an agent moving up/down the mountain", "an agent meeting various beings and on his way" and "an agent looking for a value that matters to him" appear (2010: 236), leading further to a blend in which the agent ceases to function solely as a traveller but rather undergoes a mental transformation during which he realizes the real value of life. The temporal and spatial aspects of the journey as well as various types of discourse contribute to understanding the altruistic message of the story.

In Ruskin's story the valley in which the brothers reside is conceptualized as a container, a compact whole surrounded by high mountains (Ruskin, 1947: 5):

"In a secluded and mountainous part of Styria there was, in old time, a valley of the most surprising and luxuriant fertility. It was surrounded on all sides by steep and rocky mountains, rising into peaks, which were always covered with snow, and from which a number of torrents descended in constant cataracts."

The secluded nature of the valley gives room to the interpretation that its inhabitants, Hans, Schwartz and Gluck, were oriented to each other's help in cultivating the valley. Indeed, Hans and Schwartz supported themselves with rich harvests, but also selfishness (Ruskin, 1947: 6):

"They lived by farming the Treasure Valley, and very good farmers they were. They killed everything that did not pay for its eating. They shot the blackbirds, because they pecked the fruit; and killed the hedgehogs, lest they should suck the cows; they poisoned the crickets for eating the crumbs in the kitchen; and smothered the cicadas, which used to sing all summer in the lime – trees. They worked their servants without any wages, till they would not work any more, and then quarrelled with them, and turned them out of doors without paying them"

Ruskin utilizes *dynamic* metaphors in his narration when explaining the functioning of a natural phenomenon (as is the case with the Southwest Wind) and *static* metaphors when he refers to metaphorical transfers from humans into objects, like in the example of Hans and Schwartz' transfer into two black stones⁶⁷. While the former is the result of personification as a kind of ontological metaphor, with the help of which abstract experiences and phenomena are conceived in terms of concrete physical objects (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 25 - 26), the latter transfer contains a significant amount of didacticism and is culturally determined: the two villainous brothers are punished by being turned into two black stones for having been cruel to the needy.

4.5. Garden as a Heterotopia

⁶⁷ Biti and Marot Kiš base their categorization on *static* and *dynamic* metaphors on their narrative roles, i.e. static metaphors have mainly an explanatory function, whereas dynamic metaphors have an active role in narration due to the mobility of their motifs (Biti and Marot Kiš, 2010: 231)

One of the principles that determine which places should be considered heterotopias is, according to Michel Foucault, the principle of juxtaposition of several incompatible spaces in one single real space. Besides the examples of the theatre and the cinema, the garden has also functioned as a heterotopia; in fact it has acted as one for a much longer period of time than the theatre and the cinema.⁶⁸ The Persians established the tradition of oriental gardens, in which vegetation was brought together in one place, thus representing the world in its totality. Foucault, however, points out that the garden has been a "happy, universalising heterotopia since the beginnings of antiquity."

4.5.1. The Garden as a Microcosm of (Un)happiness

The garden or the valley indeed function as a *happy, universalising* site in fairy tales written by John Ruskin and Oscar Wilde. In Ruskin's story *The King of the Golden River* the main character Gluck brings happiness to Treasure Valley, which has been devastated by wind, by casting three drops of holy water into the stream: the valley becomes covered with flowers and fresh grass, which in turn brings happiness and prosperity to the valley (Ruskin, 1947: 42):

" And as Gluck gazed, fresh grass sprang beside the new streams, and creeping plants grew, and climbed among the moistening soil. Young flowers opened suddenly along the river sides, as stars leap out when twilight is deepening, and thickets of myrtle, and tendrils of vine, cast lengthening shadows over the valley as they grew. And thus the Treasure Valley became a garden again, and the inheritance, which had been lost for cruelty, was regained by love.

⁴⁸It is emphasized that in the Orient the garden had profound and seemingly superimposed meanings: for the Persians it was a sacred place in the form of a rectangle divided into four parts, which represented the four parts of the world and brought together all the vegetation, therefore it presented the world in small and functioned like a microcosm(<http://foucault.info/documents/heteroTopia/foucault.heteroTopia.en.html>).

And Gluck went and dwelt in the valley, and the poor were never driven from his door; so that his barns became full of corn, and his house of treasure. And, for him, the river had, according to the dwarf's promise, become a River of Gold. "

Happiness is, in a similar fashion, brought into the Selfish Giant's garden in Wilde's fairy tale *The Selfish Giant*. The main character of the story is the Selfish Giant who, after a lengthy visit to his friend, the Cornish ogre, returns to his castle to find children playing in his garden. The garden is an image of joy: there is an abundance of flowers amongst thick grass, a dozen of peach - trees are in blossom, while the birds are sitting on the trees chirping sweet tunes. Schoolchildren are merrily playing in the garden and thus contributing in creating an image of a heterotopia of happiness (Wilde, 1994: 33):

" It was a large lovely garden, with soft green grass. Here and there over the grass stood beautiful flowers like stars, and there were twelve peach - trees that in the spring - time broke out into delicate blossoms of pink and pearl, and in the autumn bore rich fruit. The birds sat on the trees and sang so sweetly that the children used to stop their games in order to listen to them. " How happy are we here they tried to each other."

The garden swiftly turns into a desolate place when the Giant banishes the children from his property (Wilde, 1994: 124):

"Then the Spring came, and all over the country there were little blossoms and little birds. Only in the garden of the Selfish Giant it was still winter. The birds did not care to sing in it as there were no children, and the trees forgot to blossom...The Snow covered up the grass with her great white cloak, and the Frost painted all the trees silver ."

The garden acts like a heterotopia in another story by Wilde, namely *The Nightingale and the Rose*. The main character is the young Student who, in order to win the heart of a beautiful girl he is enamoured with, is required to bring her a red rose. It being past season, though, it is overly cold for roses to

blossom in his garden, which brings the young Student to lament loudly that there is not a single red rose in his garden. At the beginning of the story we are told that the Student has a fond interest in books and philosophy and are therefore able to put his knowledge about the real world into question: he is not able to cope with love since he is facing it for the first time.

A parable or a projection of one story to another is the result of these two little stories, from the story of the unavailability of a red rose in the Student's garden and the story of the Student's life, in which there is no place for love⁶⁹. This projection is possible, claims Mark Turner, due to the fact that most of our thinking, knowledge and experience is organized as stories, while parable is a basic and ubiquitous principle of story projecting (Turner, 1987: xi). In this manner the Student's *garden* might, via the basic metaphor EMOTIONS ARE CONTAINERS⁷⁰, relate to the Student's *realm* in which there are only books and science. The inputs contribute to the formation of a blend: the input space of the Student's garden, usually full of vegetation including roses, but at the moment lacking in them because of the cold weather and the input space representing the Student's reality filled with studies, with the generic space of the unavailability of a necessary component. The mappings include a red rose and love on the one hand and the garden and the Student's realm on the other. The result is a blend in which the garden, devoid of red roses, becomes a place which does not give room to sentimental feelings, a heterotopia of coldness, a place unsupportive of romantic feelings. Thus in this tale the garden functions as a heterotopia ruled by dispassionateness and dry science.

In another fairy tale by Wilde, *The Remarkable Rocket*, the garden acts a heterotopia of happiness. In this fairy tale the main characters are fireworks,

⁶⁹ A red rose often symbolizes love in literary as well as in the discourse of everyday life.

⁷⁰ Margaret Freeman points out that our emotions are often conceptualized in terms of a "container" that can hold, overflow or be emptied (Freeman, 2002:471).

which are due to explode on the Prince's wedding night. They are discussing what the world is and two fireworks, unable to reach a compromise, start an argument (Wilde, 1994: 141):

"The King's garden is not the world, you foolish Squib, " said a big Roman Candle, " the world is an enormous place, and it would take you three days to see it thoroughly."

"Any place you love is the world to you," exclaimed the pensive Catherine Wheel."

In this story the garden functions as a microcosm for the main characters, the only world they know of. Different from the blend from *The Nightingale and the Rose*, where the inputs are connected by the lack of love, love where the generic space reflects lack of love, in *The Remarkable Rocket* love is the basis for understanding the garden as a heterotopia of happiness.

Young readers may be, as pointed out by Bruno Bettelheim, disappointed by the unhappy ending of the story *The Nightingale and the Rose*, which suggests that the Nightingale sacrificed her life in vain.⁷¹ The idea that materialism excludes imagination and feelings is proposed at the end of the story, when the Student, disappointed by his beloved's rejection, throws the red rose in the gutter and returns to his books (Wilde, 1994: 113):

" What a silly thing Love is!" said the Student as he walked away." It is not half as useful as Logic, for it does not prove anything, and it is always telling one of things that are not going to happen, and making one believe things that are not true. In fact, it is quite unpractical, and, as in this age to be practical is everything, I shall go back to Philosophy and study Metaphysics."

⁷¹ Bettelheim argues that this story is not appropriate for children before the age of puberty since in this period they still stick to black and white characterization and are therefore unprepared for the unhappy ending to the story (Bettelheim, 2004: 9).

The unhappy ending is not uncommon in modern fanciful tales, in which authors have left a deep impact of their genius. The constraint of the deontic narrative system, the modalities of which mould fictional worlds in the form of proscriptive or prescriptive norms, envisage which actions are prohibited, obligatory or permitted (Doležel, 1998: 120) does not apply in modern fanciful tales. The Nightingale is not rewarded for her noble deeds; she dies instead, despite the reader's wishful thinking that she would survive the ordeal of colouring the rose with her blood or that she would be resurrected. By imposing new norms in the genre of the modern fanciful tale, the writers of "authored" tales change the structure of the fictional world of fairy tales. As Doležel points out, "the imposition of new prohibitions or obligations narrows the scope of the permissible and thus generates the story of deontic loss" (Doležel, 1998: 121).

Wilde was a shrewd observer of his time and criticized the Victorian attitudes in all his works, including fairy tales, and his genial dialogues aid the reader in comprehending the spirit of the time. Thus the ending of the fairy tale *The Nightingale and the Rose* is in deep contrast with the poetic tone in which the rest of the story is written. It is possible that Wilde did this deliberately in order to raise his contemporaries' consciousness about the emotionless and dry philosophy of Utilitarianism, according to which everything that cannot be utilized is superfluous. Despite the unhappy ending, we cannot help laughing at the extent to which the principles of Utilitarian philosophy can go.

4.5.2. The Garden as a Microcosm of the Victorian society

Harsh social criticism can be felt as well in the fairy tale *The Birthday of the Infanta*, where the garden functions like a microcosm of the class - divided Victorian society. The possible world of this fairy tale would be, according to Eco's understanding of small worlds, a world in which individuals are endowed

with properties (Eco, 2005: 104). Despite the fact that on the one hand in this fictional world we encounter only a few characters and can, therefore, conclude that fictional worlds are more limited than the real world, on the other hand these unique characters with their specific characteristics might lead us to the conclusion that the fictitious world is larger than the real world (Eco, 2005: 104). Flowers in the Infanta's garden as well as the birds and other animals possess their specific properties and can be understood as representatives of different classes of the Victorian society (Wilde, 1994: 184):

"The Flowers, however, were excessively annoyed at their behaviour, and at the behaviour of the Birds. "It only shows," they said, " what a vulgarising effect this incessant rushing and flying about has. Well - bred people always stay in exactly the same place, as we do. No one ever saw us hopping up and down the dragon - flies. When we want a change of air, we send for the gardener, and he carries us to another bed. This is dignified, and as it should be. But birds and lizards have no sense of repose, and indeed birds have not even a permanent address. They are vagrants like the gipsies, and should be treated in exactly the same manner."

This is another example of blending of two input spaces: the source space of flowers, which are deeply rooted and "always stay in exactly the same place like all well - bred people" (Wilde, 1994: 184) and the target space of the upper class of the Victorian society, with the generic space of an agent firmly attached to the background. The elements selected for mapping include attachment to the soil in the input space (the flowers) and a tendency to stay indoors and thus preserve the privacy of one's home, as shown earlier in the paragraph (the upper class of the Victorian society).

Flowers remain in one place forever, unlike lizards and birds, whose existence is characterized by constant movement. In the case of lizards and birds another mapping takes place: the input of vagrant animals and the input of the

members of the working class in the Victorian society (who spent a lot of time outdoors), while the generic space contains the element of an agent freely moving about. The first example (the flowers and the upper class) results in the blend of personified flowers, while the other leads to the blend of a hybrid animal, both acting like humans.

We can conclude that space significantly contributes to our understanding of social representations as well as collective emotions in the Victorian society. Those "deeply rooted" signify the dogmatic and resistant to change, the input of the flowers that stay in the same place in the garden and are moved only by gardeners can be projected onto the upper and middle classes of the Victorian society who preferred to stay indoors. A blend of inanimate objects being personified is obtained, in which garden flowers make up a world which is divided between "us" and "them", resulting in a sharply divided hierarchical society.

Another input, which can be obtained through metaphorical transfers, the structural metaphor IDEAS ARE CONTAINERS, results in an ideological dichotomy where deeply rooted flowers stand for resistant members of the society, whereas birds and lizards correspond to critical and independent society members. The ideas are conceived as breeding within the containers, within the selves of the representatives of diverse classes in the Victorian society. The outcome of these multiple income spaces is a complex blend via which inanimate objects (flowers) can be conceived in terms of spatially and ideologically (im)mobile social groups. The active conceptual metaphors include (IM)MOBILITY IS A SIGN OF CLASS and MOVEMENT IS VITALITY. The second conceptual metaphor enables us to see diverse social groups of the Victorian society as those who are able to move and think freely and those who are unable to move and thereby stick to their dogmas. Thus intellectuals

and artists, who have always been at the forefront of radical social changes, can be represented by birds and lizards, while the traditional forces, who were not in favour of major changes in the Victorian society, could be portrayed through the flower characters. In that manner the representatives of the "free" professions were more vital than the rest of the Victorian society.⁷²

Two cultural models of the West are functional in the stated sequence: 1) the Great Chain of Being cultural model and 2) the Western model of the self as a container to be guarded and appropriately situated. These cultural models are in particular noticeable in imaging digressions, i.e. fictional commentaries that are "embedded in the fictional text but express opinions (beliefs) about the actual world" (Doležel, 1998: 27). These include several imaging digressions from the monologue of the flowers in the fairy tale *The Birthday of the Infanta* ("Well - bred people always stay exactly in the same place as we do.", "When we want change of air, we send for the gardener, and he carries us to another bed." "...birds and lizards have no sense of repose, and indeed birds have not even a permanent address."). Wilde also resorts to imaging digressions in the fairy tale *The Remarkable Rocket* ("Arguments are extremely vulgar, for everybody in good society holds exactly the same opinions.").

There are two variants of, the Great Chain of Being cultural model: the *basic* Great Chain model and the *extended* Great Chain model. I shall briefly refer to both.

In their book *More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* Lakoff and Turner provide a detailed explanation of both models. The authors

⁷² In his essay *The Soul of Man under Socialism* Oscar Wilde asserts that these are the only people who can develop (a small amount of) individualism are the people who do not need to work or can choose the activity that they want to pursue and include professions such as the poets, the philosophers, the men of science and the men of culture (Wilde, 1994: 1175).

point out that the basic model is not only characteristic of the Western culture but many other cultures around the world, while the extended model pertains to the Western tradition (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 167).

4.5.3. The Basic Great Chain of Being Cultural Model

The basic Great Chain model refers to the relation of human beings to other, "lower" forms of existence. Each form of existence is defined by its attributes and behaviour: *humans* by their mental abilities and character, *animals* by their instinctual attributes and behaviour, *plants* by their biological attributes and behaviour, complex objects by their structural attributes and functional behaviour and natural physical things by their natural physical attributes and behaviour (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 170 - 171).

4.5.3.1. The Great Chain of Being Metaphor

The first component of the Great Chain of Being cultural model, the *Great Chain of Being metaphor*, determines the criteria that explain the reasons why each more advanced level of being is beyond the other forms of being. The first criterion is the possession of additional attributes and behaviours, actually the ones that the lower forms do not possess. For example, a natural physical thing such as a rock possesses solely substance, whereas a complex object, for instance a chair, has additional properties such as part - whole structure (it has a seat, a back, legs, each serving a different purpose). A tree has all the previously named properties characterizing lower levels plus life. Animals have all the properties that lower level beings have, while in addition they have interior states (desires, emotions and limited cognitive abilities). Humans, besides having all the previously named qualities, additionally have capabilities for abstract reasoning, communication, morality and a highly developed

consciousness. Secondly, as the level in the hierarchy increases, properties become more complex. Furthermore, they are more powerful, in the sense that they empower the forms of being at that particular level to dominate "lower" forms. The fourth criterion refers to its accessibility to human perception and understanding. For example, while it is more difficult to determine a moral sense amongst people because they can hide the sense, it is relatively easy for humans to determine animals' predatory instincts because animals do not try to conceal their instinctive nature (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 169).

4.5.3.2. The Nature of Things

The attitudes and behaviour that characterize beings at different levels are part of the commonplace theory of *The Nature of Things*. It makes the second component of the Great Chain of Being cultural model. Each level is characterized by essential attributes of the level below plus additional attributes. Lakoff and Turner emphasize the fact that attributes are in essence immutable and basic. However, in certain situations they can become temporary and accidental. Thus an animal can sometimes be fierce, hostile or calm, while a human being may be gentle, phlegmatic or pensive (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 170).

The Great Chain model as well as the theory of the Nature of Things are two basic components of the Great Chain Metaphor. Other two constituents include the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor and the Maxim of Quantity.

4.5.3.3. GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor

This metaphor enables us to create blends which we base on the generic structure that is shared by a source domain and a target domain. As an example

of such a blend Lakoff and Turner provide the following proverb (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 162):

Big thunder

Little rain

The source domain in this statement is the natural event of thundering and lightning. The target domain is not mentioned, but we can conclude that it is the domain of human beings since proverbs are usually about issues of the nature of human beings (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 177). The generic - level information includes a (natural) physical occurrence consisting of two causally related kinds of (natural) events, one preceding the other; at least one event of the first kind communicates to us that the second event will take place; the second has the power to affect us; the first event usually announces the second; the magnitude of the first affects the magnitude of the second; the force of the second happens to be much less than we would expect based on the magnitude of the first.

In the context of human behaviour the equivalent generic - level information is the following: a human behaviour consisting of minimum two causally related human actions; neither action precedes the other; the commencement of the second action is signalled by the first action; the second action has an impact on us; the magnitude of the first action announces the magnitude of the second action; the force of the second action is much weaker than could be expected after being based on the first action (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 178).

The generic - level schema of ineffectual bragging, which is evoked by generic - level information from the source domain (a natural physical phenomenon) and the target domain (human behaviour) can be functional in

other contexts apart from human beings. Thus the proverb *Big thunder/ little rain* can be, as outlined by Lakoff and Turner applied in the context of a dog that threatens us by his barking, but is in fact harmless. Lakoff and Turner further point out that the Great Chain metaphor can be applied at the same level on the Great Chain as the source domain, for example on another natural physical event, for example on an earthquake that has caused a lot of noise but will not cause much damage (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 179).

4.5.3.4. The Maxim of Quantity

The Maxim of Quantity requires us to be as informative as necessary. In order to do that we need to select the highest - ranking property for each level so that no superfluous information is given. In other words if not explicitly stated, lower – ranking properties can be confusing since they disrupt the Maxim of Quantity. That would happen if, for instance, we refer to an animal by providing part - whole structure instead of a higher - ranking property such as instinctual behaviour without explicitly announcing it (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 173).

4.5.3.5. The Extended Chain of Being Cultural Model

Lakoff and Turner propose that the basic cultural model of the Great Chain of Being can be extended to dominance alongside attributes and behaviour. The notion of differentiating levels of the Chain on the basis of dominance is widespread throughout diverse world cultures. It concerns humans dominating over animals, one culture dominating over other culture(s), society dominating its subjects, God dominating his followers, etc. (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 208).

4.5.3.6. Application of the Great Chain Metaphor in Ruskin's and Wilde's Fairy Tales

In Ruskin's fairy tale *The King of the Golden River* an extended model of the Great Chain of Being can be recognized. God (The King of the Golden River) occupies the top level in the hierarchy and the humans are one level below. This is in accordance with Christian theology, which conceptualizes God on top of the hierarchy of the extended Great Chain of Being, while the cosmos is determined by the divine order (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 209).

Ruskin further distinguishes sublevels at the human level of being based on ethical properties of humans. Thus Gluck is able to get close to God because of his good deeds and his moral qualities and therefore manages to ascend the mountain top. Hans and Schwartz, on the other hand, remain below because they refused to provide help to those in need. The metaphor VIRTUE IS UP, therefore, indicates that the higher the position one occupies on the vertical axis, the more virtues (s)he possesses and the other way round. In Wilde's *The Happy Prince* the main character, the prince, is turned into a statue because of the insensitivity he showed during his life. One of the components of the Great Chain metaphor, the theory of the Nature of Things, helps us understand that all forms of being have essences which result in their manner of functioning or behaving. Stone is a natural physical thing and its hardness is projected onto human emotions, i.e. insensitivity and cruelty, which are the essences of human behaviour.

Lakoff and Turner point out that the extended Great Chain also has political and social consequences. They emphasize that this cultural model is not a relic from history but a strong determining factor in shaping our social and political beliefs (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 211):

"In all contemporary societies, the more powerful classes of people are called the "upper" classes and are usually considered to be better than the "lower" classes."

In Victorian Britain the upper class was considered to be better than the middle class and the working class. One indicator of class was the tendency of the representatives of the upper (and partly middle) class to keep the privacy of their homes by staying indoors as much time as possible. Spending a considerable amount of time outdoors was considered to be an example of bad manners. The Flowers correspond to those classes of Victorian society that preferred staying indoors both to keep their privacy and to show their class status. Wilde projects the structure from the source domain of garden flowers to the target domain of the class system in Victorian Britain (Wilde, 1994: 116).

The projection is possible because the source and the target domains share a generic - level structure. Generic - level information for the source domain, the domain of plant life and the target domain, human behaviour, is provided respectively:

- there are typical (biological) attributes which keep the entity attached to a place (ground)
- the entity cannot function without the help of the place (ground)
- the entity does not normally move from the place it is attached to in order to go to another place.

The equivalent generic - level information about human behaviour contains some other details:

- There is a (human behavioural) pattern that makes the agent attached to a place (premises)

- The agent is used to functioning within the boundaries of the place (premises)
- The agent does not normally (does not wish) to move from the place (premises) in order to go to another place.

The projection from the source space of Flowers in the Infanta's garden to the target space of the behaviour of the upper class in Victorian Britain via the generic space can be performed on two levels: spatial and ideational. In the first blend of the Flowers and the behaviour of people belonging to different classes in Victorian England the element of the Flowers being deeply rooted in the soil corresponds to the boundedness of the members of the upper class (and partly the middle class) within their four walls. On the ideational level, the rooted Flowers are mapped onto deeply entrenched ideas held by traditionalists. This is one of the main ideas that were shared by the conservative members of the Victorian society: hesitation to acknowledge cognitions from diverse sciences about the origin of the species, the earth and similar, and, correspondingly, to re-evaluate their religious beliefs and the unwillingness to recognize the problems of the poor, the deprived, and the disabled.

The blend of the birds/lizards and the behaviour of the working class encompasses elements that are opposite in their character to those from the blend of the Flowers and the behaviour of the upper class. Following is the generic - level information shared by the source domain and the target domain:

- There is an agent that moves freely with no restraint
- The agent is not attached to a place
- The agent is used to functioning without restrictions

The second blend also evokes interpretation at two levels, the spatial and the ideational. The interpretation on the first level includes the following elements and relations from the source space: birds and lizards as animals that move freely on the ground and in the air respectively, these animals do not build themselves a home, they are used to free movement. The elements from the target space encompass the people belonging to the working class of the Victorian society, who spent a lot of time outdoors because their lodgings were inadequate, they were used to living outdoors.

On an ideational level the free movement of birds and lizards corresponds to the members of the Victorian society that were open to new ideas and took into consideration the cognitions from diverse sciences as well as re - examined their attitude to religion. My opinion is that the mapping which takes place on the ideational level might not necessarily be confined to members of any particular class of the Victorian society but rather encompasses all of the advanced forces of the period. Alternatively the mapping could apply, as suggested earlier in the text, to those forces in the Victorian society which preserved (at least a small dose of) individuality.

There could be another interpretation of the blend: the elements from the target space that are incorporated in the mapping refer to those individuals who were considered (or considered themselves) outcasts of the Victorian society. Such an interpretation suggests the existence of autobiographical elements, which relate to Wilde's life and persona. It is known that Wilde led a life of a dandy, wore eccentric clothes and in particular defied some of the Victorian attitudes which he despised such as hypocrisy, selfishness, Utilitarianism and others. Being a homosexual in a society which did not approve of such a sexual orientation also made him an outcast.

The functioning of these blends highly depends on personification. In the following text I shall briefly refer to the *alethic* modalities of the *formative* narrative operation and in particular to one of its crucial elements, personification.

4.5.3.7. Modalities of the Formative Narrative Operation

In his book *Heterocosmica* Lubomír Doležel points out that modalities are the main factors that influence the formative operation, a macro – operation which moulds narrative worlds into orders that can potentially create stories (Doležel, 1998: 113). There is a distinction between several types of modalities: *alethic* (these include the modalities of possibility, impossibility and necessity and they determine the basic conditions of fictional worlds such as time - space parameters or causality), *deontic* (they constrain fictional worlds by proscriptive and prescriptive norms in order to determine which actions are prohibited, mandatory or permitted), *axiological* (these modalities transform the entities in the world into values and disvalues) and *epistemic* (the effect of these modalities is to impose epistemic order on the worlds of fiction). Alethic modalities are particularly relevant for this study since fairy tales comply to specific principles in regard to the (im) possibility of supernatural worlds.

4.5.3.7.1 Alethic constraints

Because of the redistribution of the M – operator, which is the basic formative principle of impossible/supernatural worlds, these worlds are characterized by laws which do not apply in the actual world. In other words, "what is impossible in the natural world becomes possible in its supernatural counterpart" (Doležel, 1998: 115). Doležel outlines that physically impossible worlds can also be considered as possible worlds as long as they are logically

possible, while solely the worlds that include or imply contradictions are logically impossible (Doležel, 1998: 116).

4.5.3.7.2. Personification

As pointed out by Doležel, the redistribution of the M - operator defines the structures of the supernatural worlds in the following ways (Doležel, 1998: 136):

1. by introducing the supernatural, physically impossible beings such as spirits, goblins, monsters and similar beings endowed with properties and action capacities that do not characterize ordinary persons of the natural world,
2. by selecting natural – world persons which are attributed properties and action capabilities that are denied to persons belonging to the natural world,
3. by personifying inanimate objects and animals, i.e. granting them mental life and intentionality.

Personification is the figure of speech that is used very often in fairy tales. Inanimate objects/ plants and animals are personified, i.e. they become agents with a mental life and intentionality and are given human properties and action capacities encompassing speech. Blends of the human and the animal and in particular the blend of talking animals is one of the basic characteristics of children's literature (Turner, 1996: 138). Personification of inanimate objects such as street lamps, houses, toys and similar objects is very common in Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tales (Pintarić, 2008: 10). Oscar Wilde continued Andersen's tradition and perfected the genre of modern fanciful tale by resorting even more to personification.

In the examined fairy tales all three manners of structure definition of the supernatural world are utilized. Thus MacDonald introduces goblins in *The Princess and the Goblin*, while Wilde includes the character of a giant in his fairy tale *The Selfish Giant*. Ruskin resorts to the creation of a hybrid person, a dwarf, who not only has properties and capacities that are denied to persons of the natural world but also embodies the natural force by creating wind.

In Wilde's *The Birthday of the Infanta* flowers exhibit human values, they personify the behaviour of the upper class and those representatives of the middle class of Victorian society who strived to become "gentlemen". Birds represent the working class and (possibly) artists: they do not stay in one place for long, cherish freedom above all other things and move freely. This corresponds, as previously explained, to the indoors/outdoors dichotomy in Victorian Britain: upper classes and the part of the middle class that had ambitions to move up on the social scale remained indoors, while the working class spent most of the time outdoors rather than being confined to their congested rooms.

In *The Nightingale and the Rose* Wilde assigns even more complex mental abilities to the hybrid character of a talking animal, i.e. the Nightingale. This character not only experiences emotions that humans do, but she is able to prioritize them: her love for life becomes less important than her sympathy for the Student, whom she altruistically helps by paying the highest possible price. Love is in the Nightingale's eyes the supreme emotion one can experience and thus she decides to help the Student to win the love of the girl he is enamoured with by sacrificing her life.

In *The Remarkable Rocket* Wilde assigns vanity to his personified objects (fireworks) and even refers to them as "people" (Wilde, 1994: 60):

"Romance is dead, Romance is dead, Romance is dead," she murmured. She was one of those *people* who think that, if you say the same thing over and over a great many times, it becomes true in the end."

As illustrated in the examples, in fairy tales personified objects/plants/animals obtain human abilities (speech), emotions (love, altruism, empathy) and values (sense of class, hypocrisy). At this point I shall explain the functioning of the Great Chain metaphor on the above quoted extracts from fairy tales in more detail.

4.6. The Cultural Model of the Self

The main component of the second cultural model, the Victorian model of the self, is inner restraint. The self was conceived as a container the contents of which (beliefs, ideas, emotions and values) were a private matter and thus supposed to be kept within the container. The loss of the self's centre would, consequently, lead to anarchy (Kimmel, 2003: 388).

This cultural model is most easily noticeable in Wilde's fairy tale *The Remarkable Rocket*, where Frog, one of the personified animals, talked about arguments in terms of bad behaviour (Wilde, 1994: 151):

"Arguments are extremely vulgar, for everybody in good society holds exactly the same opinions."

As pointed out by Kimmel, "the constraints of English upper – class habitus dictated pulling together, a control of the passions, and a strong

avoidance of "getting carried away" (Kimmel, 2003: 387). Since arguments sometimes lead to heated debates in which it is possible to, at least for a while, lose control of oneself, it is not advisable to argue. Wilde is critical of dogmatism, the attitude that the critics of the period perceived as having negative connotations, since it advised the members of the "good" society to refrain from re-evaluation of old ideas, traditions and values and to be careful with accepting new ideas (Kimmel, 2003: 385).

The importance of keeping barriers, both spatial and moral, has already been commented in a passage from Wilde's *The Birthday of the Infanta*. The personified characters of lizards and birds are not capable to keep their privacy and, metaphorically, contain their selves, within the spatially conceived barriers. Such conduct is considered an instance of bad behaviour by the Flowers, who secure their privacy and their selves within those boundaries.

4.7. Sustained and Extended Metaphors

At this stage I shall briefly refer to Paul Werth's study of sustained metaphors/megametaphors. In Werth's words "metaphors can be sustained, as a kind of "undercurrent", over an extended text" (Werth, 1999: 323). In his analysis of a megametaphor utilized in the initial sequence of E. M. Forster's novel *A Passage to India*, Werth provides a list of expressions with which Forster describes the city of Chandrapore. These words, most of which have negative connotations, relate to the natives' dwellings and the English residential areas (the colonialist English live at the top of the hill, while the natives live at the bottom). These expressions contribute to the conception of the city as a pile of rubbish, while the local inhabitants are described as low forms of life (Werth, 1999: 318). The submetaphors THE CITY IS A PILE OF RUBBISH and THE PEOPLE ARE A LOW FORM OF LIFE, CONTROL IS UP are only a part of a

bigger picture. While the English rule over the natives is metaphorically portrayed as the former living at the top and the latter at the bottom of the hill, the native population is more vital, since they are closer to the earth and spend more time outdoors, which results in the conceptual metaphor COLOUR IS VITALITY (Werth, 1999: 322) The meanings of submetaphors are eventually condensed into one big metaphor, the megametaphor EARTHLY POWER IS LIFELESS (Werth, 1999: 317 - 320).

The conceptual metaphor CONTROL IS UP is also functional in George MacDonald's fairy tale *The Princess and the Goblin*. The ruling social group lives on the surface of the earth, while the subordinate social group, the goblins lives underground (MacDonald, 1987: 13):

"There was a legend current in the country that at one time they lived above ground, and were very like other people. But for some reason or other, the king had laid what they thought too severe taxes upon them, or had required observances of them which they did not like. The consequence was that they had disappeared from the face of the earth, and had taken refuge in these subterranean caverns, whence they never came out but at night, and then seldom showed themselves in any numbers, and never to many people at once."

Although voluntarily confining themselves to the underground life, the goblins initially, at least declaratively, acknowledged the rule of the king who had made them move to their underground caverns. With time they established their own government and ceased to be the subjects of the king's descendants (MacDonald, 1987: 13):

"They cherished a special grudge against the descendants of the king who had caused their expulsion. In the process of time they had got a king and government of their own, whose chief business, beyond their own simple affairs, was to devise trouble for their neighbours."

The relationship between the above - ground and underground residents changes over a period of time and so does the application of the conceptual metaphor CONTROL IS UP. Our understanding of the metaphor is redefined in accordance with the change of the nature of the relationship between these two groups of residents. At the beginning the underground residents were, at least formally, the King's subjects, which leads us to conceptualize their relation with the help of the metaphor CONTROL IS UP. With time two parallel sources of control emerge: the above - ground and underground control, resulting in the metaphor CENTRAL CONTROL IS UP, ALTERNATE CONTROL IS DOWN.

Research in the field of social history indicates that the last decades of the 19th century witnessed a tendency towards a redefinition of social classes in Victorian Britain. New "free" occupations emerged almost on a daily basis, while discoveries from diverse sciences cast a new light upon the origin of species and the earth. A whole new class emerged in the second half of the century, the class which defied control from "above ". This phenomenon could be understood via Wilde's conceptual metaphors in *The Birthday of the Infanta*, where the new class is represented by lizards and birds, while the flowers stand for the traditional forces in Victorian society. In a similar manner the goblins in MacDonald's *The Princess and the Goblin* represent the emerging unconformist social class.

The sociologist Bill Harrel notices a connection between root (primary) metaphors and social structure. Metaphor helps to establish the relationship between social structure, logic and cultural belief systems, argues Harrell, while in turn experience influenced by social structure aids in understanding the mechanisms of the functioning of metaphors in a narrative (Harrell, 1982: 221). Wilde and MacDonald's stories exhibit the contradictions the middle and late

Victorian periods were ridden with. These include in particular the redefinition of social boundaries and the emergence of social conflicts (Harrell, 1982: 233).

Werth's main contribution to metaphoric reading of literature, Michael Kimmel asserts, lies in the fact that he studies metaphors on a higher level than Lakoff and Johnson: while Lakoff and Johnson limit their study of conceptual metaphors to the sentential level, Werth studies them on a level of a text/discourse⁷³ (Kimmel, 2003: 383). We would not be able to grasp a "metaphorical current stretching through the text" (Kimmel, 2003: 383) without an accumulation of sub - themes into a textual Gestalt (Kimmel, 2003: 383). Kimmel develops Werth's notion of megametaphors, which allows the possibility to infer integrated meanings from extended sequences, into an idea of condensing a theme of a sequence into a summary representation (Kimmel, 2003: 384).

In this manner we can infer a summary image of the above sequence from *The Birthday of the Infanta* through a repetition of a theme, of vitality, social class and self - containment. It must be noted that understanding the Victorian society as a hierarchical organization, where it was of utmost importance to maintain inner restraint, is deeply historically bound. Kimmel points out that the structure of the image schematically defined self schema, which acts like the main cultural schema, remains relatively stable throughout time, although it is subject to historical change (Kimmel, 2003: 392). Thus we no longer consider that inner restraint is as important in the way the Victorians believed it was, neither do we perceive societies around the world to be class - ridden to such an extent as the people living in the Victorian period did. In a similar fashion, display of emotions is more acceptable today than it was in Victorian England

⁷³ Werth understands *discourse* as a more complete language event than *text*: text lacks the context and is of abstract nature, while discourse is a complete language event with a "perceived" beginning and an end" (Werth, 1999: 1).

(as shown in the analysis of schematic imagery in Wilde's fairy tale *The Nightingale and the Rose*). The cultural meaning and the context related to understanding cultural image schemas, therefore, changes, while the image schemas themselves remain relatively stable (Kimmel, 2003: 392).

4.7.1. The Plot Gene

Yuri Lotman's study of plot genes as narrative devices or primary symbols that could be developed into diverse plots (Lotman, 1990: 101) contributes to our understanding of a sequence or even a whole text in terms of an image by which we remember a narrative the best. Kimmel sees a plot gene as a "mnemonic device around which other less salient structures of the sequence can crystallize" (Kimmel, 2003: 385). This image, he claims, which we think of first when recollecting, for example, a narrative or a piece of music, has an image schematic structure and is enriched by propositional details (Kimmel, 2003: 391). Lotman argues that one and the same primary symbol can be expanded into diverse plots in an "unpredictable and irreversible way." (Lotman, 1990: 101). This is possible because the details or structures which accumulate around the symbol and are less salient than the symbol itself, contribute to different connotations of the resulting image. Lotman provides an example of the image of the feast in Pushkin's works (1990: 86 - 91): despite the fact that the meaning of the symbol is positive in Pushkin's poetry (especially in the poem *Peter the Great*), in some of his works, because of the details that accumulate around the symbol, the feast takes on negative connotations (e.g. *Mozart and Salieri*, *The Feast during the Plague*).

In Wilde's stories the image of the garden has mainly positive connotations: in the story *The Selfish Giant* the image of the garden in spring acts like a heterotopia of happiness, however, the structures that give rise to

negative connotations, such as the details that describe the same garden during the winter, turn it into a heterotopia of coldness and inactivity (*The Selfish Giant*). This is possible because the image schema of a container, in terms of which we understand the garden, is simple, relatively poor in detail and malleable. Combined with the cultural model of the self, the image of the garden produces negative associations in the stories *The Birthday of the Infanta* and *The Remarkable Rocket*. In these stories the image of the garden is associated with spatially and morally conceived barriers. In Victorian Britain to be in a proper place metaphorically meant to be your socially accepted self (Kimmel, 2003: 387), which was also reflected in the hierarchical organization of the Victorian society.

The image schema of a container helps us create an image of the garden, which subsequently develops into different plots. In Kimmel's opinion neither can a plot of every narrative be condensed into a plot - gene nor every narrative can be recollected in terms of a plot - gene (Kimmel, 2003: 390). However, the image schema of a container can be combined nicely with the models of the self as container and the Great Chain of Being. We remain, Kimmel points out, unaware of the mental operations which combine these different models because we unconsciously impose complex meanings onto basic cultural schemas (Kimmel, 2003: 391).

4.8. The Forest as a Natural Habitat

In Wilde's fairy tale *The Birthday of the Infanta* life can be understood as imprisonment, while death can be conceived in terms of deliverance. One of the main characters of the story, the Dwarf, undergoes a process of self - cognition upon seeing his image in a mirror in one of the many rooms at the Spanish court, where he dances for the Infanta's twelfth birthday. The Dwarf, a hunchback with

crooked legs and a disproportionate head compared to the rest of his body, had, prior to his performance at the Court, been living a carefree life in the forest, surrounded by friendly animals whose habits he was absolutely familiar with (Wilde, 1994: 117):

"He knew the cry of every bird, and could call the starlings from the tree - top, or the heron from the mere. He knew the trail of every animal, and could track the hare by its delicate footprints, and the boar by the trampled leaves...He knew where the wood - pigeons built their nests, and once when a fowler had snarred the parent birds, he had brought up the young ones himself, and had built a little dovecot for them in the cleft of a pollard elm. They were quite tame, and used to feed out of his hands every morning. She would like them, and the rabbits that scurried about in the long fern, and the jays with their steely feathers and black bills, and the hedgehogs that could curl themselves up into prickly balls, and the great wise tortoises that crawled slowly about, shaking their heads and nibbling at the young leaves."

The Dwarf is also in harmony with the changes brought by each oncoming season (Wilde, 1994: 117):

"All the wind - dances he knew, the mad dance in red raiment with the autumn, the light dance in blue sandals over the corn, the dance with white snow - wreaths in winter, and the blossom - dance through the orchards in spring."

The harmony of living amongst animals and trees and plants results in a peaceful life quite different from life in settlements. Having led a secluded life since his father refrained from showing his son in public, he only occasionally encountered people in the forest (Wilde, 1994: 118):

"Sometimes a Bishop rode through on his white mule, reading out of a painted book. Sometimes in their green velvet caps, and their jerkins of tanned deerskin, the falconers passed by, with hooded hawks on their wrists. At vintage time came the grape - treading, with purple

hands and feet, wreathed with glossy ivy and carrying dripping skins of wine; and the charcoal-burners sat round their huge braziers at night, watching the dry logs charring slowly in the fire, and roasting chestnuts in the ashes, and the robbers came out of their caves and made merry with them. Once, too, he had seen a beautiful procession winding up the dusty road to Toledo. The monks went in front singing sweetly, and carrying bright banners and crosses of gold, and then, in silver armour, with matchlocks and pikes, came the soldiers, and in their midst walked three barefooted men, in strange yellow dresses painted all over with wonderful figures, and carrying lighted candles in their hands."

The forest acts, therefore, as a heterotopia of happiness and the Dwarf's natural habitat. In her paper *Na krilima metafore* Marina Biti argues that the segmentation of space is established as a system of similarities and differences, with similarities being grouped into a concept, such as an island, whereas the role of the differences is to mark the segmented space with boundaries, that is to say the end of an island is the commencement of the sea (Biti, 2008: 140). The forest acts as the Dwarf's microcosm, the only world he knows of. The boundaries of the forest the Dwarf resides in are the beginning of a different world, the world in which different rules apply. The Dwarf appreciates everything the nature provides him with, be it vital resources or beneficial conditions (Biti, 2008: 141) and he completely interacts with the nature. However, his interaction with people is minimal. The people he does interact with do not react to his physical appearance, his deformed body. However, the Dwarf's first contact with "civilization" is fatal for him. He is brought to the Spanish court to entertain the Infanta during the celebration of her twelfth birthday. He dances for her and wins a big round of applause from the Infanta and her aristocratic friends, however, this applause is accompanied by laughing. For the first time people react to his deformity by laughing. The Dwarf does not recognize that he is being mocked, but rather interprets the laughter as an appraisal of his dancing skills. The Dwarf has the role of a clown who has

created his own special world or a microcosm around him, which, according to Bakhtin, functions as a chronotope by itself.

The figures of the rogue, clown or fool, Mikhail Bakhtin asserts, have appeared in literature since antique times and their function has been threefold: 1) they are connected with public spectacles and usually perform in public squares, 2) the figures of the rogue, clown and fool have a metaphorical significance in a literary text because they are not what they appear to be, and 3) their existence is in accordance with their role, beyond which they do not exist (Bakhtin, 1981:159). The role that Wilde assigns to his character satisfies these criteria: 1) he performs at the Spanish court, where his role is primarily to entertain the noble spectators, 2) the figure of the Dwarf can be conceived metaphorically, which will be explained further in the text and 3) his being coincides with his role and does not exist out of his role (The Infanta as well as other characters in the novel perceive him only as a clown and nothing more).

The Dwarf's first encounter with his reflection in the mirror is at the same time his last one. The mirror functions as both a real and an imaginary space, as pointed out earlier in the text. When the Dwarf finally realizes he can see himself in the mirror and when he becomes aware of the way he looks, he is overwhelmed by shock. He wishes he had stayed in the forest instead of coming to the Court. By doing that he returns to his true self, the self that is closely connected with the forest, where he has found his true self (Wilde, 1994: 125) :

"Why had they not left him in the forest, where there was no mirror to tell him how loathsome he was? Why had his father not killed him, rather than sell him to his shame?"

The forest in *The Birthday of the Infanta*, therefore, symbolizes man's natural state, his true self. The psychologist Bruno Bettelheim asserts that the

forest symbolizes one's encounter with his inner darkness, which he exits after resolving who he really is and what he wants to be (Bettelheim, 1976: 87). The horror which the Dwarf faces upon becoming aware of his physical appearance leads to his encounter with his own identity. In a moment of self - cognition he realizes that the Infanta, whom he fell in love with, laughed at him because she mocked his physical appearance, something his fragile heart cannot bear: he dies of a broken heart.

4.8.1. Personal and Group Identities

We become aware of our bodies, as pointed out by Danijela Marot Kiš and Ivan Bujan in their paper *Tijelo, identitet i diskurs ideologije*, in interaction situations involving attitudes towards social and cultural surrounding and the people in that surrounding (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 113). Marot Kiš and Bujan further accentuate the bidirectional relationship between a human body and its surrounding; we experience the world around us through our perceptive system as well as obtain feedback from our surrounding in the form of suggestions or or instructions, which in turn emphasize the relevance of the body in the establishment and adaptations of identity (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 115). In this reciprocal process the major role is played by ideological practices in form of value systems, stereotypes, prejudices and culturally imposed norms. Individuals are required to constantly adapt to these practices, which are imposed by the people in power representing dominant ideologies. Culture determines the manner of forming identity patterns and our understanding of the role that our bodies play in experiencing the world (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 115). Thus, Marot Kiš and Bujan claim, we become aware of our bodies primarily through the interaction with our surrounding and our attitudes towards our bodies are mostly formed through adaptation of the requirements from a wider social context (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 115)

Marot Kiš and Bujan, however, assert that traditional Western thought, based on the dualism of the body and the mind rooted in Descartes dichotomy on *res extensa* (the physical substance) and *res cogitans* (reflexive substance) denies the role of the body in forming identity. Cognitive theory, on the other hand, views the issue differently and assigns the body a crucial role in forming identity primarily because of the fact that the body is our first contact with the world and our primary foundation of identity. The traditional dichotomy on the mind and the body has been challenged lately. Thus examples of extreme practice of physical transformations including diets, exercise and re - modelling bodies with the help of esthetic surgery threaten to imperil the duality. The main aim of the recent preoccupation with physical looks is to defy time/bodily imperfections in order to function according to the norms imposed by mainstream culture or society (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 111). However, as pointed out by Marot Kiš and Bujan, the foundations of the mind/body dichotomy are not significantly shaken due to the fact that the constant "re – modelling" and shaping the body evokes its transient character as well as the limited nature of bodily performance (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 111).

Identity is, according to Marot Kiš and Bujan, understood as a group of values that form a specific worldview. Teun A. van Dijk differentiates between *personal identity* and *group identity*. The former is defined as a mental image of the personal self of a human being together with personal experience and biography in the form of accumulated mental models, from which emerges an abstract concept of self (usually in interaction with others), whereas the latter refers to the mental image of a (social) self as an array of group dependences and processes of identification related to such perceptions of dependences (van Dijk, 2006: 166).

Ideologies that mould the foundation of a group identity, i.e. the practices which refer to the evaluation of the criteria of belonging to a group and which include activities, norms and values, goals and social status (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 112), can be more or less tolerant towards bodily conditioned cases of otherness including disabled people, bodily deformed people or people of different sexual orientation (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 113). Marot Kiš and Bujan assert that extreme practices of intolerant social structures inspired by hegemonic ideologies treat otherness as a marginal issue whereas more tolerant practices address this problem as part of subculture or social subgroups (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 113). The concept of otherness, compared to the desirable features imposed by cultural/social practices, may include deviations from the usual mode of bodily functioning caused by illness or physical handicap, discrepancies with the elements of physical appearance that characterize group identity or alternative sexual orientation and practices (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 113).

If we project the group identity as depicted in the story *The Birthday of the Infanta* onto what seems to have worked as group identity imposed by hegemonic practices in Victorian Britain, we obtain an image of a class - divided society in which otherness was almost a taboo topic. Following is a conversation amongst flowers in the garden surrounding the Spanish court (Wilde, 1994: 114):

"He is really too ugly to be allowed to play in any place where we are," cried the Tulips.

"He should drink poppy juice, and go to sleep for a thousand years," said the great scarlet Lilies, and they grew quite hot and angry.

"He is perfect horror'!" screamed the Cactus. Why, he is twisted and stumpy, and his head is completely out of proportion with legs. Really he makes me feel prickly all over, and if he comes near me I will sting him with my thorns..."

"Even the Geraniums, who did not usually give themselves airs, and were known to have a great many poor relations themselves, curled up in disgust when they saw him, and when Violets meekly remarked that though he was certainly extremely plain, still he could not help it, they retorted with a good deal of justice that that was his chief defect, and that there was no reason why one should admire a person because he was incurable; and, indeed, some of the Violets themselves felt that the ugliness of the little Dwarf was almost ostentatious, and that he would have shown much better taste if he had looked sad, or at least pensive, instead of jumping about merrily, and throwing himself into such grotesque and silly attitudes."

The personified flower characters are a blend of two input spaces, flowers as they look in nature and the classes of the Victorian society. The generic space contains the idea of BIG IS UP; the bigger something is, the better position it occupies. Thus in the first input space there are flowers of different sizes such as large tulips, roses and geraniums, which are considered to be more worthy on the market and, consequently, more expensive than the flowers that are smaller in size, such as violets. In a class - divided society big becomes associated, through metaphorical transfers, with powerful social positions. In the blend the flowers contain elements from both input spaces: large flowers (Tulips, Lilies, Roses) correspond to the upper class who make sure their hegemonic ideology is imposed in practice, medium – size flowers (Geraniums) to middle classes, who basically support the ideology of the upper class as do the small flowers (Violets), although the latter show a bit of compassion for the Dwarf. The blend suggests that the historical period in which Wilde lived was intolerant to differences and marginalized the concept of Otherness. Furthermore, the Dwarf is not conscious of his bodily mediated personal identity because he is not aware of his looks, which differentiate him from most members of the group. This is a result of him living in a homogenic space segment in which he does not have much contact with the people from nearby settlements. Consequently, he is not aware of group identity and does not

comply to the ideological practice related to bodily - mediated identities (he is not sad or pensive as Violets think he should be) because he is not familiar with the practice.

In a society laden with social differences amongst classes everybody knows where his place is. In that way we can conceive of another blend, one that joins elements from two inputs, namely the flowers being rooted to the ground and the people in a class - divided society who conform to the rules of hegemonic ideologies (Wilde, 1994: 116):

"Well – bred people always stay exactly in the same place, as we do. No one ever saw us hopping up and down the walks, or galloping madly through the grass after dragon – flies... This is dignified, and it should be."

This within - the - group discourse affects group identity by calls for solidarity (staying in the same place) and group identity is in turn established through discourse within a group (van Dijk, 2006: 169). The conceptual metaphor STAYING IN ONE PLACE IS CONFORMING TO HEGEMONIC SOCIAL/CULTURAL PRACTICES expresses the previously explained ideas of deference and removable inequalities that marked the Victorian period in British history. The main principles in Victorian society concerning its division into classes was that everybody complied (deferred) to his position in society and that everybody had a chance to obtain a higher social status. While the flowers comply to ideological practices, lizards and birds do not. Birds symbolize, as pointed out by Bruno Bettelheim, the ego and the superego's striving for higher ideals, which is in accordance with their non - conformist behaviour in Wilde's story (Bettelheim; 2004: 45).

The Victorian period marked Britain, as stated earlier in the text, as a highly class - divided society where people of a higher social status were indifferent to the needs and problems of the poor. The problems of people with disabilities and deformities were not understood either and these people were often marginalized.

4.8.2. Disability Studies

The problem of personal identification of people with physical handicaps is in the focus of disability studies (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 113). Disability, as pointed out by Cindy Lacom, is of crucial importance in the context of cultural studies since it defines a norm and, by using bodies literally and metaphorically, founds the concepts of normalcy and deviance (Lacom, 2005: 547). Disability studies explore the mechanisms of adaptation of people with disabilities and deformities to collective identity patterns as well as the manners of their search for identification in the context of values promoted by hegemonic cultural and social practices (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 113).

Lacom argues that during the Victorian period public perceptions and reactions to people with disabilities and deformities were primarily founded on four forces: 1) developing capitalist economic theories, primarily the free - market economy advocated by the economic theorists Adam Smith and David Ricardo 2) an ideology of self - help, 3) a national obsession with empire building and 4) the growth of industrialism (Lacom, 2005: 547).

The economic theory of the free – market assigned people with disabilities and deformities, as argued by Holladay and Watt, the role of outcast and social parasite (Holladay and Watt, 1989: 869). The parliamentary Poor Law Amendment Act required those who were unable to keep up with

production norms and time - keeping to turn themselves into workhouses, where the conditions were so bad that many people chose to starve rather than live there (Lacom, 2005: 547). People with disabilities and deformities had few options in life: they could try to support themselves by looking for jobs that did not require "technologically useful bodies" (Lacom, 2005: 548), go into workhouses, starve or display their mishappen bodies in shows that earned money for physical difference (Lacom, 2005: 548). The fear of a revolt, fuelled by the American and French revolutions, resulted in a pressure to *contain* potentially subversive bodies. People that were marked as potentially disruptive were people with disabilities and deformities and people of different race. Lacom focuses on two Victorian individuals, one a real person and one a fictitious character, in order to illustrate the factors that shaped social conceptions of disabilities and deformities. The first individual is Joseph Merrick, a man with a severely deformed body, which was a result of his illness (neurofibromatosis).

At the age of eleven Merrick, an orphaned child, went to a workhouse but left it after a few years, following the signing of a contract with Sam Torr, an organizer of "freak shows". In those shows, as pointed out by Lacom, excess (protruding and bulging body parts) and containment took place parallelly (Lacom, 2005: 549). Deformity was, William Holladay and Stephen Watt assert, looked upon with on the one side disgust and on the other amazement (Holladay and Watt, 1989: 868). Lacom emphasizes that deformed bodies reminded spectators of potential sameness since anyone could lose a limb (that was quite common in places with bad working conditions), contract a disease the result of which might have been disability or give birth to a child with physical and/ or mental disabilities (Lacom, 2005: 549). Lacom portrays Merrick as a creator of his own destiny who instigated his own exhibition, thereby "mimicking the work of "normal" . Merrick underwent another

seclusion: upon meeting Dr. Frederick Treves, who took a personal and a professional interest in him, he agreed to be confined to a secluded part of a hospital, where he was exposed to the rich, the educated and the noble (Lacom, 2005: 551).

Unlike Merrick, whose containment brought him relative security and financial independence, Mary Shelley's fictional character has a completely opposite destiny. In Lacom's opinion the reason Frankenstein's monster incites excessive reactions from other characters lies in his decision to "refrain from participating in a marketplace economy" (Lacom, 2005: 548) rather than being deformed.

Merrick is, like the Dwarf, enslaved in his own body and kept from sight of the privileged members of the society, except in case of performances. The schema of boundedness is noticeable on two levels: the individual and the social level. Thus the Dwarf is ignorant of his looks for most part of his life and does not develop a personal identity while at the same time society limits his movement. His caretaker (his father) confines him to a life in the forest while the members of the Spanish court only allow him to exhibit himself during his performance. Merrick is, on the other hand, aware of his deformity from an early age and accepts to be kept at a "safe" distance from the "respectable" members of the society. The Dwarf is not aware of his deformity for most of his young life and when he finally becomes aware of it, he dies of shock and a broken heart. His death is the consequence of his cognition that he was a laughing stock of the aristocracy at the Spanish court, in particular of the Infanta, for whom he had cherished gentle feelings. At the same time he understands that his love for the Infanta cannot be realized because he, as a person with a deformity, occupies a marginal position in Victorian society. The Dwarf is in this respect more similar to Frankenstein's monster since he does not comply with the social status

assigned to him by the hegemonic social practices of Victorian society. Had he been aware of his deformity from an early age, he would have probably adapted to the role of an object of derision. The cognition of personal and, consequently, group identity occurs, therefore, too late.

Frida, the main character in Slavenka Ilić's book *Frida ili o boli*, finds a way to adapt to the demands of hegemonic social practices imposed upon people with disabilities/and deformities while she was still a young child. The book is a biography of Frida Kahlo, the Mexican artist and political activist. A debilitating illness which Frida partly recovered from in her infancy (childhood paralysis) alongside a tram accident, which physically scarred her for the rest of her life, marked her life as well as her search for personal and group identities. In their article *Tijelo, identitet i diskurs ideologije* Marot Kiš and Bujan emphasize that Frida's choice to mask her handicapp by wearing exotic clothes and loud makeup indicate her refusal to accept a marginal role in Mexican society between the two world wars. Frida converts attention from her disability onto her exotic looks, which becomes her way of adaptation to the hegemonic social practices of the time (Marot Kiš and Bujan, 2008: 120).

The influence of hegemonic cultural and social praxis on the formation of bodily mediated personal identity is in the focus of some other stories by Wilde. In the story *The Star Child* a foundling, apparently a descendant of a rich and noble family (several valuable items are left with the bundle), is adopted by a woodcutter and his family. The boy is strikingly beautiful, but also conceited, cruel and selfish. He accidentally meets his mother, a beggar woman in rags, who, after a search of ten years, finally finds her son. The Star - Child, however, denies his mother, abhorring the very idea that he is the son of a poor beggar woman. However, in a fashion similar to Wilde's Dorian Gray in *The Picture of*

Dorian Gray, the sins the Star - Child has committed are reflected in his physical appearance (Wilde, 1994: 192):

"So he went to the well of water and looked into it, and lo! his face was as the face of a toad, and his body was scaled like an adder. And he flung himself down on the grass and wept, and said to himself, "Surely this has come upon me by reason of my sin. For I have denied my mother, and driven her away, and been proud, and cruel to her."

His childhood friends who, prior to this transformation, adored him, now mock his looks and avoid his company. Suffering from remorse, he searches for his mother. Everywhere he goes, he is met by derision and humiliation. He is not mocked only in the forest, where he looks for the treasure that will help him find his mother. The forest thus becomes a microcosm of freedom, a world where one does not have to conform to the hegemonic ideologies related to bodily - determined social functions. However, the forest is not always a safe place: despite its wild beauty, the forest in *The Star - Child*, is, unlike in *The Birthday of the Infanta*, full of danger (Wilde, 1994: 197):

"Now this wood was very fair to look at from without, and seemed full of singing birds and of sweet - scented flowers, and the Star - Child entered it gladly. Yet did its beauty profit him little, for wherever he went harsh briars and thorns shot up from the ground and encompassed him, and evil nettles stung him, and the thistle pierced him with her daggers, so that he was in sore distress."

Poets have often referred to the forest as alluring yet perilous. In Robert Frost's poem *Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening* the forest symbolizes death and the poet, though tempted to go into the forest, refrains from doing it. In *The Road Not Taken*, another poem by Frost, the curvy forest path interspersed with thorns symbolizes the harder yet the more challenging course of life that the poet opts to take instead of the easier but monotonous path. Thus

the forest acts like a garden with interspersing paths and everybody is free to choose which path to take.

The Star - Child decides to take a different path in life and undergoes a radical transformation: he is no longer selfish and cruel, but helps the needy. Eventually he is rewarded for his good deeds by obtaining his former good looks and is welcome as a new king, after it has been revealed that he is the son of a leper, whom he helped on several occasions, and the beggar woman.

The image schema of a container fits nicely with the concept of a bodily - mediated personal and group identity, resulting in the emergence of the conceptual metaphor DEFORMITY IS CONTAINMENT. This metaphor mirrors the social hegemonic practices of the Victorian historical period which concerned the status of people with deformities. It appears that the Victorian society was rather intolerant of the disabled and deformed, assigning them a marginal place in society. The disabled and the deformed were *contained* within the premises of workhouses or freak shows. Keeping boundaries was a must and people with deformities and disabilities were discouraged to appear in public. However, we might conclude that there were some members of Victorian society who sympathized with these people. In Wilde's *The Birthday of the Infanta* lizards and birds like the Dwarf and sympathize with him (Wilde, 1994: 114 - 115):

"But somehow the Birds liked him... They did not mind his being ugly a bit.", "The Lizards also took an immense fancy to him...And, though it sounds absurd to say so, he is really not so ugly after all, provided, of course, that one shuts one's eyes, and does not look at him."

The birds and lizards, who do not mind the Dwarf's ugliness correspond, as proposed earlier, to the progressive/unconformist forces in the Victorian society. Such a projection is in accordance with the Zeitgeist of the late 19th

century, which witnessed a re - evaluation of the traditions and norms that had been established in the previous subperiods of the Victorian era.

4.8.3. Final Notes on Spatial Schemas

To sum up the discussion of the active function of spatial image schemas in the studied fairy tales; the most productive schemas are the CONTAINER, the UP and DOWN, the CENTRE and ALTERITY and the PATH schemas. They serve as the basis for a number of basic and some novel conceptual metaphors including EMOTIONS ARE CONTAINERS; POWER IS UP, CONTROL IS UP; CENTRAL CONTROL IS UP, ALTERNATE CONTROL IS DOWN; (IM)MOBILITY IS A SIGN OF CLASS; TRAVEL IS A MENTAL JOURNEY and combine with the cultural models of the studied historical period. Certain sequences or even whole stories can be understood via a megametaphor or a summary image. Thus certain sequences of Mac Donald's fairy tale can be understood via the conceptual metaphor CENTRAL CONTROL IS UP; ALTERNATE CONTROL IS DOWN. Ruskin's story can be conceived through the megametaphor TRAVEL IS A MENTAL JOURNEY, while Wilde's *The Birthday of the Infanta* can be understood with the help of the megametaphor DEFORMITY IS CONTAINMENT. The symbol that occurs in different fairy tales by the same author gives rise to different connotations due to the structures that accumulate around it and results in opposing images. Thus the garden gains both positive and negative connotations in *The Selfish Giant* (depending on the season), while it produces negative connotations in *The Nightingale and the Rose* because the lack of love in the Student's life corresponds to the unavailability of a red rose. I shall explore in a similar way an array of image schemas and conceptual metaphors that we resort to when talking about time.

4.9. Conceptualization of Life and Death

Life and death are complex concepts and, as pointed out by Lakoff and Turner, "are all - encompassing matters that there can be no single conceptual metaphor that will enable us to comprehend them." (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 2). We conceive these two concepts in accordance with our understanding of time as linear and irreversible. The most common conceptual metaphors that we use when conceptualizing life are the primary metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and the conventionalized conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY.

Death is often conceptualized with the help of the primary metaphor EVENTS ARE ACTIONS and STATES ARE LOCATIONS. Through the metaphor EVENTS ARE ACTIONS we project an action story onto an event story. In that way the source story is an action story, while the target story is an event story (Turner, 1996: 27). An event story with a nonactor is, therefore, perceived as an action - story which includes an agent, i.e. a causal actor. The causal actor becomes a metaphorical actor and is often personified (Turner, 1996: 28).

Furthermore, the very event of death is a non - spatial story, however, it is often understood in terms of an agent departing on a voyage without a chance to return. Thus while there is essentially no movement in death as a target story, in the source - story there is an agent who goes on a one - way journey. Language has marked this manner of conceptualization of death in the expressions such as *He's gone* or *He's left us* (Turner, 1996: 31).

Projecting from a source action story onto a target event story would not be possible if there was no similarity in the structure of image schemas between a source and a target: in the source space someone who has been present goes

away for good, while in the target space someone/something that has existed goes out of existence forever (Turner, 1996: 31). Thus, Turner points out, projecting from a source to a target is, due to the invariance principle which does not tolerate a clash between the structure of image schemas, not arbitrary (Turner, 1996: 31).

The cause in the event *Death- in - general*, or death which is the result of a general cause or an abstract element that causes death, corresponds structurally to the action story of departure, in which there may be an actor who causes somebody to depart. Causal relationships are thereby preserved by using personification, namely personifying the element that causes death (Turner, 1996: 32). The general personification of Death - in - general may be made more particular. Thus the most widespread specific personification of Death is that of *the Grim Reaper*. This blend is, as pointed out by Turner, the result of at least four input spaces (Turner, 1996: 76). The first projection envisages a source space with reapers during a harvest and a target space of an individual dying human being. These two inputs are joined by the conventional metaphor PEOPLE ARE PLANTS WITH RESPECT TO THE LIFE CYCLE, which is in turn marked in language in common expressions including *She's withering away*, *He's a late bloomer* and *He's a young sprout*. (Turner, 1996: 78). In this way the action - story of reaping is projected onto the event - story of death. Another input space to the blend of the Grim Reaper is the abstract story of causal tautology, according to which we conceive events belonging to the same category as having the same abstract cause (Death causes Dying, Sleep causes sleeping, Desire causes desiring and similar). This space is blended with a particular event - story of death, i.e. death that is caused by a particular cause such as stomach cancer, injury, heart attack or pneumonia. The resulting blend of the abstract story of causal tautology and the specific event of death obtains an abstract cause, Death, which is the common denominator of every other event of death.

When Death - in - General is blended with the action - story of departure the result is a blend where Death - in - General ceases to function like an abstract cause, but rather becomes an actor in which it acts as a personified agent who enforces the departure (Turner, 1996: 78). The fourth income space to the final blend of the Grim Reaper includes, Turner asserts, a prototypical story of a human killer causing death in a victim (Turner, 1996: 78). This space encompasses the features of a *human killer* who *intentionally* kills a specific person and in that matter differs from Death - in General or a reaper (Turner, 1996: 78).

In further text I intend to explain the functioning of conceptual metaphors that we have found most productive in studied fairy tales.

4.9.1. A LIFETIME IS A YEAR

A lifetime is often conceptualized in terms of a year. In this way the target domain of a lifecycle is understood in terms of the source domain comprising four seasons in a year. Thus springtime, summer, autumn and winter are mapped onto youth, maturity, old age and death respectively (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 18). As Lakoff and Turner point out, such a metaphoric understanding of the concepts of life and death is natural: spring marks the emergence of new animal and plant life, while winter announces the dormancy/hibernation of both animals and plants (Lakoff and Turner, 1987: 18).

Such an understanding of a lifecycle can be derived from Wilde's fairy tale *The Selfish Giant*. In spring the Giant's garden celebrates the arrival of flowers, blossoms on trees, the fresh grass and the chirping of birds (Wilde, 1994: 33):

"It was a lovely garden, with soft green grass. Here and there over the grass stood beautiful flowers like stars, and there were twelve peach – trees that in the spring – time broke out into delicate blossoms of pink and pearl, and in the autumn bore rich fruit. The birds sat on the trees and sang so sweetly that the children used to stop their games in order to listen to them."

4.9.2. DEATH IS WINTER

The Giant's change of heart, his welcome of the children in his garden, marks the alteration of the eternal winter in the garden into spring, where every spring resembles one another and the same principle can be applied to winters. Time is conceptualized cyclically: as shown in these extracts, each spring marks the birth of plant and animal life, while each winter announces the state of inactivity of both plants and animals (Wilde, 1994: 35):

" ... in the Garden of the Selfish Giant it was still winter. The birds did not care to sing in it as there were no children, and the trees forgot to blossom. Once a beautiful flower put its head out from the grass, but when it saw the notice - board it was sorry for the children that it slipped back into the ground again, and went off to sleep."

The only active agents during the winter are the Frost, the Snow, the Hail and the North Wind. Wilde often resorts to personification in his fairy tales, thus in this fairy tale the dialogues between these natural phenomena contribute to the image of coldness of both the weather and the (initially) Giant's heart (Wilde, 1994: 35):

"The only people who were pleased were the Snow and the Frost. "Spring has forgotten this garden," they cried, "so we will live here all year round." The Snow covered up the grass with her great white cloak, and the Frost painted all the trees silver. Then they invited the North Wind to stay with them, and he came. He was wrapped in furs, and he roared all day about the garden, and blew the chimney - pots down. "This is a delithful spot,"

he said, "we must ask the Hail on a visit." So the Hail came. Every day for three hours he rattled on the roof of the castle till he broke most of the slates, and then he ran round and round the garden as fast as he could go. He was dressed in grey, and his breath was like ice."

The schoolchildren who play in the Giant's garden, are in harmony with nature, and they start frequenting the Giant's garden with the arrival of spring (Wilde, 1994: 36). The conceptual metaphor SPRING IS LIFE, with the help of which we understand the initial period of one's life in terms of emerging of new animal and plant life, is coherent with another conceptual metaphor, the metaphor PEOPLE ARE PLANTS. This metaphor helps us understand birth or youth in terms of the emergence of buds and new shoots (Lakoff and Turner, 1994: 18). Thus in Wilde's fairy tale young children sitting on trees correspond to blossoms appearing on the trees of the Giant's garden (Wilde, 1994: 36):

"Through a little hole in the wall the children had crept in, and they were sitting in the branches of the trees. In every tree that he could see there was a little child ... And the trees were so glad to have the children back again that they had covered themselves with blossoms, and were waving their arms gently above the children's heads."

However, the arrival of spring or winter does not necessarily mean that the spring/winter occupies the whole garden. On the first day of the children's return to the Giant's garden and, accordingly, the arrival of spring, there is still one cold spot in the garden (Wilde, 1994: 37):

"It was a lovely scene, only in one corner it was still winter. It was the farthest corner of the garden, and in it was standing a little boy. He was so small that he could not reach up to the branches of the tree, and he was wandering all round it, crying bitterly. The poor tree was still quite covered with frost and snow, and the North Wind was blowing and roaring above it."

The cold spot, however, melts when the Giant completely changes from a selfish and emotionless person into an altruistic, warm - hearted person and helps the boy climb the tree (Wilde, 1994: 37):

"And the Giant stole up behind him and took him gently in his hand, and put him up into the tree. And the tree broke at once into blossom, and the birds came and sang on it, and the little boy stretched his two arms and kissed him."

Similarly, when the little boy reappears and meets the Giant for the last time, it is winter, except for one spot in the garden (Wilde, 1994: 38):

"One winter morning he looked out of his window as he was dressing. He did not hate the Winter now, for he knew that it was merely the Spring asleep, and that the flowers were resting.

Suddenly he rubbed his eyes in wonder, and looked and looked. It certainly was a marvellous sight. In the farthest corner of the garden was a tree quite covered with lovely white blossoms. Its branches were all golden, and silver fruit hung down from them, and underneath it stood the little boy he loved."

In that way the little boy's final arrival announces the Giant's end since death is, when the conceptual metaphor DEATH IS WINTER is applied, understood in terms of winter. The Giant and the little boy's departure to the "garden of heaven" is marked with them being covered with white blossoms. White signifies that the good has won, with the active conceptual metaphor WHITE IS GOOD, BLACK IS BAD, while at the same time it symbolizes the inactivity of the winter. In Wilde's understanding winter is only partially inactive, since it is "a dormant spring" (Wilde, 1994: 38):

"He did not hate the Winter now, for he knew that it was merely the Spring asleep, and that the flowers were resting."

4.9.3. DEATH IS SLEEP

We can apply another conceptual metaphor relating to our understanding of death, i.e. DEATH IS SLEEP (Lakoff and Turner, 1987: 18). We can notice the following resemblances: the inactive nature, namely the dormant animal and plant life resembles death, which appears as if they were sleeping. Not only animals and plants resemble a death - like state, the same principle is applied to the main character of the story, the Giant, so that the Giant's dead body corresponds to a body of a sleeper.

Death is understood in terms of sleep in another fairy tale written by Wilde, *The Happy Prince*. The Swallow, who keeps the company of the statue of the Happy Prince and does good deeds in the Prince's name, is aware that he is going on his last, one - way journey (Wilde, 1994: 20):

"But at last he knew that he was going to die. He had just strength to fly up to the Prince's shoulder once more. "Good - bye, dear Prince!"e murmured, "will you let me kiss your hand?"

"I am glad that you are going to Egypt at last, little Swallow," said the Prince, "you have stayed too long here; but you must kiss me on the lips, for I love you."

"It is not to Egypt that I am going," said the Swallow. "I am going to the House of Death. Death is the brother of Sleep, is he not?"

And he kissed the Happy Prince on the lips, and fell down dead at his feet."

In his book *Death is the Mother of Beauty* Mark Turner points out that the kinship metaphor *Death is the brother of Sleep* and similar metaphors which contain groups of siblings as a source space, highlight two kinds of properties:

inheritance or the "salient characteristics of their parents" and *functional properties* or properties belonging to a group such as family loyalty, common cultural background, and so on (Turner, 1987: 25). Inherent properties are passed on from parents to children, and in turn shared by siblings. Thus through the metaphor *Death is the brother of Sleep* we understand death and sleep as sharing a common inherent feature, namely inactivity.

Turner emphasizes that the kinship metaphor *Death is the brother of Sleep* incorporates three inferences: 1) *group*, in the sense that sleep and death are companions, 2) *lineage*, meaning that sleep and death share the same mental source and 3) *similarity* and concludes that only real - world knowledge can determine which of the named three inferences operates in a given situation (Turner, 1987: 66).

In the fairy tale *The Happy Prince* similarity plays a crucial role in the conceptualization of death in terms of sleep. However, this similarity is not based solely on the inactivity of both a sleeper and a dead body, it also emphasizes the lightness with which one dies. Death is, therefore, perceived as a sleeplike state into which one enters lightly and as a journey on which the dying person goes accompanied by an agent who makes the departure easier for him. The Statue of the Happy Prince acts at the same time as an agent aiding the departure and the Swallow's co - traveller on his one - way journey (Wilde, 1994: 21):

"At that moment a curious crack sounded inside the statue, as if something had broken. The fact is that the leaden heart had snapped right in two. It certainly was a dreadfully hard frost."

4.9.4. DEATH IS A MOVER AND MANIPULATOR and DEATH IS DEPARTURE

The metaphor about the Giant's death is in fact a combination of three metaphors: DEATH IS SLEEP, DEATH IS DEPARTURE and DEATH IS A MOVER AND MANIPULATOR (Lakoff and Turner, 1987: 10).

4.9.4.1. DEATH IS DEPARTURE

This metaphor conceptualizes death in terms of a one - way journey, with the dying person being the traveller, the starting point corresponding to the life on earth which the dying person is leaving, while the final point of the journey maps onto the arrival of the soul into the Kingdom of Heaven or some other destination, which is culturally and socially determined (according to the Judeo - Christian tradition the deceased go to either paradise or hell, while the purgatory is a temporary spot on the way to paradise). Death can also be personified in the form of an agent who helps you depart or an agent who effects your death. Thus in T.S.Eliot's poem *The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock* death is understood, as pointed out by Lakoff and Turner (1987: 10) in terms of a footman who helps the person being carried in the carriage to leave the earthly life. The Giant's departure is assisted by the little boy whom the Giant helps to climb the tree. The boy reappears one more time in the Giant's garden in order to play in it for the last time and subsequently take the Giant to the other world (Wilde, 1994: 39):

"And the child smiled on the Giant, and said to him, "You let me play once in your garden, to – day you shall come with me to my garden, which is Paradise."

Thus the figure of the little boy acts like a "civil and gentlemanly" (Lakoff and Turner, 1987: 16) agent who escorts or possibly even effects the traveler to leave this world.

The second category of personifications of death include agents that do not accompany one to death, but cause one's death. The most common personification of an agent effecting death includes the figure of the Grim Reaper. Such an understanding of death originates, as pointed out by Bakhtin, from collective time when time "was measured by the events of *collective* (original emphasis) life" (Bakhtin, 1981: 206). Collective time was primarily *labour time*, i.e., time is measured by labour events including the phases of agricultural labour which in turn became *productive time*, or a time of "growth, blossoming, fruit - bearing, ripening, fruitful increase, issue" (Bakhtin, 1981: 207). According to such an understanding of time, death was perceived as a sowing and was followed by a period of increase and harvest. This cyclic understanding of time perceived old age, death and decay as "aspects subordinated to growth and increase, the necessary ingredients of generative growth" (Bakhtin, 1981: 207), thus limiting their destructive aspects (finalizing and destructive character) to an individual rather than collective plane.

It is important to note, Mark Turner asserts in his book *The Literary Mind*, that the constraint on the personification involves the element of our feeling about the event, which has to correspond to the appearance and character of the personification (Turner, 1996: 79). Thus in situations in which we feel grimly about the cause of death and death itself, we take a grim view of Death, which results in the blend of the Grim Reaper. Contrary to a grim vision of death, we can take a more affirmative view of death and conceive it as an agent who assists us to depart, which in turn results in blends where, for instance, figures of little boys (*The Selfish Giant*) act as agents aiding the dying person

on his journey with no return. Turner corrects his and Lakoff's initial analysis of the conventional conceptual metaphor PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, according to which the stages of a person's life correspond to the stages of plant life, i.e. youth corresponds to the stage of sprouting or burgeoning, full maturity to full flowering, old age to withering and death to the disintegration of the (relevant part, e.g. flower) of the plant (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 12). Plants are, according to such an understanding of the life cycle of plants, harvested at the end of their life cycle. Turner, however, subsequently corrected the initial stance by claiming that the blending is only partial in the case of the Grim Reaper: rather than the end of the life cycle of a plant, the harvesting occurs at the end of its cultivation cycle, which takes place in the middle of its life cycle. Death of a person can occur at any stage of the human life cycle: infancy, childhood, maturity or old age. Thus the conventional metaphoric correspondences between stages of plant and stages of human life are not taken into account in the blend of the Grim Reaper, the consequence of which is our understanding of the figure of the Grim Reaper as an agent who is able to reap at any stage of human life (Turner, 1996: 81).

The Grim Reaper takes his victims in a similar fashion to the angelic figure of the little boy who assists the Giant's departure: his very appearance heralds death. Thus in Wilde's story *The Young King* Death is a personified figure that arrives and causes the dying (Wilde, 1994: 88):

"And Death laughed, and took a cup, and dipped it inot a pool of water, and out of the cup rose Ague. She passed through the great multitude, and a third of them lay dead."

On another occasion in the same story Death establishes physical contacts with her victims with the help of its assistant, Ague (Wilde, 1994: 98):

"And Death laughed, and took up a black stone, and threw it into the forest, and out of a thicket of wild hemlock came Fever in a robe of flame. She passed through the multitude, and touched them, and each man that she touched died. The grass withered beneath her feet as she walked."

The more physical contact is established between Death and its assistants on one side, and their victims on the other, the more fatal the consequences, and more people die (Wilde, 1994: 89):

"And Death laughed again, and he whistled through his fingers, and a woman came flying through the air. Plague was written upon her forehead, and a crowd of lean vultures wheeled round her. She covered the valley with her wings, and no man was left alive."

Death is merciless and kills more and more people, and the number of people killed grows parallel to Death's revenge on Avarice, who repeatedly refuses to give *him* a grain of corn. The terms for death are usually masculine in kinship metaphors in the West, Turner asserts, since feminine terms "strongly connote (potential for) life (Turner, 1987: 66). However, Turner provides an example which conceives of death in a different manner, Wallace Stevens's *Death is the mother of beauty*. Stevens' s understanding of death as feminine, claims Turner, is the result of its different connotations. Death is in this kinship metaphor understood in terms of "the perception of death", which in turn leads to the conceptualization of death as a result of the progeneration of beauty through the inference of *lineage*. Death, therefore, progenerates the perception of beauty (Turner, 1987: 67).

The blend of the Grim Reaper, as pointed out by Turner, does not reside in any input spaces to the blend (Turner, 1996: 78) but rather obtains its structure from selected elements from input spaces. Thus in the input harvest story reapers work hard for long intervals, while the Grim Reaper acts only once

on a dying person; reapers are subject to persuasion/negotiation, while the Grim Reaper does not negotiate with anybody, it acts on its own will; reapers are mortal and interchangeable, while the Grim Reaper is immortal and irreplaceable (Turner, 1996: 79). Furthermore, the Grim Reaper does not reside in the input space with the individual event of human dying due to the fact that there are no reapers or plants in that space. Similarly, he does not appear in the input space of the causal tautology because it is too abstract, while he is also absent from the input story of prototypical killing performed by an individual killer, because reapers do not reside in that space (Turner, 1996: 78).

Death in *The Young King* does not resemble the figure of the Grim Reaper in appearance, namely it does not carry a scythe like a prototypical reaper, neither does it wear a robe and a cowl, the attire we metonymically associate with priests or monks, who we traditionally link with dying, funeral, burial and similar (Turner, 1996: 80). Despite its undefined appearance (we only know that he rides a horse) Death in Wilde's story *The Young King* is similar to the Grim Reaper in many aspects. It brings death just by appearing or touching those who it plans to kill. Furthermore, it is conceived as grim and beyond persuasion, since it kills its victims without negotiation. Its sole presence suffices to terminate the lives of those who are destined to die.

4.9.4.2. DEATH IS A MOVER AND MANIPULATOR

This metaphor perceives death as an agent who comes up to you and manipulates you in your "hour of death" (Turner, 1996: 47). Thus the figure of the little boy can as well be understood as a mover or manipulator, who seizes the the Giant's soul and takes it to his "garden". Apart from the little boy, time can as well be understood as a mover and a manipulator. According to Turner, time "catches up with you, wears you down, races against you, stops you, takes

your youth away, your beauty away, your friends away, and your family away” (Turner, 1996: 46). The Giant becomes “very old and feeble” (Wilde, 1994: 38) and, consequently, loses his last battle (his life) as a result of the natural changes that time has imposed on his body.

In Ruskin’s fairy tale death is conceived in terms of natural forces that manipulate the person who is going on his last voyage (Ruskin, 1947: 33):

“ ... the lightning glared in his eyes, and the earth gave way beneath him, and the waters closed over his cry. And the moaning of the river rose wildly into the night, as it gushed over

The Two Black Stones.”

4.10. *Summary*

Fairy tale was a popular genre during the Victorian period. The modern fanciful tale, which emerged as a subgenre of the fairy tale, introduced new narrative techniques, more detailed descriptions, while a deserved reward or punishment is often missing. The target audience of modern fanciful tales were children as well as adults.

The study incorporates the cognitions of Lubomír Doležel’s theory of “possible” worlds, which supports the notion that an infinite number of alternate fictional worlds exist parallel to the actual world. Fictional worlds (each fairy tale represents a fictional world by itself) are ruled by principles which are, in most cases, different from those that shape the actual world. The study also aims to show an interrelation of the concepts of space and time and for that purpose refers to Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of chronotope, which he defines as “intrinsic

connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” (Bakhtin, 1994: 84).

The studied fairy tales by Ruskin, MacDonald and Wilde address issues that concerned the Victorians and especially criticized attitudes that produced negative connotations amongst contemporary critics.

The fairy tale can be understood as a medium for social criticism. The attitudes that Wilde attacks most harshly in his fairy tales include dogmatism, hypocrisy, insensitivity to the needs of the poor, deprived or disabled/deformed and the pragmatism of the Utilitarian philosophy. Ruskin, on the other hand, criticizes greed and preoccupation with material things, while MacDonald addresses the problem of subversive forces in the society.

I have taken a cultural and historical approach to literary study and only briefly referred to biographical and reader response approaches. Metaphors that we resort to when conceptualizing space and time proved to be a good medium for a subtle criticism of the vices that marred the Victorian period. These are based on the PATH, UP and DOWN, CENTRE and ALTERITY and CONTAINER image schemas and include basic metaphors such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY; CONTROL IS UP; EMOTIONS ARE CONTAINERS; POWER IS UP; BIG IS UP, as well as novel metaphors TRAVEL/LIFE IS A MENTAL JOURNEY; CENTRAL CONTROL IS UP, ALTERNATE CONTROL IS DOWN; SMALL IS DOWN; BOUNDEDNESS IS A SIGN OF CLASS, MOVEMENT IS VITALITY; DEFORMITY IS CONTAINMENT and other metaphors. I also focused on metaphors that conceptualize time as a moving agent, The Time Moving Metaphor, or a goal to be reached, the Observer Moving metaphor. Related to these metaphors are the personifications of life and death, which are marked in conceptual metaphors LIFETIME IS A

YEAR (DEATH IS WINTER, LIFE IS SPRING); LIFE IS A JOURNEY; DEATH IS SLEEP; DEATH IS A MOVER AND MANIPULATOR.

The metaphors via which we conceptualize time and events related to the passage of time such as life and death are related to the Positivist notion of cyclic time and the cultural models of collective time, as proposed by Bakhtin.

On the other hand, spatial metaphors correspond to the cultural models of the self and the Great Chain of Being and fit with Yuri Lotman's notion of a plot gene, a narrative device which enables us to understand a sequence or a whole text in terms of an image by which we remember the narrative the best. Similarly, certain sequences and, in some cases, the whole texts, can be understood in terms of a megametaphor, as proposed by Paul Werth or as a summary image, as elaborated by Michael Kimmel.

5. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

The fairy tale has been rather unexplored in terms of understanding social and cultural issues that have characterized a historical period via conceptual metaphors. Metaphors that we utilize when talking about space and time can combine with contemporary cultural models, thus bringing together two complementary sciences: cognitive linguistics and cultural anthropology.

5.1. Conceptualization of Space via Spatial Metaphors and the Cultural Models of the Victorian Period

I have connected some conceptual metaphors which we use when conceptualizing space with two cultural models: the Great Chain of Being and the Victorian self - model. I have found that the structural organization of Victorian society, in particular the class system, strongly relied on the Great Chain of Being model. All the four components of the model: the Great Chain metaphor, the theory of the Nature of Things, The Maxim of Quantity and the primary metaphor GENERIC IS SPECIFIC, indicate a diversification amongst levels of being based on their attributes and behaviour. The hierarchical model of the basic Chain of Being acquires another dimension in the extended model of the Great Chain of Being, dominance. Thus both models serve as paragons of the theory according to which the higher position of a level within these hierarchies, the more dominant it is compared to other levels. The Great Chain of Being is complementary with conceptual metaphors which rely on spatial image schemas, i.e. CONTAINER, PATH, UP and DOWN and CENTRE and ALTERITY image schemas. Hybrid characters of talking animals or personified inanimate objects aid in derivation of metaphors and blends which relate to the class - divided Victorian society.

The Victorian self - model can specifically be connected to the CONTAINER image schema. The imperative of keeping boundaries during the Victorian period can be projected onto a metaphorical plane. In that fashion the body functioned as a container the contents of which (opinions, emotions, values) were not supposed to leak out of.

5.2. Conceptualization of Time and Prevalent Philosophies and Cultural Models of the Victorian Period

Time was, on the other hand, understood as linear and irreversible, but also cyclic. Two concepts related to the passage of time are life and death. I have based my study of conceptual metaphors that are utilized when conceptualizing time, in particular the concepts of life and death, on George Lakoff's and Mark Turner's principles of cognitive poetics. Thus the linear conception of time perceives life in terms of a journey with a beginning (the moment of birth, the middle part (the course of one's life) and the end (death). The cyclic understanding of time conceives life as a change of seasons (spring corresponds to life, while winter corresponds to death). The result is the conceptual metaphors LIFE IS A JOURNEY, SPRING IS LIFE, WINTER IS DEATH. Death is often personified and the most productive metaphors of death in the studied stories include DEATH IS DEPARTURE, DEATH IS A MOVER AND MANIPULATOR, DEATH IS SLEEP. It is important to note that a key role in conceptualizing death as departure is played by the blend of the Grim Reaper, who causes death just by appearing. The blend originates, as pointed out by Mikhail Bakhtin (1981: 207), from the times when the concept of time was measured by the events of collective life (labour time became productive time or a time when the phases of agricultural labour such as growth, blossoming, fruit - bearing, ripening, fruitful increase, and issue alternated). Unlike the Grim Reaper, which produces negative connotations since his appearance signifies an

imminent end, the figure of an assistant who aids the dying person (helps him move to another world) has positive connotations.

Such conceptualizations of life and death comply with the cultural model of collective time, as proposed by Bakhtin, and with the positivist philosophy as advocated by Auguste Comte, who understands human history in terms of the stages of human life (Newsome, 1998: 176). The conceptualization of death fits with Emile Durkheim's determinism since death is understood as an imminent event over which humans do not have control.

5.3. Studying Literary Works in Terms of a Major Metaphor/Image

The cognitive scientists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have been focused on understanding metaphors on the level of the sentence rather than on the level of the discourse or text (Kimmel, 2003: 383). My approach to studying literary works relies on several theories that emphasize the importance of a social and cultural context for metaphorical reading of entire texts.

Firstly, I have based my study on Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor. The classification of conceptual metaphors onto structural, orientational and ontological served as a basis for extending the study onto compatible theories, which understand sequences of texts or whole text in terms of one major metaphor.

The second theory that I have consulted was Paul Werth's theory of *sustained metaphors* and *megametaphors*. Sustained metaphors act as an "undercurrent" over an extended text and can be inferred from primary and conventional metaphors. Megametaphors have a cumulative effect, i.e. they are a result of a concentration of sub - themes which we grasp via primary and

conventional metaphors and are context bound. In that manner the primary metaphor PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS gives rise to the conventional metaphors LIFE IS A JOURNEY and NARRATIVE IS TRAVEL, which in turn result in the novel metaphor TRAVEL IS A MENTAL JOURNEY. While some of the studied fairy tales can be understood in terms of a megametaphor, such as *The King of the Golden River*, which can be understood in terms of the megametaphor TRAVEL IS A MENTAL JOURNEY or *The Birthday of the Infanta*, in terms of DEFORMITY IS CONTAINMENT, only certain sequences of other fairy tales can be understood in terms of a sustained metaphor or a megametaphor.

Image schemas are contained in all types of the named metaphors, i.e. primary, conventional, novel, megametaphors or sustained metaphors. The CONTAINER image schema is functional in fairy tales written by Wilde and Ruskin: it is the basis of the metaphors DEFORMITY IS CONTAINMENT (*The Birthday of the Infanta*), GARDEN IS A PLACE OF (LACK OF) LOVE (*The Nightingale and the Rose*), VALLEY IS A PLACE OF PROSPERITY/MISERY (*The King of the Golden River*). The UP and DOWN image schema is productive in metaphors which can be derived in fairy tales written by all the three authors: GOOD IS UP and VIRTUE IS UP in Ruskin's *The King of the Golden River*; CENTRAL CONTROL IS UP, ALTERNATE CONTROL IS DOWN in MacDonald's *The Princess and the Goblin* and BIG IS UP, POWER IS UP, VITALITY IS UP in Wilde's *The Birthday of The Infanta*.

The named metaphors correspond with the cultural model of *The Great Chain of Being*, which proved to be relatively stable during the whole Victorian period. However, the evaluative dimensions of the cultural model are, as pointed out by Kimmel (Kimmel in Stolac, Ivanetić and Pritchard, 2003: 392) subject to historical change. Thus the UP and DOWN image schema relates to the extended model of The Great Chain, which conceptualizes the members of the upper class

as more worthy than the members of the middle and working classes. While in MacDonald's story the Victorian society can be understood in terms of a political system with sharply defined boundaries between classes, in Wilde's story the emergence of a new class which defies the principles of a class-divided society can be recognized. This new social class, which corresponds to the blend of personified animals (birds and lizards) is not defined by any boundaries and is the only class in the Victorian hierarchy of social classes which is characterized by (albeit a small dose of) individualism.

Thirdly, I refer to Yuri Lotman's notion of the *plot gene* and a similar notion of *summary images*, proposed by Michael Kimmel. According to the semiotician Lotman, a literary work can be recognized by its *plot gene* or a mnemonic device around which less salient sequential structures accumulate (Lotman, 1990:111). These structures can in turn, due to their lower level of salience, lead to diverse connotations of the image, either positive or negative. In that way, as previously explained, the image of the garden in *The Selfish Giant* produces both positive (in springtime) and negative (during the winter) connotations, while in *The Nightingale and the Rose* it connotes an image of a cold, dispassionate place.

A theory which is closely related to Lotman's theory of plot genes is Michael Kimmel's theory of *summary images*. Kimmel understands summary images as "bracing structures into which the more complex propositional details are inserted" (Kimmel in Stolac, Ivanetić and Pritchard, 2003: 394). Summary images are, thus, simplified images that people retain after being exposed to a sequence of a text, a musical piece or a work of art.

Some studies indicate that a common feature of sustained metaphors/megametaphors, plot genes and summary images is their image

schematic structure (Kimmel in Stolac, Ivanetić and Pritchard, 2003: 394). Image schemas with their Gestalt structures are a basis of conceptual metaphors. In my study I have paid special attention to the image schemas that influence the formation of conceptual metaphors with which we conceptualize space and time. I have found that the most productive image schemas in the studied fairy tales include the CONTAINER, UP and DOWN, PATH and CENTER and ALTERITY image schemas.

5.4. Areas to Be Explored

The issue that has been only briefly referred to is the problem of political ideologies that influence the image schematic structure of conceptual metaphors which we understand cultural models with. I have illustrated how hegemonic social practices can, via metaphors that rely on the CONTAINER image schema, lead to marginalizing people with disabilities and deformities. These people were seen as a burden for the society because they could not satisfy the demands of a fast - developing industrial and economic power as Britain was in the 19th century (Lacom, 2005).

All three authors, Ruskin, MacDonald and Wilde, were interested in the social issues of the period they lived in. Sympathy for the poor can be felt throughout their stories, and the authors address the problem of an uneven division of wealth and unjust treatment of the poor in different ways. Ruskin wrote his *The King of the Golden River* in 1841, while he was still a supporter of the Evangelical Church, the principles of which required strict self discipline. This in turn resulted in his "obsessive sense of the sin in himself and in society" (Chapman, 1970: 214). Ruskin in particular attacked the constant pursuit of material gain, which was, for the Christian religion, the root of all evil (LeRoy in Wright, 1961: 273). He felt the paradox of, on the one hand, condemnation of

the love for money by the Church, and on the other the establishment of Utilitarian ideas which propagated a rejection of everything that cannot be used for material purposes. The society in which self - interest became a virtue led Ruskin abandon his former beliefs and turn into an atheist in the 1860s. He explained his sudden turn from criticism of art to criticism of society with the impossibility to "paint pictures in a burning house" (LeRoy in Wright, 1961: 268). Between 1860 and 1880 he was addressing solely the working class because he thought they were "the only body to which we can look for resistance to the deadly influence of moneyed power" (LeRoy in Wright, 1961: 276). Ruskin demanded a higher appraisal of these people's work and was in a way, argues I.A.Chesterton, "the second founder of Socialism" (Chesterton, 1966: 26). Furthermore, A.O.J. Cockshut emphasizes that Ruskin was "execrated as a socialist at a time when this was generally felt to be an ugly word" (Cockshut in Pollard, 1988: 24). However, Ruskin believed that society should have a hierarchical organization in which every man gives orders to those that are below him on the social scale (LeRoy in Wright, 1961: 277). For that reason it is questionable whether Ruskin can indeed, as claimed by I.A. Chesterton, be considered a founder of Socialism. In fact, as pointed out by Raymond Chapman (Chapman, 1970: 215), he even distanced himself from socialism in his work *Unto this Last* :

"Not countenancing one whit, the common socialist idea of division of property; division of property is its destruction; and with it the destruction of all hope, all industry and all justice."

Wilde, on the other hand, openly revealed his sympathies for the Socialist philosophy. Thus in his essay *The Soul Of Man under Socialism* Wilde advocates the idea of a society in which private property would be abolished. Private property destroys individualism, opines Wilde, and leads to a senseless

accumulation of wealth (Wilde, 1994: 1178). Thomas Mann, on the other hand, makes a parable between Oscar Wilde and Friedrich Nietzsche, claiming that both of them were as far from socialist ideas as one can be. They were both, claims Mann, the rebels of beauty, the advocates of Aestheticism (Mann in Ellman, 1969: 170). The main principle of aestheticism included the notion that "life can be justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon" and these two artists, points out Mann, indeed lived this principle. Thus, when talking about Nietzsche, Mann concludes that "an aesthetic phenomenon - applies exactly to himself, to his life, his thinking and his writing" (Mann in Ellman, 1969: 170). A similar principle, in Mann's opinion, can be applied to Wilde. Mann claims that, although having rebelled against the morality of the bourgeois age, Wilde and Nietzsche's rebellion seems to have directed public attention towards themselves and not the current issues (Mann in Ellman, 1969: 371).

It appears that Ruskin and Wilde had a lot in common, above all a love for beauty, honesty and true values in life. A future study can, therefore, address the issue of the connectedness between metaphorical conceptualization of space and time in Ruskin and Wilde's fairy tales and the authors' political beliefs. A writer - based (biographical) approach would, in that case, be a convenient ground for explaining the interrelation between these metaphors and the political and social beliefs held by the two authors.

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