The dissertation deals with the seventh and last great war of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires (1787–1791) and the military chaplain Basilius (Blaž) Bošnjak’s poem that thermalizes the same war. By comprehensively studying the context of time, place, people, relevant documents and Croatian literary works related to the wars of the second half of the 18th century, a much broader interdisciplinary platform was provided for a more concrete and revived analysis of the war. An interactive and correspondent connection between military-historical and literary-historical sciences has been apprehended. Chaplain Bošnjak as a direct participant in the Turkish war is a key figure in this analysis. In the manner of the folk poet, he wrote a kind of verse chronicle of war. Sung events from his perspective serve more to conjure up the ambience of time, space and people than to establish the credibility of the event, because its credibility is unquestionable. It's only questionable why he didn't mention the most critical events anywhere and they certainly didn't miss him. The emergence of an infectious disease that have killed three times more soldiers on the Habsburg side than in the battle or being captured was a taboo subject, or perhaps it should not have been written about. The poet sang critically about an army that had been passively camped at Zemun for a long time. However, not a word about the infectious disease that all the authors cite as one of the key reasons for the Habsburg failure, of which Emperor Joseph II himself died. He also mentioned only briefly the confusion that arose in Banat after the panic caused by friendly fire. Apparently, Bošnjak was thinking about what might be subject to censorship and what might not be. Emperor Joseph II entered the war with a lot of caution and calculations, relying on the assumption that the main burden of war would fall on Russian allies. He concentrated most of his forces on Belgrade but instead of occupying the city he dedicated himself to setting up his own camp nearby. He did not use the force because he calculated that firstly the Russians had to attract the bulk of the Turkish army with their military operations. The then-strategy of limited warfare, which was based on protracted sieges of fortifications and the provision of communication routes, was wrong. The Turks took the initiative and stormed into Banat, causing a panicked Habsburg reaction. The offensive strategy suddenly became defensive because the emperor with much of the bulk of the forces had to save Banat. In addition to the increasing number of sufferers and deaths from infectious diseases, the Ottoman counteroffensive has led to panic even in Budapest. However, pressed by successes on the left and right Habsburg wings, the Turks withdrew from Banat. With the consolidation of forces after the first campaign, the war situation improved, but the absence of an early conquest of Belgrade was the cause of the eventual Habsburg failure.