

Filozofija u temelju Teorije samoodređenja i motivacije. Važnost razumijevanja motivacije kao filozofsko-antropološkog koncepta za organizacijske znanosti

Jalšenjak, Borna

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Theory and Motivation.
Importance of Understanding Motivation as
Philosophical-anthropological Concept for
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Mentori:

Prof.dr.sc. Ivan Šestak
Prof. dr.sc. Randy Richards

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Summary

This thesis looks at three content theories of motivation and compares them with the ideas about human beings found in history of philosophy. Three theories discussed are Maslow's, Herzberg, and Self-Determination theory and they are compared to Aristotle's, Hume's and Kant's philosophy on human nature. The objective of this thesis is to research and verify the requirement of substantive philosophical understanding of human nature and action in modern organizational sciences. In addition, an outline of philosophical anthropological teachings of the authors in question is given. This matters because today management and all its sub disciplines have a large impact on the effective operations of any business enterprises. From an organizational perspective it also matters because without understanding what human beings are it is possible that despite extrinsic motivational policies being in place, there is no evidence of expected higher performance. Philosophical anthropology provides a framework for deeper conceptual understanding of the phenomena in question. The existence of such framework is evidenced by comparing themes discussed by theorists of motivation and philosophies of human nature. Same themes are present in both philosophy and motivation science. In addition, philosophical anthropology is important for management science because in the end management practice will be set in accordance to what one assumes about human nature. By not being familiar with the underlying principles of human nature it is possible that organizational policies are implemented for the wrong reasons. Even more, ignoring philosophical insights on human condition, and philosophy behind the theories can hurt people.

Key words: Aristotle, action, content theories of motivation, Frederic Herzberg, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, philosophical anthropology, Abraham Maslow, motivation, Self determination theory.

Prošireni sažetak

Disertacija promatra tri sadržajne teorije motivacije i uspoređuje ih s idejama o ljudskoj naravi kroz povijest filozofije. Tri promatrane teorije su teorija Abrahama Maslowa, Frederica Herzberga i Teorija samoodređenja. Propozicije o ljudskoj naravi iz tih teorija se uspoređuju sa propozicijama o ljudskoj naravi u Aristotelovoj, Humeovoj i Kantovoj filozofiji. Kroz tu usporedbu ocrтана je skica povijesti ideja o ljudskoj naravi. Ova tema je važna jer danas menadžment i sve njegove poddiscipline imaju snažan utjecaj na učinkovitost poslovanja i moguće je da, usprkos postavljenim ekstrinzičnim politikama motivacije, nema očekivanih boljih rezultata. Razlog leži u tome što ekstrinzični čimbenici motivacije ne utječu na „ljudskog“ zaposlenika nego samo na različite biološke čimbenike. Ako se ova razlika razumije tada slijede dvije pozitivne posljedice. Zaposlenicima je bolje jer se uzimaju kao cjelovita bića. Drugo, tvrtkama je bolje jer se postižu bolji rezultati. Zbog toga je cilj ove disertacije istražiti i verificirati zahtjev za detaljnim filozofskim razumijevanjem ljudske naravi i djelovanja u suvremenim organizacijskim znanostima. Uz to, dana je i skica filozofsko antropološkog nauka spomenutih autora.

Ovi ciljevi su postignuti verifikacijom slijedećih hipoteza:

- (H1) Pitanje ljudske naravi sadržano je u filozofiji, ali nije uvijek izričito postavljeno. Pitanje je postojano tijekom povijesti filozofije.
- (H2) Filozofsko-antropološka pitanja su samo djelomično istražena u raznim aspektima organizacijskih znanosti.
- (H3) Djelovanje je jedno o relevantnih oznaka ljudskih bića. Djelovanja, posebice ona intrinzično motivirana, temeljna su za ljudska bića. Teorije djelovanja i intrinzične motivacije su dijalektički povezane.
- (H4) Ako su (H1) – (H3) verificirane tada filozofska antropologija pruža okvir za potpunije razumijevanje suvremenih teorija motivacije.

Prva hipoteza je nužna kao polazišna točka za verifikaciju ostalih hipoteza iz filozofske perspektive. Pregled povijesti filozofije i pozorniji pogled na filozofiju Aristotela, Humea i Kanta pokazuje kako su u svakom razdoblju, od antičke grčke filozofije do suvremenih filozofskih pokreta, na ovaj ili onaj način razmatralo pitanje o ljudskim bićima. Uz to, povijesni pregled je pokazao povezanost između Aristotela, Humea i Kanta.

Druga hipoteza je važna zbog toga što se organizacijske znanosti snažno oslanjaju na pretpostavljeno razumijevanje koncepta ljudske naravi. Čitajući o motivaciji i sadržajnim teorijama motivacije vidljivo je prihvaćeno, no ne i objašnjeno, mišljenje da neke stvari

motiviraju svakog čovjeka – što implicira nešto što nalikuje na ljudsku narav. U protivnome, ne bi bilo moguće tvrditi da neke stvari motiviraju svakog čovjeka. Začetnici tri sadržajne teorije motivacije koje su obrađene u disertaciji su bili pod utjecajem filozofije. To je vidljivo makar oni i ne pokazivali dubinu koja se očekuje od filozofskog bavljenja problemom čovjeka. Čini se da ova povezanost prestaje s drugom generacijom istraživanja provedenih unutar konteksta već neke od teorija motivacije. U takvim istraživanjima filozofski utjecaj je potpuno izostavljen. Naposljetku, pregled udžbenika iz menadžmenta upućuje na to da menadžeri danas nisu obrazovani razumjeti zašto se koriste neke motivacijske politike niti na kojim potrebama i aspektima ljudi su te politike izgrađene. Takva situacija, barem u sadržajnim teorijama motivacije vodi u „pučko-filozofsko“ razumijevanje ljudske naravi.

Treća hipoteza je postavljena jer organizacijske znanosti samo koriste koncepte, ali ih ne objašnjavaju. Filozofska antropologija pomaže u osvjetljavanju značenja tih koncepata. Jedan od tih koncepata je ljudsko djelovanje. Nadalje, koncept intrinzično motiviranog djelovanja se čini posebno važan za ljude. Ljudi djeluju. Oni to mogu činiti zbog mnogih razloga, ali svi filozofi obrađeni u ovoj disertaciji upućuje na intrinzične temelje za djelovanje. Iz organizacijske perspektive je ovo važno jer razumijevanjem intrinzičnih čimbenika ljudskog djelovanja postaje jasno da ekstrinzični čimbenici ne skrbe o cijelom spektru ljudskih potreba i ne dovode do boljih rezultata zaposlenika.

Četvrta hipoteza je postavljena jer se čini kako se u organizacijskim znanostima razumijevanje smanjuje krećući se od motivacije, preko djelovanja do ljudske naravi gdje ga gotovo uopće i nema. Filozofska antropologija pruža okvir za dublje konceptualno razumijevanje prije spomenutih fenomena. Postojanje takvog okvira je potvrđeno dvjema stvarima. Prvo, verificiranjem prve tri hipoteze, i drugo, uspoređivanjem tema koje raspravljaju teorije motivacije i filozofije ljudske naravi. Teoretičari motivacije će imati potpunije razumijevanje tema koje ih zanimaju ako su upoznati s filozofijama ljudske naravi (Tablica 1).

Tablica 1: Sličnost tema I P između teorija motivacije i filozofija ljudske naravi koja dovodi do okvira za potpunije razumijevanje teorija motivacije¹

Teme	Teorije motivacije			Filozofije (ljudske naravi)			
	P (primjeri)	Teorija	×/✓	×/✓	Filozofija	P (primjeri)	
ljudska narav	P _{MN3} P _{MN5} P _{MN7} P _{MN16}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN54} P _{AN55} P _{AN62} P _{AN65}	
	P _{HeN21} P _{HeN22} P _{HeN24} P _{HeN26}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN70} P _{HN76}	
	P _{SN33} P _{SN38} P _{SN40}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN86} P _{KN87} P _{KN88} P _{KN89}	
materijalno vs. više	P _{MN1} P _{MN4} P _{MN19}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN53} P _{AN56}	
	P _{HeN21} P _{HeN22} P _{HeN23} P _{HeN27} P _{HeN31}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN72} P _{HN73}	
	P _{SN32}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN86} P _{KN89} P _{KN94}	
društvenost	P _{MN6} P _{MN13} P _{MN14} P _{HeN28}	M He	✓ ✓	✓ ✓	A H	P _{AN67} P _{AN69} P _{HN74} P _{HN75}	
	P _{SN35} P _{SN37} P _{SN44} P _{SN48}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN85} P _{KN91}	
	potrebitost	P _{MN9} P _{MN10} P _{MN12} P _{MN15}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN63} P _{AN64}
P _{HeN20} P _{HeN26} P _{HeN30} P _{SN33}		He S	✓ ✓	✓ ✓	H K	P _{HN71} P _{HN77} P _{KN92} P _{KN93}	
znatiželja		P _{MN18} P _{HeN20} P _{HeN26} P _{SN34} P _{SN45} P _{SN46}	M He S	✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	A H K	P _{AN59} P _{AN64} P _{HN79} P _{KN87} P _{KN90}
	motivacija	P _{MAc97} P _{HeAc100} P _{HeAc104} P _{SN42} P _{SAc107}	M He S	✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓	A H K	P _{AAc112} P _{HN71} P _{HAc114} P _{HAc115} P _{KAc117}

Sve četiri hipoteze su verificirane. Filozofska antropologija je važna za organizacijske znanosti jer će na kraju menadžerska praksa biti postavljena u skladu s onime što se misli o ljudskoj naravi. Neupoznatost s temeljnim principima ljudske naravi može dovesti do toga da se organizacijske politike implementiraju iz pogrešnih razloga. Jedan od takvih pogrešnih razloga je učinkovitost. Učinkovitost je jedan od mogućih i potrebnih posljedica organizacijskih politika, ali sam po sebi nije razlog za njih. Razlog je taj da teorije motivacije smatraju da se prema ljudima treba odnositi na određeni način zbog toga što su ljudi. Ovo se ne može razumjeti bez znanja i razumijevanja filozofije koje se nalazi u podlozi tih teorija. Bez tog razumijevanja moguće je da se nešto, što zapravo šteti ljudima, pokušava sprovesti samo zbog učinkovitosti. Tu filozofija može pomoći menadžmentu. Štoviše, zanemarivanje filozofskih uvida u čovjekovo stanje i filozofije u podlozi teorija može naštetiti ljudima.

¹ Skraćenice i simboli su sljedeći: M = Maslow, He = Herzberg, S = SDT, A = Aristotel, H = Hume, K = Kant, P = propozicija, ✓ = postoji, × = ne postoji.

Ključne riječi: Aristotel, djelovanje, filozofska antropologija, Frederic Herzberg, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Abraham Maslow, motivacija, sadržajne teorije motivacije, Teorija samodređenja.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	1
Note on referencing	4
Abbreviations	5
The objective, hypotheses, and a formal outline of the thesis.....	7
1. INTRODUCTION.....	12
1.1. Philosophy, anthropology, and organizational sciences	12
1.1.1. Place of philosophical anthropology in philosophy.....	12
1.1.2. Question of human being in philosophy.....	13
1.1.3. Study of motivation in organizational sciences	19
1.2. Authors and theories	20
1.2.1. Abraham Harold Maslow	20
1.2.2. Frederic Herzberg.....	29
1.2.3. Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan	36
1.2.4. Aristotle.....	51
1.2.5. David Hume	53
1.2.6. Immanuel Kant	58
Conclusions	63
2. HUMAN NATURE.....	65
2. 1. Propositions of selected content theorists on human nature	65
2.1.1. Propositions about human nature in Maslow's work	65
2.1.2. Propositions about human nature in Herzberg's work	75
2.1.3. Propositions about human nature in SDT	87
2.1.4. Partial understanding of human nature in theories of motivation.....	97
2.2. Propositions of selected philosophers on human nature	102
2.2.1. Propositions about human nature in Aristotle's work	102
2.2.2. Propositions about human nature in Hume's work.....	115
2.2.3. Propositions about human nature in Kant's work.....	127
Conclusions	139
3. HUMAN ACTION AND MOTIVATION FOR ACTION.....	141
3.1. Overlapping points of philosophy of action and theories of motivation	141
3.2. Propositions of selected content theorists on motivation.....	143
3.2.1. Propositions about motivation in Maslow's work.....	143
3.2.2. Propositions about motivation in Herzberg's work	147
3.2.3. Propositions about motivation in SDT	152
3.3. Propositions of selected philosophers on motivation.....	158
3.3.1. Propositions about motivation in Aristotle's work	158
3.3.2. Propositions about motivation in Hume's work	171

3.3.3. Propositions about motivation in Kant's work	179
Conclusions	190
4. PROPOSITIONS ON HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN ACTION.....	191
5. CONCLUSION.....	204
5.1. Further research	207
References	208

Executive Summary

This thesis looks at three content theories of motivation and compares them with the ideas about human beings found in history of philosophy. Three theories discussed are Maslow's, Herzberg's, and Self-Determination Theory. Propositions found in them are compared to propositions about human nature found in Aristotle's, Hume's and Kant's philosophy. By this comparison a sketch of history of ideas is outlined. This matters because today management and all its sub disciplines have a large impact on the effective operations of any business enterprises and, without understanding what human beings are, it is possible that despite extrinsic motivational policies being in place, there is no evidence of expected higher levels of performance. This is because extrinsic motivation factors do not touch humanity aspects of employees but only their biological factors. If this difference is understood it results in two positive consequences. First, for employees, they are better off because their full being is considered, and second, for companies, because they achieve higher levels of performance. Thus, the objective of this thesis is to research and verify the requirement of substantive philosophical understanding of human nature and action in modern organizational sciences. In addition, an outline of philosophical anthropological teachings of the authors in question is given.

These objectives are achieved through verification of the following four hypotheses:

- (H1) Issue on the nature of human beings is interior to philosophy, although not always explicatively stated. This issue persists throughout history of philosophy.
- (H2) Philosophical–anthropological questions are only partially examined in the various aspects of organizational sciences.
- (H3) Action is one of the most relevant features of human beings. Actions, especially ones intrinsically motivated are fundamental to being human. Theories of action and intrinsic motivation are dialectically linked.
- (H4) If (H1) – (H3) are verified, then philosophical anthropology provides the framework for a more complete understanding of contemporary theories of motivation.

The first hypothesis is necessary as a starting point for verification of other hypotheses from a philosophical point of view. Overview of the history of philosophy, and more detailed look at Aristotle's, Hume's and Kant's philosophy shows that every period from ancient Greek philosophy till contemporary philosophical movements has, in one way or another, discussed the issue of human beings. In addition, a historical overview showed a continuous relation, either through education or through acquaintance between Aristotle, Hume, and Kant.

The second hypothesis is important because organizational sciences rely heavily on presupposed understanding of the concept of human nature. When reading on motivation and content theories of motivation an accepted, yet not explained, position surfaces. That position is that some things motivate every human being which implies something resembling human nature . Otherwise it would not be possible to claim that some things motivate every human being. Founders of three content theories of motivation in focus have been influenced by philosophy even if they do not show the depth which is expected from philosophical study on human nature. This connection seems to end with the second generation research conducted within context of some specific theory of motivation. In that kind of research philosophical inputs are left aside altogether. Finally, review of the textbook literature on management indicates that managers today are not trained to comprehend why certain motivational policies are implemented, nor what kind of needs or aspects of human beings are those policies built on. Such a claim, at least in the content theories of motivation, leads to a “folk-philosophical” understanding of human nature.

The third hypothesis is set because organizational sciences only use the concepts and do not explain them. Philosophical anthropology helps to clarify the meaning of concepts. One of such concepts is human action. Furthermore, the concept of intrinsically motivated actions seems especially important for human beings. They might do that for variety of reasons, but all of the philosophers in this thesis point out to intrinsic basis for action. This is important from an organizational perspective because by understanding the intrinsic factors for human action it also becomes clear that extrinsic motivation factors do not cater to the entire specter of human needs and in the end do not result in a better productivity of employees.

The fourth hypothesis is suggested because it seems as if in organizational sciences the understanding decreases when moving from motivation, over action to human nature where it is almost non-existent. Philosophical anthropology provides a framework for deeper conceptual understanding of the phenomena in question. The existence of such framework is evidenced by two things. First, by verifying the first three hypotheses, and second, by comparing themes discussed by theorists of motivation and philosophies of human nature. Same themes are present in both philosophy and motivation science. Theorist of motivation will have more complete understanding of the themes they are interested in if they are acquainted with philosophies of human nature (Table 1).

Table 1: Similarities of themes and Ps between theories of motivation and philosophies of human nature resulting with a framework for more complete understanding of theories of motivations²

Themes	Theories of motivation			Philosophies (of human nature)		
	P (examples)	Theory	×/✓	×/✓	Philosophy	P (examples)
human nature	P _{MN3} P _{MN5} P _{MN7} P _{MN16}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN54} P _{AN55} P _{AN62} P _{AN65}
	P _{HeN21} P _{HeN22} P _{HeN24} P _{HeN26}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN70} P _{HN76}
	P _{SN33} P _{SN38} P _{SN40}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN86} P _{KN87} P _{KN88} P _{KN89}
material higher vs.	P _{MN1} P _{MN4} P _{MN19}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN53} P _{AN56}
	P _{HeN21} P _{HeN22} P _{HeN23} P _{HeN27} P _{HeN31}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN72} P _{HN73}
	P _{SN32}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN86} P _{KN89} P _{KN94}
sociality	P _{MN6} P _{MN13} P _{MN14}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN67} P _{AN69}
	P _{HeN28}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN74} P _{HN75}
	P _{SN35} P _{SN37} P _{SN44} P _{SN48}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN85} P _{KN91}
needfulness	P _{MN9} P _{MN10} P _{MN12} P _{MN15}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN63} P _{AN64}
	P _{HeN20} P _{HeN26} P _{HeN30}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN71} P _{HN77}
	P _{SN33}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN92} P _{KN93}
curiosity	P _{MN18}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN59} P _{AN64}
	P _{HeN20} P _{HeN26}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN79}
	P _{SN34} P _{SN45} P _{SN46}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN87} P _{KN90}
motivation	P _{MAc97}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AAc112}
	P _{HeAc100} P _{HeAc104}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN71} P _{HAc114} P _{HAc115}
	P _{SN42} P _{SAc107}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KAc117}

All of the four hypotheses have been verified. Philosophical anthropology is important for management science because in the end management practice will be set in accordance to what one assumes about human nature. By not being familiar with the underlying principles of human nature it is possible that organizational policies are implemented for wrong reasons. One of such wrong reasons is efficiency. Efficiency is one of the possible and needed consequences of organizational policies, but itself is not the reason for them. The reason is the fact that theories of motivation think that humans need to be treated in a certain way because they are human. This is not understood without learning and understanding the philosophy underlying theories of motivation. Without such understanding it is possible that some action, that actually brings harm to human beings, will be done for the sake of efficiency. This is where philosophy can help management. Even more, ignoring philosophical insights on human condition, and philosophy behind the theories can hurt people.

² Abbreviations and symbols are the following: M = Maslow, He = Herzberg, S = SDT, A = Aristotle, H = Hume, K = Kant, P = proposition, ✓ = there is, × = there is not.

Note on referencing

Aristotle

Aristotle's works are referenced by abbreviation of the title, book number, chapter and Bekker numbers, and line number.

David Hume

Treatise on Human Nature is referenced by abbreviation, and page number.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding is referenced by abbreviation, section and paragraph numbers, and a page number.

An Enquiry Concerning Principles of Morals is referenced by abbreviation, section and paragraph numbers, and a page number.

Immanuel Kant

Kant's works are referenced by abbreviation and standard pagination. "Ak" stands for *Akademie*, and refers to the Prussian Academy edition of Kant's works. The number after it refers to a particular book and the last number is the page number. For the list please see: <http://www.manchester.edu/kant/Helps/AcadEd.htm> (accessed 12/11/2012)

Abbreviations

Abbreviations regarding propositions

For clarity propositions (P) are numbered. Their designations are the following³:

A	=	Aristotle
H	=	David Hume
He	=	Frederic Herzberg
K	=	Immanuel Kant
M	=	Abraham Maslow
S	=	Self-Determination Theory

After the author, the context in which proposition was introduced is pointed out by

Ac	=	human action
N	=	human nature
PU	=	partial understanding

After the context, the number of the proposition in the whole text is noted.

For example: P_{MN2}

Stands for: Proposition (P) given by Maslow (M) on human nature (N) and that is the second proposition mentioned in the whole text.

Abbreviations regarding primary philosophical sources

Aristotle

EN	=	Nicomachean Ethics
De An	=	On the Soul
GA	=	On the Generation of Animals
HA	=	History of Animals
MA	=	Movement of Animals
Metaph	=	Metaphysics
PA	=	On the Parts of Animals
Pol	=	Politics
Rhet	=	Rhetoric

Hume

T	=	Treatise on Human Nature
EHU	=	Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
EPM	=	Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals

³ Only exception to this kind of designations is introductory propositions related to the first hypothesis. They are designated simply as: P_{1H1}, P_{2H1}, and P_{3H1}.

Kant

Anth	=	Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
CB	=	Conjectural Beginning of Human History
CF	=	Conflict of the Faculties
Ed	=	Education
Gr	=	Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
Idea	=	Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective
KrV	=	Critique of Pure Reason
KU	=	Critique of the Power of Judgement
LMH	=	Letter to Marcus Herz
LoE	=	Lectures of Ethics
LS	=	Letter to Stäudlin
OP	=	Opus Postumum
Rel	=	Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason

The objective, hypotheses, and a formal outline of the thesis

The objective of this thesis is to research and verify the requirement of substantive philosophical understanding of human nature and action in modern organizational sciences. The thesis begins with a question as to how deeply grounded three major theories in organizational sciences are in philosophical anthropology. The goal of the research is to uncover the foundational grounding of those theories and to compare them with three seminal philosophers of philosophical anthropology. The comparison will allow the reader to examine those modern understandings and to identify if and where they may be lacking. If lacking, then how does that create problems for organizational practices. In addition, the thesis aims to give an account of human nature from two sources. These objectives and goals are achieved through verification of the following four hypotheses:

- (H1) Issue on the nature of human beings is interior to philosophy, although not always explicatively stated. This issue persists throughout history of philosophy.
- (H2) Philosophical–anthropological questions are only partially examined in the various aspects of organizational sciences.
- (H3) Action is one of the most relevant features of human beings. Actions, especially ones intrinsically motivated are fundamental to being human. Theories of action and intrinsic motivation are dialectically linked.
- (H4) If (H1) – (H3) are verified, then philosophical anthropology provides the framework for a more complete understanding of contemporary theories of motivation.

The text of the thesis consists out of five major parts: *Introduction*, *Human nature*, *Human action and motivation for action*, *Propositions on human nature and human action*, and *Conclusion*. Each of major parts is comprised out of several subsections. The subsections are always organized following the same template. At the beginning of each major part the hypothesis which is being verified in that section is stated. Following the hypothesis a summary of each of the sub-parts is presented. Every part ends with a conclusion. In the *Propositions on human nature and human action* part propositions of all previous parts are repeated, and is explicated how they verify hypothesis related to that specific part, as well the whole thesis. Basically, every major part can be read independently of others and is written in a way that it covers its topic, and deals with the hypothesis given at its beginning.

In the *Introduction* the first hypothesis is researched. The *Introduction* is divided into two parts. In the first part general outline of philosophical anthropology as a philosophical discipline is given, as well as the place of research on motivation in the broader field of

organizational sciences. The second part explicates the relevant authors and theories as well as the reason for focusing on them. The authors and theories covered are Abraham Maslow, Frederic Herzberg, Edward L. Deci, and Richard M. Ryan on the organizational science side. From the philosophical perspective Aristotle, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant are researched.

In the *Human nature* part the second hypotheses is researched. Here the basic propositions of mentioned motivational theorists are explained and are compared with remarks on the same topic made by three selected philosophers. In the conclusion part when fundamental elements of both subparts are emphasized it can be seen that in the motivational studies understanding of human nature resembles some kind of *folk philosophical* understanding where an understanding of human nature is presupposed without any confirmation.

The third major part of the thesis, *Human action and motivation for action* mirrors the second part, with the difference that it deals with a question about human action and motivation and not human nature per se. The third hypothesis is researched. Actions, especially ones intrinsically motivated are fundamental to being human. Theories of action and intrinsic motivation are dialectically linked. Again, first the propositions of selected content theorists on motivation are given, and followed by propositions of selected philosophers on the same issue.

In the fourth part *Propositions on human nature and human action* the fourth hypothesis is researched. In order to verify this hypothesis, in the first subsection of the fourth major part the conclusions about human nature, and human action reached so far are reviewed.

The final major part of the thesis is the *Conclusion* where all of the hypotheses are repeated, as well as their overviews. At the very end of the thesis remarks on further research in the interdisciplinary field between organizational sciences and philosophical anthropology are given.

Explaining the hypotheses

When reading the texts in organizational sciences, and following the organizational practice itself, the notions of motivation, action, and human nature are often used. In just using the notions, without explaining their meaning may lead to certain issues and difficulties. One method of attaining clarification of those notions is philosophical analysis.

The first hypothesis is, when looking at the thesis as a whole, not relevant, but it is necessary as a starting point for verification of other hypotheses from a philosophical point of view. It is well-known that from Plato to contemporary philosophers reflection on human nature has always been a part of philosophical questioning.

The second hypothesis is researched by textual analysis of works by four mentioned motivational theorists. But generally speaking, organizational sciences rely heavily on presupposed understanding of the concept of human nature. Nice illustrations of such “use of unexplained concepts” are the titles themselves of different theorists (i.e., Herzberg’s book *Work and the Nature of Man* and Deci’s & Ryan’s Self-Determination Theory). In summary, when reading on motivation, and content motivational theories an accepted, yet not explained, position that some things motivate every human being – which implies something resembling human nature, surfaces. Otherwise it would not be possible to claim that some things motivate every human being. Such a claim, at least in the content theories of motivation, leads to a “folk-philosophical” understanding of human nature.

Philosophical anthropology helps to clarify the meaning of concepts, something which is lacking in organizational sciences, which only use the concepts and does not explain them. Concepts of interest for this thesis are human nature, action and motivation. Furthermore, the concept of intrinsically motivated actions seems especially important for human beings. Hence, the third hypothesis.

The fourth hypothesis is suggested because it seems as if in organizational sciences the understanding decreases when moving from motivation, over action to human nature where it is almost non-existent. This hypothesis suggests that the opposite trend is noticeable in the discipline of philosophical anthropology. The fourth hypothesis aims to connect these two opposing trends, and thus create a better conceptual understanding of the phenomena in question.

Another important reason for why philosophical anthropology is important for management science is the fact that one will direct its management practice in accordance to what one assumes about human nature. Because it would make no sense to make decisions and behave in a certain way if it would not be thought that reached decisions and behavior will not bring about the wanted result. So if a purpose of management is to manage, then it

should be done in a way that it is believed to be effective.⁴ Hence, the issue of human nature extends beyond philosophical reflection unto the actual action of contemporary management practice. This fact levels a special importance to this thesis.

Reasons for this kind of research

To date little interdisciplinary research has been conducted on the topic of human nature, human action and the motivation for that action from the view point of organizational sciences. These topics have been well researched within closed contexts of their respective sciences, but contemporary theories of motivation presuppose some kind of non-philosophical understanding of human nature and that gap brings out a question: Is substantive philosophical understanding of human nature needed to understand and refine contemporary theories of motivation, which are being discussed in modern organizational sciences? And will such understanding help in clarifying the issues arising in organizational sciences?

Generally speaking, in the last forty years research in the management and organizational sciences exploded. One of the reasons for this is the fact that management and all its sub disciplines have a large impact on the effective operations of any business enterprises. This recognition was first made by Frederic Taylor in the beginning of the 20th century who coined the term scientific management. Once management was thought of as a scientific enterprise, research branched out into multiple directions covering various issues. Theories of motivation garnered special attention because it was a critical element in understanding and improving organization effectiveness. Research on motivation eventually evolved into two lines of inquiry, process theorists (e.g. Taylor, Skinner, and Thorndike) and content theorists (e.g., Maslow, Herzberg, Deci, Ryan).

The process theories of motivation stress out the importance of rewards and not so much intrinsic (eudemonistic) factors which are emphasized by content theories. This thesis is more drawn to the content theorists because they seem to already have an intuitive

⁴ So if one assumes that people are by nature lazy, resistant to change, and quite indolent then that would require a management practice which supports strict procedures, surveillance of employees, strong control and decision making reserved for exclusively management positions. This approach is sometimes labeled as Theory X approach. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 295) An example of Theory X way of thinking would be Taylor's scientific management approach. On the other hand, what if one starts with a different assumption about human nature? In Theory Y the assumption is that people are intrinsically motivated to be effective and that there is an inherent satisfaction in knowing that the job was well done. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 295) In this case it is not longer a manager's job to control employee's behavior. What they are required to do now is to create conditions within which subordinates will motivate themselves. In this setting the manager is more of a source of feedback and not a controller of behavior. What is crucial about that kind of (participative) management is the support for autonomy. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, pp. 295-296; 298)

understanding that they are talking about something universal to human beings, such as needs, drivers or traits. They seem to directly speak to universal human nature.

Those topics also engaged the attention of philosophical anthropologists concerned with human nature. The content theorists point out that there are basically two general kinds of human motivation - intrinsic and extrinsic motivators for human action. Intrinsic motivation is that stimuli to act driven by the inherent satisfaction simply of the act itself, rather than some extrinsic separable consequences. Intrinsic motivation is explained primarily by internal universal needs of human beings such as competence, autonomy and relatedness.

At this point the thesis finds an intersection with the concerns of philosophical anthropology on human nature. Through history of philosophy almost all of the major authors, starting with ancient Greek philosophers (e.g. Plato, Aristotle), through period of Church fathers and Scholastic philosophy (e.g. Augustine, Aquinas), over modern period in philosophy (e.g. Descartes, Hume, Kant) to teachings of various contemporary philosophers, but also of evolutionary scientists (e.g. Wilson) and cognitive ethologist (e.g. Bekoff, Allen, Burghardt) researched what does it mean to be human.

Again, this thesis is forced to be focused, due to the vastness of possible choices, to three major philosophers. Those philosophers are Aristotle, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. Additional thinkers are mentioned where appropriate in order to illustrate some points of the presented arguments, or to illuminate a sketch of thought. Three mentioned philosophers were chosen because of several reasons. The first reason is that they are in some way important for the theories of motivation. This primarily applies to Aristotle whose influence is more than obvious in the SDT. On the other hand the remaining two philosophers were chosen because they have contributed to the development of philosophical inquiry on human beings in the sense of it becoming independent discipline. Namely, Hume has thought that every science should ultimately rest on the study of human nature, and Kant was responsible (among others) for bringing the discipline of philosophical anthropology to German universities. Also, their opinions are sometimes in contrast which is useful for waging the arguments they made. In addition, philosophers in question belong among top ten philosophers through the entire history of western philosophy. This is easily evidenced by looking at any introduction, history, or encyclopedia of western philosophy.

1. INTRODUCTION

Summary

In the *Introduction* the first hypothesis is researched:

(H1) Issue on human being is interior of philosophy, although not always explicatively stated. This issue persists throughout history of philosophy.

The first hypothesis is necessary as a starting point for verification of other hypotheses from a philosophical point of view. It is well-known that from Plato to contemporary philosophers reflection on human nature has always been a part of philosophical questioning.

The *Introduction* itself is comprised out of two parts. In the first part general outline of philosophical anthropology as a philosophical discipline is given, as well as the place of research on motivation in the broader field of organizational sciences. Besides this, the first hypothesis is verified. The second, larger, part of the *Introduction* deals with the authors and theories which are going to be researched, as well as reasons for focusing on them. The authors and theories which are researched are Abraham Maslow, Frederic Herzberg, Edward L. Deci, and Richard M. Ryan on the motivational side. From the philosophical perspective Aristotle, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant are examined. The part ends with the conclusion in which the fundamental elements of the subparts are emphasized.

1.1. Philosophy, anthropology, and organizational sciences

1.1.1. Place of philosophical anthropology in philosophy

Every science has its material and formal object. Material object in the case of philosophical anthropology is human being⁵ with all of its properties. Formal object of philosophical anthropology is the existence of human being. The emphasis is put on those properties of human beings which are most significant. In philosophical anthropology the essence of those properties and their causes are examined. Precisely this formal object of philosophical

⁵ It is important to point out that the expression human being is used throughout the text with a meaning of not just a biological category, but also encompassing the meaning of a person, i.e., moral agent with everything that belongs to it.

anthropology is what differentiates this philosophical discipline from other kinds of, today probably better known, anthropologies such as cultural, biological, etc. (Belić, 1995, p. 12)

Because of its emphasis on the essence of properties and their causes, historically speaking, philosophical anthropology is placed in the category of *metaphysica specialis* in the classical categorization of philosophical disciplines. One definition of philosophical anthropology, in the “classical” style, is “*Scientia quae investigat ultimas causas operationum et naturae hominis*”. (Butković, Psihologija, p. 50 according to Šestak, 2011, p. 158) Additionally, over time the discipline was named differently, e.g., on the soul, rational psychology, metaphysical anthropology, and even philosophy of man.

In this thesis the classical conception of philosophical study of human beings will not be followed precisely. The nature of human beings will be researched, but the findings will not so much be compared and scrutinized from the ontological or phenomenological point of view. Instead, remarks on human nature are compared in order to find gaps and/or overlapping points and create a sort of history of ideas sketch of the field of research.

1.1.2. Question of human being in philosophy

The first hypothesis is connected with philosophical anthropology. The goal of the first part of the thesis is to verify the first hypothesis. The first hypothesis is:

(H1) Issue on human being is interior of philosophy, although not always explicatively stated. This issue persists throughout history of philosophy

The hypothesis can be divided into three segments or propositions which are:

P1_{H1} Issue on human being is interior to philosophy.

P2_{H1} Although not always explicatively stated.

P3_{H1} The issue persists throughout history of philosophy.

Once the first hypothesis is broken down to these three propositions it is possible to deal with each proposition separately.

P1_{HI} Issue on human being is interior to philosophy

When looking at history of philosophy it can be seen that a great majority of authors did ask questions about the nature of human beings. When thinking about significant philosophers it can be said that, at least according to usual way of judging the importance, three philosophers – Aristotle, Hume, and Kant – are considered to be influential regarding questions about human nature. In order to give a short overview and at least to give an idea of the quantity, if not the quality, of the texts written by authors in question following places can be marked out.

Aristotle made numerous remarks about human beings. Some of them are in: PA, II, 10, 656a7-13; PA III, 10, 673a7-9; PA III, 1, 662b20-20; PA 656a7-13; PA IV, 10, 686a27-31; PA IV, 10, 687a6-15; PA IV, 10, 687a15-23; PA IV, 10, 687b2-5; Hist. An. I, 9, 492a5-6; Pol., I, 2, 1253a3-7; Pol., I, 2, 1253a7-18; Pol., I, 2, 1253a9-10; Pol., I, 2, 1253a27-29; Metaph., I, 1, 980a1-6; De An., II, 3, 414a29; De An., II, 3, 414a32-414b28; De An., II, 3, 414b16; E.N., I, 3, 1094b 13-27; E.N., I, 4, 1095a15-1095b10; E.N., I, 7, 1097b28-33; E.N., III, 1, 1111a22-4; E.N., IX, 9, 1170a13-20; E.N., X, 7, 1177a12-14; E.N., X, 7, 1177b15-26; E.N., X, 7, 1178a5-8; E.N., X, 7, 1177a18-23; E.N., X, 7, 1177a27-1178b1; E.N., X, 7, 1177a31-1178b1. Aristotle discusses different issues in these selected parts of his texts. For example he talks about the composition and physiognomy of human beings. In others, he talks about the soul and the purpose of human beings; while in others about the happiness of human beings. Still, in all of these places, Aristotle asks and gives answers and remarks related to the issue of human nature.

While Hume is not so open to give such specific remarks on human nature as Aristotle is, because according to him it is not possible to reach such knowledge, still in his philosophy human nature is at the center of all other human endeavors. Besides this, he will often give remarks about the behavior, motives, actions, and faculties of human beings. Some of the examples in his texts are: T., p. xv; T., p. xvi; T., p. xviii; T., p. xix; T., p. 13; T., p. 252; T., p. 253; T., pp. 260-261; T., pp. 261-62; T., pp. 280-281; T., p. 399; T., p. 401; T., p. 414; T., p. 415; T, p. 484.; T., p. 485; T., pp. 484-485; T., p. 533; T., pp. 483-484; T., p. 590; E., I,1, p. 5; E., I,2, p.6; E.,XI, 23, p.142; EPM IX, 1, 271-31. Again, as with Aristotle, the topics Hume talks about are different, but they are all related to the questions about human beings, or some of their faculties.

Finally, Kant also at various places in his texts remarks on human beings. Some of those places are: KrV A 546–7/B 574–5; KrV A 550/ B 578; KrV A 801–2/ B 829–30; Ak 8:

20-21; Ak 4: 415-416; Ak4: 447-8; Ak 5: 430; Ak 7: 321-322; Ak 7: 323; Ak 7:324-325; Ak 7: 329; Ak 8:112; Ak 9: 443; Ak 11:429; Ak 21:50.

In order to show that the question on human beings is interior to philosophical activity it is not enough to show that three, no matter how important, philosophers did ask that question. Fortunately it can also be shown that the entire history of western philosophy is colored with that kind of question as it will be shown shortly below. But there are differences in how those anthropological questions are raised and answered. Hence the second part of the first hypothesis is.

P2_{HI} Although not always explicatively stated.

Some of the philosophers explicitly asked what human beings are, others did not. Some will give explicit answers while others will refrain from answering. Still some of them will clearly say that human nature is unknown to us, and even that it is not possible to know it. In this thesis it is not possible to compare every philosopher, but the distinction is evident even when looking at the philosophers chosen for this thesis. Aristotle will clearly state what human beings are, what their nature, their faculties and so forth, is. Hume, on the other hand will clearly state at the beginning of his *Treatise* that human nature is the basis of all sciences, but unfortunately human nature escapes deeper understanding as do the principles present in human beings and connected to it. Kant will also be reluctant to give the definition of human beings due to the impassable boundaries to knowledge in which we are confined, but will offer some ideas what human beings are, what are their specialties and their destinies. From all of this follows the second proposition connected to the first hypothesis.

Generally saying the criteria used for determining if some philosophy explicatively stating the questions (or giving answers) about human beings is that if the authors clearly say something like: “what human beings are?”, or “human nature is...”, or “human beings are...”. If this is not the case, then an issue on human being is not explicatively stated in that particular school of thought or by that particular philosopher. Still this does not mean that their questions are not somehow connected to the issue of human nature. This is so because fundamentally, the answers given provide deeper understanding of both the matter in question as well as the entity that has come up with answers. That object of inquiry is always a human being.

P3_{HI} The issue persists throughout history of philosophy.

If one looks at the history of philosophy almost in every epoch some anthropological questions are raised. At the early stages in ancient Greek philosophy, anthropological questions can be found despite the general tendencies towards cosmological research. Examples are the philosophies of Thales, Anaximander, Democritus, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Socrates. Some of these ideas have later become incorporated and further developed in the metaphysical and other writings of Plato and of course Aristotle. Precisely the concept of hylemorphism, which is presumably Aristotelian, has played a significant role in the scholastic formulation about human being as an *anima forma corporis* and *unio substantialis*.

Period of Christian medieval philosophy was marked by Greek thought. Augustine, probably under the influence of Platonic dualism, understood human beings as comprised out of two separate entities which are bound together only in action. The previously mentioned concept of human beings as the union of the matter and form was further distinguished by Thomas Aquinas. It can be said in general, that human beings in medieval Christian philosophy have a clear metaphysical position in the objective and universal order which has its foundation in God.

In the period between middle ages and modern philosophy a new movement in arts and culture, whom Voltaire and encyclopedists named renaissance, occurred. With renaissance movement another term is often associated. That term is humanism and it was supposed to describe the rebirth of classical thought through education based on Greek and Latin classical works. Over time this movement spread through Europe and with the advancement of science the influence of scholastic medieval philosophy vanes. Namely, human being became the center of attention with the idea that human beings can fashion the rational world according to their will. (Šestak, 2003) One of the philosophers usually considered as a example of that period was Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. He held that human beings are given freedom by God for complete self-determination. It is up to human beings to decide how they will live. Such a view is today considered to be typical for renaissance anthropology, but is also similar to ideas later brought up by existentialism. (Hankis, 2003).

A new momentum appeared in modern philosophy when Descartes changed the focus of reflexion from human being as a whole to only its rational part (considered to be the true

human being). This is sometimes thought to be a consequence of the foundation for his philosophy, i.e., his *Je pense donc je suis*. Descartes words are:

”I will know shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will eliminate from my thoughts all images of bodily things, or rather, since this is hardly possible, I will regard all such images as vacuous, false and worthless. *I will converse with myself and scrutinize myself more deeply*; and in this way I will attempt to achieve, little by little, a more intimate knowledge of myself. *I am a thing that thinks*: That is, thing that doubts, affirms, denies, understands a few things, is ignorant of many things, is willing, is unwilling, and also which imagines and has sensory perceptions; for as I have noted before, even though the objects of my sensory experiences and imagination may have no existence outside me, nonetheless the modes of thinking which I refer to as cases of sensory perception and imagination, in so far as they are simply modes of thinking, do exist within me – of that I am certain.” (Mediations, III, p. 34)

“Next I examined attentively what I was. I saw that while I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world and no place for me to be, I could not for all that pretend that I did not exist. I saw on the contrary that from the mere fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed quite evidently and certainly that I existed; whereas if I had merely ceased thinking, even if everything else I had ever imagined had been true, I should have no reason to believe that I existed. From this I knew I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist. Accordingly this ‘I’ – that is, the soul by which I am what I am – is entirely distinct from the body, and indeed is easier to know than the body, and would not fail to be whatever it is, even if the body did not exist.” (Discourse, IV, pp. 32-33)

Moving from modern into contemporary philosophy the situation gets even more complicated. New philosophical approaches like Marxism, nihilism, existentialism, personalism started to emerge. What complicated the situation even more and fastened and strengthened the inclination to look only at the concrete individual human being, is the dawning of new scientific theories, starting with Darwin’s and later developed in all of the sciences today related to human beings. It is therefore hard to resist the idea that the entire history of philosophy is marked by anthropological questions, but the differences in how those anthropological questions are raised, and sometimes answered are visible.

In Aristotle, Hume and Kant, philosophers chosen for this thesis, it is also possible to find a connection among each other, either through their education, or through their work and correspondence. This of course does not mean that they necessarily agree with each other.

Besides connections among the three, they were also connected through other people who were somehow connected to the issues raised by philosophical anthropology.

Since Kant is the most modern of philosophers chosen for this thesis, it seems appropriate to start with him. Kant studied in the University of Königsberg under another German philosopher named Martin Knutzen. Under Knutzen he studied Newtonian physics. Martin Knutzen on the other hand also did his studies at the same University, but more importantly he was a student of Christian Wolff. Under Wolff, Knutzen was trained in rationalist school. Wolff also had a huge influence on the entire system of German universities who until then followed the scholastic-Aristotelian model for both textbooks and for the curriculum. (Hettche, 2006)

For this thesis it is important that Wolff was the one who placed philosophical anthropology, although under the name of psychology, in his categorization of philosophy in the category of theoretical philosophy. His psychology has two components rational and empirical and the goal of both of them is: “(...) a discussion the of soul's nature or true definition. In the empirical approach, the content of introspective experience allows for the construction of a nominal definition of the soul. A nominal definition is simply a thin description of something that awaits further elucidation.” (Hettche, 2006) There are obvious similarities between this and what is generally understood as the topics of philosophical anthropology.

In his career Wolff was in contact with many prominent philosophers of his time. One of them was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Actually the idea that Wolff was a disciple of Leibniz is not completely accepted and there appear to be reasons for both accepting and denying that statement. (Hettche, 2006) But, what is not in question is that they knew each other, and Wolff has had the opportunity to be influenced by Leibniz's ideas. Besides that, Leibniz also influenced Kant. Basically it is usually thought that Kant tried to find a middle way between Leibniz's rational philosophy and the empiricism of David Hume. (Wilson, 2012) Leibniz is put in the same group as other rationalists, most basically Descartes, whose importance for anthropological questions has already been demonstrated. What seems important to emphasize is that many of his philosophical problems and ideas have already been researched by earlier philosophers. Although Descartes seems reluctant to admit that someone has influenced his way of thinking. The issue was Descartes influenced by others or not is not important for this thesis. What is important is that he was educated in the Jesuit College of La Flèche. And Jesuit curriculum was based on the philosophy of Aristotle, and divided into the then standard topics of logic, morals, physics, and metaphysics, besides other

topics. Aristotle's philosophy was approached through textbooks and commentaries. (Hatfield, 2008) so Descartes admitting it or not was of course exposed to Aristotle.

Traditionally, Hume is considered as one of the most prominent representatives of empiricism. As it turns out he also lived in La Flèche where he did not study but has had contact with the Jesuits from the college. (Morris, 2009) This might also mean that he has had additional contact with Aristotelian philosophy. His philosophy was directed against rationalism advocated by many, but for here important, Descartes and Leibniz. Finally, Kant clearly says that he was awoken from dogmatic slumber by Hume.

It seems therefore that all of the three philosophers researched in this thesis are interconnected either directly, or by education, or the topics of interest. Some of them share the direct interest in philosophy of human nature, either by the way they were educated, the system they philosophized in, or at least by studying the classics such as Aristotle, even if they did not share his opinions. Aristotle was active in the period of ancient Greek philosophy named anthropological period, Hume was the opponent of rationalism, represented by Descartes and Leibniz, and has had contact with Aristotelian philosophy, and obviously he wrote a book on human nature. Kant was influenced by both Leibniz and Hume, and he also thought a course in anthropology for a number of years. Furthermore, the influence of those philosophers and by that the probability of persistence of anthropological questions is not necessary to explain in more details because it is a general opinion that they have influenced almost the entire subsequent western philosophy. Therefore, it seems that all the propositions regarding H1 are verified, and thus is H1 itself.

1.1.3. Study of motivation in organizational sciences

In the last forty years research in the management and organizational sciences exploded. One of the reasons for this is the fact that management and all its sub disciplines have a large impact on the effective operations of any business enterprises. To be a science management issues first required that data be gathered, measured, understood and interpreted. This recognition was first made by Frederic Taylor in the beginning of the 20th century who coined the term scientific management. Once management was understood as a scientific enterprise research branched out into multiple directions covering various issues.

Theories of motivation garnered special attention because it was a critical element in understanding and applying the theories in order to improve organization effectiveness. Research on motivation eventually evolved into two lines of inquiry, process theories (e.g.

Frederic Taylor, Burrhus Frederic Skinner, Edward Thorndike) and content theories (Abraham Maslow, Fredrick Herzberg, Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan) This thesis is more drawn to the content theorists because they seem to already have an intuitive understanding that they are talking about something universal to human beings, such as needs, drivers or traits. The content theorists point out that there are basically two general kinds of human motivation - intrinsic and extrinsic motivators for human action. Intrinsic motivation is that stimuli to act driven by the inherent satisfaction simply of the act itself, rather than some extrinsic separable consequences. Intrinsic motivation is explained primarily by internal universal needs of human beings.

1.2. Authors and theories

1.2.1. Abraham Harold Maslow

One of the most well-known, prominent psychologist and thinkers on motivation is Abraham Harold Maslow. He was born in 1908 in Brooklyn New York and died in 1970 in California. He conducted all his studies in the United States, first he studied law at the City College of New York, but he became interested in psychology and got his degree, and later a doctorate, from University of Wisconsin. After earning a doctorate he served as faculty member at Brooklyn College, Brandeis University, and finally he was a fellow of Laughlin Institute in California. He is considered to be a founder of the so called humanistic psychology, a sort of a third way between Freudian psychology and behaviorism. (Boeree, 1998; Cherry, 2013)

Although not ordinarily considered to be a philosopher of human nature, Maslow's contributions are of great value for understanding human nature. Maslow says about himself the following: "(...) a theoretical psychologist who has been trying to figure out what human nature is like in general." (Maslow, 1971, p. 217) Furthermore, Maslow's theory of motivation, specifically hierarchy of needs, is one of the most influential theories in motivational literature. As it is stated in the Introduction to Maslow's posthumously published book *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature* (1993, p. xv) Maslow invented many of today's well-know and often used terms such as: self-actualization, peak experience, the hierarchy of needs, being-needs, and many others. Those terms were coined by him in order to provide answers to the, mostly psychological, questions about human beings he was raising. Besides the novelty in terminology his approach to research also deserves attention, according to Henri Geiger, an editor of *the Farther Reaches of Human Nature*, Maslow arrived to a lot of

his findings by observing himself.⁶ Geiger continues by quoting Maslow: “We must remember, (...) that knowledge of one’s deep nature is also simultaneously knowledge of human nature in general.” (Maslow, 1993, p. xv)

In this chapter three things are going to be presented in order to better place Maslow, and his theory in context relevant for this thesis. First, a short sketch of interrelatedness between Maslow and the historical philosophical concerns on human nature will be outlined, second Maslow’s method of research is going to be presented, and finally, a short description and overview of Maslow’s theory is going to be given.

Concerning the interrelatedness and connections between Maslow’s work and philosophy the following quote, from one of Maslow’s letters, may serve to illuminate the matter:

“I’m still vulnerable to my idiotic memory. Once it frightened me – I had some characteristics of brain tumor, but finally I thought I’d accept... I live so much in my private world of Platonic essences, having all sorts of conversations with Plato & Socrates and trying to convince Spinoza and Bergson of things, & getting mad at Locke and Hobbes, that I only *appear* to others to be living in the world. I’ve had so much trouble ... because I seem to mimic being conscious & interpersonal, I even carry on conversations and look intellectual. But then there is absolute and complete amnesia – and then I’m in trouble with my family!” (Maslow, 1993, p. xxi)

Maslow read a lot of philosophy. He claims that, although it is not always clear or easy to understand the writings of philosophers, many of their ideas can be valuable for “Third force psychology”. While not new these ideas can still be looked as stressing, confirming, and rediscovering of what was already present in Third force psychology. (Maslow, 1968, p. 9)

In comparing philosophers and psychology he arrives at several conclusions. First it can be said that European philosophers and American psychologists are not so far apart. That may strengthen the notion that, in their research, both of philosophers and psychologist, were responding to something real outside themselves, and thus were reaching similar conclusions. (Maslow, 1968, p. 10). Maslow claims that existentialist philosophers have to provide underlying philosophy for psychologists. Maslow, also states that logical positivism has been a failure when clinical and personality psychologist are in question. (Maslow, 1968, p. 10) When talking about human nature, Maslow states that the notion of dichotomizing human nature (higher-master part and lower) is not justified. Human beings have a nature which is

⁶ This, as it will be mentioned later in the text is opposite to Kant's view that introspection is almost worthless in studying human beings.

simultaneously defined by both “higher” and „lower” characteristics. Existentialists do not separate the two. (Maslow, 1968, pp. 10-11) Finally, according to Maslow, American psychologists should ask a question what is a human being. So, American psychologists should put greater emphasis on what European writers call philosophical anthropology. In Maslow’s words:

“From the European writers, we can and should pick up their greater emphasis on what they call “philosophical anthropology,” that is, the attempt to define man, and the differences between man and any other species, between man and objects, and between man and robots. What are his unique and defining characteristics? What is so essential to man that without it he would no longer be defined as a man?” (Maslow, 1968, p. 12)

In addition to the presented conclusions⁷, further evidence of Maslow’s closeness to philosophical anthropology can be seen in his definition of the so called Being-Psychology. In his words, the Being psychology:

⁷ Maslow also gives other conclusions that were not mentioned in the main text. Those conclusions are: 1. democracy and economic prosperity do not solve any of the value problems. (Maslow, 1968, p. 10); 2. there should not be a lot of emphasis put on the existentialists’ focus on dread, despair, anguish because they should have picked up from psychologists that a loss of illusions and discovery of identity, although painful sometimes, can be strengthening. (Maslow, 1968, p. 16); 3. The question presents itself, what is an ideal, authentic human being? Maslow thinks that this question is no more than the question what are the goals of a therapy? (Maslow, 1968, p. 11); 4. Existentialists (for example Sartre) are putting too much importance on self-making of the self, but also some psychological groups are talking about discovering the self and uncovering therapy. Besides that there are also obviously forces in play against which human beings are helpless. In any way Maslow thinks that we can both discover and uncover ourselves, and also, to a certain degree, decide what we shall be. (Maslow, 1968, p. 13); 5. Psychologists have not taken on the issue of responsibility and will, nor the issue of strength and courage. (Maslow, 1968, p. 13); 6. The study of the uniqueness of the individual human being will have to be fitted into the concept of science. There is a strong “push” towards that direction from phenomenologist and existentialist, which Maslow believes cannot be ignored. (Maslow, 1968, p. 13); 7. European phenomenologist can reteach American psychologist the best way of understanding another human being. (Maslow, 1968, pp. 13-14); 8. Existentialists’ pointing out of the ultimate aloneness of an individual is useful for psychologist in various ways. When thinking about decisions, responsibility, and choice, but also about communication between “alenesses”. (Maslow, 1968, p. 14); 9. Maslow is of the opinion that existentialists’ emphasis on the “tragic sense of life”; sense of profundity of living vs. the shallow and superficial life as a defense against ultimate problems of life is important. Those notions have an implication for example in psychotherapy. According to him, there have been facts showing that tragedy can be therapeutic. (Maslow, 1968, p. 14); 10. Existentialists (and also others) are criticizing the emphasis on the abstraction and issuing a call back to the raw experience. For Maslow this is a justified critique of the whole scientific Western world of the 20th century (positivistic science and philosophy). (Maslow, 1968, p. 14); 11. Sciences are generally a realm of abstraction rather than experience, and an introduction of the previously mentioned raw experiences will change them. That is possibly, according to him, the most important change helped along by the phenomenologists and existentialists. Also, “It is not only the Cartesian split between subject and object that needs to be overcome.” (Maslow, 1968, p. 15); 12. The final point of interest for existentialists which can be useful for psychologists is the concept of future. More precisely, the importance of systemizing the dynamic role of the future in the presently existing personality. Maslow thinks that no psychology will be complete if it does not contain the concept that human beings have future dynamically active at the present (Maslow, 1968, p. 15)

“Deals with Definition of Core and with defining characteristics of the human being; his nature; his “intrinsic core”; his essence, his presently existing potentialities; his sine qua nons (instincts, constitution, biological nature, inherent, intrinsic human nature). This makes possible definition (quantitatively) of “full humanness” or “degree of humanness” or “degree of human diminuation.” Philosophical anthropology in European sense. (...)” (Maslow, 1971, p. 122)

Before proceeding to the general description of the theory it seems appropriate to say a few words about Maslow’s method of research. According to Maslow, the value-free and value-neutral scientific models, which are appropriate for sciences dealing with objects and things, are unsuitable for study of human beings. (Maslow, 1971, p. 164) He continues in the text touching on social sciences, their ends and values:

“Many people are beginning to discover that the physicalistic, mechanical model was a mistake and that it has led us ... where? To atom bombs. To a beautiful technology of killing, as in the concentration camps. To Eichmann. An Eichmann cannot be refuted with a positivistic philosophy or science. (...) I point out that professional science and professional philosophy are dedicated to the proposition of forgetting about the values, excluding them. This therefore must lead to Eichmann’s, to atom bombs, and to who knows what!” (Maslow, 1971, p. 167-167)

Rather, Maslow suggests a method which is totally different than the one described. A different method should be used in the study of human beings.

“I am convinced that the value-free, value-neutral, value-avoiding model of science that was inherited from physics, chemistry and astronomy, where it was necessary and desirable to keep the data clean and also to keep the church out of scientific affairs, is quite unsuitable for the scientific study of life. Even more dramatically is this value-free philosophy of science unsuitable for human questions, where personal values, purposes and goals, intentions and plans are absolutely crucial for the understanding of any person, and even for the classical goals of science, prediction, and control.” (Maslow, 1971, p. 5)

Once the approach to the study of human beings has been corrected, then suited objects for study, i.e., suitable human beings have to be chosen for study. According to Maslow, when studying human beings or more precisely when studying how far human beings can go, it is

appropriate to choose the best examples.⁸ By choosing the best examples it is possible to observe and look at the most developed potentialities of human beings. (Maslow, 1971, p. 7) In choosing the best examples for research Maslow is quite close to Aristotle's view that what superior human being thinks is good, that is really good. Maslow (1971, p. 9) himself points to this similarity by quoting Aristotle. The idea is that what healthy human beings, in Maslow's terminology, are like is what human beings in general will eventually come to be like.

Maslow (1971, pp.40-41) actually describes the way he started doing research in self-actualization, and it is in alignment with his understanding how science about human beings works, or should work. Everything started with two people who Maslow admired, he made notes about them, and when looking at the notes he realized that there is a pattern to their personalities.⁹ He also points out that self-actualizing human beings know more easily right from wrong when compared to average people. Furthermore, he also claims that this is the basis for his theory of metamotivation. The idea is that self-actualizing human beings are better perceivers of facts and values. Maslow considered using their values as possibly ultimate values for the entire human species. (Maslow, 1971, p. 9)

Another indication of a wide, almost holistic, approach to study of human beings are so called Big Problems. (Maslow, 1971, pp. 18-22) The first such problem is how to make the Good Person. In order to solve that problem, such a human being has to be defined first, or better said, its traits have to be named. According to Maslow such a human being can also be called: self-evolving person; the responsible-for-himself-and-his-own-evolution person; the fully illuminated or awakened or perspicuous man; the fully human person, etc. Second Big Problem is how to make the Good Society. When looking at Good Person and Good Society there can never be one without the other because they develop simultaneously.

After the presented connections to philosophical thinking and his method of research, a general description of Maslow's theory is needed. First, Maslow calls his psychology a "Third Psychology", or "Humanistic" psychology. He considers it as an alternative to behaviorist and to orthodox Freudian psychology. (Maslow, 1968, p. iii) Even more, Maslow

⁸ As a side note, the interesting thing that Maslow points out in connection to his opinion is that usually throughout history great examples of human beings have not been considered human, but supernaturally endowed. (Maslow, 1971, p.7).

⁹ After that additional evidence supporting Maslow's claims appeared. Maslow himself (1971, p. 41) mentions these: Rogers, C.R., (1961). *On becoming a person*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin; Bugental, J.F., (1967). *The search for Authenticity*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston; Mogar, R.E., (1967). "Psychedelic (LSD) research: a critical review of methods and results". In Bugental, J.F. (ed), *Challenges of humanistic psychology*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

considers Third Psychology¹⁰ to be a part of a worldview of a new philosophy of life. “This third Psychology is now one facet of a general *Weltanschauung*, a new philosophy of life, a new conception of man, the beginning of a new century of work (that is, of course, if we can meanwhile manage to hold off holocaust).” (Maslow, 1968, p. iii) According to Maslow (1943), his theory is in the functionalist tradition of William James and John Dewey as well as other thinkers such as Max Wertheimer, Kurt Goldstein, Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler, and in the tradition of Gestalt psychology. This fusion, as Maslow calls it, can be called “general-dynamic” theory.

As presented by Maslow (1968 pp. 3-4) this “new” psychology of health rests on a few basic assumptions. If those assumptions are true, then it will bring about a scientific ethics, natural value system, and a way of determining good from bad and right from wrong. In brief, the basic assumptions of his theory are that human beings have a biologically based inner nature that is somewhat unchangeable. It is possible to discover it. Negative aspects of human nature do exist but they seem more to be violent reactions against frustration of the intrinsic needs which are neutral, pre-moral or positively good. On the other hand, the inner nature can be easily overcome by habits and cultural pressures; however, even if it gets suppressed it will very rarely disappear completely. Finally if inner nature is suppressed then human being will get sick.

Central to Maslow’s theory is the concept of needs. According to him there are “at least five sets of goals, which we may call basic needs”. (Maslow, 1943) And these needs are organized in a hierarchical manner. The basic need can be defined in terms of which questions it gives answers to. Maslow’s question is: What makes people neurotic? (Maslow, 1968, p. 21) The lowest, or most prominent needs are physiological, they are followed by safety needs, love needs, esteem needs, and finally self-actualization. According to Maslow (1943), most people have these needs, irrelevant of cultural and social differences. People are not necessarily conscious or unconscious of these needs, although in an average person they are often more unconscious.

The general idea is that once a “lower” order kind of need is satisfied, than another emerges. Rarely is a need completely satisfied. Basically the percentages of satisfaction will drop as one goes higher on the hierarchy of needs. So for an example, safety needs will be more completely satisfied, while for example esteem needs will have a lower percentage of

¹⁰ Interestingly, Maslow’s ideas do not stop on Third psychology level, he is also thinking about something he calls “Fourth psychology”. That psychology will be transpersonal, transhuman, and will be centered in the cosmos and not in human needs and interests. (Maslow, 1968, p. iv)

satisfaction. What Maslow (1943) suggests is that: “In actual fact, most members of our society who are normal are partially satisfied in all their basic needs and partially unsatisfied in all their basic needs at the same time.” Additionally, once a need is gratified it no longer functions as a motivator. The idea is that: “What this means is that, *e. g.*, a basically satisfied person no longer has the needs for esteem, love, safety, etc. The only sense in which he might be said to have them is in the almost metaphysical sense that a sated man has hunger, or a filled bottle has emptiness. (...)” (Maslow, 1943) Another interesting quote is: “The perfectly healthy, normal, fortunate man has no sex needs or hunger needs, or needs for safety, or for love, or for prestige, or self-esteem, except in stray moments of quickly passing threat.” (Maslow, 1943)

As it was already said there are different groups of needs in human beings. The lowest group is physiological needs. When one looks at all the accomplishments in *bellas artes* it is probably justified to think that they would not be possible if certain more basic requirements were not met. For example, if one is starving then one would not be so keen on philosophizing about life, or painting landscapes in sunset. It is at this point that Maslow’s theory of motivation begins. According to him, physiological needs are “the most pre-potent of all needs”. (Maslow, 1943) Maslow is basically saying that if human beings are starving, or are suffering from some other basic need deprivation than their behavior is going to be motivated by the need for food or some other kind of basic need fulfillment. In Maslow’s words: “What this means specifically is, that in the human being who is missing everything in life in an extreme fashion, it is most likely that the major motivation would be the physiological needs rather than any others.” (Maslow, 1943) Fortunately, it is not very common that these “emergency conditions” are present in a normal, functioning society. If the case is that the basic needs are usually gratified, then other needs are going to emerge. In other words, once the needs are gratified, there is room for higher, more “social” needs to appear. (Maslow, 1943)

Safety needs are the first group of needs that emerge once the basic physiological needs are satisfied. (Maslow, 1943) Safety needs include things like physical safety, financial safety, health safety, etc. Maslow is suggesting that similar activities take place with the safety needs as was with the physiological needs. It is possible for example that a human being which is constantly experiencing threats to its safety may be said to live only for safety alone. According to Maslow, the safety needs can be clearly observed in young children who seem to be better off in a “predictable, orderly world”. (Maslow, 1943) Basically the need for safety is an active and dominant mobilizer only in emergencies. Maslow (1943) gives the

following examples of emergencies: war, disease, natural catastrophes, crime waves, social disorganization, neurosis, brain injury, chronically bad situation. Although it seems true that in the modern world safety needs are more or less gratified, in the business context, the need for safety and predictability turns out to be a critical element. It is not unusual for employees to feel insecure in their job, position, task, and team members. Such uncertainty may reflect negatively on work motivation, while on the other hand, job security is positively correlated with both organizational commitment and job performance. (e.g., Yousef, 1998; Battu, McMaster, White, 2002; Kang, Gold, Kim, 2012)

The safety needs play another important role, that role can be described like this. Human beings prefer familiar rather than unfamiliar things, and that, according to Maslow (1943), leads to creating philosophies, religions, science and similar things which can organize the universe in a coherent and meaningful way. In his words:

“Other broader aspects of the attempt to seek safety and stability in the world are seen in the very common preference for familiar rather than unfamiliar things, or for the known rather than the unknown. The tendency to have some religion or world-philosophy that organizes the universe and the men in it into some sort of satisfactorily coherent, meaningful whole is also in part motivated by safety-seeking. Here too we may list science and philosophy in general as partially motivated by the safety needs (...).” (Maslow, 1943)

After safety needs are gratified higher group of needs, the so called love needs, will appear. (Maslow, 1943) Love needs are needs for love, affection and belongingness. Basically, human beings need to be loved by other human beings; they need to feel as belonging and as accepted to both small and large social groups. Concretely, these needs are pointed at things like family, intimacy with other human beings, and friendship. Similar rules apply to love needs as to the previous two kinds of needs. Although one thing might be interesting to point out, and that is that love, as in love needs, is not the same or a synonym to sex which can be a purely physiological need. (Maslow, 1943)

After the three already mentioned groups of needs are gratified the so called esteem needs emerge. It is possible to divide esteem needs in two broad categories. In the first category are the desires of human beings for strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom. The second set is comprised of desire for reputation (respect from other people), recognition, attention, importance or appreciation. It might be appropriate to describe the first category as the needs

which gratification will result in the extrinsic impact in the world, while the second category is connected to the interior impact in the individual. If the mentioned needs are gratified this will result in the feeling of self-confidence, worth, strength, capability and adequacy. (Maslow, 1943)

Finally, even after all of the mentioned needs have been satisfied apparently human beings can still be restless. The possible reason of restlessness is that human beings are not doing what they are supposed to be doing, or what they think they ought to be doing. A human being must do what he is meant to do. This is what Maslow labels as self-actualization. (Maslow, 1943) The term self-actualization was coined by Kurt Goldstein and in the way that Maslow is using it has some deep philosophical notions. The term self actualization is being used in the sense that: "It refers to the desire for self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for him to become actualized in what he is potentially." (Maslow, 1943) Of course, if potency is mentioned then something inherent is suggested, which in the end is consistent with Maslow's assumption about his psychology. Anyway, in the end it can be said that generally speaking, any conscious desire is more or less important depending on how close it is to the basic needs. (Maslow, 1943)

Another content theory is often compared to Maslow's. That theory is the work of Frederic Herzberg¹¹, also a psychologist, who through his activities in academia, but also through consulting is considered as one of the most influential writers in management science.

¹¹ Herzberg states that he was not influenced by Maslow's work because he was not familiar with it, except for some research on animals. (Herzberg, 1993, p. 11) Although his research supports Maslow's theory of existence of human self-actualization needs, which he calls motivator needs, the difference is that in Maslow's theory self-actualization needs are dependent on satisfaction of lower order needs and in Herzberg's work Motivator and Hygiene needs appear as to operate independently. (Herzberg, 1993, p. 11)

1.2.2. Frederic Herzberg

Frederic Herzberg was born in 1923 in Lynn, Massachusetts and died in 2000 in Salt Lake City, Utah. He got his bachelor degree in psychology from the City College of New York, and later his master's degree and PhD from the University of Pittsburg. During his career he was a faculty member in management at several institutions such as Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio, and the University of Utah. Besides teaching he is distinguished for working closely with management professionals through consulting work, research, and industrial psychology. How important the connection between academia and practice for him is can be seen from the statements he makes at the beginning of his book *Work and the Nature of Man*. He describes the relation between practitioner and academics as such that usually practitioners and academics do not work very well together. Practitioners are accused of not paying attention to “breakthroughs” in science, while academics are being blamed for the “fact” that their “breakthroughs” have no relevant application to practice. One of the exceptions to such tenuous relation is, at least according to Herzberg, the relation between academic research and practice in business practice. (Herzberg, 1966, p. viii)

Herzberg is sometimes called the "Father of Job Enrichment" and the originator of the "Motivation-Hygiene Theory". His relevance for business education and the management is confirmed by the fact that his article “One More Time, How Do You Motivate Employees?” is one of the most accepted articles in the *Harvard Business Review*.

In this chapter, first a short sketch of connection between Herzberg and philosophy will be outlined, second Herzberg’s method by which he arrived to his theory will be presented, and finally, a short description and overview of Herzberg’s theory will be given.

Even at first glance the connection between Herzberg’s theory and philosophy, and the possible relevance for both disciplines, can be seen. For example, his own explanation of the primary purpose he had for writing *Work and the Nature of Man*: “My task is to offer a definition of man’s total needs, one that is consistent within the world of work.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. x) His second purpose is the fact that a lot of research has been done about the theory presented in his earlier book, so he wanted to give a follow-up. In addition, Herzberg alludes to the protest of human beings against the way that the society treats them, but also against the fact that prevailing institutions over time presented human nature however it suited them. (Herzberg, 1966, p. viii) Herzberg concludes that human being seems to:

“(…) demand a more realistic appraisal of his nature, than the myths about him that have so conveniently and over so long a period have been provided. If the past centuries have seen man shift from a mystical to a rational point of view of his physical universe, he now demands an equally rational view of his total needs.” (Herzberg, 1966, pp. viii-ix)

He admits that there have been some tentative answers to the question of human nature, but, as it can be seen from the previous quote, *Weltanschauung* changes over time, and those answers have not always been accepted, and sometimes they are simply overlooked. Possible reasons for such a situation today might be that “(…) philosopher’s preoccupation with the verities of existence smacks too much of medieval metaphysics for the Space-Age man.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. ix)

Nevertheless, he himself references philosophical and religious literature. When considering the influential authors for his work, Herzberg mentions Hannah Arendt’s book *The Human Condition*, because in it Arendt differentiates between the terms work and labor. Herzberg holds the opinion that this distinction helps to clarify the “distinction between motivation (growth-creativity) and hygiene (pain-avoidance)”. (Herzberg, 1993, p. 11) Besides this, his whole theory presupposes two sets of needs: Abraham’s needs and Adam’s needs. The so called Adam’s needs are oriented on avoidance of pain, while the so called Abraham’s needs are focused on human potential, i.e., that human beings are able to achieve much. Furthermore, in his description of various understandings of human nature in different periods throughout history it can be seen that Herzberg was not only familiar with the Bible, but also with philosophical deliberations and history of western civilization in general. In addition, Herzberg thinks that: “Innovation in the field of psychology generally consists of changing the name of the treatment. Every treatment known to modern psychology was invented by primitive cultures – from dream analysis, to shock therapy, to behavior modification.” (Herzberg, 1993, p. 11) and that: “The historical roots of psychology, the science of behavior, come from two allied disciplines – philosophy and physiology.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 44) Scientific psychology began to develop by rejecting the philosophical approach to answering questions about the human behavior, or more precisely by rejecting the philosophical inability to answer questions about human behavior. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 44-45). In this process an important moment was that human beings started to be considered to be equal and that they do not transcend the sum of their parts. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 45)

Herzberg suggested to judge degrees of mental health and mental illness on two separate scales: the motivator continuum and the hygiene continuum. The motivator

continuum is used to measure good events – feelings, and the hygiene continuum which is used for measuring bad events – feelings. (Herzberg, 1993, p. 12) Such an approach led to his so called Two factor theory, where on one hand are things he calls motivators, which contribute to having good feelings, and on the other hand there are so called hygiene factors, which are major dissatisfiers.

Concerning the method by which Herzberg created his theory, it differs from Maslow's. Where Maslow was influenced by two notable figures in his experience, Herzberg developed his method in a study of 200 employees, mostly engineers and accountants. The theory was later tested and confirmed on numerous occasions and with different populations geographically, socio-economically, according to the position and type of the company, etc (see Herzberg, 1966, pp. 92-129) Employees were asked to recall the times when they were feeling really good about their jobs. After the analysis of their answers Herzberg reports five factors (there were others, but only those factors for which it was determined that they differentiate statistically between positive and negative job attitudes). (Herzberg, 1966, p. 77) The factors that were presented in the end stand out as strong determiners of job satisfaction. Motivating factors are: achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility, and growth. The hygiene factors are: company policy and administration, supervision, salary, interpersonal relations, and working conditions.¹²

In Herzberg's theory, industry plays an important role. Industry, says Herzberg (1966, p. 11), has assumed the leadership role in the world¹³. It is important to emphasize that when Herzberg is commenting on the business institution leading role in the society it is not meant to be looked at either good or bad for mankind. It is only a way he sees the situation around him. Some of the possible reasons for that might be that industry, as a concept, is the outcome of, in his time, dominant rational and scientific worldview. (Herzberg, 1966, p. ix) If this is so,

¹² For more detailed overview of motivators and hygiene factors see Part 3 of the thesis.

¹³ Herzberg claims that business is a dominant institution of modern times and gives a few examples of different areas of life where he thinks this is the case. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 2-11) The examples of spheres of life and society which he mentions are the military, the academia, the religion related activities, performing arts and leisure. One of the possible answers why this is so is that business enterprises and their mechanics have proven their superiority and that is why business methodologies are being adopted in different areas of life. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 5) Education is a nice example of such a human enterprise. Over course of history, education was often considered to be a responsibility either of the state, or the religion. Now it is common that companies pay, encourage, and in a variety of ways stimulate education of their employees. It is even expected of companies to have employee professional development plans implemented. Also, it is often that companies work closely with Universities on different programs, internships and various models of cooperation. To realize this it is enough to remember numerous executive education programs, and MBAs which are offered by different business schools. On the other hand, from the universities point of view changes also occurred. The head of a university (or a school) has become more involved in a business of retailing education than in educating students. The business responsibility does not stop at the management level of the school but is being leaked to faculty members, for good or bad, as well.

then the psychologists serve industry in creating the image of rationality which is connected to it and give a scientific façade to management. In order to do that, behavior scientists together with industry try to give answers about psychological and physical needs of human beings. (Herzberg, 1966, p. ix) Unfortunately, managers' primary concern is that they are: "(...) dealing with the *Geist* of human behavior in a manner consistent with industry's image of science and reason.", and not if this picture of humans is valid or not. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. ix-x) Actually, incomplete answers about human nature are beneficial to the industry, and they are even, says Herzberg (1966, p. x), one of the most needed tools in the building of modern industry. All of this results in a specific position for industry where industry is: "one of the despoilers of man's efforts to achieve happiness – in spite of the management's most sincere attempts to do just the opposite." (Herzberg, 1966, p. x)

For this thesis most of the material is taken from Herzberg's book *Work and the Nature of Man* (1966), which is the third book of a trilogy about job attitudes. The first book was *Job Attitudes: Review of Research and Opinion* (1957), the second book *The Motivation to Work* (1959) in which a hypothesis how people feel about their jobs is presented. Herzberg challenged the assumption that feelings of happiness and unhappiness are the highs and lows on the same feeling continuum, and that they are caused by presence or absence of the same factors. (Herzberg, 1993, p. 10) The research conducted in *The Motivation to Work* showed that what made people happy in their workplace was what they were doing, and what unsatisfied them was the situation and the environment in which they were doing it. (Herzberg, 1993, pp. 10-11) The third book, *Work and the Nature of Man*, is thought to expand the hypothesis from the previous book and to expand it to a general theory of work and the nature of man. (Herzberg, 1966, p. vii)

The question is how is it possible to know that a human being is more advanced psychologically than before. Since serious psychological dysfunctions are usually not present in the work environment, Herzberg gives an overview of characteristics of psychological growth which are important and relevant to the growth in job capability and performance. The key, according to Herzberg, is to monitor not performance of the worker per se, but what performance indicates about his growth. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 57-58) Herzberg offers six characteristics which are listed in hierarchical order where every next characteristic is considered a higher development than the one before. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 58-70). The six characteristic that Herzberg is talking about are: knowing more; seeing more relationships in what we know; being creative; being effective in ambiguous situations; maintain individuality in the face of pressure of the group, and attaining real psychological growth. (Herzberg, 1966,

p. 70) All of these characteristics are part of the Abraham view of human beings which is focused on realizing human potential for perfection, and not the Adam view which is focused on avoid physical deprivation.

Knowing more is the first characteristic. Human being should know more now than in the past. Perhaps, as human beings grow older they are not able to run as fast, or as long, but they should add more information and knowledge. Since almost every job experience contains some new information, it is justified to ask has a person after the job is completed learned anything new. Something new can be learned from success, but also from failing at a particular task. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 58-60)

Herzberg calls the second characteristic *relationship in knowledge*. The basic idea behind this characteristic is how much is a human being able to connect what it knows, to see relations between bits and pieces of information, in order to get the “big picture”. This is of course different than knowing a lot of information, a person can know a lot and still be a kind of *idiot savant*. This will (failure to see interrelationships) in turn lead to ineffective practice. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 60-61)

Creativity is the third characteristic. Human beings, unlike animals, do not rely only on imprinted systems, and are not determined solely by them. Herzberg is claiming that for human beings it would not be possible to survive if they dependent only on information that was specifically taught. Creativity, as used by Herzberg, is a concept which encompasses any knowledge, understanding or principle that originates with the individual. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 61)

Human existence is filled with uncertainty, and the world is ambiguous, and human beings are aware of that fact. According to Herzberg this is a source of anxiety but on top of that it can be considered as a reward to human beings because it adds challenges to life if looked from an Abraham point of view. Thus, fourth characteristic is *effectiveness in ambiguity*. The trick of becoming an adult is to be able to cope with the complexity and uncertainty of existence and continue to look at the world from a childlike perspective. This is also important in the work context, because rendering every job, that is removing all the ambiguity from the job will only accomplish reinforcing the immature dependency on lack of ambiguity. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 62-65)

When looking at the levels of psychological growth one of the highest is becoming an individual so the fifth characteristic is *individuation*. Over the course of life human beings are socialized in a great variety of manners, but the point of maturing process is to be able to

have personal feelings, beliefs, ideas etc, while at the same time retaining the benefits of the socialization process. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 65-68)

Human beings are easily persuaded that they are “bigger than they actually are”. In today’s society there are many symbols which help to do that. For example, job titles, social courtesies, relationships with others, ownership of status symbols and the like. Artificial growth, according to Herzberg, besides the things like already mentioned, is most easily fueled by degrading others, or using others; as well as growing on the expense of others. Such an artificial growth is not a sign of advancement; it is a sign of psychological weakness. So the sixth and final characteristic that Herzberg is talking about is the *real growth*. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 68-70)

Herzberg’s description of job enrichment¹⁴ is that it is a movement which: “(...) provides the opportunity for the employee’s psychological growth.” (Herzberg, 1968) The argument for job enrichment is the following: “If you have employees on a job, use them. If you can’t use them on the job, get rid of them, either via automation or by selecting someone with lesser ability. If you can’t use them and you can’t get rid of them, you will have a motivational problem.” (Herzberg, 1968)

It is important to mention that Herzberg thinks that not all jobs can be enriched, nor it is necessary that they be enriched. (Herzberg, 1968) But if jobs can be enriched there are two ways that people usually think about job enrichment. The wrong way to approach it, at least according to Herzberg, is the horizontal job loading. Horizontal job loading is when management reduces the personal contributions of employees instead of giving them opportunities for growth in their jobs. In horizontal job loading approach only enlargement of the already meaningless job occurs. Examples might include: challenging the employee by increasing the expected amount of production; adding more meaningless task to an already meaningless task; rotating the assignments of a number of jobs that need to be enriched (washing plates and then washing glasses); removing the most difficult part of the task leaving the employee free to accomplish more of the less challenging parts, etc. (Herzberg, 1968)

Different from the previously described horizontal loading, the vertical loading will contain the following actions: removing some controls while retaining accountability

¹⁴ Herzberg applied his theory to practice at various institutions. He implemented a large number of job enrichment programs based on Motivation-Hygiene theories in various companies during his career (chemical companies, AT&T, VA hospitals, Texas instruments, Imperial Chemical Industries, US Air Force Logistics Command etc.) These programs were both implemented at the low as well as executive level, and both for minorities, and majorities in work organizations. Herzberg admitted some of them worked and some did not. (Herzberg, 1993, p. 16-25)

(motivators: responsibility and personal achievement); increasing the accountability of individuals for own work (motivators: responsibility and recognition); giving a person a complete natural unit of work (motivators: responsibility, achievement and recognition); granting additional authority to employees in their activity: job freedom (motivators: responsibility, achievement and recognition); making periodic reports directly available to the workers themselves rather than to supervisors (motivators: internal recognition); introducing new and more difficult tasks not previously handled (motivators: growth and learning); assigning individuals specific or specialized tasks, enabling them to become experts (motivators: responsibility, growth, advancement). (Herzberg, 1968)

What is important to emphasize is that job enrichment, as Herzberg (1968) thinks of it, is a long-term management function, and the changes should last for a long period of time. Some of the reasons are: the changes should bring the job up to the level of challenge commensurate with the skill that was hired; those who have still more ability eventually will be able to demonstrate it and get a promotion to higher level jobs; and the very nature of motivators, as opposed to hygiene factors, is that they have a much longer term effect on employees' attitudes, and will not need as much emphasis as hygiene factors.

Following in the tradition of content theories of motivation, amongst others Maslow's and Herzberg's work, is the Self-Determination Theory (SDT). Today SDT stands as one of most researched content theories. It grew out of the research conducted on motivation, and today is being expanded through various studies in different areas of human activities such as education, organizations, sport and physical activity, religion, health and medicine, parenting, virtual environments and media, close relationships, and psychotherapy. The most well-known proponents and initiators of SDT is firstly Edward L. Deci, and secondly Richard M. Ryan. Of course numerous researchers have added to the theory over the years.

1.2.3. Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan

The most well known proponents of SDT, namely Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, through their backgrounds, show a nice similarity to the general orientation of this thesis. Deci with a PhD in social psychology, and Ryan with a bachelor degree in philosophy and a PhD in clinical psychology show that combination of philosophical foundation and psychological research may lead to theories for explaining human motivation. Furthermore the connection between philosophy and psychology has been many times proven both by historical development of the disciplines and by the questions the disciplines raise. Deci and Ryan are currently faculty member at the University of Rochester.

SDT is a theory of motivation¹⁵ because it addresses the energization and direction of behavior. Energy basically refers to needs, both the innate ones and needs acquired through the course of a lifetime. Direction on the other hand relates to processes and structures of the organisms that give meaning to internal and external stimuli and in that way direct action. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, pp. 3-7) In the context of this theory self-determination means: “(...) a quality of human functioning that involves the experience of choice, in other words, the experience of an internal perceived locus of causality.” (Deci & Ryan, 1985, p. 38) But self-determination is also considered as need as: “(...) the capacity to choose and to have those choices, rather than reinforcement contingencies, drives or any other forces or pressures, be the determinants of one’s actions. (...) self-determination is more than a capacity; it is also a need” (Deci & Ryan, 1985, p. 38)

When talking about the types of theories of motivation, SDT is a dialectic based theory. The dialectic is centered “between integration oriented human beings and the nutrients provided, versus the obstacles posed, by the actual social contexts.” (Ryan & Deci, 2000a) Also, it belongs to the tradition of organismic theories in psychology. Two core notions, as authors call them are: first is that behavior is regulated in part through internal

¹⁵ Generally speaking, theories of motivation usually suppose that people will initiate and persist in the behavior to the extent they believe that the behavior in question will lead them to the desired outcome or goal. Authors such as German-American psychologist Kurt Lewin or an American Edward C. Tolman started the line of research which explored the psychological value people give to goals. Many other authors, for example Victor H. Vroom – famous for expectancy theory of motivation – continued in that direction. Somehow this approach to the study of motivation led to the idea that any two equally valued goals (with the same expectancies for attainment) would have the same quality of performance. After a while theories began to differentiate types of goals or outcomes. Like the mentioned theories, SDT also differentiates, but what is critical for SDT is the notion that effects of goal pursuit and attainment is connected to the degree which people are able to satisfy their basic needs for competence, relatedness and autonomy. (Deci, Ryan, 2000)

structures that are refined, the second notion is that human beings are by nature active. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 113)

It is interesting to point out little bit of historical background on organizational paradigmatic framework within which SDT operates. It started as a result from the conflict between reductionist and vitalists on the nature of life. In short reductionist wanted to reduce the entire life or biology to physic, or to lower order efficient and material causal principles. For example in the context of biology, can classical genetics be reduced to molecular biology? (Brigant, Love, 2012) On the other hand vitalists argued that living entities have a special nature due to their tendency towards integrity and activity. Also it is interesting to emphasize in the context of this thesis the fact that vitalists talked about things like *entelechy* which guides the organization and development of potentials, or also a commonly known Bergson's term *élan vital*. In the end the vitalists have not prevailed, but they helped in forming a framework in which biological processes can be explained in a non-reductionist environment. So SDT as a theory is working in the paradigmatic framework of organizational principles in life sciences. (Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 1997)

In what follows the connections between SDT and philosophy, as well as possible relevance of SDT for philosophical anthropology will be presented. In addition, the method how SDT is developed, and a short outline of the theory itself will also be described.

When talking about the philosophical background of SDT some similarities can be seen from the already mentioned paradigmatic framework in which SDT operates. Furthermore, it can be said that there are many more similarities between SDT and philosophy. Aristotle's philosophy specially stands out. This connection is even explicitly stated at some points. Some of the examples are:

“If one were to spend a short while observing a child, he would undoubtedly be delighted by the child's inquisitiveness. Children keep picking things up, smelling them, tasting them, feeling them, and asking, “What's this?” They seem to have an insatiable curiosity. Aristotle (980) recognized this when he stated, “All men by nature desire to know.” He was in essence, postulating an intrinsic motivation to learn.” (Deci, 1975, p. 23)

Ryan and Deci (2006) state that in addition to Aristotle's influence SDT also incorporated ideas from other philosophers. Some of them are Alexander Pfänder, and Paul Ricoeur, existential thinkers on autonomy. For example, the understanding of autonomous acts in the context of SDT is influenced by the understanding that an autonomous act is initial act of the

ego centered self, or that it is fully endorsed by the self. In addition, the important thing to emphasize would be that those actions must be congruent and endorsed by the whole self, and are not equivalent to independence. Similarly, the thinkers in the analytic tradition say that people are autonomous only to the extent that their first order motives are (or would be) endorsed at a higher order of reflection.

Besides that, SDT as a theory is interesting for philosophical undertakings since it has a goal of promoting human flourishing in addition to explaining psychological phenomena. In these two passages that intent is obvious:

“As psychologists, we believe strongly that it is our responsibility not only to uncover and detail basic psychological phenomena but also to consider the relevance of these phenomena for improving the human condition.” (Ryan, Deci, 2000a)

“SDT thus provides tools for questioning any and all interpersonal, social, and cultural structures. It asks the same questions about capitalism that it does about central planning economies and about fascist states; namely, in what ways do these systems facilitate or obstruct the fulfillment of psychological needs and promote human well-being?” (Ryan, Deci, 2000a)

It is obvious from the two cited passages that SDT’s goals can easily be commented first – in a more general sense – as philosophical activity, and second – in a stricter sense – as philosophical anthropology (a philosophical discipline that studies human beings).

Considering the method by which SDT is developed, Deci and Ryan review a significant number of different theories before giving their own opinion. The authors mention the Aristotelian view of the human development in which human beings possess a tendency towards psychological growth and integration. Human beings by using and stretching their abilities actualize their potential. Similar ideas about human beings as active integrative organisms can also be found in the psychodynamic and humanistic theories of personality. For example in previously described Maslow’s theory which emphasizes an actualizing tendency¹⁶. On the other hand, there are opponents to such school of thought in psychology.

¹⁶ Concerning the difference between SDT and Maslow’s theory, according to Deci (1975, p. 84), what Maslow names as needs is something which when satisfied prevents illness, and causes it when not satisfied. And both physiological and higher order needs are considered in the same way. According to him there are a few difficulties with Maslow’s theory/hierarchy of needs. Namely, the hierarchy implies that infants are motivated entirely by physiological needs, which appears not to be the case. Because, for example, love needs are important from the start onward. A nice example of that might be the UNICEF’s slogan “First 3 years are most important” which is being used for their Early Childhood Development and Positive Parenting programme. Also,

Most notable, according to Ryan and Deci (2002, pp. 3-4), are the representatives of the so called operant behaviorism. They suggest that there is no inherent direction to development and any such appearance is not because of some integrative tendency in human beings. They argue instead that relevant contingencies have a structure which human beings encounter over lifetime and it is responsible for appearances of such inherent direction to development.¹⁷ Ideas about intrinsic motivation¹⁸ emerged as a response to that kind of thinking. (Vansteenkiste, Lens, & Deci, 2006).

The basic notion and understanding of human beings in the context of SDT is that human beings have natural, innate tendencies towards development of an “ever more elaborated and unified sense of self” (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 5) But it is important to emphasize that mentioned development will not be possible without also some other factors being present and fulfilled. The factors which support, or thwart, this innate human tendency are basically the social environment which caters for integrated and vital human functioning. The social context is crucial in determining will human potential be unlocked or inhibited. In their words: “Thus, in SDT the social context is viewed as playing a crucial role in supporting individuals’ potentials versus stimulating their vulnerabilities.” (Brown, Ryan, 2003) In order for a social environment to do that, it needs to take care of three needs: the need for competence; the need for relatedness; and the need for autonomy. These needs are basic and innate requirement for deciding is the environment supportive or not for integrated and vital human functioning and development. (Ryan & Deci, 2002, pp. 5-6)

the second difficulty Deci points out (1975, p. 84) is that there are no intrinsic needs for competence and self-determination in human beings, which are for SDT of paramount importance as it has already been stated many times. Although Deci in the same place points out that Maslow recognized this and stated that there is also something called growth-motivation. In Deci’s interpretation, Maslow suggests that those growth needs (related to creativity, human potentialities, talents ...) lead into self-actualization as soon as the lower-needs are satisfied in the appropriate amount. What Deci (1975, p. 85) is pointing out is that the need for self-actualization is different from the basic intrinsic needs for competence and self-determination. The third difficulty stated by Deci (1975, p. 85) comes from Maslow’s definition of what characteristics a self-actualized human being has. Maslow mentioned quite a large number of them and they are: the human being has clear perceptions, is self-accepting, is spontaneous and natural, has an orientation towards problem solving, requires a certain amount of privacy and detachment, is autonomous, continues to appreciate the basic qualities of life, has a deep affection and sympathy for all humans, carries deeper and more meaningful love relationships, has mystical experiences, understands “humanness” and “nonhumanness”, etc. These traits are of course relevant for Maslow’s point of view. The difficulty with them is that a human being would be self-actualized if it had Maslow’s traits. It is possible that two self-actualizers although somewhat different would be the same in regards to the mentioned qualities. This problem Deci refers to as sameness vs. differentness of humans.

¹⁷ It might be said that it is a bit strange that for the most part of the 20th century academic psychology believed that it is possible to explain human behavior with no regards to what people thought and felt. (Leary, Tangney, 2003, p. xi)

¹⁸ As historical information the idea of intrinsic motivation, according to Ryan and Deci (2002), was first suggested in the context of animal behavior research where it was noted that sometimes animals do things because of the sheer pleasure of doing so. The paper they point to is: White, R. W. (1959). “Motivation Reconsidered”. *Psychological Review*, **66**, 297–333.

SDT investigates people's inherent growth tendencies and innate psychological needs (autonomy, competence, relatedness) that are basis for human self-motivation and personality integration. According to SDT psychological needs are essential for "optimal functioning of the natural propensities for growth and integration, as well as constructive social development and personal well-being." (Ryan & Deci, 2000b) Overall importance of believing that people have a natural tendency towards integrity and enhancement of their potential for the practitioners is suggested this way. If there is a belief in human natural tendencies toward growth and enhancement the practitioners will focus of facilitating those tendencies in different contexts in which a human being can find itself in. If the opposite is believed than the practitioners will focus on training, controlling, directing behavior towards ends which are thought valuable. (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 5)

Motivation, it seems, is not a unitary phenomenon, it is possible to have different kinds and not just different levels of motivation. (Ryan & Deci, 2000c). SDT, as a content theory of motivation, distinguishes between intrinsic motivation (doing something because it is inherently satisfying, or an end in itself) and extrinsic motivation (doing something because of some other reason than the action itself).

Possible description of intrinsic motivation can be that intrinsic motivation is a spontaneous tendency of organisms to exercise their capacities in the service of developing cognitive and personality growth. (Ryan, Kuhl, Deci, 1997) Furthermore, when talking about the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation Deci says that if there is no apparent external reward then that reward is in the activity itself. The question of how to operationally define intrinsic motivation comes down to two possible ways; the so called "free choice" measure, and the self-reports of interest and enjoyment. In the "free choice" measure, people are doing a task under different conditions, after that, they are told that they will no longer be working on that task and are left alone in the room. The point is if they return to the task for which there is no longer any extrinsic reason, and for how long they do so, that is how much they are intrinsically motivated for it. The second way is the use of self-reports of interest and enjoyment of the activity per se. (Ryan & Deci, 2000c) Deci thinks that the definition is operationally useful, but he also claims that it is superficial and therefore of little use in study of motivation. (Deci, 1980, p. 31)

Instead Deci (1980, p. 33), proposes the following definition of intrinsically motivated behaviors:

“(...) intrinsically motivated behaviors are based in people’s need to be competent and self-determining in relation to their environment. This need, which is based in the central nervous system, is ever present and motivates ongoing thoughts and behaviors unless it is interrupted by basic drives or emotional responses. The need for competence and self-determination leads people to *seek out* and *conquer* challenges that are optimal for their capacities. These challenges can be view as incongruities that exist between a stimulus input and some internal structure of the organism, thereby reconciling the two approaches to conceptualizing intrinsic motivation.” (Deci, 1980, p. 33)

In the motivation research, there has often been a case (except for process theorists) that the extrinsic motivation was thought to be less worthy than intrinsic. This is also the case with two researchers on motivation dealt with in this thesis (for examples see Maslow (1971) and Herzberg (1968). Contrary to that, SDT proposes that there are different kinds of extrinsic motivation and they are not considered to be less important when compared to intrinsic motivation. Also, it is possible, according to SDT, that some kinds of extrinsic motivation are quite similar to the intrinsic ones. (Ryan & Deci, 2000c) What is special about SDT is that it states that it is possible that extrinsic motivation can be internalized to a certain degree. Internalization process requires something to be fulfilled. (Ryan & Deci, 2000c). And that is what distinguishes SDT from other theories of motivation. In them, motivation is usually treated as a unitary concept that varies in amount rather than in kind. This is not so in SDT. (Gage, Deci, 2005) Also, being a content theory, SDT will look at different psychological needs in human beings, and if those are satisfied then people will be more effective and have well-being. Something similar is also happening in other need oriented theories such as those created by Maslow and Herzberg. The difference between SDT and other theories focused on needs is twofold. First, SDT on top of talking about basic psychological needs will also discuss regulatory processes that are in the foundations of behavior. And, secondly, SDT in contrast to other theories evolved using empirical research. (Gage, Deci, 2005)

In other words, in SDT there is a self-determination continuum suggested that tries to explain the spectrum of different kinds of motivation, ranging from amotivation to intrinsic motivation. In the middle between amotivation and intrinsic motivation there are different kinds of extrinsic motivation. Listed according to the degree they have been internalized the kinds of extrinsic motivation are: external regulation; introjections; identification; and integration. Also, it is important to point out, in this context, that internalization is defined as a “proactive process through which people transform regulation by external contingencies

into regulation by internal processes”. (Schafter 1968, referenced using Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, Ryan, 1991)

One of the peculiarities of SDT is that it has evolved over time in the form of mini theories, which then inductively add to SDT as an overarching theory. Each of the five mini theories evolved trying to explain a certain phenomenon. (Ryan & Deci, 2002, pp. 9-10) Five theories and their topics are: *Cognitive evaluation theory* which is concerned with intrinsic motivation; *Organismic integration theory* whose topic is extrinsic motivation and autonomy; *Causality orientations theory* is concerned with individual differences; *Basic psychological needs theory* is trying to explain relation between goals motivation and well-being; and *Goal contents theory* whose topic is the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic goals. (<http://www.psych.rochester.edu/SDT/theory.php>, retrieved on 06.20.2012) In the text which follows five theories are presented¹⁹.

At first SDT was focused on research how extrinsic rewards relate to intrinsic motivation. *Cognitive evaluation theory* was created in order to help clear up and improve understanding of the effects that external events have on motivation. It was first introduced by Deci in his book *Intrinsic motivation* (1975) and it has been refined over time due to empirical findings. Here an updated version from 1985 (Deci, Ryan, 1985) is presented.

Traditionally speaking intrinsic motivation is defined as “noninstrumentally focused, instead originating autotelically from satisfaction inherent in action.” (Ryan & Deci, 2000a; Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 10) According to SDT intrinsic motivation is natural propensity to engage interests and exercise the abilities, and if the circumstances allow for that people will display those manifestations. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 43). In other words, intrinsic motivation is innate. (Deci, 1975, p. 65) At the bottom of intrinsic motivation are the needs for competence and self-determination (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 58). It can be also said that from teleological point of view “intrinsic motivation involves doing an activity for its own sake”. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 66) Intrinsically motivated behaviors are those which are trying to achieve certain internal rewarding consequences that are not dependent of non-nervous-system tissue needs. They are actually aimed at achieving the feeling of competence and self-determination. (Deci, 1975, p. 59) It can be concluded about the description of intrinsic motivation that “intrinsically motivated behaviors are behavior which a person engages in to feel competent and self-determining.” (Deci, 1975, p. 61) Also, those behaviors are of two types. Human

¹⁹ For sake of clarity, it is important to point out that every one of them in some part touches on the intrinsic vs. extrinsic debate, and on the concepts of needs.

beings will either engage in finding situations that enable them to feel competent and self-determining. The other kind is that human beings will engage in resolving or conquering presented challenges. (Deci, 1975, p. 61)

In connection with intrinsic motivation is the concept of perceived locus of causality (PLOC). The theory suggests that when something changes the perception toward a more external locus, then intrinsic motivation tends to be undermined. This phenomenon relates to the need for autonomy. (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 11) The need of autonomy is important for intrinsic motivation; Deci (1975, p. 111) suggested that intrinsically motivated behaviors are a prototype of self determined activities. Those activities have a so called internal perceived locus of causality (I-PLOC) The term was coined by Richard de Charms. On the other hand, things like threats, surveillance, deadlines etc. do not support intrinsic motivation probably because there is a shift to external perceived locus of causality (E-PLOC). (Deci, Ryan, 2000)

Another important thing is the perceived competence which relates to the need for competence in a way that intrinsic motivation will be enhanced when there is a increase in perceived competence and *vice versa*. (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 11) Again, social context is important in both controlling and informational aspect. In the controlling aspect it concerns the social pressure toward specific outcome. The more the pressure, more will the focus be shifted to external locust of causality. The informational aspect refers to feedback in regards of competent engagement. The more that feedback is informational in opposition to controlling the more intrinsic motivation will be enhanced. (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 12)

Basically SDT, or more precisely the *Cognitive evaluation theory*, revolves around four propositions (three originally and the forth was added in the 1985). The first proposition concerns the need for self-determination and is formulated as follows:

“External events relevant to the initiation or regulation of behavior will affect a person’s intrinsic motivation to the extent that they influence the perceived locus of causality for that behavior. Events that promote a more external perceived locus of causality will undermine intrinsic motivation, whereas those that promote a more internal perceived locus of causality will enhance intrinsic motivation.” (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 62)

It was already said that self-determination and competence were important or even crucial for intrinsic motivation. Second proposition talks about competence and mastering of optimum challenges:

“External events will affect a person’s intrinsic motivation for an optimally challenging activity to the extent that they influence the person’s perceived competence, within the context of self-determination. Events that promote greater perceived competence will enhance intrinsic motivation, whereas those that diminish perceived competence will decrease intrinsic motivation.” (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 63)

Events which are somehow relevant for initiation and regulation of behavior have, according to SDT, three aspects. The third proposition related to *Cognitive evaluation theory* deals with those three aspects: informational, controlling, and amotivating. So, the third proposition runs as follows:

“Events relevant to the initiation and regulation of behavior have three potential aspects, each with a functional significance. The informational aspect facilitates an internal perceived locus of causality and perceived competence, thus enhancing intrinsic motivation. The controlling aspect facilitates an external perceived locus of causality, thus undermining intrinsic motivation, and promoting extrinsic compliance or defiance. The amotivating aspect facilitates perceived incompetence, thus undermining intrinsic motivation and promoting amotivation. The relative salience of these three aspects to a person determines the functional significance of the event.” (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 64)

The fourth proposition, which was added later, considers three things. First, internally informational events, focusing on satisfaction from improving one’s performance. Second, internally controlling events, focusing on the need to practice accompanied with a sense of grief if that did not happen. Here the focus is not on the satisfaction of improvement as in the first case. Third, internally amotivation events. This is important because a lot of actions are not initiated by an outside source, but by events inside a person such as needs, feelings, expectations, etc. The fourth proposition is:

“Intrapersonal events differ in their qualitative aspects and, like external events, can have varied functional significances. Internally informational events facilitate self-determined functioning and maintain or enhance intrinsic motivation. Internally controlling events are experienced as pressure toward specific outcomes and undermine intrinsic motivation. Internally amotivating events make salient one’s incompetence and also undermine intrinsic motivation.” (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 107)

As a conclusion it can be said that studies confirmed that extrinsic motivation such as money (i.e., something concrete in form, or recognitions of some kind (i.e., something symbolic)

both decrease intrinsic motivation. (Ryan, Deci, 2002, pp. 10-11) As for the issue of rewarding someone for something, it is considered that all contingent rewards, whether they are task-contingent, performance contingent, or competitively contingent, tend to decrease intrinsic motivation. On the other hand, any rewards that carry positive performance feedback enhance the intrinsic motivation. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 81) Another thing which is important is how a persons who is rewarding someone acts. If a person giving an award administers the rewards with control, then intrinsic motivation tends to be undermined compared to no rewards. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 90)

SDT as a theory assumes that it is possible that extrinsic motivation can become to some degree autonomous. Differently said, it is possible to be autonomously extrinsically motivated. That is the focus of the second mini theory within SDT. The *Organismic integration theory* is “based on the assumption that people are naturally inclined to integrate their ongoing experiences, assuming they have the necessary nutrients to do so.” (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 15)

What is special about *Organismic integration theory* is that it views internalization in terms of a continuum. In the sense that “the more fully a regulation (or the value underlying it) is internalized the more it becomes part of integrated self and the more it is the basis for self-determined behavior.” (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 15) Also, as a part of this mini theory, taxonomy of types of regulation for motivation which differ according to the represented autonomy is created. The types of motivation for regulation ranging from no motivation to intrinsic motivation (being completely autonomous), are: *non regulation* (amotivation), *external regulation*, *introjected regulation*, *regulation through identification*, *integrated regulation*, and finally *intrinsic regulation* (intrinsic motivation). An important thing is that SDT does not state that it is necessary to go through every stage of internalization for every possible regulation (Ryan & Deci, 2002, pp. 15-18)

External regulation is, to put it simply, kind of motivation which is usually described as the opposite of intrinsic motivation. The examples might be rewards or punishments. The reason for doing something is external to the person. (Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, Ryan, 1991). The remaining three types of motivation connected to external regulation differ on how much has the external regulation been internalized. Strictly speaking, “internalization²⁰ is a process of taking in a value or regulation.” (Ryan, Deci, 2000c; Deci, Ryan, 2000)

²⁰ If internalization refers to the process of individual persons internalizing social regulations (to a certain degree), then socialization would be the same process from a society’s point of view. Socialization is thus a process of fostering internalization (Ryan & Deci, 2003, p. 262.)

The first type of that kind of external regulation is *introjected regulation*. Examples of it might be the cases including contingent self-esteem which pressures people to behave in a certain way in order to feel worthy. I am writing this chapter not because the regulation for the task is a part of myself, but because I do not want to feel like a bad student or even a bad person. That kind of regulation is within a person but it is still very much controlled. (Gagné, Deci, 2005).

On the other hand, in *identified regulation* people have greater sense of volition than with introjected. Causes for the behavior are perceived as reflecting an aspect of the agents, and regulatory process has become more fully a part of the person. Example might be that I am doing an extra chapter because I believe that it important for successful completion of the thesis. (Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, Ryan, 1991)

Finally, the most complete type of internalization is *integrated regulation*. Integration of values and regulations is a process “by which individuals more fully transform the regulation into their own so that it will emanate from their sense of self.” (Ryan, Deci, 2000c) In integrated regulation agents have a full sense that their behavior is an integrated part of who they are, and that it comes from them. This kind of motivation is nonetheless still extrinsic, and not intrinsic, although it is highly autonomous. The reason for that is the fact that in intrinsic motivation agents are interested in the activities themselves, and here they are interested if an activity is somehow important to the agents in an instrumental sense. (Gagné, Deci, 2005)

In the process of internalization the need for relatedness is important, but other two needs are also required. This is especially true for the need for autonomy. The degree in which this need is satisfied will decide how full the internalization of a certain regulation is. (Ryan & Deci, 2000b; Ryan & Deci, 2002, pp. 19-20)

Generally, how much autonomy a person experiences is important when considering different forms of regulation. For instance, an amotivated person has no volition whatsoever. On the other hand if a person is externally regulated for the behavior that person is somehow motivated, but has no autonomy. The amount of experienced autonomy rises from introjected, across identified and integrated regulation. If someone is intrinsically motivated, then a significantly high degree of autonomy is experienced. (Deci, Ryan, 2000) This is what SDT calls continuum of relative autonomy. (Ryan, Deci, 2003, p. 259) The idea is that the people will likely accept some tasks, and internalize the regulation, if other people with whom they are close also value the same things. From this idea SDT suggests the need of relatedness. Second need of competence flows from the idea that human beings are more ready to accept

things of which they know about, or they have sufficient knowledge, and skills to actually achieve. Finally if a person rationally understands the worth of the task then the regulation can become fully internalized.

All above can be summarized like this. In order that a person fully internalize some outside regulation, it is necessary that its surroundings support the needs for competence, relatedness and autonomy. This is because people are more willing to accept something which their surrounding community approves and supports, also it is easier for people to internalize something which they are good at, and finally being fully rational agent is also necessary. Perhaps it is possible to make an analogy between community in the wider sociological sense and an organization in a narrower, work related context. It seems that the same principles apply.

SDT in one of its parts presumes that people in their dealings with society develop some kind of inner resources. Those resources together with the social context influence motivation, behavior and experience. *Causality orientations theory* was created to explain those inner resources. Three orientations are suggested: *autonomy orientation*, *controlled orientation*, and *impersonal orientation*. All people have them to a certain degree, and it was found the more autonomy orientation was present in a person the more positive relation to well being there is. (Ryan & Deci, 2002, pp. 19-21) Every human has according to SDT some elements of all of the listed orientations. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 153)

What is important for the *autonomy orientation* is the experience of choice, and not choice in the sense of deciding to do something (so called cognitive perspective), but choice in the sense of experiencing a sense of freedom (motivational perspective). So, the chosen behavior would be a kind of behavior for which a person could seriously entertain the option of not doing it. Another thing, besides choice, which is important, is the awareness of one's integrated needs. An autonomously oriented person will usually act in a way which will provide opportunities for further autonomy and with such people intrinsic motivation will be strong. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, pp. 154-157) In order for such orientation to develop an informal environment is required. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 159)

The *control orientation* is lacking the experience of choice. In such orientation initiating events are experienced as pressure. The environment will strongly influence one's behavior with commands and words such as should, have to, must, etc. Besides the absence of experience of choice, awareness will also not be present. What is present is so called cognitive consistency which is characterized by rationalization processes with which people

try to align their thoughts and their actions. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, pp. 157-158) In order for such orientation to develop a controlling environment is required. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 159)

Finally, *impersonal orientation* is nonintentional, and the belief that behavior and outcomes are independent and the resulting experience is incompetence. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, pp. 159) In order for such orientation to develop an amotivating environment is required. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 159)

The fourth SDT theory is the *Basic psychological needs theory*.²¹ In SDT needs are defined as “innate psychological nutrients that are essential for ongoing psychological growth, integrity, and well-being” (Deci, Ryan, 2000) For something to qualify as a need it has to be in direct relation to eudaimonic conception of well-being which SDT endorses. (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 22.) In SDT the needs are understood as: “(...) pertains to those nutrients that must be procured by a living entity to maintain its growth, integrity, and health (whether physiological or psychological).” (Ryan, Deci, 2000a) Basic needs both physiological and psychological, on the other hand, are defined as: “(...) an energizing state that, if satisfied, conduces toward health and well-being but, if not satisfied, contributes to pathology and ill-being.” (Ryan, Deci, 2000b).

Generally speaking, the needs are suggested because that concept provides a way of explaining diverse phenomena such as intrinsic motivation, the role of rewards, feelings of control, the benefit of integrating values, etc. in parsimonious way. (Ryan, Deci, 2000a) Although, the authors do not claim that three needs explain everything, they do claim that most significant events in social life relate to basic psychological needs. (Ryan, Deci, 2000a) As it was already mentioned, three basic psychological needs which are proposed in SDT are: *autonomy, competence and relatedness*. In short, competence means to be able to succeed in some tasks, autonomy is related to be able to feel as having a choice in some action, and relatedness is marked by a sense of support and respect to others. In more detail the needs can be described as follows.

²¹ In history of psychology there were two traditions which tried to define concept of needs. The first one suggested that there are innate physiological needs like needs for food or water or sex intercourse and that they are based in non-nervous-system. One of the examples is Clark L. Hull. On the other hand a different tradition considered needs as constructs, as required things and not something innate. A well know representative of that tradition is Henry A. Murray. The difference between SDT and drive theories such as Hull's is that in the drive theories needs are deficits which need to be satisfied. So, the idea is that humans are basically passive. In other words they only act to satisfy the deficiencies. In SDT however, the people are viewed as naturally prepared for action. In their words: “(...) rather than viewing people as passively waiting for a disequilibrium, we view them as naturally inclined to act on their inner and outer environments, engage activities that interest them, and move toward personal and interpersonal coherence. Thus, they do not have to be pushed or prodded to act.” (Deci, Ryan, 2000) And also: “Thus, in drive theories, the set point of the human organism is quiescence or passivity; need satisfaction is a process of replenishing deficiencies; and the purpose of behavior is need satisfaction. By contrast, in SDT, the set point is growth-oriented activity.” (Deci, Ryan, 2000)

Competence is not understood as an acquired skill as for example being very good at football. Competence refers to “feeling effective in one’s ongoing interactions with the social environment and experiencing opportunities to exercise and express one’s capacities.” (Deci, 1975; Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 7). The need for competence for intrinsic motivation is emphasized, along with the other two, because it is perceived that positive feedback will encourage intrinsic motivation, while negative feedback will thwart it. That is presumably the case because negative feedback implies incompetence. The competence includes the “ability to understand or grasp the meaning or rationale behind the regulation and the ability to enact it.” (Deci, Ryan, 2000)

The need for *relatedness* in sense that SDT is using it refers to “feeling connected to others, to caring for and being cared for by those others, to having a sense of belongingness both with other individuals and with one’s community” (Ryan, 1975; Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 7) Although, as authors point out, people can be intrinsically motivated to do a solitary activity (their example is playing solitaire) it still appears that “secure relational base appears to provide needed backdrop – a distal support – for intrinsic motivation”. (Deci, Ryan, 2000) In the context of SDT, the need for relatedness is the principal impetus for internalization (Ryan, Deci, 2000) as it was already mentioned in the *Organismic integration theory* section of the text.

The third universal need in SDT is the need for *autonomy*. Autonomy might be reflected in a sense that one’s actions are one’s own. On the other hand, if there is some kind of external pressure to act, or some internal pressure, the act would still be intentional, but it would not be autonomous. (Deci, Ryan, 1987) Autonomy in the context of SDT is understood as “being the perceived origin or source of one’s own behavior” (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 8) In this sense autonomy is not necessarily connected to independence, quite the opposite. According to SDT, it is possible to be autonomous in enacting values that have heteronomous origin. (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 8) The concept of autonomy is to be understood as self-governance, but it does not imply, as has often been stated, that it is completely devoid of influences of social environment. This can be seen from: “Autonomy concerns the extent to which people authentically or genuinely *concur* with the forces that do influence their behavior.” (Ryan, Deci, 2000a) Finally, the definition of autonomy in SDT is:

“autonomy retains its primary etymological meaning of self-governance, or rule by the self. Its opposite, heteronomy, refers to regulation from outside the phenomenal self,

by forces experienced as alien or pressuring, be they inner impulses or demands, or external contingencies of reward and punishment.” (Ryan, Deci, 2006)

The general idea is that people²² who are autonomously functioning are more productive, and are generating more wellness and human capital. (Ryan, Deci, 2006) And that autonomy, when accurately defined, is essential to the full functioning and mental health of individuals and optimal functioning of organizations and cultures (Deci, Ryan, 2000; Ryan, Deci, 2001)

Another point that SDT is making about human behavior is that it is quite plastic, we can be controlled to do almost anything, but that is not the case when we act autonomously. When autonomy is present, human beings will be in touch with their true needs. (Ryan, Kuhl, Deci, 1997)

The idea of autonomy is not without its problems. For example, it has often been mentioned that, since autonomy is so important for SDT, that SDT is basically a Western theory because the concept of autonomy does not apply in the collectivistic cultures like for example the Chinese culture or the Japanese one. As a response it can be said that according to the findings of various researchers it has been confirmed that autonomy is important no matter which culture was looked at. Furthermore, it has been confirmed that no matter what did the test subjects (originating from different culture) thought about their culture, the degree of autonomy was a positive predictor for their health. (Ryan, Deci, 2003, p. 267)

Finally, according to Ryan and Deci (2003, p. 266) this conflict about autonomy is based on two reasons. First reason is the definition of autonomy. Some theorists equate autonomy with independence, which is not true for SDT where autonomy is understood as volition and self-endorsement. Second reason for the conflict is that SDT thinks there are universal human needs, which is against the “standard social sciences model” in which human nature is contextually relative.

It is important to emphasize that three needs, according to the SDT are innate. This is, according to them, confirmed by various studies as it is going shown later in the text. If

²² It is important to point out that within an organizational perspective, which is SDT’s paradigmatic framework, autonomy is not considered uniquely human, but all organisms are to varying degrees “centres of regulation”. This is clear from the following: “Specifically, we argue that the phenomenon of self-regulation or autonomy is neither mystical nor uniquely human. The striving to integrate and cohesively direct action is a basic form of biological activity.” (Ryan, Kuhl, Deci, 1997) Nevertheless in the context of human beings, and according to SDT, autonomy is related to: “In human personality, the construct of autonomy concerns the processes through which action and experience are initiated and governed by “the self”. The greater one’s autonomy, the more one acts in accord with self-endorsed values, needs, and intentions rather than in response to controlling forces external to the self (...)” (Ryan, Kuhl, Deci, 1997)

mentioned needs are satisfied then it is expected that they will yield positive outcomes. This plays an important part in the managerial process, task engagement and well-being, as well as being universal, their satisfaction promotes psychological health, and their neglect has the opposite effect. This approach is different from other organizational theories since in them needs have usually been treated as individual differences. (Gagné, Deci, 2005) It is of course possible that three basic needs clash during lifetime, but concerning SDT, it is just one of the challenges of life. (Ryan, Deci, 2000a)

There is also a connection between people's life goals or aspiration and basic needs. SDT suggest that there are intrinsic aspirations and extrinsic aspirations. (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 24.) Intrinsic aspirations give more or less direct satisfaction of the basic needs. The examples of such aspiration are: affiliation, personal growth, community contribution. On the other hand extrinsic aspirations are more related to obtaining external signs of worth. The examples would be: wealth, fame, image, etc.

The fifth SDT mini theory, *Goal contents theory*, concerns the goals one strives for. The basic idea behind this theory is that goals can also be extrinsic or intrinsic. It is claimed that intrinsic goals such as community, close relationships, and personal growth will have a more positive impact on well-being of humans. Extrinsic goals for example might be to make money. According to Ryan and Deci (2008) studies have shown that intrinsic goals tend to be more autonomously enacted than extrinsic. Also, pursuit of extrinsic goals is usually associated with poorer well-being.

From the three here described content theories of motivation remarks on human nature and action will be explicated later in the text. In addition to the theories of motivation, remarks on same issues will also be explicated from the teaching of three philosophers. Philosophers who will be discussed are Aristotle, David Hume and Immanuel Kant.

1.2.4. Aristotle

Aristotle was born in 384 BC in Stagira and died in Chalcis in 322 BC. First he came to Athens to study under Plato. After Plato's death he moved to Assos and worked as a philosopher under the ruler Hermeias. From there he was called by Philip II of Macedon to serve as a tutor for his son Alexander III of Macedon, later known as Alexander the Great. After serving as a tutor for a few years he returned to Athens and established a school there on the outskirts of a city. He remained in Athens until Alexander's death, and due to anti-

Macedonian attitude that grew stronger was charged with impiety, which forced him to move away. He moved to the island of Euboea, to the town of Chalcis where he died.

In this section Aristotle's connection to contemporary theories of motivation will be presented and also a short sketch of his theory of human nature will be outlined.

Aristotle's connection with theories of motivation relevant for this thesis is clear. First, authors of SDT explicitly reference Aristotle because of the similarities between his ideas on *eudaimonia* and theirs on the human well-being. Second, Aristotle's emphasis on the social character of human beings is also shared by every theory of motivation discussed in this thesis.

In the thesis the emphasis will be put on Aristotle's ideas about human nature across three areas: Aristotle's metaphysics and psychology; Aristotle's ethics; and Aristotle's politics. The reasons for such an approach are that when compared to SDT and motivational theories these three areas play an important part. Namely, metaphysics because of its focus on the study of beings in general (because of the topic of thesis psychology is added); politics because of the fact that human beings are social beings, and almost always act in some kind of social circumstances; and finally ethics because humans usually act when motivated and human agents are thought to bear responsibility for their actions. In addition, it is claimed by commentators that ethics and politics for Aristotle constitute one continuous study named philosophy of human life. The ethics will sketch what is a good life which may be realized by good human beings in a good state. In the politics the principles of such a good state are given. (Guthrie, 1981, p. 331)

Similar to Plato, the soul in Aristotle's philosophy is the principle of vitality in living beings. (Copleston, 2003, p. 327) The novelty in Aristotle's approach is that he tried to overcome the platonic dualism by claiming that neither the soul, nor its effects, in living beings, exists separately from matter. If that is the case, then the body does not only suffer the consequences of what is happening with the soul, but also plays a crucial role in that process.²³ Since the soul is the vital principle of every living being it is present in all of them. In order to explain the obvious differences between living beings Aristotle uses three types, or levels of the soul. Every type has all of the abilities of the one lower to him, but also adds something new. The lowest type of the soul is the so called "nutritive" which enables growth

²³ In order to explain the processes occurring in living beings Aristotle turned to concepts of matter and form. According to Aristotle, living beings are made up out of the body (matter) and form which transforms the potentially living being into an actual living being. The soul in this case is one of the principles and the same as form does not exist separately from particular/concrete things the soul does not exist separately from the living body. The soul is the formal, efficient, and final cause, the one that is missing, i.e., the material cause is provided by the body. (Höffe, 2003:92).

and nutrition. Higher type is the “sensitive” soul which enables perception, and locomotion. The highest type is the “rational” soul. It enables all of the previously mentioned abilities, but also adds something which is present only in human beings – the intellect. (Shields, 2003)

Summarizing, according to the commentaries, man in Aristotle’s philosophy is:

“A cursory review indicates that man is a living, breathing, animal endowed with soul; he investigates the world and deliberates how he himself should live, pondering his actions as represented dramatically by the tragic poets. Aristotelian man sleeps, dreams, and is anxious about old age; living in a political state and fascinated by the animal world, he looks to the heavens in hope of discerning his destiny.” (O'Rourke, 2011:1)

Aristotle, belonging to an anthropological period of ancient Greek philosophy, had as one of his major concerns the nature of human beings. His philosophy rests heavily on the idea that human beings have a certain nature, some set of characteristics which are universal and have some sort of a function. Those characteristics will heavily influence what Aristotle thinks is a worthy human life, as well as what motivates, or should motivate, human beings. These issues are also important for every theory of motivation because without finding out what characteristics of human beings are there can basically be no theory of motivation.

Besides Aristotle in this thesis another philosopher significant for the development of the western philosophical tradition and relevant for the study of human nature will be presented. British empiricist David Hume tried to introduce the scientific method of inquiry to the issue of human nature, with the presupposition that in understanding human beings better, all other sciences shall also advance in the understanding of their phenomena.

1.2.5. David Hume

David Hume was born in 1711 and died in 1776. He first studied law at the University of Edinburgh, but later switched to study of philosophy because he became exhilarated with philosophical inquiry which has opened to him a new scene of thought. (Ayer, 1980, p. 2) In his career, he unsuccessfully applied to two universities. First he applied to the University of Edinburgh, and then later to the University of Glasgow. Despite not managing to get a position at the university, he is today considered as one of the most important philosophers in the western tradition.

First a connection between Hume's philosophy and the issue of motivation will be presented, than a short description and intention of Hume's study of human nature. Finally, a short overview of Hume's philosophy, concerning human beings will be given.

The connection between theories of motivation described in this thesis and David Hume is not as clear as in Aristotle's case. Nonetheless, when looking at Hume's philosophy, there is an entire field of study dedicated to the so-called Humean theory of motivation. Hume in his writings reserves a special place for, as he calls it, the science of man. More precisely, Hume is of the opinion that all sciences have some connection to human nature. He is even trying to resolve some issues and improve understanding in all spheres of science by pointing out such a connection. (Noonan, 2003, p. 34) Hume talks about this in the beginning of his *Treatise* like this:

“Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even *Mathematics*, *Natural Philosophy* and *Natural Religion*, are in some means dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. 'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding and cou'd explain the nature of the ideas we employ and of the operations we perform in our reasonings.” (T., p. xv)

By directly going to the center of all the sciences, i.e., to human nature, issues those sciences are dealing with become solvable. From there it is possible to proceed to other different areas of other sciences. Again, Hume is quite specific:

“Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital and centre of these sciences, to human nature itself; which once being masters of, we may everywhere else hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more fully those, which are the objects of pure curiosity. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.” (T., p. xvi)

If this is true, then it is of the paramount importance to try to establish such a science of man. But if all other sciences in the end rest on the foundations made by science of man, on what grounds it is possible to build a science of man? Hume is an advocate of an experimental method. Hume says: “And as the science of man is the only solid foundation from the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation.” (T., p. xvi)

What Hume is trying to achieve is to introduce the methods customary held for Newtonian sciences into the study of human nature (Noonan, 2003, p. 37) The science of man should explain the diverse phenomena of human life in all their complexity by appeal to general principles. (Stroud, 1977, p. 3) Important consequences of such an approach is that everything starts with empirical data, and not with some kind of, as Copleston (2003, p. 261) says, intuition of the essence of human mind. General principles have to be reached by the experimental method of reasoning. (Stroud, 1977, p. 4) If the science of man is build on such foundations then the results will be the following: “Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility, to any other of human comprehension.” (T. p.xix)

Hume’s described approach is similar to what SDT proponents are using. Namely, by carefully collecting and comparing data in order to develop a certain science he is much closer to the modern approach to motivation studies. (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012) As a preview it might be said that while Hume, insisting on Newtonian methods is more similar to SDT, while Maslow using his observation method is more closely connected to for example Aristotle.

Hume holds that his method ought to be used to clarify many issues arising when human nature is being researched. This research can be approached in two ways. One way is to look at human beings as mainly created for action. The results of such an approach will try to govern actions of human beings in a virtuous way. (EHU, I,1, p. 5) Another way of looking at human beings is to emphasize and focus their reasonableness, i.e., to look upon them as reasoning beings. The results of this second approach will try to improve the understanding of them, and not so much their behavior. (Copleston, 2003, p. 262) Hume says the following about the philosophers who choose the second approach: “They regard human nature as a subject of speculation; and with narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any

particular object, action or behaviour.” (EHU, I,2, p.6) This again is stunningly similar to what different theories motivation are trying to accomplish.

In deciding to follow the principles of Newtonian style sciences for research of human nature Hume points out that there are some difficulties. Namely:

“For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must equally be impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observations of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations.” (T, p. xvii)

“And tho’ we must endeavor to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ‘tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience, and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.” (T, p.xvii)

“But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to affirm, that ’tis a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, wheather they be such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or practiced in the shops of the meanest artisans.” (T, p. xviii)

“None of them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority.” (T, p. xviii)

Noonan (2003, p.38) suggests that the possible solution to that methodological difficulty can be found in the following Hume’s text: “We must therefore glean up our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by men’s behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures.” (T, p. xix)

Before proceeding to describe Hume’s theory it is appropriate to point out the meaning of the word “moral” as Hume is using it. Hume uses the term “moral philosophy” in the ordinary 18th century meaning, as “pertaining to what is specifically human”²⁴ and it refers to science of human nature (Noonan, 2003, p. 5)

²⁴ This is also clearly stated in the explanatory notes in *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* as follows: “‘moral’ is here used in the common eighteen-century sense, meaning related to the human sphere, rather than in

Hume's theory of human nature represents a new vision of human beings (Stroud, 1977, p. 1) The novelty, according to Stroud (1977, pp. 7-8) is that it reverses the traditional conception of human nature by claiming that feeling and not reason is responsible for thinking and acting. This view is not in accordance with the traditional definition of human beings as rational animals who truly realize their nature only through reason. Basically, according to Hume, nothing in the world can fulfill conditions for being human being as set by the traditional definition of man as rational animal. This on the other hand does not mean that he denies that human beings are rational beings, only that the strict traditional definition is too hard to satisfy. (Stroud, 1977, p. 14)

In the discussions about the foundations for morality²⁵ Hume asserts that morality has a firm foundation in human nature. (Norton, 2006, p. 149) If something like that is stated then it also seems that there has to be something which actually can be called human nature, which in turn will serve as basis for morality.²⁶ What is indicative about human nature in Hume's account of morality is that he thinks that there is a point in which explanations of morality cannot go any further. That point is human nature. Actually Hume often states that human nature is something which cannot be more thoroughly explained. For example, in the *T* it is said that human nature is the ultimate explanation, and that it is unwise to try to explain it with some other principles which are allegedly more ultimate. Furthermore, in *T* it is also stated that the effects in the mental world are extraordinary and that its causes must be resolved into the original qualities of human nature, which is mostly unknown and into which Hume does not want to venture further. Hume's words are: "Its effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolv'd into *original* qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain." (T, p. 13) Also, at the near the end of the *T*²⁷ something called the particular original principle of human nature is mentioned, but

the more usual modern sense of ethics. Hence Hume's equation of 'moral philosophy', with the science of human nature'" (EHU, p. 185.)

²⁵ Although morality is not in the center of this thesis, the fact that Hume uses the idea of human nature as foundations of morality indicates that he agrees with the notion that human beings have certain traits which are a part of their nature. Furthermore, such traits explain certain things related to human beings (in this case morality). It is of lesser concern that they cannot be explained, or more precisely that Hume thinks that they cannot.

²⁶ Concerning morality, commentators state that Hume thinks that moral skepticism is wrong, as are the positions of rationalists and voluntarists. (Norton, 2006, pp. 155-156)

²⁷ Considering this principle in *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* Hume's words are: "It is needless to push our researches so far as to ask, why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others. It is sufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle in human nature. We must stop somewhere in our examination of causes; and there are, in every science, some general principles, beyond which we cannot hope to find any principle more general. No man is absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of others. The first has a natural tendency to give pleasure; the second, pain. This every one may find in himself. It is not probable, that these principles can be resolved into principles more simple and universal, whatever attempts may have been made to that purpose. But if it were possible, it belongs not to the present subject; and we may here safely consider these

Hume says that it is the fundament, i.e., that it cannot be accounted for. Hume says: “Some of these qualities produce satisfaction in others by particular *original* principles of human nature, which cannot be accounted for.” (T, p. 590)

Besides Aristotle and Hume, a third philosopher whose work on human nature will be presented is Immanuel Kant. During his career Kant often tackled with the issue of what human beings are. This is evidenced by the scope of his lectures on anthropology, as well as his textbook on anthropology. In addition it seems that he influenced notable philosophical anthropologists such as Max Scheller and by extension Martin Heidegger. Furthermore, Kant is often studied and compared to Hume, and is often looked at as a sort of ending or a meeting point of rationalism and empiricism in the modern philosophy.

1.2.6. Immanuel Kant

Kant was born in 1724 in Königsberg (today Kaliningrad), which was at that time capital of Prussia. He remained there for his entire life and died in 1804. He spent his career in and around Königsberg working as a private tutor, a librarian, *Privatdozent* at the University of Königsberg, and finally a faculty member at the same university. Kant stands out as a notable representative of enlightenment in Germany, and he is responsible for introducing the course on anthropology to the university curriculum in Germany.

Question about humans is persistent issue in Kant’s philosophy. (Jacobs, Kain, 2003, p.1). Kant’s famous three questions are: “What can I know?”, “What ought I do?”, and “What may I hope?”. Besides these three, there is also a fourth question: “What are human beings?”. The answer to the fourth question will also affect the previous three questions. Kant asks these questions about human beings in three separate texts. Those texts are: *Logic* (Ak 9:25), in a *Letter to Stäudlin* (Ak 11:429), and *1790-1791 Pölitz* (Ak 28:533-34). In a *Letter to Stäudlin* the text goes like this:

“... The plan I prescribed for myself a long time ago calls for an examination of the field of pure philosophy with a view to solving three problems: (1) What can I know?” (metaphysics). (2) What ought I to do? (moral philosophy.) (3) What may I hope?

principles as original: happy, if we can render all the consequences sufficiently plain and perspicuous!” (EPM 5.2,219-20n) About this text Norton (2003, p.178) says that it is usually interpreted as a sign of the shift in Hume’s position. Namely, the principle of humanity or fellow-feeling replaced the principle of sympathy which is central in the *Treatise*. Be that as it may, and whatever the ultimate principle of human nature may be, it is the original principle with which investigations must end.

(philosophy of religion). A fourth question ought to follow, finally: What is man? (anthropology, a subject on which I have lectured for over twenty years).” (LS, Ak 11:429)

Disciplines tasked with answering the questions, as can be seen, are metaphysics, morals, religion, and anthropology. Metaphysics should answer the first question, morals the second, and religion should provide answers to the third one. Final, fourth question is answered in the discipline of Anthropology. First three questions are usually thought to refer to the fourth, as well as their respective disciplines. (Wood, 2003, p. 38)

In this section, first possible connections with motivation studies will be outlined, than the way how Kant’s anthropology was created, and finally a short overview of the theory will be presented.

Although Kant is not specifically referenced by theorists behind theories of motivation mentioned in this text he was chosen to be included because of his importance for the development of philosophical anthropology, education, and in general science about human beings. His contributions in philosophy, as well as his relation to Hume also make him a suitable candidate to be included. In addition, his emphasis on the role of desires in his account of action, as it is presented in the third part of the thesis further support his inclusion in this thesis.

Kant’s anthropology has evolved from his lectures at the university and from other activities. First, Kant lectured on anthropology from 1772 to his retirement probably in 1796. Eventually, in 1798, he prepared a textbook for his course in anthropology. (Louden, 2011, p. xvii) Kant himself gave a description of his course in anthropology and its goals in a letter he wrote to one of his students called Marcus Herz. (Louden, 2011, p. 78)

“This winter I am giving, for the second time, a lecture course on Anthropologie, a subject that I now intend to make into a proper academic discipline. But my plan is quite unique. I intend to use it to disclose the sources of all the (practical) sciences, the science of morality, of skill, of human intercourse, of the way to educate and govern human beings, and thus of everything that pertains to the practical. I shall seek to discuss phenomena and their laws rather than the foundations of the possibility of human thinking in general. Hence the subtle and to my view, eternally futile inquiries as to the manner in which bodily organs are connected with thought I omit entirely. I include so many observations of ordinary life that my auditors have constant occasion to compare their ordinary experience with my remarks and thus, from beginning to the end, find the lectures entertaining and never dry. In my spare time, I am trying to prepare a preliminary study for the students out of this very pleasant empirical study,

an analysis of the nature of skill (prudence) and even wisdom that, along with physical geography and distinct from all other learning, can be called knowledge of the world.” (LMH, Ak 10:145-146)

A short overview of Kant’s anthropological theory²⁸ can be given by looking at different meanings of the word “pragmatic” Kant uses to describe his anthropology. The word pragmatic is being used with four different meanings. First, Kant uses the word pragmatic to differentiate his anthropology from physiological anthropology, second from the scholastic discipline, third to emphasize the usefulness of his teachings, and fourth to point out to the prudential value of his anthropology.

It can be said that the first meaning in which Kant uses the word pragmatic is a result of general circumstances in which he started working on his anthropology. Namely, his pragmatic anthropology is a response to Ernst Platner’s²⁹ physiological anthropology published in his work *Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise*. (Wood, 2003, p. 40; Loudon, 2011, pp. 79-80) Thinkers like Platner study only what nature makes of human beings, while on the other hand Kant’s pragmatic anthropology also studies what human beings as free agents can and must do. This is quite clearly stated by Kant:

“A doctrine of knowledge of the human being, systematically formulated (anthropology), can exist either in a physiological or in a pragmatic point of view. - Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being; pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself.” (Anth, Ak: 7:119)

²⁸ According to commentators, e.g. Loudon (2011, p. xviii) there are three other fields where remarks on anthropology can be found in Kant’s philosophy. Those fields are geography, history, and education. Concerning geography, Kant is of the opinion that geography and anthropology are closely connected areas. They are connected in a way that knowledge about human nature and knowledge about the world together comprise the knowledge of the world. History on the other hand is important because the vocation or destiny of human beings (*Bestimmung*) and their focus on the future is what makes human beings different in relation to other beings on earth. Kant’s historical writings deal with those kinds of issues. Finally, as will be presented later, education is of utmost importance for making human beings truly and completely human. In other words, education is important to realize their potential. “The human being can only become human through education” (Ed, Ak 9: 443)

²⁹ Both Platner and Kant have influenced future anthropology. Loudon (2011, p. 81) summarizes their influence like this: “Broadly speaking, the physiological anthropology promoted by Platner and other philosophical physicians of the Enlightenment is the predecessor to physical anthropology, whereas Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, with its emphasis on free human action, is the progenitor of various philosophical and existentialist anthropologies. For instance, Max Scheler, an important voice in this latter tradition who also influenced Martin Heidegger, holds that the human being is not only an animal being but also “a ‘spiritual’ being [*ein ‘geistiges’ Wesen*]” that is “no longer tied to its drives and environments, but rather ‘free from the environment’ [*umweltfrei*], or, as we shall say, ‘open to the world’ [*welttoffen*].”

Basically, pragmatic anthropology deals with both human actions, and with human nature. And what is important, human nature is understood as something at least partially self-produced by free action. Furthermore, the idea that pragmatic anthropology deals with what human beings acting freely can make of themselves is close to what SDT has as its goal. As another commentator concludes:

“From this description, it looks like pragmatic anthropology is intended to include “practical anthropology” – the empirical part of moral philosophy (Ak 4: 388), since that study is also supposed to deal with human nature in light of human freedom and what human beings *ought* to do.” (Wood, 2003, p. 41)

The second meaning in which Kant uses the word “pragmatic” is to emphasize the difference between his anthropology and the scholastic knowledge. That kind of knowledge stands more for, at least according to Kant, “being acquainted with the world”. On the other hand, pragmatic knowledge, i.e., “knowledge of the world” (*Weltkenntnis*) involves “having a world”. (Wood, 2003, p. 41) This difference is nicely put by Kant using the following example of a play: “In addition, the expressions “to know the world” and “to have the world” are rather far from each other in their meaning, since one only understands the play that one has watched, while the other has participated in it.” (Anth, Ak 7:120) The point about this comparison is that pragmatic anthropology should involve a kind of knowledge about human nature that is gained from interacting with others, and not just by observing³⁰ them. (Wood, 2003, p. 41)

Furthermore, knowledge procured in the course of using pragmatic anthropology should not be the end in itself; it should also be useable somehow. This is the third mentioned meaning of the word pragmatic³¹. (Wood, 2003, p. 42) Kant says the following: “(...) all theoretical speculation about this is a pure waste of time. - But if he uses perceptions concerning what has been found to hinder or stimulate memory in order to enlarge it or make it agile, and if he requires knowledge of the human being for this, then this would be a part of anthropology with a pragmatic purpose, and this is precisely what concerns us here.” (Anth, Ak, 7:119)

³⁰ This might go against armchair philosophizing about management in organizations, and generally about the business world without actually being engaged in business activities. In short, against something that is being done in this thesis.

³¹ As a side note, the use of the word pragmatic is derived here from the idea of pragmatic history, the study of history undertaken for the purpose of utility in action. Here utility encompasses technical knowledge, prudential knowledge and moral knowledge. In Germany the term was primarily applied to Hume’s work. (Wood, 2003, p. 42)

Finally, the fourth meaning of the word pragmatic is pragmatic as prudential. Prudential here stands for the knowledge which furthers happiness of human beings. Kant describes prudence as:

“There is, however, one end that can be presupposed as actual in the case of all rational beings (insofar as imperatives apply to them, namely as dependent beings), and therefore one purpose that they not merely could have but that we can safely presuppose they all actually do have by a natural necessity, and that purpose is happiness. The hypothetical imperative that represents the practical necessity of an action as a means to the promotion of happiness is assertoric. It may be set forth not merely as necessary to some uncertain, merely possible purpose but to a purpose that can be presupposed surely and a priori in the case of every human being, because it belongs to his essence. Now, skill in the choice of means to one's own greatest well-being can be called *prudence* in the narrowest sense.”(Gr, Ak 4: 415-416)

Wood (2003, p.42) concludes the following in regards to the prudential knowledge gained from Kant's teachings of pragmatic anthropology: “Kant's audience is often being told what will help them to use their own capacities to advance their ends, especially their well-being, and also what will help them make use of the characteristics of others for their own advantage.”

It seems that every motivational theory is also connected with furthering human happiness in some way. Every content theory of motivation in this thesis deals with the satisfaction of some needs that human beings have. This will be covered later in the text but as a preview it can be mentioned that for example Maslow, in his hierarchy of needs when talking about self-actualization is also talking about the wellness of human beings. Herzberg in his discussion of two origins of human needs also tries to promote well-being. Finally in SDT the notion of human well-being is the pivotal one.

In the end it is appropriate to point out that, at least according to Kant, human nature is hard to define. This is so because it is impossible to find what is special to only human beings because human species is only one possible variant of rational nature. Unfortunately, it is impossible to compare human beings with some other variant simply because we do not know of any. Basically, if it is not possible to compare it to any other variant, then it is not possible to find *differentia specifica* for human beings. (Wood, 2003, p. 47) On top of that, when one looks at possible regularities in the behavior of human beings – which may in turn point to human nature – the problem is that those regularities are done in the context of habits. In that way the real underlying principles of that behavior remain unclear. (Wood, 2003, p. 48) One

possibility to avoid that problem, suggested by Wood (2003, p. 48), would be to observe un-self-conscious behavior, but that approach, as Wood also points out, is problematic since human beings hide their true selves. For example: “If a human being notices that someone is observing him and trying to study him, he will either appear embarrassed (self-conscious) and *cannot* show himself as he really is; or he dissembles, and does not want to be known as he is.” (Anth, Ak 7:121) Another quite popular approach which tries to circumvent the mentioned problems of observation in the study of human nature is self-observation. Unfortunately, this approach is also not efficient because when a human being observes (in a methodological way) himself its tendency to represent himself in some artificial way will again surface. (Wood, 2003, p. 48) Kant is quite clear on this: “For without noticing it, we make supposed discoveries of what we ourselves have carried into ourselves, like a Bourignon with his flattering ideas, or a Pascal with his terrifying and fearful ones.” (Anth, Ak 7:133) Despite all of the mentioned difficulties which Kant encounters, still remarks about human beings and human nature can be found in his texts as it will be presented in the second part of the thesis.

Conclusions

The intention of the first part of the thesis was threefold. First, a context for the entire thesis needed to be sketched out by giving short descriptions of philosophical anthropology and content theories of motivation. This was done in part 1.1.1 for philosophical anthropology, and in part 1.1.2 for content theories of motivation.

The second intention was to validate the first hypothesis which is that: *(H1) Issue on human being is interior of philosophy, although not always explicatively stated. This issue persists throughout history of philosophy.* This was done in part 1.3 where the hypothesis was broken down into three propositions: P1_{H1} Issue on human being is interior of philosophy; P2_{H1} Although not always explicatively stated; P3_{H1} Issue persists throughout history of philosophy. All three of the propositions have been confirmed.

P1_{H1} was confirmed by short overview of the texts written by Aristotle, Hume and Kant. P2_{H1} was verified through showing that some philosophers discussed in this thesis clearly propose statements on what human beings or their nature is (Aristotle), while others (Hume, and Kant) do not say this explicitly. In addition the criterion for judging explicativeness of philosopher’s statement was suggested. The criteria suggested is if authors clearly say something like: “what human beings are?”, or “human nature is...”, or “human

beings are...” then their statements are explicit. If this is not the case, then issues on human beings are not explicatively stated in that particular school of thought or by that particular philosopher. Finally, P3_{H1} was confirmed by an overview of the history of philosophy where it can be seen that every period from ancient Greek philosophy till contemporary philosophical movements has, in way or another, discussed the issue of human beings, and by showing a continuous relation, either through education or through acquaintance between Aristotle, Hume, and Kant.

Third, authors and their theories needed to be described in order to provide a general framework for further research in following parts of the texts. The thinkers discussed in this thesis are: Maslow, Herzberg, Deci, Ryan, Aristotle, Hume, and Kant and descriptions were given in subsections 1.2.1 through 1.2.6.

In part what follows, a more detailed search for statements about human nature made by both content theorists and philosophers will be presented.

2. HUMAN NATURE

Summary

As it was pointed out in a general outline of the thesis, the second part is aimed at validating the second hypothesis. The second hypothesis is:

(H2) Philosophical–anthropological questions are only partially examined in the various aspects of organizational sciences.

The hypothesis is researched through textual analysis of works by the four motivational theorists. Generally speaking, organizational sciences rely heavily on presupposed understanding of the concept of human nature. In content motivational theories an accepted position is that some factors motivate every human being. This implies that something resembling human nature exists. Otherwise it could not be possible to claim that those factors motivate every human being. This claim leads to a “folk-philosophical” understanding of human nature among the content motivational theorists. The remarks of mentioned motivational theorists are followed by the remarks on the same topic made by selected philosophers. In the conclusion the fundamental elements of both subparts are emphasized.

2. 1. Propositions of selected content theorists on human nature

2.1.1. Propositions about human nature in Maslow's work

Maslow was quite aware of the difficulties one encounters when trying to explain what human beings are. Those difficulties can be objective, methodological, or more broadly scientific in nature (for example finding the right methods, or subjects, or ways to validate the findings). On the other hand, answers to question what the nature of human being is should have relevance for every individual. This is the source of more subjective difficulties. Maslow illustrated this by “The trouble is that human species is the only species which finds it hard to be a species” (Maslow, 1971, p. 179).

A great variety of propositions about human nature can be found in Maslow’s work. In this thesis his propositions are grouped into four categories. In the first category are general propositions about human beings, and the role of a society for the development of human

beings. The second category consists of propositions derived from Maslow's treatment of human needs. The third category contains propositions derived from the way how Maslow understands the process of self-actualization. Finally, in the fourth category the propositions about human nature derived from the needs "to know" and "to understand" are collected.

According to Maslow it is quite dangerous to tell human beings what they ought to do, without finding what they actually are. So, the best way to find what one ought to do is to find who he is. As Maslow cleverly puts it: "(...) the path to ethical and value decision, to wiser choices, to oughtness, is via "isness," via discovery of facts, truth, reality, the nature of particular person." (Maslow, 1971, pp. 106-107) That is what psychotherapy is meant to do. This seems to stand in opposition to Hume's famous Is-Ought distinction. From this quote an important proposition about human nature and a nice starting point for the description of Maslow's view of human beings can be read. Basically, what Maslow is saying is:

P_{MNI}: In order to find out what human beings ought to do, they first must find what their nature is.

It is important that both aspects of humans are taken into account if a true description of human beings is to be achieved. Furthermore, Maslow claims that human beings must be looked both in their highest states and in their humanely limited states. It is the only way that wholeness of human beings can be perceived.

"Human life will never be understood unless its highest aspirations are taken into account. Growth, self-actualization, the striving toward health, the quest for identity and autonomy, the yearning for excellence (and other ways of phrasing the striving "upward") must by now be accepted beyond question as a widespread and perhaps universal human tendency." (Maslow, 1970, pp. xii-xiii)

"To perceive unitively we must be able to perceive both the sacred and profane aspects of a person. Not perceiving these universal, eternal, essential symbolic qualities is (...) therefore a kind of partial blindness. (...) The relevance of this for our topic lies in the fact that this is a technique for perceiving simultaneously the *is* and *ought*, the immediate, concrete actuality and also what might be, what could be, the end value that not only could come to pass but is there now, existing before our eyes." (Maslow, 1971, p. 112)

From this the following proposition about human nature can be stated.

P_{MN2}: Human beings are both part of the material and “spiritual” world.

So, human beings, according to Maslow, are part of both material and “spiritual” world. In order to correctly perceive human beings every part of them has to be taken together, and one is not allowed to pick one trait and leave out another for whatever reason.³²

From the idea of two-sided nature of human beings, Maslow continues like this: “The integrated wholeness of the organism must be one of the foundation stones of motivational theory.” (Maslow, 1943) A proposition about human nature which can be created out of the Maslow's sentence is that there is wholeness to human beings, and it has to be taken into account when creating theories of motivation. This seems to be true for creating a theory of motivation, but the same can be applied when creating the philosophical account of human nature.

P_{MN3}: Human beings have to be looked at as a whole. This in turn implies that there is an underlying unity or integrity of human beings.

Although Maslow's theory placed in the work related context will be visited later in this text at this point it seems appropriate to point out what Maslow says about the results of his approach to study of human nature. Those results, although in work related context, provide additional findings about the nature of human beings.

“It draws some of the truly revolutionary consequences of the discovery that human nature has been sold short, that man has a higher nature which is just as “instinctoid” as his lower nature, and that his higher nature includes the needs for meaningful work, for responsibility, for creativeness, for being fair and just, for doing what is worthwhile and for preferring to do it well.” (Maslow, 1971, p. 228)

P_{MN4}: Human beings have a higher nature which is “instinctoid”³³ as well as lower nature.

³² It is always important how one defines a certain characteristic of human beings. Because, the way some characteristic is defined will also impact how a being having that characteristic is looked at, and judged. For example, if sexuality is defined as selfish, then obviously the beings which possess such a characteristic will not be looked upon with favor. Maslow states this quite clearly with: “(...) basic human nature has been called dirty, evil, or barbaric because some of its characteristics were *a priori* defined to be so, If you define urination or menstruation as dirty, then the human body becomes dirty by this semantic trick.” (Maslow, 1971, pp. 110-111)

³³ It is interesting to say that he also points out that they should be considered not only as needs, but also as human rights, because: “This follows immediately upon granting that human beings have a right to be human in

On the same note, when Maslow was asked to condense his entire book *Motivation and Personality* into one sentence he responded:

"(...) in addition to what the psychologies of the time had to say about human nature, man also had a higher nature and that this was instinctoid, i.e., part of his essence. And if I could have had a second sentence, I would have stressed the profoundly holistic nature of human nature in contradiction to the analytic-dissecting-atomistic-Newtonian approach of the behaviorisms and of Freudian psychoanalysis." (Maslow, 1970, p. ix)

Connected to the materiality and spirituality of human beings as well as the request for looking at them as a whole, another thing might be added:

"The value life (spiritual, religious, philosophical, axiological, etc.) is an aspect of human biology and is on the same continuum with the "lower" animal life (rather than being separated, dichotomized, or mutually exclusive realms). It is probably therefore specie-wide, supracultural even though it must be actualized by culture in order to exist." (Maslow, 1971, p. 313)

A number of propositions about human beings can be given from the upper quote.

P_{MN5}: "Spiritual life" is species wide, so are its traits.

P_{MN6}: The potentiality of the "spiritual life" must be actualized by culture.

The second proposition taken from the quote stresses the importance of culture and with it the importance of society in Maslow's theory. The importance of society, even more the "good society", for actualization of human beings can be seen from the following: "(...) actualization of the highest human potentials is possible - on the mass basis - only under "good conditions". Or more directly, good human beings will generally need a good society in which to grow." (Maslow, 1971, p. 7)

Concerning the role of society in the quest for human nature Maslow (1970, p.xvii) writes: "In a word, man in his a biological essence, but this is very weakly and subtly determined, and needs special hunting techniques to discover it; we must discover,

the same sense that cats have a right to be cats. In order to be fully human, these need and metaneed gratifications are necessary, and may therefore be considered to be natural rights." (Maslow, 1970, p. xiii)

individually and subjectively, our animal nature.” (Maslow, 1970, p. xviii) This point is important when thinking about human nature in the way Maslow did because it leads him to the conclusion that: “(...) human nature is extremely malleable in the sense that it is easy for culture and environment to kill off altogether or to diminish genetic potential, although it cannot create or even increase this potential.” (Maslow, 1970, p. xviii) He then continues why this is important for society and the way it is being organized:

“So far as society is concerned, this seems to me to be an extremely strong argument in favor of absolute equality of opportunity for every baby born into the world. It is also an especially powerful argument in favor of the good society, since human potentials are so easily lost or destroyed by the bad environment. This is quite apart from the contention already put forward that the sheer fact of membership in the human species constitutes *ipso facto* a right to become fully human, i.e., to actualize all the human potentials possible. *Being* a human being – in the sense of being born to human species – must be defined also in terms of *becoming* a human being. In this sense a baby is only potentially a human being, and must grow into humanness in the society and the culture, the family.” (Maslow, 1970, p. xviii)

The part of the previous quote, which states that baby is only a potentially human being, and must grow into humanness through activities within a society, seems reminiscent on the Kant’s view that human beings become human only through education. It is also very much Aristotelian in tone.

When describing the primary focus of theory of motivation Maslow notes that: “Such a theory should stress and center itself upon ultimate or basic goals rather than partial or superficial ones, upon ends rather than means to these ends.” (Maslow, 1943) This indicates that there is a difference among goals. Namely, some of them are basic, important, while other are in a lot of instances superficial – as means to an end, rather than the end in itself. From this the following proposition about human nature can be suggested.

P_{MN7}: There are goals, ends, purposes which are basic to human beings.

Maslow thinks that basic goals are not culturally relative, and are universal to all human beings. Although the goals are not culturally relative, there are various culturally relative methods for obtaining the goals. In other words, how these goals get actualized or neglected is influenced by the society, but the goals themselves are universal. Maslow is clear: “There are usually available various cultural paths to the same goal. Therefore conscious, specific, local-

cultural desires are not fundamental in motivation theory as the more basic, unconscious ones.” (Maslow, 1943) The existence of such goals might help to explain the apparent cultural diversity. Those differences are simply instrumental ends and activities meant to satisfy the essential underlying universal human needs. It appears that Maslow is claiming that the phenomena of cultural relativity, very often confusing for motivational research, is basically the diversity of means to accomplish the common ends. So the following proposition about human nature can be derived.

P_{MN8}: There are basic, non-culturally related, universal goals.

A number of propositions on human nature can be seen from Maslow’s treatment of human needs. Maslow says: “Human needs arrange themselves in hierarchies of pre-potency. That is to say, the appearance of one need usually rests on the prior satisfaction of another, more pre-potent need. Man is a perpetually wanting animal (...).” (Maslow, 1943) At least two propositions about human nature can be taken from this quote. The first proposition is that there are different kinds of needs. Some of them are more potent than others. In order to satisfy the needs, or explain how they appear, attention must be paid to their hierarchy. Namely, ranking of human needs from lower to higher in the ascension of motivation shows a correlation with animal aspect to fully human aspect. The second proposition is that it is impossible to achieve a state when no need is present. This is so because needs are such that satisfaction of one need leads to the appearance of another. From this it can be said that human beings in their nature are always in some kind need.

P_{MN9}: Human needs are arranged in hierarchies.

P_{MN10}. Human being is perpetually wanting animal.

As it was already said there are different kinds of needs present in every human being. Those needs range from the most basic ones, such as various physiological needs to highly advanced, sometimes referred to as fully human. The most basic needs are the so called physiological ones, for example the need for food. If a human being is lacking everything in the fullest sense of the word then its actions are motivated by physiological needs. In other words, if human being lacks even the most basic things necessary to sustain his life, then his action will be directed towards fulfilling those basic needs. In Maslow’s words:

“What this means specifically is, that in the human being who is missing everything in life in an extreme fashion, it is most likely that the major motivation would be the physiological needs rather than any others. A person who is lacking food, safety, love, and esteem would most probably hunger for food more strongly than for anything else.” (Maslow, 1943)

From this quote the following proposition about human nature can be stated:

P_{MN11}: Human beings are irremovably tied to biological part of their nature, and the “biological needs” stemming from it.³⁴

Besides physiological, human beings also have, previously described, safety needs. So the following proposition can be stated.

P_{MN12}: Human beings need to feel safe and secure.

In addition to physiological and safety needs, human also have other needs. Maslow says that: “If both the physiological and the safety needs are fairly well gratified³⁵, then there will emerge the love and affection and belongingness needs (...).” (Maslow, 1943)

P_{MN13}: Human beings require love, affection and belongingness.

“Higher” needs than the physiological, safety, love, affection, and belongingness are the needs of recognition. The terms “lower” and “higher” indicate the place of the need on the hierarchy of human needs Maslow developed. Recognition here is considered as both self-recognition and recognition from other members in the society, as well as the feeling of confidence which flows from it Maslow says: “All people in our society (with a few pathological exceptions) have a need or desire for a stable, firmly based, (usually) high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others.” (Maslow, 1943) Again, the proposition about human nature can be constructed.

³⁴ This proposition is probably confirmed not only in the context of Maslow’s theory but also in everyday experience. For example, if someone is lacking food most likely everything that person does will somehow revolve around the efforts to fulfill its need for food, and everything else like love, poetry, philosophy, etc. will be further down on the list.

³⁵ In Maslow’s statement it appears the degree of satisfaction appears to vary before the next emergent need arises. This ambiguity might result in problem for his theory.

P_{MN14}: Human beings require both self-recognition, and recognition by their peers.

Finally, human beings have a tendency to do what they are meant to do, to fully³⁶ actualize their potentials, and if that does not happen, human beings may, and often will experience restlessness. In Maslow notes:

“(…) we may still often (if not always) expect that a new discontent and restlessness will soon develop, unless the individual is doing what he is fitted for. (…) It refers to the desire for self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for him to become actualized in what he is potentially. This tendency might be phrased as the desire to become more and more what one is, to become everything that one is capable of becoming.” (Maslow, 1943)

P_{MN15}: Human beings have a need to actualize their potential, and in that way to fulfill themselves, otherwise discontent will appear.

The point Maslow is trying to make is that human beings are driven to actualize their potentials, and the ones that do that are healthy, while an unhealthy, in Maslow’s terminology, human being is going to be the one who has basic needs ungratified in a chronic way. Maslow phrases it like this:

“I should then say simply that a healthy man is primarily motivated by his needs to develop and actualize his fullest potentialities and capacities. If a man has any other basic needs in any active, chronic sense, then he is simply an unhealthy man. He is as surely sick as if he had suddenly developed a strong salt-hunger or calcium hunger.” (Maslow, 1943)

“All the evidence that we have (mostly clinical evidence, but already some other kinds of research evidence) indicates that it is reasonable to assume in practically every

³⁶ Self-actualizing human beings have, according to Maslow (1971, pp. 42-43) traits which he calls being values (B-values), metaneeds; and metapathologies. According to Maslow human beings who are self actualizing devote their lives to what he calls B-Values. B-Values are ultimate and intrinsic, and may be referred to as the meaning of life for most people. He states that there are fourteen of these values. The full list of B-values that Maslow mentions is: 1. truth; 2. goodness; 3. beauty; 4. wholeness; 4.a dichotomy-transcendence; 5. aliveness; 6. uniqueness; 7. perfection; 7a. necessity; 8. completion; 9. justice; 9a. order; 10. simplicity; 11. richness; 12. effortlessness; 13. playfulness; 14. self-sufficiency. (Maslow, 1971, pp. 128-129) A little differently numbered list can be found in Maslow (1968, p. 83). Metaneeds are actually mentioned B-Values, because those values act as needs, and if they are not achieved they will bring about some illness, the same as with the basic five kinds of needs. Maslow refers to that illness as metapathology.

human being, and certainly in almost every newborn baby, that there is an active will toward health, an impulse toward growth, or toward the actualization of human potentialities.” (Maslow, 1971, p. 24)

What this quote shows, besides the fact that Maslow assumes that human beings are from the very beginning of their lives in most part oriented toward growth, is that there are some potentialities which are in human beings just because they are human beings, or it might be stated, it is in their nature. Unfortunately, not all people actually achieve, for a great variety of reasons, the state in which their potentialities are actualized.³⁷

From everything said on needs in Maslow’s theory, and seen in everyday experience, follows that the entire *Weltanschauung* of human beings is relative to the context they find themselves in and changes accordingly how the needs change. Maslow again gives an example which includes human being who is starving.

“Another peculiar characteristic of the human organism when it is dominated by a certain need is that the whole philosophy of the future tends also to change. For our chronically and extremely hungry man, Utopia can be defined very simply as a place where there is plenty of food. (...) Life itself tends to be defined in terms of eating. Anything else will be defined as unimportant. Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy, may all be waved aside as fripperies which are useless since they fail to fill the stomach.” (Maslow, 1943)

Third source of propositions about human nature can be found in Maslow’s understanding of the self-actualization process³⁸. According to Maslow (1971, pp. 43-49), there are eight ways in which human being self-actualizes. Those ways are:

1. experiencing things fully, vividly, and selflessly
2. making a choice, and that choice has to be toward growth and not out of fear
3. there is a self to be actualized, according to Maslow human beings are not *tabula rasa*

³⁷ Interesting point about human beings that Maslow is making is related to something he calls the Jonah complex (Maslow, 1971, pp. 34-39). The Jonah complex is fear of achieving the best one can achieve. Connected to that Maslow notices that although human beings often admire great men, they in the same time are often hostile toward great human beings. The reason for such a state of mind is that great human beings (great by intelligence, virtue, looks, etc) remind the rest that they are lacking to a certain point that quality which is in question. Only overcoming such a fear of success, according to Maslow a human beings can become truly great.

³⁸ For Maslow the self-actualization does not happen in young people, at least in his culture, because, young human beings still have not achieved their identity, autonomy, nor have they experienced enduring romantic love relationship, nor found their calling, etc. That is why it is appropriate to differentiate between fully-human, self-actualizing human beings and the concept of health at any age level. (Maslow, 1970, p. xx)

This idea that human beings are not *tabula rasa* might need further explanation. According to Maslow:

“(…) to talk of self-actualization implies that there is a self to be actualized. A human being is not *tabula rasa*, not a lump of clay or Plasticine. He is something which is already there, at least a “cartilaginous” structure of some kind. A human being is at minimum, his temperament, his biochemical balances, and so on.” (Maslow, 1971, p. 44)

Following two propositions about the nature of human beings can be stated.

P_{MN16}: Human beings are not *tabula rasa*.

P_{MN17}: Human beings at the minimum are their temperament, their biochemical balances.

Continuing the way of self-actualization:

4. being honest when in doubt, and accepting responsibility for ones doings
5. choosing to act in alignment with the guidelines from the first four ways
6. using one’s intelligence and being as good in something as much as possible
7. peak-experiences are important³⁹
8. self-actualization is actually finding out who one is.

The fourth category consists out of propositions which were derived from the needs “to know” and “to understand” which are present in human beings. One of the things that Maslow is clear about, and which is in alignment with one of the fundamental Aristotle’s remarks about human nature, as it will be seen later in the text, is that two desires are present in human beings. One of them is the desire to know, and the other one is the desire to understand. The second desire is a result of the fact that desire to know has no known limits. Human beings always, according to Maslow, have the need to know more. In other words human beings are searching for “meaning”. (Maslow, 1943) The search for meaning starts with the need for knowledge and then proceeds to the desire for understanding. Maslow explains the connection between the two like this:

³⁹ Peak experience is a term Maslow uses to describe in a general way the best or the happiest moments of human life, or experiences of ecstasy, etc. Those experiences come from profound aesthetic experiences. Some of the words used to describe those peak experiences in Maslow’s opinion are order, perfection, richness, effortlessness, self-sufficiency, etc. (Maslow, 1971, pp.101-102)

“Even after we know, we are impelled to know more and more minutely and microscopically on the one hand, and on the other, more and more extensively in the direction of a world philosophy, religion, etc. The facts that we acquire, if they are isolated or atomistic, inevitably get theorized about, and either analyzed or organized or both. This process has been phrased by some as the search for 'meaning.' We shall then postulate a desire to understand, to systematize, to organize, to analyze, to look for relations and meanings.” (Maslow, 1943)

P_{MN18}: Human beings are searching for meaning.

Continuing on the idea of human beings searching for a meaning is Maslow's (1971, p. 10) statement that human beings are: “choosing, deciding, seeking animal”. According to him that statement has often been proven. And actually, it is in alignment with many philosophical statements on human nature. So in conclusion for this part it can be said that:

P_{MN19}: Human beings are choosing, deciding, and seeking animals.

In the next chapter the propositions on human nature made by Herzberg are going to be presented.

2.1.2. Propositions about human nature in Herzberg's work

Following in the tradition of content⁴⁰ theories of motivation, the thesis examines Herzberg's propositions on human nature. The propositions are grouped together based on the context in which they were given. First propositions derived from Herzberg treatment of myths are mentioned. They are followed by propositions from his discussion of myths which were created in different periods of time. Finally, propositions derived from comparison of human beings and animals will conclude this section.

Framework of Herzberg's book *Work and the Nature of Man* is that every society has to establish myths in order to sustain its institutional forms. By myths he means the stories which aim to discover, explain and uncover worldviews, phenomena, historical events, etc. in a certain society. Over time, these myths become a sort of paradigm and are no longer

⁴⁰ According to Herzberg other theories which have the concept of self-actualization, or self-realization, as the ultimate goal of human beings (he mentions Jung, Goldstein, Maslow, etc) fails to specify factors relevant and necessary for research progress. So he will try to do that. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 56)

questioned. Another role of myths, claims Herzberg (1966, p.13), is that they provide emotional support and cater to intellectual needs of human beings. Intellectual needs of human beings are such that humans must be able to give certain unified meaning to the data that they are receiving. Herzberg (1966, p. 13) talks about such needs: “Man will disintegrate psychologically if he is unable to cope with the tremendous amount of information that he receives and if there is no possibility of giving the data some unified meaning.” From this a first proposition about the nature of human beings can be read out.

P_{HeN20}: Human beings have a need to give unified meaning to the information they receive.

Myths about human nature seem to be “most far reaching, ubiquitous, and serviceable”, because human beings are indivisible unit of society, no society can be if it does not have an implicit conception of what human beings are like. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 13) Since this is the case than Herzberg says that:”In the past, the accepted conceptions of man have been utilized by the dominant organizations to acquire and maintain control over society.”⁴¹ (Herzberg, 1966, p. 12) Again, if this is the role of the conceptions of human beings then it is not surprising that the institutions also devise the definitions of human beings which suite their needs. Herzberg says that:

“The definition of man lies within the loose, vertical cultural and psychological guidelines of societies: and it is confined horizontally only by narrow biological limits. All of us are free to define others in terms suitable to ourselves. The institutions of society are also free to evolve their own table of contents of human nature, which is, by the same token, a projection of institutional needs.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 14)

The most important definitions of human beings are created by top institutions in the society at a certain time. Such definitions are usually incomplete because only those human needs that are beneficial to the institution which creates the definition and the needs which maintain or reflect that institution’s values are put in front, and not needs of human beings per se. As a response to that, Herzberg claims that a human being has to be studied in his totality. That is the only way to get a true perspective on human beings. This is so because if human beings are studied in detail then only their animal nature, i.e., avoidance of pain will be found. On the

⁴¹ As it happens, those conceptions eventually no longer apply and become dangerous to the social structure. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 12)

other hand, if human beings want to be observed in all their faculties than they have to be looked at in totality and this is when the “human” side of human beings will be shown.

“As We study man in detail, more and more of the basic mechanisms that determine his reactions to environmental stimuli are found, and the means by which man has broadened his avoidance goals so extensively are delineated. In fact, psychology has made its greatest contribution in making lawful the content of man the animal.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 168)

“When we look at the man in his totality, however, we find that in addition to his avoidance nature there exists a human being – a human being who seems to be impelled to determine, to discover, to achieve, to actualize, to progress and to add to his existence.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 168)

The first quote talks about what Herzberg refers to as the Adam concept of man, and the second quote talks about the so called Abraham concept of man. Herzberg points out that “the two aspects of man are essentially independent” and that the fact is that “man exists as a duality”. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 169) These aspects Herzberg found will be explained later in greater detail, but concerning the method of study of needs that belong to either Adam or to Abraham he says that: “We cannot hope to gain a clue to Abraham by microscopic analysis, nor can we hope to gain an understanding of Adam by macroscopic procedures.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 169)

Since myths about human nature are obviously important to Herzberg he gives a description of the most dominant myths through history. More precisely, he gives a description of myths about human nature in: the Bible, the Middle ages, the Renaissance, during the Protestant reformation, the time of Industrial revolution, and in the contemporary time or as he calls it, the industries’ concept of human beings.

In the Bible Herzberg notices two accounts of human nature.⁴² (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 15-19) The two accounts are the creation of Adam and the God’s covenant with Abraham and Moses. These two, so called Adam’s account and Abraham’s account of human beings, have an important role in Herzberg’s theory.

Concerning the Adam’s account it is said that he (human beings) was created as a perfect human being. Following his eating the fruit from the Tree of knowledge of good and evil he was cast by God out of Eden, and forced to the life of hardship and suffering. In this context the main need of human beings is avoidance of “the multitude of pain-provoking

⁴² He notices that there are many more actual accounts but the two come directly from God.

events that are found in his new alienated environment, outside the gates of paradise.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 16) The second account of human nature is the one that can be found in the conversation between God and Abraham in Gen 17⁴³ and Herzberg says that this account can be understood as: “(...) that man is capable, that he had been given innate potential, indeed, so much potential that God has chosen him to be His emissary on earth.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 16) A few passages later Herzberg again says that: “The idea that man was created in the image of God was evidence to the Jews that men were capable of great accomplishments because they were given divine abilities.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 16)

In two short definitions of human beings that can be found in the Bible and which come directly from God are the so called Adam’s view of human beings and the Abraham’s view of human beings. The following propositions can be given; the first one is for Adam’s view and the second for Abraham’s.

P_{HeN21}: From Adam’s account it seems that main motivation of human beings is the avoidance of pain.

P_{HeN22}: From Abraham’s account it seems that human beings can achieve much, because they are given innate potential.

During the Middle ages human beings were looked at as if they had two forms of existence. One was the corporeal body, and the other was the soul. The final objective of the human endeavors was the salvation of the soul. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 18) With this overarching paradigm in place there was a need for another unification of the experience of human beings. This is where, according to Herzberg (1966, pp. 18-19), Catholic Church through its doctrines that human beings are sinful, but the salvation was still possible through repentance, consolidated its position. The Church was involved in every aspect of human life through sacramental means. Herzberg is giving an example of such a philosophical doctrine by describing the position made by Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa* (Part 2. Q.1. Article 8) stated that human happiness is not located in the values of the body, nor in anything

⁴³ Herzberg at the mentioned place in his book references Gen 17:1, although the passage that talks about this specifically is: “As for me, this is my covenant with you: You will be the father of many nations. No longer will you be called Abram; your name will be Abraham, for I have made you a father of many nations.” and that is Gen 17:4-5. Gen 17:1 is: “When Abram was ninety-nine years old, the Lord appeared to him and said, “I am God Almighty; walk before me faithfully and be blameless.” (Translation used here is The New International Version, available at: <http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=gen%2017&version=NIV>, retrieved 02.17.2013)

created. The ultimate goal of human will, the ultimate good, can be found only in God. The realization of the potential of human beings with their own efforts was considered as not possible. Over a period of time, the Church even more firmly emphasized the depravity of human beings, which in turn led to an even more active role of the Church as a leader in the material world. Parallel to that another institution used its own description of human beings for its benefit. Namely, the state used the description of human nature to safeguard the legal system that was present at the times. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 18) In short it can be said that, according to Herzberg, Adam's description of human beings was dominant in the Middle Ages, i.e., only the negative aspects were highlighted.

In the renaissance more importance was put on the view that achievement was important need for human beings. Herzberg (1966, p.22) specifically mentions Pico della Mirandola and his *Oration on the Dignity of Man* and the idea that human beings are unique due to their central position in the universe. Later, the Protestant revolt brought about a situation which Herzberg describes as paradoxical. Paradoxical in a sense that both the eternal damnation was emphasized as was the uniqueness of human beings in being able to secure their own salvation. In his words:

“The Protestant Revolt can be seen as further evidence of the overriding need of the individual to express himself, but it was a paradoxical period. It was then that man saw himself on the one hand as degraded and eternally damned, and on the other hand as being a little less than an angel and able to secure his own salvation.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 23)

Industrial revolution, when looked from the perspective of an industrial psychologist such as Herzberg, was a time when a shift in a way people looked at themselves and each other occurred. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 24) Two things happened. First change was connected to the relation between a human being and its technology:

“(…) the tools of a man became the important member of the team and the man became the tool's helper. As a tool grew to factory proportions, the function of man was curtailed and the worker became an interchangeable specialized instrument, so that the tool took over the direction and the coordination of the task.” (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 24-25)

Under the influence of the capitalistic idea another thing changed. That change was the purpose of work. Capitalist idea alienated a worker from his conception of value of work.

“When production is in the service of perceived consumption, as it was in the preindustrial society, there was little difficulty in relating the role of the worker to his work. (...) When the goal of production is simply for the color of a bookkeeper’s ink, it is too great an abstraction for significant comprehension on the part of the worker.” (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 25-26)

When comparing the old feudal system and the capitalist society differences are more than obvious. One difference deserves a special attention. In the feudalistic society the feudal lord was responsible for the total human being, i.e. the peasant owed the lord work and loyalty, and the lord was responsible for protection, security, advice and various other paternalistic concerns. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 28) Such preindustrial ideas were not aligned with the industrialist efforts so a new definition and point of view on human beings was necessary. What followed was the idea that all men should be free from all previous commitments to assure minimum barriers of business enterprise. Now each worker was free to seek his own development and to bargain for his services and compensations, and the managers were free to choose whom they liked, having no responsibilities outside the contract. Things like working conditions, social responsibility for employees needs and the community were usually considered outside managers’ obligations. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 29) Herzberg is very critical about such development, because how can a human being believe in its freedom when the facts indicate otherwise. He says: “The result is the perennial treason of enslaving man by waving before him the banner of his most cherished need but keeping the attainment of it just out of reach.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 29)

In such a situation, new myths were needed in order to bring into alignment the facts of life and the general ideas about human beings. Two new myths were created: Protestant ethic and social Darwinism. Those two worldviews were used by the industrial leadership to reshape the concept of human nature. It seemed that the neglected need for achievement, might be put into focus, but what happened was that the business institutions merely altered the contents of avoidance needs. So, human beings were defined by the set of secular counterparts to the fear of sin. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 31)

In the contemporary society business is the dominant institution, and as such it has the power of defining what basic characteristics of human beings are. Talking in broad terms, in contemporary times, virtue became defined as economic success and economic success was defined as evidence of virtue. Great part in such labeling played the value system often referred to as Protestant ethic (Herzberg, 1966, p. 32) One of the results of such a view on the

world was that the “economic man” replaced the “spiritual man”. The change brought about the advancement in science, and change from scholastic logic to scientific methodology. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 33)

To answer the call of this new scientific methodology and to fill in the gaps in religious interpretation of human nature, Darwin’s theory was used. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 33-34) Some of the general ideas of Darwin’s theory actually fitted nicely in the collage of the protestant doctrine of the Elect. Namely, the companies which succeeded were the hardest, strongest and best equipped to survive the competition. Alongside that it was necessary to define a human being as the creature of physical needs; hence, humans are economically determined beings, but also creatures of comfort. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 35)

Another definition of human beings, created by the business institution, emerged with the implementation of Taylorism. This new “myth” was that of the “mechanistic man”. Since in Taylor’s scientific management only the lowest common denominator of human’s ability was utilized (the rest of abilities were not used) a mechanistic view of human beings was needed. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 35-36) It was often repeated that: “The man is happiest when he is “an interchangeable part of an interchangeable machine making interchangeable parts.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 37)

Further study of the industry settings showed that often the worker found the informal organization and his place in it more important than his economic goal. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 38) This led to the start of the myth of the “social man” and “emotional man”, at that point another significant thing happened and that is the emphasized difference between manager and the worker. The managers were thought to be higher than the workers, and the workers were inferior to managers by their nature. This was manifested, in their opinion, in a way that workers were easily influenced by their emotions which hurt their economic goals. The managers, as by nature higher, would never allow for something like that to happen to them. Basically, workers seemed to be motivated by some irrational needs. And only rational needs such as efficiency, economic gain, and humane physical treatment were recognized. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 38)

The last definition of human beings that is offered by Herzberg in *Work and the Nature of Man* is what he calls “neomechanistic man” or “instrumental man”. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 42) the new definition arose from the technological development of industry. According to it every man should somehow be specialized, to perform his work with a precision and rationality, which are cardinal virtues. Such a human being will find the greatest happiness in being an unattached expert. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 42)

Herzberg claims that all of the previously mentioned myths about human beings or the definitions of human nature, namely the “economic man”, “mechanistic man”, “social man”, “emotional man”, and “neomechanistic or instrumental man”, are “stamped with the concept that man’s nature is cast wholly from Adam’s genes.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 43) As a possible answer to the question why industry prefers the Adam view of human beings Herzberg offers two reasons. The first reason is that he thinks it is easier for companies to concentrate on the short-term goals, and it is easier for them to motivate through fear (e.g., of losing a job or facing some kind of disciplinary measure). Generally fear of what is called in Herzberg’s system hygiene deprivation. The second reason is that Abraham needs, besides actualization and achievement, contain the codetermining need, i.e., the need to cooperate in creation of policies, which usually is not much liked in companies. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 172-173)

Following his purpose on finding out what human nature is Herzberg (1966, p. 44) notices that human nature seems to avoid scientific classification which is common in the contemporary science. Nonetheless, he proceeds to compare human beings to animals. This is the third source of propositions about human nature. When human beings are compared to animals it turns out that they bear close anatomical and material similarities, and are also affected by the same laws of biology, primarily the law of evolution. Since a process of evolution determines the genetic structure of an organism, it also (to a certain degree) determines the behavior. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 45) The difference is that, unlike with animals, human brain through evolutionary process has been prepared for most activities that are not precoded. Herzberg claims: “The human brain has the capacity to adjust to the many threats to its survival because of the myriad unassigned neurons available in the nervous system. Thus, the human animal can adapt to many situations where lower-level animals cannot.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 46) From this the following proposition about human beings can be created.

P_{HeN23}: Human beings are adaptable to various situations, much more than other animals.

Furthermore, there seems to be a difference in the way human beings and animals respond to different needs. Herzberg (1966, p. 47) gives an example of hunger. According to him, animals instinctively know that they must feed in order not to die, and they search for food. Human beings also have the instinctual operating systems for avoidance of hunger, but theirs is more complex. Herzberg (1966, pp. 47-48) describes it in the following way:

“When man feels hunger pangs, his impulse is to seek food. But the human precoded response to hunger becomes much more involved than the initial urge. For man has to earn money in order to purchase food, and that depends on his boss’s good will. Later, when employee has tenure and no longer worries about the loss of the boss’s affection, his desire for food is complicated further by more sophisticated needs. He searches for a place where the food is specially prepared to his order, where the surroundings are pleasant and where he may be served by a pretty young waitress dressed in a bunny costume. If he cannot fulfill these specifications, he suffers from loss of appetite.”

This according to Herzberg leads to the situation that almost anything can become a source of pain to human beings, because “his tremendous reservoir of carte blanche nervous cells provides for an almost infinite number of new stimuli that can be conditions to his primary precoded drives and thereby partake of their avoidance qualities.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 48) This ability, unfortunately leads to the result that can be expressed with the following proposition.

P_{HeN24}: Human beings can experience suffering from almost unlimited number of sources.

Herzberg continues like this on the topic of human suffering:

“The human being is conscious of his own consciousness, and so he remembers past pain, he experiences present pain and he anticipates future pain. Mankind is doomed to find the human condition painful and punishing because of the development of his brain. He is an organism seeking not only the surcease of pain; he is seeking surcease from suffering.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 50)

Because human beings are able to remember past pain, experience present pain, and anticipate future pain it can be said that human condition can be quite painful and punishing. Basic point is that the escape from pain, by satisfying certain needs (both lower like hunger, or higher like status) is only temporary. Herzberg concludes that human condition is a state of suffering. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 50) This Herzberg's view can be presented with the following proposition on human nature.

P_{HeN25}: Human beings, because of their experiences of past pains, present pains, and anticipated pains, find their existence hard.

When trying to summarize the Adam view of human beings and compare it to other animals Herzberg says that human beings differ from animals in the following way: “Quantitatively, he has a greater source of pain – he hurts more frequently; and qualitatively, his hurt is more pressing because he experiences suffering beyond his pain.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 50) Herzberg concludes that: “(...) in examining the history of human experience and in cataloguing all the situations that can cause pain, it must be noted that the human being has an infinite capacity to make himself miserable.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 48)

Fortunately, the human beings are not only directed by the laws of evolution, and they are not entirely predetermined or limited by nature. It can be said that human beings are also determiners of themselves. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 50) One of the definitive highlights of human beings is the ability to survive by using mental abilities, and it is this “surplus potentiality that engenders a separate and unique force in motivation of the human.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 51) That potentiality is the source of what Herzberg calls Abraham characteristics of human beings: “(...) to use one’s brain is a need system of itself, divorced from any connection with, or dependence on, the basic biological stresses.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 51)

P_{HeN26}: Human beings have a need to use their mental abilities and that motivates them.

As an example for backing up the proposition about using the brain, Herzberg gives an example of boredom, which is caused by the absence of stimuli (or the constant repetition of the same ones). (Herzberg, 1966, p. 51)

Another important difference between human beings and other animals is the possibility of growth. When animals reach biological maturity it is usually the end of expansion of the animal’s repertory of behavior. Human beings are able to learn and expand their repertory of behavior even after the peak of biological maturity has been reached. This of course does not mean that the body of human beings will not start to slowly deteriorate once the peak has been reached. Never minding the slow deterioration of the body, the mind is still possible of further development past the point of physical maturity. In order for that to be possible the physical development must be more or less complete, if it is not then it is considered as pathology. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 53-54) “The basic distinction is that the actions of lower animals are determined by their biological substrates, while the human animal can continue to become psychologically more active even when his biological structure is dying.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 54) From this an important proposition about the development potentiality of human beings can be set.

P_{HeN27}: Human beings can continue to grow after their biological peak has been reached, which is different than animals.

There are additional two sources of psychological growth in human beings besides the psychological potential. The first is the fact that biological maturity indicates the biological dying and that the stop in the psychological growth indicates psychological dying. It would be horrible punishment to be aware of the psychological decline for the rest of someone's life. So, in order to postpone psychological oblivion, growth period must be extended. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 55) The second source is the capacity for self-awareness for the issue of one's mortality, and a capacity to recognize the fact that every human being is an individual, separate from the rest of the world. Basically, the capacity to recognize the loneliness of human condition is part of human suffering. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 55) By noticing these capacities another proposition is possible regarding human beings.

P_{HeN28}: Human beings are aware of mortality, individuality, and loneliness.

Due to this, human beings seek solace in metaphysical mysteries. Following all that was said, Herzberg states that precisely faith in the potential to achieve anything has kept human beings from the oblivion of meaningless existence. Herzberg states this in the following manner:

“The history of civilization is, in part, a history of man's attempt to provide himself with comforting mysteries. But that very genius that created the mysteries by which man lives also has the power to destroy them. Every mystery that man has developed to give meaning to life has been fair game for rational analysis by man's brain. There is only one illusion that has resisted destruction. That is man's potentiality – where he can go, what he can become. This article of psychological faith gives purpose to man's existence.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 56)

His view can be expressed with the following proposition.

P_{HeN29}: Belief in potentiality gives meaning to life of human beings.

Herzberg summarizes his position on the needs of human beings like this:

“(…) human animal has two categories of needs. One set stems from his animal disposition, that side of him previously referred to as the Adam view of man; it is centered on the avoidance of loss of life, hunger, pain, sexual deprivation, and other primary drives, in addition to the infinite varieties of learned fears that become attached to those basic drives. The other segment of man’s nature, according to the Abraham concept of human being, is man’s compelling urge to realize his own potentiality by continuous psychological growth.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 56)

“If a man is to be understood properly, these two characteristics must be constantly viewed as having separate biological, psychological and existential origins.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 56)

As a concluding remark the following proposition, summarizing Herzberg’s opinion, can be stated.

P_{HeN30}: Human beings have two set of needs. The so called Adam’s needs which are avoidance of many different version of pain, and Abraham’s needs which are phenomenalized by the urge to realize their potential, to grow psychologically.

All in all, human beings are understood as having two set of needs, ones which stem from human beings’ “animal” part and ones which stem from the human beings’ “human” part. Human beings which seek to satisfy only needs coming from the animal nature are, as Herzberg puts it, doomed to live in dreadful anticipation of pain and suffering. But fortunately, human beings – besides the animal compulsion to avoid pain – also have the ability to achieve happiness. The only way to achieve happiness, at least according to Herzberg, is to cater both for animal needs of pain avoidance and to human need of psychological growth. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 86)

P_{HeN31}: Human beings can achieve happiness only by catering to both animal and human set of needs which is present in them.

When applying Herzberg’s Motivation-Hygiene theory to the concepts of mental health and mental illness Herzberg (1966, pp. 77-91) comes to the conclusion that the mentally healthy human being will be characterized by following traits: seeking life satisfaction through personal growth experiences. Growth experiences are defined as those experiences which contain the motivator factors. Such human beings will also be characterized by sufficient

success, corresponding in size with the ability and tolerance for delay, to give direct evidence for growth. And finally, they will be characterized with successful avoidance of poor hygienic conditions. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 83)⁴⁴

The last of the content theories presented is the Self-determination theory, envisioned by Deci and Ryan. In the following section their propositions on human nature will be discussed.

2.1.3. Propositions about human nature in SDT

Important for this thesis is the statement made by Deci and Ryan (1985, pp. 3-4) when they discuss the difference between mechanistic theories of motivation and the organismic theories, one of which is the Self Determination Theory (SDT) itself. Generally speaking there are two ways one can view human beings. It is possible to view humans as mechanistic organisms which are passive and are controlled by outside stimuli and their physiological drives. This is how people are viewed in the context of mechanistic theories of motivation. The views of humans as active, volitional and initiate behaviors are a trait of so called organismic theories. Their text is the following:

“Mechanistic theories tend to view the human organism as passive, that is, as being pushed around by the interaction of physiological drives and environmental stimuli, whereas organismic theories tend to view the organism as active, that is, as being volitional and initiating behaviors. According to the latter perspective, organisms have intrinsic needs and physiological drives, and these intrinsic needs provide energy for the organism to act on (rather than simply to be reactive to) the environment and to manage aspects of their drives and emotions. The active-organism view treats stimuli not as causes of behavior, but as affordances or opportunities that the organism can utilize in satisfying its needs. When theories are based on the assumption of an active organism, they give primacy to the structure of people’s experience, and are concerned more with the psychological meaning of stimuli than with the objective characteristics of those stimuli.” (Deci, Ryan 1985, pp. 3-4)

As one reads through SDT theoretical texts propositions on human nature are easily seen. The propositions in this section are presented in the following order. First propositions are derived from the origin of human nature. Second are propositions from the understanding of human

⁴⁴ Additional six categories of human beings are mentioned by Herzberg and each of them is characterized by certain traits. For details see Herzberg (1966, pp. 83-91).

beings as active. The third are propositions related to the treatment of intrinsic values and goals.

Human nature is understood in the context of SDT as developed over the course of evolutionary history. That is different than those theories who claim that human nature is wholly plastic. This can be seen from the following quote: “We nonetheless suggest that our theory of needs, and of human nature, is consistent with the belief that the distal causes of human psychological functioning lie in evolutionary history.” (Deci, Ryan, 2000) And from: “(...) SDT does not abide by the so-called standard social science model (see, e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), but rather posits that people have an evolved human nature that includes basic psychological needs and integrative propensities.” (Deci, Ryan, 2000)

From the two quotes the following proposition is possible:

P_{SN32}: Origins of human needs and nature are in the evolutionary history of mankind, and it includes basic psychological needs and integrative propensities.

That does not mean that there is no variability within cultures. The point that SDT is trying to make is whatever culture is in question if support, tools, practices and values for autonomy, competence and relatedness are provided it will improve well-being.⁴⁵ (Deci, Ryan, 2000)

As was already presented in SDT the three basic psychological needs are understood as necessary conditions for the growth and well-being of people. (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 7) According to their definition the basic needs are:

“(...) universal – that is, they represent innate requirements rather than acquired motives. As such, they are expected to be evident in all cultures and in all developmental periods. (...) In humans, the concept of psychological needs further suggests that whether or not people are explicitly conscious of needs as goal objects, the healthy human psyche ongoingly strives for these nutriments, and when possible, gravitates toward situations that provide them.” (Ryan & Deci, 2002, p. 7)

Also:

⁴⁵ On the other hand, there are some cultural goals which cannot be integrated because they are inconsistent with basic needs. As an example authors provide the case of genital mutilation. (Deci, Ryan, 2000)

“The theory posits three universal psychological needs—the needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness—and suggests that work climates that allow satisfaction of these needs facilitate both work engagement and psychological well-being. (...) Implicit in the self-determination model is the assertion that the three psychological needs are universal—that they are basic to all people—therefore, satisfaction of these needs should yield positive outcomes in all cultures.” (Deci, et al, 2001)

In short:

P_{SN33}: There are three universal, innate, psychological needs which are rooted in human beings. Those needs are: competence, autonomy, and relatedness, which when satisfied can bring about positive outcomes, and provide well-being

For SDT the proposed three basic psychological needs are actually psychological elements of human nature. It is important to distinguish between physiological understanding of needs (deficiencies) and psychological understanding. In their words: “By positing a set of basic psychological needs, SDT specifies psychological elements of human nature (...).” (Deci, Ryan, 2000) Also important for human nature is the fact that living organisms have a purpose which can be found in their innate needs, and they arise from them. (Ryan, Kuhl, Deci, 1997) The opinion that human beings have a purpose can be seen as early as in Aristotle. This will be emphasized in the following part of the thesis.

Although SDT suggests that there are things as universal human needs, that point is still questioned among the psychological community, especially when one takes into the account that there are so many variations and different factors across cultures which might influence the appearance of different kinds of needs in people with different backgrounds. Concerning the replies to objections various studies done in the context of SDT have repeatedly shown that difference in culture does not bring significant difference⁴⁶ in basic needs nor goals and values, as it can be seen from the studies conducted transculturally. Examples of such studies are: Schmuck, Kasser, Ryan, 2000; Chirkov, Ryan, 2001; Kasser, Ahuvia, 2002; Kim, Kasser, Lee, 2003; Downie, Koestner, ElGeledi, Cree, 2004; Sheldon et al., 2004; Chirkov, Ryan, Willness, 2005; Ryan et al., 2005; Vansteenkiste, Zhou, Lens, Soenens, 2005; Vansteenkiste, Lens, Soenens, Luyckx, 2006; Chirkov, Vansteenkiste, Tao,

⁴⁶ Of course it is possible that there are differences in how strong the mentioned needs are, but that is considered not so important in the context of SDT. What is important are individual differences in motivational orientation and goal contents. These differences are results of interaction of basic needs and the social environment. (Deci, Ryan, 2000)

Lynch, 2007; Downie et al., 2007; Rudy, Sheldon, Awong, Tan, 2007; Bao, Lam, 2008; Lynch, La Guardia, Ryan, 2009; Zhou, Ma, Deci, 2009.

Such findings may be indicative of human nature since it has been found that mentioned needs of autonomy, competence and relatedness are shared among cultures, and that there are evidences which support the claim that they are universal. Even if the concept of human nature has always been elusive one, it appears that three psychological needs are rooted in the concept of being human.

It is appropriate at this point to describe why the three needs are important for human beings. As was said SDT supposes that human nature has evolved, and that needs, which have also evolved, bring the adaptive advantage to human beings. The need for competence has as an adaptive consequence in the context of evolution in a sense that open organism, interested in acquiring new knowledge (as humans are), will better adapt in the new situations and contexts which are unavoidable during life. Also, experiencing satisfaction about learning, without any external incentives, strengthens the will to engage in new activities and areas. And finally human beings having the need of competence in themselves, are by nature curious, and that is one of their defining features. (Deci, Ryan, 2000) Considering relatedness one finds that having that need reflects a design feature of social organism. (Deci, Ryan, 2000) Finally, the need for autonomy shows a basic tendency of all living things and that tendency is integrated functioning. In humans autonomy is just an “extension of this deeply evolved tendency” and it incorporates self-regulation and coherence in the organism behavioral aims. Those are at the phenomenological level reflected in the experience of integrity, volition and vitality that accompanies self-regulated action. (Deci, Ryan, 2000)

From all of this propositions about human nature can be stated. The need for competence indicates that human beings are by their nature curious, the existence of the need for relatedness that they are social organisms, and the need for autonomy is phenomenologically reflected in human beings in the experiences of integrity, volition, and vitality which are present when one acts from self-regulation. So, the propositions about human nature are the following:

P_{SN34}: One of defining feature of human beings is curiosity.

P_{SN35}: Human beings are social organisms.

P_{SN36}: Self regulated actions are accompanied with the experiences of integrity, volition, and vitality.

Concerning the sociality of human beings, creators of SDT think that human beings have no identity when they are born. Only once the society exerts influence over time will young people acquire their social roles. But, once acquired, they will be significant force in determining how people behave in the society. In other words:

“When human beings emerge into the world, they have no identity. That is, infants are not yet defined in terms of institutional affiliations, self representations, and social roles by which others recognize them. (...) Plainly put, individuals *acquire* identities over time, identities whose origin and meanings derive from people’s interactions with the social groups and organizations that surround them. In turn, these identities once adopted, play a significant role in the organization and regulation of people’s everyday lives.” (Ryan, Deci, 2003, p. 253.)

P_{SN37}: Human beings acquire their social identities over time, once acquired they regulate the way people live their lives.

This does not apply to the basic psychological needs. Social identities can change, the needs are permanent. This is phrased by the authors as:

“(…) what has not changed in human nature over the past few millennia are basic psychological needs. We have argued herein that the function of identities – the reasons we form them – is to fulfill our basic needs. First and foremost, identities facilitate relatedness by helping individuals connect with others and experience belonging in society, (...), identities, (...) also facilitates the experience and expression of the basic needs for competence and autonomy (...).” (Ryan, Deci, 2003, p. 269)

There is an unchanging core in human beings, and also human nature is not totally relative to culture, although culture definitely has a role. This view on culture is visible from:

“At another level of analysis, because SDT posits the basic universal human needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness, we stand at odds with the “standard social science model,” as it is referred to by Tooby and Cosmides (1992), in which human nature is seen as culturally constructed, highly plastic, and contextually relative. In our view, despite manifold differences in the manifestation and opportunities to fulfill

needs in different cultures, we view some psychological needs as invariantly influential in all countries and contexts. Thus we know of no nation in which feelings of belonging, feelings of effectance, or feelings of autonomy and self-congruence are not important for well-being of cultural members.” (Ryan, Deci, 2003, p. 266)

SDT as a theory of motivation is special because of its focus on human beings which are understood as active and oriented towards growth. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 11) Or differently, but with the same meaning:

The starting point for SDT is the postulate that humans are active, growth-oriented organisms who are naturally inclined toward integration of their psychic elements into a unified sense of self and integration of themselves into larger social structures. In other words, SDT suggests that it is part of the adaptive design of the human organism to engage interesting activities, to exercise capacities, to pursue connectedness in social groups, and to integrate intrapsychic and interpersonal experiences into a relative unity. (Deci, Ryan, 2000)

From the previous quotes it is possible to suggest two propositions:

P_{SN38}: Human beings are active, growth oriented beings.

P_{SN39}: Human beings have an adaptive design which incorporates engaging interesting activities, exercising capacities, trying to achieve social connection, and to have a sense of self.

If human beings are growth oriented then the question arises. What is necessary to actually achieve the growth towards which human beings are oriented? For SDT the growth oriented nature can be seen through three things. First is intrinsic motivation: “Within SDT, intrinsic motivation is seen as the motivational instantiation of the proactive, growth-oriented nature of human beings.” (Vansteenkiste, Lens, Deci, 2006). The second is the process of internalization. As it can be seen from: “This process of internalization, we maintain, represents a second instantiation (in addition to intrinsic motivation) of the growth-oriented endowment of human beings (...).”(Vansteenkiste, Lens, Deci, 2006). Finally the third is pursuit of intrinsic goals. “The pursuit of intrinsic goals is considered a third instantiation of natural growth orientation (in addition to the processes of intrinsic motivation and internalization).” (Vansteenkiste, Lens, Deci, 2006) It can be concluded that, according to

SDT, from the three things (intrinsic motivation, process of internalization, and pursuit of intrinsic goals) follows the validation for the notion that human nature is growth oriented.

The third reason, the pursuit of intrinsic goals, deserves a closer look, because it is foundational for additional propositions about human nature. Connected to the intrinsic goals are intrinsic values (e.g., Ryan and Deci (2000b)). In SDT intrinsic values are postulated like this:

“As we stated at the outset, we conceive of eudaimonia as referring to a way of living, not to a psychological state or out-come. Specifically, it is a way of living that is focused on what is intrinsically worthwhile to human beings. In stating this we are making a broad claim that there are intrinsic values built into human nature and that these values are universal. Within our formal theory of eudaimonia we specify at least some of these intrinsic values, and at the same time we argue that the list is not in any way closed.” (Ryan, Huta, Deci, 2008)

P_{SN40}: There are intrinsic values built into human nature and these values are universal.

What are intrinsic values for SDT? They are something which is natural to humans. Also, intrinsic values are first-order values which means they are: 1) a value not reducible to other values, and 2) a value that does not exist for the sake of another value. It must be a basic value in its own right. For example, life would be an intrinsic value, and aggression would not be. Or to put it otherwise, intrinsic goal is intrinsic only if it is a first order goal (Ryan, Huta, Deci, 2008).

The authors point out that eudaimonia is a way of living in where intrinsic values are dominant, where people are focused on things which have inherent worth and on the goal that are first order. In contrast, hedonic, or some other kind of non-eudaimonic living would be focused with second and third-order values or motives. If one goes back to the three universal needs which are proposed by SDT they should be best satisfied by pursuing and attaining intrinsic, that is first-order, goals. What SDT is suggesting is that reaching intrinsic goals will satisfy the intrinsic needs which than should enhance well-being.

By following intrinsic values one comes to eudaimonic way of living which is connected with autonomy. According to Ryan, Huta, and Deci (2008): “(...) eudaimonia is necessarily rooted in human autonomy, as Aristotle also claimed. One cannot be following one’s true self and not be autonomous.”

P_{SN41}: Eudaimonia is necessarily rooted in human autonomy.

When looking at individual human beings it can be noticed that not all of them are equal in the terms how they position themselves in the world. Precisely, the characteristic of activity shows the fullest representation of humanity, as do the characteristics of curiosity, vitality, and self-motivation.

“The fullest representations of humanity show people to be curious, vital, and self-motivated. At their best, they are agentic and inspired, striving to learn; extend themselves, master new skills; and apply talents responsibly. (...) Yet it is also clear that the human spirit can be diminished or crushed and that individuals sometimes reject growth and responsibility.” (Ryan, Deci, 2000b)

In short, human beings at their best are active, curious, vital and self-motivated beings. But not all of humans are like that. SDT suggests that the possible catalizer for differences between individuals is the social contexts. In their words: “Specifically, social context catalyze both within- and between-person differences in motivation and personal growth, resulting in people being more self-motivated, energized, and integrated in some situations, domains, and cultures than in others.” (Ryan, Deci, 2000b)

It can be said that intrinsic motivation for SDT is one of the most important traits of the positive potential of human nature. Ryan and Deci say it like this: “Perhaps no single phenomenon reflects the positive potential of human nature as much as intrinsic motivation, the inherent tendency to seek out novelty and challenges, to extend and exercise one’s capacities, to explore, and to learn.” (Ryan, Deci, 2000b) A proposition about the nature of human beings can be stated.

P_{SN42}: Intrinsic motivation reflects the potential of human beings.

Also, for SDT, the previously mentioned feeling of vitality and interest that goes with intrinsic motivation is considered the evolved features of human nature. The reason for this is that human beings find inherent pleasure in exercising and expanding their functioning. (Ryan, Kuhl, Deci, 1997) It can be said that

P_{SN43}: Positive feeling of vitality and interest that attend intrinsic motivation are evolved features of human nature.

For intrinsic motivation important factor is that human beings are proactive organisms as it can be seen from the following:”The postulate of intrinsic motivation begins with a proactive organism; it presupposes that humans are naturally active and that there are natural tendencies toward development that require nutriments to function effectively.” (Deci, Ryan, 2000) Also, from the above quote which comes from studying intrinsic motivation it can be seen that what is being said is in alignment with what was previously postulated about human nature, i.e. human beings are active beings. Although, it is claimed that human beings have a natural tendency to be intrinsically motivated for some actions, a suitable environment is also a necessary requirement. The SDT suggest that: “intrinsic motivation, being an inherent organismic propensity, is catalyzed (rather than caused) when individuals are in conditions that conduce toward its expression.” (Ryan, Deci, (2000c) SDT would suggest that intrinsic motivation is inherent to humans but:

P_{SN44}: The natural tendencies towards intrinsic motivation can be activated or inhibited by social/environmental factors.

The existence of intrinsic motivation in human beings according to SDT also reflects the organismic conception of human nature, as it is visible from: “Organismic conceptions of human nature assume an inherent tendency toward growth and assimilation. Perhaps no phenomenon illustrates the self-directed, organizationally extending activity of life better than that of *intrinsic motivation*.” (Ryan, Kuhl, Deci, 1997) Ryan and Deci (2000c) argue the following:

“In humans, intrinsic motivation is not the only form of motivation, or even of volitional activity, but it is a pervasive and important one. From birth onward, humans, in their healthiest states, are active, inquisitive, curious, and playful creatures, displaying a ubiquitous readiness to learn and explore, and they do not require extraneous incentives to do so. This natural motivational tendency is a critical element in cognitive, social, and physical development because it is through acting on one’s inherent interests that one grows in knowledge and skills. The inclinations to take interest in novelty, to actively assimilate, and to creatively apply our skills is not limited to childhood, but is a significant feature of human nature that affects performance, persistence, and well-being across life’s epochs.”

P_{SN45}: Human beings have inherent interests in acquiring knowledge and skills.⁴⁷

In human beings a need to feel competent and self-determining according to Deci (1975, p. 57) influences two kinds of behavior. The first kind of behavior is that human beings will search for situations in which they can experience (reasonable) challenge. The second kind of behavior is that human beings, once they find the challenge, will try to “solve it” and in that way, as Deci puts it, “reduce uncertainty”. Using Deci’s words: “I am suggesting, therefore, that the need for feeling competent and self-determining motivates two kinds of behavior: behavior which “seeks” optimal challenge and behavior which “conquers” challenge.” (Deci, 1975, p. 57) The above quote provides another proposition about human nature:

P_{SN46}: Human beings are looking for challenges, and they try to conquer them.

Furthermore Deci (1975, p. 69) states that in his opinion: “(...) organism, in striving to feel competent and self-determining, is involved in a continual process of seek and destroy.” That might be the indication of a part of human nature which is interested in finding out new things and solving challenges. If human beings have a tendency to find new challenges, and it appears that they do, then it is also quite easy to see the benefit of that disposition in the context of perseverance and evolution of human life and culture as was already mentioned previously in the text.

One might also comment how humans are probably the only beings who are capable of knowing that they are mortal. This obviously has some significance on understanding of life in general. SDT addresses these issues, in a way that it recognizes that awareness of death is a big challenge in life, but it is still possible to face it in an authentic and integrated way. On the other hand, it is also possible to face it in a defensive and controlled way. Depending on the degree in which needs for autonomy, competence, relatedness are met, one has a more solid sense of significance and meaning (Ryan, Deci, 2004) Authors cleverly mention Camus and his existential anxiety which brought up the question of suicide, and then proceed on stating that in their experience people very rarely are suicidal because of just existential anxiety, and more because of hopelessness concerning ineffectiveness at central life goals. (Ryan, Deci, 2000a)

⁴⁷ Konrad Lorenz, also discussed the importance of curiosity and activeness of humans, he termed human beings as *Neugierwesen*. The more a creature is unspecialized (human are highly unspecialized) the more it is curious. (Lorenz, K. (1955). *Man meets dog*. London: Methuen.) (Ryan, Kuhl, Deci, 1997)

P_{SN47}: Human beings are aware of their mortality.

From the studies conducted on internalization of external regulation for behaviors it was noted that: (a) people are inherently motivated (out of the three basic needs) to internalize and integrate within themselves the regulation of uninteresting activities that are useful for effective functioning in the social world, and (b) the extent to which the process of internalization and integration proceeds effectively is a function of the social context. (Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, Ryan, 1991)

P_{SN48}: Individuals naturally want/need to be effective in a society, and the society has influence on how well an individual will accomplish that.

Before proceeding to propositions about human nature given by Aristotle, Hume and Kant, in the section that immediately follows, it will be shown that human nature is only partially understood in contemporary theories of motivation.

2.1.4. Partial understanding of human nature in theories of motivation

The aim of the second part of the thesis is to research the second hypothesis which is: philosophical–anthropological questions are only partially examined in the various aspects of organizational sciences. It seems that originators of the theories of motivation are familiar with, at least some, philosophical concepts on human nature. When one looks at the seminal works by Maslow, Herzberg or SDT it is possible to notice a variety of philosophers being referenced. It is not clear what happens with the second generation of scholars working in the tradition of some specific theory of motivation. It seems that second generation of researchers, and definitely the people who are actually implementing the theory to practice lose this connection with philosophy. For demonstration purposes the following bibliographical facts can be mentioned.

Maslow, in his work *The farther reaches of human nature*, references following philosophers: Aristotle; H. Bergson; M. Eckhart; R. Hartman; Heraclitus; W. James; F. Nietzsche; O. Rudolph; Plato; J.P. Sartre; Socrates; A.N. Whitehead. In addition to these western philosophers he also is also influenced by taoism.

Herzberg in his book *Work and the nature of man* references: Th. Aquinas, H. Arendt, K. Marx, M. Weber, P. Mirandola.

Finally the founders of SDT, first Deci, and then Deci and Ryan in the sample of their works mention: Aristotle, G. Dworkin; M. Friedman; A. Pfander; P. Ricoeur; H. Frankfurt, etc. The authors mentioned here are probably not all, but the list suffices to show that the originators of the theories in question read philosophy and that, in one way or the other, philosophy has influenced their opinion.

PUN49: Originators of selected theories of motivation were acquainted with philosophy and they referenced philosophers often.

With this confirmed interesting thing happens when looking at papers, manuals, guidelines, etc. on those theories in the context of their application. It seems that the influence of philosophy or perhaps the being familiar with the philosophical reasoning is weakening as one approaches application. For example

(1) In Kiechel (2012) a nice overview of the history of management is given, but there is no mention of the philosophical basis for those management practices. A brief overview of several textbooks in the area of management can be used as an example.

(2) Dessler (2004, pp. 438-475) when talking about psychological needs and intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation gives an overview of all of the three theories of motivation mentioned in this thesis. In addition he also mentions Vroom's theory of motivation. He then proceeds to cover different types of incentive plans which he covers in quite a detail and finishes with the experience from practice considering the topic. What is important is that he does not mention, not even once, what are foundations for these theories. For example, it is stated that relying only on monetary incentives is risky (Dessler, 2005, p. 440) but the reason why do people who have created theories think so is not mentioned. Also, it is not mentioned why human beings should be motivated by this and not by something else. The originators of the mentioned theories on the other hand, as was presented, do touch on that topic, and write about the foundations.

(3) Furthermore, Gómez-Mejía, Balkin, and Cardy (2010) talk about motivation in several places in their textbook. First they define it (Gómez-Mejía, Balkin, Cardy, 2010, p. 48; 86) than give an overview of some of the theories. From the theories in this thesis only Herzberg's theory is described, but some of the others are also included. Namely, Work adjustment theory; Goal-setting theory and Job characteristic theory. (Gómez-Mejía, Balkin,

Cardy, 2010, pp. 86-87) Again, the reasons how and why Herzberg came up with his two-factor theory of motivation are not mentioned, nor are the foundation for other theories mentioned. For example, Gómez-Mejía, Balkin, and Cardy (2010, p. 87) when talking about Goal-setting theory say: “Because it suggests that managers can increase employee motivation by managing the goal-setting process, goal-setting theory has some important implications for managers (...).” The reasons for this kind of thinking are not mentioned.

(4) In another textbook this time by Robbins and Coulter (2012, pp. 428-457) after the initial definition of motivation as well the subchapter on early theories of motivation where the following theories are explained: Maslow’s, Herzberg’s, McGregor’s “Theory X and Theory Y” and David McClelland's three-needs theory authors proceed to explain and describe what they call the contemporary theories of motivation. In short, again as with all the other textbooks mentioned in this part, there is no mention of human nature nor the explanation what is behind the ideas that specific theory proposes.

(5) Similar situation is in Certo and Certo (2012, pp. 398-416). Although it is important to emphasize that they offer a more detailed overview of motivational theories classifying them as process and content based. For the content based they offer a following description: „(...)is an explanation of motivation that emphasizes people’s internal characteristics. Content theories focus on understanding what needs people have and how these needs can be satisfied.“ (Certo, Certo, 2012, p.400) this definition touches on the importance of understanding human nature, but again no further investigation into the matter is presented.

On the basis of a few textbooks mentioned here it appears that while all of them talk in one way or the other about theories of motivation, and concepts like universal needs and so forth, none of them offer to students access to what is behind the theories nor foundations for their specific understanding of human nature. The textbook examples are important because modern managers are trained using those textbooks. Managers are affected by that situation because they are not trained to comprehend reasons why are they doing what they are doing and why are they trained to do it like that. One of the often mentioned reasons for doing things that they are doing is efficiency. Efficiency is one of the possible consequences of their actions, but not the reason for those actions. The reason for the actions is the fact that theories of motivation think that humans need to be treated like they proscribe it because they are human. This is not understood without learning and understanding the philosophy underlying theories of motivation. Without such understanding it is possible that some action will be

done that actually brings harm to human beings for the sake of efficiency. It is possible to state the following proposition about the state of management education.

P_{PUN50}: In significant manuals, guidelines, and textbooks concerning theories of motivation there is no mention of philosophical basis for those theories.

For the purpose of further demonstration the research and application in SDT is going to be used. SDT is chosen for two reasons. The first reason is that SDT as a theory emerged on the foundations of earlier content theories of motivation, such as Maslow's or Herzberg's. The second reason is that the literature is more freely available for SDT since it is newer and in the last 25 years or so the theory has been constantly improved. In this second step of demonstration, papers on SDT in work related context will be presented with an aim of showing that researchers working on application of SDT in business context in their research do not have the same level of awareness for the questions about human nature as the founders of the theory have. This is apparent even if founders of the theory are co-authors of published research. It is possible to argue that researchers at this stage do not need full awareness about human nature in order to compile their data.

There is a wealth of materials on SDT in the work context available on the Self-determination website⁴⁸. The materials available are research reports on different issues done within SDT framework, and various kinds of review papers. The reviewed materials can be, provisionally, categorized further as research done in: cross-cultural study context with focus on variety of topics such as motivation, needs, well-being, etc as well as determining measuring scales (e.g., Deci, et. al., 2001; Gagné, et al., 2010); general overviews of the theory (e.g., Gagné, Deci, 2005; Vansteenkiste, et al., 2007; Meyer, Gagné, 2008; Meyer, Maltin, 2010); research connected to job-searching behavior and career planning and decisions (e.g., Vansteenkiste et al., 2004; Vansteenkiste et al., 2005; Guay, et al., 2006; Broeck, Vansteenkiste, Lens, De Witte, 2010); motivation (e.g., Ilardi, Leone, Kasser, Ryan, 1993; Richer, Vallerand, 1995; Gagné, Senécal, Koestner, 1997; Senécal, Vallerand, Guay, 2001; Richer, Blanchard, Vallerand, 2002; Baard, Deci, Ryan, 2004; Guay, 2005; Otis, Pelletier, 2005; Grant, 2007; Gagné, Chemolli, Forest, Koestner, 2008; Millette, Gagné, 2008; Roca, Gagné, 2008; Foss, Minbaeva, Pedersen, Reinholt, 2009; Gagné, 2009; Kuvaas, 2009; Tremblay et al., 2009; DeVoe, Pfeffer, 2010; Fernet, Gagné, Austin, 2010; Kenny et al, 2010;

⁴⁸http://www.selfdeterminationtheory.org/index.php?option=com_sdt&view=SearchPublications&task=domainSearch&domain=16 (accessed 01.12.2013).

Laran, Janiszewski, 2010; Fernet, 2011; Grant, Berry, 2011; Grant, Nurmohamed, Ashford, Dekas, 2011; Broeck et al., 2011; Fernet, Guay, Senecal, Austin, 2012; Mitchell, Gagné, Beaudry, Dyer, 2012); needs (e.g., Lynch, Plant, Ryan, 2005; Broeck, Vansteenkiste, De Witte, Lens, 2008; Broeck et al., 2010; Hetland et al., 2011; Kovjanic et al., 2012; Lian, Ferris, Brown, 2012); self-determination (e.g., Gagné, Koestner, Zuckerman, 2000; Fernet, Guay, Senécal, 2004; Lam, Gurland, 2008). Of course this is only a provisional categorization done for clarity purposes and it is evident that there is some overlap between the papers. What is notable for the thesis is that papers here mentioned do not explain further what are the foundations of SDT nor do they mention specifically human nature. They do mention various notions like needs, values, goals of human beings, but they do not explicitly mention human nature, or the bases for the proposition. This is the same for even the papers on SDT categorized as review.

P_{PUN51}: In research and in overviews of application of SDT to business contexts there is no explicit mention of human nature.

Finally the third step of the presentation how the issue of human nature is less and less present in the materials dealing with SDT the closer they are to practice is to look at the actual application of SDT tenants in business practice. Unfortunately, many issues arise. For example, how do we know who and to what extent any company is using SDT based practices? Finding answers to this question is complicated by the fact that few organizations explicitly articulate their practices in such a way as to allow us to easily answer these questions. The matter is further complicated by the layers of management within organizations. Beyond that we have the problem of within each layer, there will be numerous individual managers – some of whom may understand and follow the principles and insights developed in the SDT literature and research and some of whom will not either out of ignorance or disagreement.

Let's start at the organizational top. To know if they are using SDT some kind of checklist of policies and practices that were derivable from or consistent with the SDT research would have to be developed. Then we would compare any explicit HR policies and practices for a given organization to see how well they matched up with the SDT checklist. From that point, it would be a matter of further research inside the organization to see what training was being provided, how these policies were reflected in formal performance evaluations/promotions/raises/bonus etc, surveying the employees to see if their manager's

practices were consistent with SDT. Unfortunately, as it was pointed out, this is beyond the scope at the moment.

P_{PUN52}: Determining knowledgeability of philosophical basis for management practices in companies is complicated and it is beyond scope and limits of the present research, although P_{PUN50} to P_{PUN51} indicate that philosophical basis is not present as well.

A question might be raised is it necessary that organizations have explicit conversation about human nature. The answer might be something like this: probably not, people could simply apply the policies without knowing or understanding the broader meta-anthropological foundations. At the same time, having that conversation would increase the chances of success in the application of those policies because people would know why the organization articulated such policies in the first place. This would also help them to make fast individual decisions that would be consistent without having an explicit policy statement on what to do. Because of this, in the following text possible philosophical foundation for understanding human nature in motivational theories will be presented.

2.2. Propositions of selected philosophers on human nature

In this subsection propositions about human nature that can be found in Aristotle's, Hume's and Kant's philosophy are pointed out. First propositions made by Aristotle are given.

2.2.1. Propositions about human nature in Aristotle's work

Many of Aristotle's propositions about the human nature are elucidated in his ethical writings. His ethical writings will be described later, but for the opening and setting the overall tone of the subsection it is important to state that according to Copleston, Aristotle's view of ethics presupposes that there are natural tendencies implanted in humans, allowing the creation of natural and not just arbitrary ethics. (Copleston, 2003, p. 333) Even if our topic is not ethics, this view is important because of the tendencies which are implemented in every human being. Copleston notes:

“Moreover, although we can discern evidence of contemporary Greek taste in matters of human conduct, e.g. in Aristotle's account of moral virtues, the philosopher

certainly considered himself to be dealing with human nature as such, and to be founding his ethic on the universal characteristics of human nature – in spite of his opinion of the “barbarians”(…) he would no doubt insist on the basic universality and constancy of human nature and the necessity of constant valuations, which are not merely relative but are founded in nature.” (Copleston, 2003, pp. 333-334)

Additionally it is important to emphasize that our purpose is not to analyze Aristotle’s philosophy in detail. The purpose is to point out propositions about the nature of human beings that Aristotle made which are relevant and can be brought in connection to previously presented theories of motivation. This subsection gives propositions in the following order. First propositions which are the result of comparing human beings and animals are presented. Following these, the propositions stemming from his *Metaph* are given. The third group consists of propositions derived from his teachings on the soul. Fourth group are proposition based on his ethical writings. Finally, in his *Pol* also a number of propositions can be located, and they are going to close this subsection.

An overview of Aristotle’s works on animals, nature, and living things brings up a great variety of remarks about human beings. Some of them are quite obvious and today some of them are known to be wrong. Examples of such remarks are: “(…) man alone grows grey and the horse is the only other animal whose hairs whiten visibly in old age.” (GA V,1,780b5-6), or: “That man alone is affected by tickling is due firstly to the delicacy of his skin, and secondly to his being the only animal that laughs.” (PA III, 10, 673a7-9). Also: “Man is the only, or nearly the only, creature, that has eyes of diverse colours. The others have eyes of one colour only. Some horses have blue eyes.” (HA I,9,492a5-6)

Nonetheless, some of the observations Aristotle made regarding human beings seem to have importance for understanding human nature. Examples of such remarks are: “For as man is the only animal that stands erect, he is also the only one that looks directly in front; and the only one whose voice is emitted in that direction“ (PA III,1,662b20-20)

Background to Aristotle’s thought is the claim that nature does nothing in vain, and it always provides everything needed to fulfill the functions designated to every being. (O’Rourke, 2011, p. 3). With that in mind, his statement about the gift of speech is significant. Aristotle says: “Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech.” (Pol., I, 2, 1253a9-10)

P_{AN53}: Human beings are the only animals that possess the speech.

When Aristotle is talking about speech he is also talking about the fact that human beings are animals that possess the *logos*. It can be said, together with O'Rourke (2011, p.1) that:

“What distinguishes man most properly from other animals is the possession of logos. This is the source of all that is distinctive of human nature and behaviour. It provides, moreover, the internal goal or telos for the elements which together make up his constitution.” (O'Rourke, 2011, p.1)

P_{AN54}: Human beings possess the logos.

P_{AN55}: The logos is distinctive of human nature and behavior.

Another indication of the purpose and the nature of human beings is the way they are built. From the way that human beings are built Aristotle concludes that there is a higher purpose to human beings when compared to other animals. For example:

“For of all living beings with which we are acquainted man alone partakes of the divine, or at any rate partakes of it in a fuller measure than the rest. For this reason, then, and also because his external parts and their forms are more familiar to us than those of other animals, we must speak of man first; and this the more fitly, because in him alone do the natural parts hold the natural position; his upper part being turned towards that which is upper in the universe. For, of all animals, man alone stands erect.” (PA, II, 10, 656a7-13)

For this quotation O'Rourke (2012, p. 2) has the following remark:

“On man, defined as ‘upward gazer’, see Plato, Cratylus 399c: ,The word *ανθρωπος* implies that other animals never examine, or consider, or look up (ἄναθεῖ) what they see, but that man not only sees but considers and looks up at that which he sees, and hence he alone of all animals is rightly called ἄνθρωπος, because he looks up at (ἀναθεῖ) what he has seen (ἀπώπε).” (O'Rourke, 2011:2)

From this the following proposition about human nature can be given:

P_{AN56}: Only human beings, compared to all other animals, examine and consider what they see.

Furthermore in regards to physiognomy of human beings which may indicate its nature, purpose and destiny Aristotle remarks:

“For of all animals man alone stands erect, in accordance with his god-like nature and substance. For it is the function of the god-like to think and to be wise; and no easy task were this under the burden of a heavy body, pressing down from above and obstructing by its weight the motions of the intellect and of the general sense. (θνηλὴ αἰ ζζεζηο).” (PA IV, 10, 686a27-31)

P_{AN57}: Human nature and essence is divine.

In similar way, hands are given to human beings because they can use them. Aristotle’s text goes as follows:

“Now it is the opinion of Anaxagoras that the possession of these hands is the cause of man being of all animals the most intelligent. But it is more rational to suppose that man has hands because of his superior intelligence. For the hands are instruments, and the invariable plan of nature in distributing the organs is to give each to such animal as can make use of it; nature acting in this matter as any prudent man would do. For it is a better plan to take a person who is already a flute-player and give him a flute, than to take one who possesses a flute and teach him the art of flute-playing. For nature adds that which is less to that which is greater and more important, and not that which is more valuable and greater to that which is less.” (PA IV, 10, 687a6-15)

“Seeing then that such is the better course, and seeing also that of what is possible nature invariably brings about the best, we must conclude that man does not owe his superior intelligence to his hands, but his hands to his superior intelligence. For the most intelligent of animals is the one who would put the most organs to good use; and the hand is not to be looked on as one organ but as many; for it is, as it were, an instrument for further instruments. This instrument, therefore,—the hand of all instruments the most variously serviceable, has been given by nature to man, the animal of all animals the most capable of acquiring the most varied arts.” (PA IV, 10, 687a15-23)

From these quotes it can be seen that human beings are, by Aristotle, considered to be the most intelligent beings, and have the capacity to acquire and to develop the greatest number of arts. So the following proposition about the capacities of human beings, based on the notion that they are the most intelligent beings, can be made.

P_{AN58}: Human beings have the capacity to acquire the greatest variety of arts, out of all beings, due to their intellect.

Sometimes it is said that human beings because of their lack of fur, claws, powerful sense of smell or sight, and similar biological attributes are not very well prepared, biologically speaking, for survival. This view is clearly rejected by Aristotle. His strategy is to point out the multitude of different ways that human beings can use what they biologically have and in that way they can make up for the shortcomings of not being biologically speaking, equipped for certain climatic contexts. (O'Rourke, 2011, p. 4) Again, the example of the hand can be used. Aristotle's quote goes like this: "For the hand is talon, hoof, and horn, at will. So too it is spear, and sword, and whatsoever other weapon or instrument you please; for all these can it be from its power of grasping and holding them all." (PA IV,10, 687b2-5)

Second group of propositions about human beings are given by Aristotle in his *Metaph*. One of the best known statements about human beings made by Aristotle can be found in the opening part of his book *Metaph*. In this text Aristotle remarks that all human beings have in their nature the desire to know. The text goes as follows:

"ALL men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer sight to almost everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things." (Metaph., I, 1, 980a1-6)

The fundamental proposition about the nature of human beings can be made, and this, as was already seen, serves as the base not only for Aristotle's understanding of human beings, but also for the understanding of human beings in the content theories of motivation. The proposition is thus.

P_{AN59}: Human beings desire knowledge by nature.

The third group of propositions is stemming from Aristotle's teachings on the soul. Similar to other Greek philosophers of that time the soul is the vital principle in living things. Aristotle defines it as: "the first actuality of a natural body which has life potentially." (De An., II, 1,

412a27-28) and “If we are to speak of something common to every soul, it will be the first actuality of a natural body which has organs.” (De An., II, 1, 412b4)

All living things are different from the non-living ones by possessing a principle of life, and that principle is the soul. (O’Rourke, 2011, p. 5) Aristotle writes:

“We say, then, making a beginning of our inquiry, that that which has a soul is distinguished from that which has not by life. But life is so spoken of in many ways, and we say that a thing lives if but one of the following is present – intellect, perception [aisthēsis]⁴⁹, movement, and rest in respect of place, and furthermore the movement involved in nutrition, and both decay and growth.” (De An., II, 2, 413a20-25)

To put it differently, in living beings certain processes take place. Those processes for example are: feeding, growth, reproduction, perception, etc, and they do not occur in beings that are not alive. And it is precisely the soul which enables these activities. (O’Rourke, 2011, p. 5) This can be seen from the following: “Now the soul is in the primary way that by means of which we live, perceive, and think. Hence it will be a kind of principle [logos] and form, and not matter or subject.” (De An., II, 2, 414a 12-14)

In order to explain mentioned processes Aristotle uses the concepts of matter and form. According to him, living beings are comprised of the body and the form (soul). The soul transforms life in potency to a real living being. According to hylomorphism, the soul is one of the principles and the same as the fact that form does not exist separated from matter; neither does the soul exist separated from the living body. It can be said that the soul is the realization of the body and is inseparable from it.⁵⁰ (Copleston, 2003, p. 327)

If soul is the vital principle of every living being, then all living beings have it. The question is: are all souls the same? The obvious reason for such a question is that it appears to us that not all living beings are the same, and that they differ in various ways from one another. For example, a being that only grows is quite different from the one that grows but is also able to move, or being that grows and can move is also quite different from a being that grows, can move, but also can use language, etc.

⁴⁹ Words in the square brackets are the originals pointed out by the translator to avoid misunderstanding. Please see Notes on translation in the used edition of De Anima. (Hamlyn, De Anima, 2002, pp. xvii-xviii).

⁵⁰ Although it appears strange, in the hylomorphian context, it seems that some parts of the soul can exist separately from the body and even be immortal. Such part is usually said to be *nous*, but this is an open question. Still the question is important since immortality of the *nous* is an important part of Aristotle’s view of human beings and of the soul. For details see O’Rourke (2011:8-11).

Aristotle tries to explain the mentioned differences by talking about three kinds of the soul. Every “higher” kind of the soul contains the characteristics of the previous, but also adds some different faculties. Aristotle says the following:

“Of the potentialities of the soul which have been mentioned, some existing things have them all, as we have said, others some of them, and certain of them only one. The potentialities which we mentioned are those for nutrition_K, sense perception_K, desire_K, movement_K in respect of place, and thought_K.”⁵¹ (De An., II, 3, 414a29)

Aristotle continues to describe the faculties in *De Anima* (II, 3, 414a32-414b28). In short, the lowest kind of the soul is the so called nutritive soul which enables feeding and reproduction. These processes are necessary to sustain life so such kind of the soul exists in every living being. (Copleston, 2003, p. 328) Higher on the scale is so called sensitive soul which enables the activities of sense perception, desire and local motion. What follows sense perception is imagination and what follows even further is the memory. Finally, Aristotle says that besides every faculty of the soul mentioned so far that: “(...) men and anything else which is similar or superior to men, have that of thought_K and intellect.” (De An., II, 3, 414b16)

That soul brings together all the previously mentioned faculties and it also adds something special – the *nous*. The *nous* enables two different actions. The first one is scientific thought (*logos*) which has truth as itself for its object. The second is the power of deliberation which has truth for its object for practical purposes. (Copleston, 2003, p. 328) Having the *nous* as a part of the soul is the key element in being human. (Shields, 2003) From everything discussed about the soul it can be stated that according to Aristotle human beings have the capacity for thought and the intellect.⁵²

P_{AN60}: Human beings have the intellect and are capable of thought.

⁵¹ All of the potentialities, i.e., for nutrition, sense perception, desire, movement in respect of place, and thought are marked by the translator with a subscript K designating: “Terms constructed from verbs of perception, etc., with an article and the termination ‘-ikos’, the most common form being that with the neuter definite article, e.g. to aisthētikon. These should literally be translated ‘that which can perceive’, etc., and I have tried to translate them in this way wherever possible. In such cases, the term may refer to the animal, a sense-organ, the soul or a part of it. In some cases, either because the above procedure would result in excessive awkwardness or because it is obvious that one is supposed to supply some such phrase as ‘part of the soul’, I have had resort to other translations, including that most commonly used by translators – ‘faculty’.” (Hamlyn, *De Anima*, 2002, pp. xvii-xviii).

⁵² Of course it is possible to go further into the discussion on the active and passive intellect, but this raises additional issues which cannot be dealt in this thesis.

As it was pointed out, Aristotle's ethical writings are also a valuable source of propositions on human nature. When thinking about what is good for human beings Aristotle makes an interesting point concerning the universality of the rules for deciding what is actually good. According to Copleston (2003, p. 333):

“As to the question what is the good of man, Aristotle points out that it cannot be answered with the exactitude with which a mathematical problem can be answered, and that owing to the nature of subject – matter, for human action is the subject – matter of ethics, and human action cannot be determined with mathematical exactitude.”

Aristotle says this in the following paragraph from the *Nicomachean Ethics*:

“Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any more than in all products of the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which political science investigates, exhibit much variety and fluctuation, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature. And goods also exhibit a similar fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage. We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should each of our statements be received; for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs.” (EN, I, 3, 1094b 13-27)

Together with Copleston a following proposition about human action and the predictability of it can be taken from this quote:

P_{AN61}: Human action cannot be determined with mathematical precision.

The topic of happiness of human beings is another source of propositions on human nature. Happiness is actually a wanted result, and the question itself is what the desirable goal of a life is. Similar to other Greek philosophers of that period, Aristotle thought that the end of life is happiness – *eudaimonia*. The trouble with such a view is that it is not clear what is meant

by saying that the end of life is happiness. This is so because different people can understand happiness differently. For example, some people consider wealth as happiness, some pleasure, some honor, etc. (EN, I, 4, 1095a15-1095b10; Copleston, 2003:334) Aristotle rejects all of the mentioned suggestions. Pleasure is according to him end fitted for a slave and not a freeman; and honor cannot be the end because it does not depend on the actor, but the giver, and so forth. What about moral virtue, could that be the way to understand happiness? Apparently moral virtue cannot be the way to understand happiness because moral virtue can go with inactivity and misery as well as happiness. And what is to be the end of life must be an activity and excludes misery. (Copleston, 2003, p. 334)

It is possible to correctly understand what happiness is if we determine what is the function of human beings. (O'Rourke, 2011, p.15) The discussion on the function of human beings is going to be picked up later in the third part of the thesis. For now it can be stated that Aristotle says the following:

“Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he naturally functionless? Or as eye, and, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man.” (EN, I, 7, 1097b28-33)

If that is the case, than what kind of activity should that be. It cannot be for example growth or reproduction, or sensation because those activities are not exclusive to human beings. What is exclusive to human beings is some activity connected with reason, or in accordance with reason. (Copleston, 2003, p. 334). Be that as it may Copleston (2003, p. 334), following Aristotle (EN, I, 9, 1100a4; I,10,1101a14-20) summarizes this point in the following manner:

“In any case, happiness, as the ethical end, could not consist simply in virtue as such: it consists rather in activity according to virtue or in virtuous activity, understanding by virtue both the intellectual and the moral virtue. Moreover, says Aristotle, it must, if it really deserves the name of happiness, be manifested over a whole life and not merely for brief periods.” (Copleston, 2003, p. 334)

Furthermore, human nature is defined as the capacity for perception and thought. (O'Rourke, 2011, p. 17) Aristotle's words are: “Now life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception, in that of man by the power of perception or thought; and a power is referred to the corresponding activity, which is the essential thing; therefore life seems to be essentially

perceiving or thinking.” (EN, IX, 9, 1170a13-20) Following this O’Rourke (2011, p. 18) says: “to exist is to be self-aware as perceiving and thinking. (...) For good men, existence is good and pleasant because they are aware that their activities, which constitute their existence, are directed toward their final goal and happiness. Their entire existence is an actualization of their prospective happiness.” From this, more propositions about human nature, based on Aristotle’s account of happiness, can be stated.

P_{AN62}: For human beings the mode of existence is to be self-aware as perceiving and as thinking.

P_{AN63}: For human beings the existence is an actualization of prospective happiness.

Finally regarding the issue of happiness, Aristotle states that for human beings: “If happiness is activity in accordance with excellence, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest excellence; and this will be that of the best thing in us.” (EN, X, 7, 1177a12-14)

That best thing in human beings is faculty of activity of intellect:

“So if among excellent actions political and military actions are distinguished by nobility and greatness, and these are unpleasurable and aim at an end and are not desirable for their own sake, but the activity of intellect, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the activity), and the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the blessed man are evidently those connected with this activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness of man, if it be allowed a complete term of life (for none of the attributes of happiness is incomplete).” (EN, X, 7, 1177b15-26)

P_{AN64}: The activity of intellect is crucial for happiness of human beings.

Even more, intellect is the element which defines human beings. Aristotle’s words are:

“And what we said before will apply now; that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to intellect is best and pleasantest, since intellect more than anything else is man. This life therefore is also the happiest.” (EN, X, 7, 1178a5-8)

P_{AN65}: Human beings are by nature endowed with intellect, and the intellect is the most distinguishing feature of human beings.

Copleston (2003, p. 349) mentions another interesting notion. Although human beings are mortal, according to Aristotle, they should not limit themselves to things that are human and mortal. Instead, human beings should strive to put emphasis on the divine part of themselves which is expressed, in previously mentioned, exercise of activity of intellect. (O'Rourke, 2011, p. 18) Aristotle says:

“That this activity is contemplative we have already said. (...) For this activity is the best (since not only is intellect the best thing in us, but the objects of intellect are the best knowable objects); and secondly, it is the most continuous, since we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do anything.” (EN, X, 7, 1177a18-23)

Contemplation is the „divine part” which surpasses all others parts of human beings in value. Aristotle says:

“But such life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of excellence. If intellect is divine, then in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. (...) for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything.” (EN, X, 7, 1177a27-1178b1)

Aristotle expects human beings to strive towards the “divine part” in them and not to limit themselves to, we might say, “human affairs” no matter what others suggest. This can be seen from:

“But we must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and being mortal, of mortal things, but must so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass everything.” (E.N., X, 7, 1177a31-1178b1)

P_{AN66}: Human being should try to live in accordance with the best in them, i.e., with the faculty of intellect.

Besides in ethical writings, in his political works Aristotle also gives remarks which point to certain findings about the nature of human beings. In his *Pol* Aristotle is quite clear concerning what he thinks is the place for human beings. There is a hierarchy of all living substances within the cosmos, and the human being is the goal of the entire nature. (O'Rourke, 2011, p. 4). For the highest place in nature human beings have to thank the possession of intellect and language, and because of the Logos they are the most political animals in nature. Besides that, human beings, having the mentioned properties, are also the only animals which can perceive good and bad and other moral qualities. (O'Rourke, 2011, pp. 4-5) Aristotle puts it like this:

“Now that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal who has the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.” (Pol., I, 2, 1253a7-18)

P_{AN67}: Human beings are the most political of animals.

P_{AN68}: Human beings are the only animals with the sense of moral qualities.

In addition, human beings are by their nature inclined to live in communities, and are inclined towards connectedness with other human beings. This can be seen from the following quotes:

“Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the: Tribeless, Lawless, hearthless one, whom Homer denounces – the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts.” (Pol., I, 2, 1253a3-7)

“But he who is unable to live in a society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state” (Pol., I, 2, 1253a27-29)

From this short discussion it seems that the following proposition about human nature is in order.

P_{AN69}: Human beings are, by their nature, inclined to live in connection to other human beings.

With the propositions that can be found in *Pol* Aristotle's account on the nature of human beings for this thesis is rounded up.

At the end of subsection it is appropriate to point to some similarities which can be seen between Aristotle's philosophy and theories of motivation researched in this thesis. Aristotle's position that it will be possible to correctly understand what human happiness is if we determine what is their function seems close to already mentioned Maslow's position that we should first know what is and only then we can know what is ought to be done. This of course seems opposite to the famous Hume's Is-Ought issue. But it also seems in alignment what Kant says, as it will be shortly present in the subsequent section. Aristotle's position that which is the best thing in human beings, i.e., the activity of faculty of intellect, "seems both to be superior in worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the activity), and the self-sufficiency" seems to resonate the ideas on intrinsic motivation often discussed in theories of motivation. What else sounds similar in all theories of motivation and Aristotle's philosophy is the idea of some kind of duality of human beings (although this time not ontologically speaking) exists. Namely when Aristotle talks that human beings should strive towards the "divine part" in them despite all difficulties it strongly resembles the position that higher human needs should also be catered to. In addition the emphasis on social aspect of human nature is also shared by all of the theories of motivation. Finally, the idea that human actions cannot be predicted and determined with mathematical precision actually goes against so much favored approach of prescribing universal solutions to managing people.

In the following section propositions that can be found in Hume's philosophy will be presented.

2.2.2. Propositions about human nature in Hume's work

In this subsection the topics will be presented in the following order: on morality; discussion about the virtues (especially the virtue of justice); Hume's opinion on customs; and finally discussion concerning personal identity.

Hume is founding morality on human nature, so Norton (2006, p. 175) suggests that:

“The very idea of morality presupposes a "sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation," a sentiment "so universal and comprehensive" as to extend even to those persons the most remote from any given moral assessor. This sentiment, derived from a "universal principle of the human frame," is, of all our sentiments, the only one capable of providing "the foundation of any general system and established theory of blame or approbation" or "the foundation of morals." Why? Because the sentiments that derive from this principle: (a) are the same for all humans; (b) produce in each of us the same moral assessments; (c) have as their scope all humans; and (d) produce moral assessments, in each of us, of all other humans”

Hume in EPM puts it like this:

“The notion of morals implies some sentiment common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of the persons the most remote, an object of applause or censure, according as they agree or disagree with that rule of right which is established.” (EPM IX,1, 221)

In addition:

“(…) if we cast our eye upon human nature, and consider that in all nations and ages, the same objects still give rise to pride and humility; and that upon the view even of a stranger, we can know pretty nearly, what will either increase or diminish his passions of this kind. If there be any variation in this particular, it proceeds from nothing but a difference in the tempers and complexions of men; and is besides very inconsiderable. Can we imagine it possible, that while human nature remains the same, men will ever become entirely indifferent to their power, riches, beauty or personal merit, and that their pride and vanity will not be affected by these advantages” (T., pp. 280-281)

According to Hume, not minding what person's background is, the same things will affect them in the same way, some possible variations can be noticed but they arise due to some differences between individual human beings. But what is important, the nature of human beings remains the same. So it can be stated that:

P_{HN70}: Human nature remains the same across cultures.

Concerning mentioned variations between human beings, it appears that they arise from the fact that individual people are a bit different if compared to one another, while the human nature itself is unalterable. (Norton, 2006, p.159) Hume in the *T* says it like this:

“The skins, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer are different from those of a man of quality: So are his sentiments, actions and manners. The different stations of life influence the whole fabric, external and internal; and these different stations arise necessarily, because uniformly, from the necessary and uniform principles of human nature” (T., p. 402)

It does not matter there are individual differences because: “There is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operations of the sun and climate. There are also characters peculiar to different nations and particular persons, as well as common to mankind.” (T., pp. 402-403) Another outcome of resting morality on human nature is that it suggests that human nature shows some substantive features, which when taken together with other circumstances of human life produce moral experience and moral distinctions. (Norton, 2006, p. 160)

Second group of proposition about human nature is found in the discussion about virtues. When talking about moral distinction Hume makes a difference between natural and artificial virtues. Natural virtues are done instinctively and automatically and artificial virtues are due to human influence. (Norton, 2006, p. 164) We respond to them with approval. (T. pp. 578-579) Concerning natural virtues, what Hume is saying is that every human being, never minding its background, is motivated by these inherent virtues. (Norton, 2006, p. 164) The examples of such virtues are: love for the children (T., p. 352), beneficence (T. p. 352), generosity (T. p. 352), clemency (T. p. 352), moderation (T. p. 352).

P_{HN71}: There are some virtues in human being which are fundamental propensities of human nature, and they motivate all human beings.

P_{HN72}: Natural virtues are love for the children, beneficence, generosity, clemency, moderation, temperance, frugality.

In contrast to natural virtues Hume is also talking about the artificial virtues. The artificial virtues are those that have evolved over time because of the fact that human beings interact with one another and because of the simple fact of human nature with all its characteristics. The examples of those virtues are justice (e.g., T. pp. 483-484; T. p. 518), fidelity (e.g., T. pp. 518-519) and allegiance (e.g. T. p. 577). Hume's idea is that even the most primitive people are inclined to act generously to one another, but there was no need for complex rules since the size of the groups were small. The system of justice was developed when groups grew larger. (Norton, 2006, p. 165)

P_{HN73}: Artificial virtues in human beings, those evolved due to connectedness of human beings, are justice, fidelity and allegiance.

When considering the artificial virtues, as Hume calls them, the virtue of justice seems especially important. When talking about the justice, Hume makes a statement about human condition and the natural unpreparedness in which human beings are cast into. His text is:

“Of all the animals, with which this globe is peopled, there is none towards whom nature seems, at first sight, to have exercis'd more cruelty than towards man, in the numberless wants and necessities, with which she has loaded him, and in the slender means, which she affords to the relieving these necessities.” (T, p. 484.)

While it looks like that human beings are not equipped sufficiently to live in the world, they do have a certain unique advantage in comparison to other beings. That advantage is that by banding together people can overcome hardships of the world. Hume says:

“Tis by society alone that he is able to supply his defects, and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquire a superiority above them. By society all his infirmities are compensated; and tho' in that situation his wants multiply every moment upon him, yet his abilities are still more augmented, and leave him in every respect more satisfied and happy, than 'tis possible for him, in his savage and solitary condition, ever to become.” (T., p. 485)

Basically, society enables people to increase their force, their abilities, and their safety. This is where justice comes into account – namely, society is a social unit governed by rules of justice. Hume admits that while society might not be the original feature of the human condition, its development is still based on certain features of human nature which enabled the advancement from primitive social unit to larger units of true societies. (T., pp. 484-485; Norton, 2006, p. 166)

Furthermore, when discussing the virtue of justice, Hume mentions two additional features of human nature which make it possible. First feature Hume mentions is the tendency to establish general rules which can be immune to self interest. The second feature is the principle of sympathy, which later on comes about to full-fledged moral virtue. (Norton, 2006, p. 168) The principle of sympathy is of great importance for Hume and his view on morality, it can be said that the principle is the chief source of moral distinctions. (Trigg, 1999, p. 87) Hume’s account of the first feature is the following:

“Upon the whole, then, we are to consider this distinction betwixt justice and injustice, as having two different foundations, *viz.* that of *self-interest*, when men observe, that 'tis impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by certain rules,- and that of *morality*, when this interest is once observed to be common to all mankind, and men receive a pleasure from the view of such actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it. 'Tis the voluntary convention and artifice of men, which makes the first interest take place; and therefore those laws of justice are so far to be consider'd as *artificial*. After that interest is once established and acknowledge, the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows *naturally*, and of itself; tho' 'tis certain, that it is also augmented by a new *artifice*, and that the public instructions of politicians, and the private education of parents, contribute to the giving us a sense of honour and duty in the strict regulation of our actions with regard to the properties of others.” (T., p. 533)

From all the above it appears that Hume is thinking that features of human nature are:

P_{HN74}: Human beings exhibit inclination to create general rules, which are immune to self-interest.

P_{HN75}: Human beings exhibit principle of sympathy.

Gill (2000) argues that there can be no doubt that Hume put forth new ideas, and that they are real advances of the topic considering previous philosophical achievements. One such advance is what can be called a “progressive view of human nature”.

It seems that the discussion about the virtue of justice is a continuation and sort of combination of ideas put forth by three philosophers on the issue of sociability of human beings. Gill (2000) argues that the combination of the mentioned ideas of the three philosophers by Hume represents a significant improvement in the science of man. It seems that Hume is in regards of justice claiming two things. First, justice is an artificial virtue which originates in self-interest. Second thing that Hume argues about justice is that people really do exhibit the non-self-interested virtue of justice. This two part position seems to on one hand go along the lines of thinking of Bernard Mandeville, but also in part with the ideas of Anthony Ashley Cooper (the third Earl of Shaftesbury) and Francis Hutcheson. Gill (2000) claims that Mandeville would agree that the virtue of justice originates in self-interest, and Shaftesbury and Hutcheson would agree with the second. What is important that none of them would agree with both.

The reason why all of the three philosophers think that the two-position is unsustainable is because of their, according to Gill (2000), “static or originalistic” view of human nature. Basically, this means that the original motives of human beings always remain the only truly fundamental ones, or the basic elements of human motivation are static. Of course socialization and experience change the focus of original human motives, but there are no new motives created. Gill (2000) phrases it like this: “The ultimate driving forces of human conduct stay the same. (...) What is impossible, according to this view, is that an original selfish motive to become sociable could be supplemented and even contravened by a non-selfish motive that did not exist before sociability emerged.”

Hume, on the other hand, holds what Gill (2000) calls a “dynamic or progressive” view of human nature. This view allows that original motives evolve into other motives of different kinds. Hume shows that: “(...) that is, how there can evolve a regard for justice that is not original but is nonetheless entirely sincere-how a real commitment to the impartiality of justice grows out of our originally partial nature.” (Gill, 2000) The main reason for this evolution is the use of principle of association, the one which makes it possible to human beings to move from an uncultivated partiality to cultivated impartiality. This is what Gill (2000) says:

“But if we have represented to us enough harmful acts of injustice that do not affect our own interests, and if (as we must) we feel disapproval in most of these cases, we will eventually develop the associative habit of conjoining disapproval and injustice. This associative habit develops, we will tend to feel disapproval toward all unjust acts, even those that benefit us.”

The reason for this is the inclination of human beings to create general rules, or to over generalize. Gill (2000) concludes that Hume uses the same approach when explaining the other moral phenomena such as love, pride, or approval. And precisely this progressive use of the principles of association might be Hume’s greatest innovation.

Similar to his account of virtue of justice, from Hume’s treatment of duties and moral obligation further remarks about human nature can be reached. As it is well known, Hume is saying that propositions of the form X ought to do Y are unfounded. For example Hume states that:

“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with *ought*, or an *ought not*.” (T., p. 469)

It seems that Hume is also saying that human beings have natural and moral duties.

“I shall add, as a corollary to this reasoning, that since no action can be laudable or blameable, without some motives or impelling passions, distinct from the sense of morals, these distinct passions must have a great influence on that sense. ‘Tis according to their general force in human nature, that we blame or praise. In judging of the beauty of animal bodies, we always carry in our eye the œconomy of a certain species; and where the limbs and features observe that proportion, which is common to the species, we pronounce them handsome and beautiful. In like manner we always consider the *natural* and *usual* force of the passions, when we determine considering vice and virtue; and if the passions depart very much from the common measure on either side, they are always disapprov’d as vicious. A man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, his nephews better than his cousin, his cousin better than strangers, where everything else is equal. Hence arise our common measures of duty, in preferring one to the other. Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions.” (T., pp. 483-484)

This is sometimes taken to be inconsistency in Hume's thought. But commentators are saying that this reading is not correct because Hume is saying that if obligations are reactionally deducted from merely factual premises there is a logical blunder at work, but the obligation itself is not meaningless or wrong. (Norton, 2006, p. 169) Duties can be explained by looking at human nature. As it turns out, human nature is uniform, and human beings generally follow certain patterns in a way that there is a natural or usual course of behavior that corresponds to the passions or motivating principles that constitute human nature. Finally, if mentioned patterns are not followed then the result is feelings of blame.⁵³ (Norton, 2006, p. 169) Following propositions about human nature can be given.

P_{HN76}: Human nature is uniform.

P_{HN77}: Human beings act following certain patterns, failure to do so results in a feeling of blame. (regarding duties)

Insights into human nature are further provided in Hume's account of the role of customs in the life of human beings. On this topic Copleston (2003, p. 291) remarks that Hume often speaks as though customs do not only dominate life, but that it is proper for them to dominate it. At the same time, he says that experience should guide one's life. Hume's words concerning this are: "The experienced train of events is the great standard by which we all regulate our conduct. Nothing else can be appealed to in the field, or in the senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school, or in the closet." (EHU XI, 23, p.142) One way of resolving this issue, at least according to Copleston (2003, pp. 291-292), is to state that there are some customary fundamental beliefs which are essential for human beings. Those customary beliefs are: belief in the continuous and independent existence of bodies; and belief that everything which begins to be has a cause. The mentioned beliefs have to dominate in order for human life to be possible.

Hume's discussion about personal identity of human beings is another place where it is possible to find the remarks about human nature. In a famous passage Hume says that:

"The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and

⁵³ More so, Hume will insist that: „In short, it may be establish'd as an undoubted maxim, that no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality.“ (T., p. 479)

situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different; whatever natural propensity we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which this is compos'd." (T., p. 253)

When Hume is writing about the problem of personal identity he is thinking about the question what constitutes personal identity.⁵⁴ (Noonan, 2003, p. 188)

"For, according to Hume, personal identity is a fiction; the aspiration of identity over time to persons, a mistake. It is an explicable mistake and one we all necessarily make, but nonetheless a mistake. For persons just do not endure self-identity over time. Consequently, since there is no such thing as personal identity over time, nor is there any problem of the metaphysical-cum-semantic variety presented by the question: in what does personal identity over time consist? The only problem that exists is the genetic one of specifying the psychological causes of the universal but mistaken belief in the existence of enduring persons, and this is the problem to which Hume addresses himself in his discussion of personal identity." (Noonan, 2003, p. 189)

For Hume it is not strange that persons, or any other entities, do not endure self identity over time. (Noonan, 2003, p. 189) The concept of identity, as Hume defines it, is not compatible with the idea of change. The way that Hume defines the concept of identity is: "We have a distinct idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterrupted thro' a suppos'd variation of time; and this idea we call that of *identity* or *sameness*." (T., p. 253) The problem is thus what happens and why do we – human beings – attribute the false belief in identity of changing things. (Noonan, 2003, p. 190) Actually, the mechanism that creates this false belief, is the same operation of the mind which ascribes identity to distinct perceptions:

"Our last resource is to yield to it, and boldly assert that these different related objects are in effect the same, however interrupted and variable. In order to justify to ourselves this absurdity, we often feign some new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects together, and prevents their interruption or variation. Thus we feign the continu'd existence of the perceptions of our senses, to remove the

⁵⁴ In the Lockean tradition it can be said that the answer to this issue has two components. First the negative component which is basically the idea that personal identity is not constituted by identity of either material or immaterial substance. (Noonan, 2003, p. 188; Essay II, xxvii.7). On the other hand, the positive component, of the answer is that what actually constitutes personal identity, at least according to Locke, is the sameness of consciousness. (Noonan, 2003, p. 188; Essay II, xxvii.9) When Hume is talking about constitution of personal identity his emphasis is on the negative component Locke emphasized.

interruption; and run into the notion of a *soul*, and *self* and *substance*, to disguise the variation. But we may farther observe, that where we do not give rise to such a fiction, our propensity to confound identity with relation is so great, that we are apt to imagine something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, beside their relation; and this I take to be the case with regard to the identity we ascribe to plants and vegetables. And even when this does not take place, we will feel a propensity to confound these ideas, tho' we are not able fully to satisfy ourselves in that particular, nor find any thing invariable and uninterrupted to justify our notion of identity." (T. pp. 254-255)

Even more, when one uses introspection, it still does not come up with anything resembling the self, or any kind of mental substance. (Noonan, 2003, p. 193) Hume writes that like this:

"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist." (T., p. 252)

Hume's position is not without the possibility of a critique. Noonan (2003, p.197) simplifies the possible answers like this:

"To put the same point in different terms, the relation between the self and its perceptions is analogous to that between the sea and its waves. The waves are modifications of the sea and perceptions are modifications of the self. But Hume, in claiming that perceptions are logically and ontologically independent, denies this and thus denies the only possible basis for regarding the self, *qua* perceiver, as ontologically prior to its perceptions. That he should claim that the self is in reality nothing but a bundle of its perceptions in the section following is thus entirely intelligible. Once perceptions are reified as substances no other conception of the self makes any sense at all." (Noonan, 2003, p. 197)

In thinking that there is soul, or the self, according to Hume, philosophers are mistaken. But, on the other hand he also does not force his skeptical position to the far limits. (Noonan, 2003, p. 192) Basically what Hume is saying is that when one looks into oneself that there is no constant and invariable impression. This kind of impression is necessary because in order for the self to be constant through the entire life its impression should also be like that. But there is nothing like it:

“If any impression gives rise to the idea of the self, that impressions must continue invariably the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos’d to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea.”(T., pp. 251-252)

Furthermore, perceptions, according to Hume, are ontologically independent entities and this positions results in additional complications for the notion of substantial self. In Hume’s words:

“But farther, what must become of all our particular perceptions upon this hypothesis? All these are different, and distinguishable, and separable from each other, and may be separately consider’d, and may exist separately, and have no need of any thing to support their existence. After what manner therefore do they belong to self; and how are they connected with it?” (T., p. 252)

Resulting from all of this is Hume’s notion that the self is necessarily a “bundle of perceptions”. This is unavoidable when taking into the account his denial of the observability of the self distinct from perceptions. (Noonan, 2003, p. 200) If Hume, i.e. Bundle theory, is right then the person is: “(...) nothing but a sequence of different (ontologically independent) objects existing in succession, and connected by a close relation – something like a thunderstorm.” (Noonan, 2003, p. 201).

P_{HN78}: The self is a “bundle of perceptions”

The trouble now is that this kind of description is definitely not something we can consider as an identity. So how come we ascribe identity to it? Hume tries to explain it like this⁵⁵:

⁵⁵ Something similar Hume used when talking about how ancient philosophers made a mistake about the substance. (Noonan, 2003, p. 202) This is what Hume says: “’Tis evident, that as the ideas of the several distinct *successive* qualities of objects are united together by a very close relation, the mind, in looking along the succession, must be carry’d from one part of it to another by an easy transition and will no more perceive the change than if it contemplated the same unchangeable object. This easy transition is the effect, or rather essence of relation; and as the imagination readily takes one idea for another, where their influence on the mind is similar; hence it proceeds, that any such succession of related qualities is readily consider’d as one continu’d object, existing without any variation. The smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought, being alike in both cases, readily deceives the mind, and makes us ascribe an identity to the changeable succession of connected qualities. But when we alter our method of considering the succession, and instead of tracing it gradually thro’ the successive points of time, survey at once any two distinct periods of its duration, and compare the different conditions of the successive qualities; and in that case the variations, which were insensible when they arose

“That action of the imagination, by which we consider the uninterrupted and invariable object, and that by which we reflect on the succession of related objects, are almost the same to the feeling, nor is there much more effort of thought requir’d in the latter case than in the former. The relation facilitates the transmission of the mind from one object to another, and renders its passage as smooth as if it contemplated one continu’d object. This resemblance is the cause of the confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute the notion of identity, instead of that of related objects. However at one instant we may consider the related succession as variable or interrupted, we are sure the next to ascribe to it a perfect identity, and regard it as invariable and uninterrupted.” (T., pp. 253- 254)

Ideas being connected in this smooth and interrupted chain is where the reason for belief in the unity of the self lies. (Noonan, 2003, p. 203) Hume says that the belief in the unity of the self: “(...) proceed entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas according to the principles above explain’d.“ (T., p. 260) This mentioned uninterrupted train of the thought, according to Hume, is the product of two factors. Those factors are: resemblance and causation. Concerning resemblance, our perceptions resemble one another for different reasons, but remembering past experiences is pointed out by Hume. (Noonan, 2003, p. 203)

“For what is the memory, but a faculty by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? And as an image necessarily resembles its object must not the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object?” (T., pp. 260-261)

The second important factor for having a belief in the unity of the self is causation. In this regard Hume states the following:

“As to causation; we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link’d together

gradually, do now appear of consequence, and seem entirely to destroy the identity. By this means there arises a kind of contrariety in our method of thinking, from different points of view, in which we survey the object, and from the nearness or remoteness of those instants of time, which we compare together. When we gradually follow an object in its successive changes, the smooth progress of the thought makes us ascribe an identity to the succession; because ‘tis by a similar act of the mind we consider an unchangeable object. When we compare its situation after a considerable change the progress of the thought is broke; and consequently we are presented with the idea of diversity: In order to reconcile which contradictions the imagination is apt to feign something unknown and invisible, which it supposes to continue the same under all variations; and this unintelligible something it calls a *substance, or original and first matter.*” (T., p. 220)

by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other. Our impressions give rise to their correspondent ideas; and these ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chaces another, and draws after it a third, by which it is expell'd in its turn. In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as the same individual republic may not only change its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation of causation." (T., p. 266)

Furthermore, Hume continues:

"As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be consider'd, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou'd have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person. But having once acquir'd this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed." (T., pp. 261-62)

Hume concludes, as does Noolan (2003, p. 204) in his interpretation that: "In this view, therefore, memory does not so much *produce* as *discover* personal identity, by shewing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions" (T., p. 262) The following proposition can be stated

P_{HN79}: Memory by showing the relation of cause and effect among different perceptions discovers personal identity

There are obviously many possible objections to Hume's ideas about identity, but they are not the topic of this thesis, so the text will not follow where they might lead.⁵⁶

Looking at the ideas described in this subsection, and comparing them to what was said in theories of motivations, there are again some similarities. First, small variations are present between people, while human nature is the same, resonates the position about

⁵⁶ For more details please see e.g. Noonan (2003, pp. 205-211).

universality of human needs with variations due to cultural means of catering to those needs, and different social backgrounds shared by SDT and other content theories of motivation. Similarities continue with claiming that some characteristics are propensities of human nature itself. Second, Hume together with all other authors in the thesis emphasizes the importance of sociality and social context for human beings. Third, the Is-Ought issue Hume is famous for apparently goes against what Maslow is saying when he states that first it is necessary to find what “is“ regarding human beings, and only then it is possible to say what human beings “ought“ to do.

With this the presentation of propositions made by David Hume regarding human nature is completed. In the last subsection of part two of the thesis propositions made by Immanuel Kant on the same topic will be presented.

2.2.3. Propositions about human nature in Kant’s work

Importance of Kant’s anthropology lectures is that in them and in lectures on physical geography he intends to give students cosmopolitan knowledge. This means that his intent was not only to teach students scientific facts, but also to prepare them for the real world. (Wilson, 2006, p. 8) Furthermore, the significance of putting together geography and anthropology is that it points to the idea that human beings should be viewed as objects of the experience in the world. Human being is pictured as a natural being which is a member of the world. (Wilson, 2006, p. 8)

Kant does not offer some kind of definitive answer to the question about human nature. His reservations are felt as early as his *Universal Natural History and Theory of Heavens*:

“It is not even known at all to us what the human being now is, although consciousness and the senses ought to instruct us in this; how much less will we be able to guess what one day he ought to become. Nevertheless, the human soul’s desire for knowledge snaps very desirously at this object, which lies so far from it, and strives, in such obscure knowledge, to shed some light” (Ak 1: 366; cited according to Wood, 2003, p. 40).

The reason for it is that in order to know what is unique about the human species, it has to be compared to other species of rational beings, which of course have not been encountered yet. (Louden, 2011, pp. xix-xx) In his *Anth* Kant says: “It seems therefore that the problem of indicating the character of the human species is absolutely insoluble, because the solution

would have to be made through experience by means of the comparison of two *species* of rational being, but experience does not offer us this.“ (Anth, Ak 7: 321) Kant explains it like this: “The highest species concept may be that of a terrestrial rational being; however, we shall not be able to name its character because we have no knowledge of non-terrestrial rational beings that would enable us to indicate their characteristic property and so to characterize this terrestrial being among rational beings in general.” (Anth, Ak 7: 321)

Despite this he is still committed to the position that there is a set of common characteristic shared by all human beings that can be called nature. This can be seen from the following statement: “Anthropology, is not a description of human beings but of human nature” (anonymous-Friedländer 4.3, Ak 25: 471, cited according to Wood, 2003, p. 39) Anthropology should be general and not local; it is the quest for the nature of humanity, not a description of human beings, but of human nature. Kant offers several ideas about human nature. In this subsection the propositions about human nature that are generally derived from comparing other animals to human beings will be presented. More narrowly, first set of propositions comes from Kant’s treatment of rationality, second from the idea of four natural predispositions of human beings, third from the vocation or destiny of human beings, and forth from the insights what contributes to happiness.

The first source of ideas on human nature is comparison of human beings with other species on earth. One of the differences that become visible by comparing human beings and animals is rationality. (Louden, 2011, pp. xxi-xv)

“Therefore, in order to assign the human being his class in the system of animate nature, nothing remains for us than to say that he has a character, which he himself creates, in so far as he is capable of perfecting himself according to ends that he himself adopts. By means of this the human being, as an animal endowed with the *capacity of reason (animal rationabile)*, can make out of himself a *rational animal (animal rationale)* – whereby he first preserves himself and his species; second, trains, instructs, and educates his species for domestic society; third, governs it as a systematic whole (arranged according to principles of reason) appropriate for society.” (Anth, Ak 7: 321-322)

Human beings are rational, but they are not rational automatically. What they do have is the ability to become rational.⁵⁷ What Kant is saying in the paragraph above is, at least according

⁵⁷ Kant compares the mental abilities of human beings with the hand: “The characterization of the human being as a rational animal is already present in the form and organization of his *hand*, his *fingers*, and *fingertips*; partly through their structure, partly through their sensitive feeling. By this means nature has made the human being not suited for one way of manipulating things but undetermined for every way, consequently suited for the use of

to commentators, that human rationality is the problem which has to be solved in a way that it is no longer just a potentiality, but fully developed rationality.

P_{KN80}: Human beings have an ability to become rational, they are not so immediately.

According to Kant human beings are the only rational beings⁵⁸ on earth. There are three functions of reason in the life of human beings. First is that human beings are the only animals who determine for themselves how they live. All other beings are determined by their instincts. (Wood, 2003, pp. 51-52) Second function is education. Namely, human beings are capable of passing their preferred capacities from one generation to another via education in the domestic society. And finally, the third function is that human beings are able to determine for themselves the form of their social interactions by adopting shared principles for the government of social wholes. (Wood, 2003, p. 52)

P_{KN81}: Human beings are capable of perfecting themselves.

Because of the capacity to choose their ends, the mode of life of human beings is open and not closed. The issue of freedom is going to be picked up later in the third part of the thesis, but now it can be stated that Kant says that: “There is in man an active, but supersensible principle which, independently of nature and the causality of the world, determines nature’s appearances, and is called freedom” (OP, Ak 21:50) The crucial moment in the development of human beings was when early human beings realized that they can make free choices. (Louden, 2011, p. xxii) In Kant’s words:

“The occasion for deserting the natural drive might have been only something trivial; yet the success of the first attempt, namely of becoming conscious of one’s reason as a faculty that can extend itself beyond the limits within which all animals are held, was very important and decisive for his way of thinking. Thus if it had been only a fruit whose outward look, by its similarity with other pleasant fruits that one had otherwise tasted, invited him to the attempt; if to this perhaps was added the example of an

reason; and thereby has indicated the technical predisposition, or the predisposition of skill, of his species as a *rational* animal.” (Anth, Ak 7: 323)

⁵⁸ Humans exhibit a specific kind of rationality, i.e. substantive rationality. Namely when an animal strategizes how to satisfy its hunger the instrumental rationality is at play. On the other hand, when animal reflects on its hunger, and decides to ignore it that is substantive rationality. (Louden, 2011, pp. xxi-xv) In short, only human beings demonstrate this kind of substantive rationality, while, for other animals, Kant admits that they sometimes possess instrumental rationality.

animal whose nature was suited to such a gratification as was, on the contrary, disadvantageous to the human being; hence if there was a natural instinct consequently opposing it, then this could give reason the first occasion to cavil with the voice of nature (*Genesis 3:1*) and, despite its opposition, to make the first attempt at a free choice, which, as the first one, probably did not turn out in conformity to expectation. Now, the harm might have been as insignificant as you like, yet about this it opened the human being's eyes (*Genesis 3:7*). He discovered in himself a faculty of choosing for himself a way of living and not being bound to a single one, as other animals are. Yet upon the momentary delight that this marked superiority might have awakened in him, anxiety and fright must have followed right away, concerning how he, who still did not know the hidden properties and remote effects of anything, should deal with this newly discovered faculty. He stood, as it were, on the brink of an abyss; for instead of the single objects of his desire to which instinct had up to now directed him, there opened up an infinity of them, and he did not know how to relate to the choice between them; and from this estate of freedom, once he had tasted it, it was nevertheless wholly impossible for him to turn back again to that of servitude (under the dominion of instinct).” (CB, Ak 8:112)

Since reason or more precisely, the capacity of human beings to have an open-ended and self-devised life – in contrast to other animals ruled by instinct – is regarded as a sign of freedom. Human beings are free agents. (Wood, 2003, p. 51)

P_{KN82}: Human beings are free.

The moment when human beings realized that they can make choices which are different than those chosen by instinct also marks the beginning of morality. (Louden, 2011, p. xxiv) This is because once it was discovered that humans can act differently than simply satisfying the instincts present, it led to a discovery that it is possible to refuse the instincts completely in some context. So, as Kant says: “*Refusal* was the first artifice for leading from merely sensed stimulus over to ideal ones.” (CB, Ak 8:113) Furthermore : “(...) *propriety* [*Sittsamkeit*], an inclination by good conduct [*guten Anstand*] to influence others to respect for us (through the concealment of that which could incite low esteem), as the genuine foundation of all true sociability, gave the first hint toward the formation [*Ausbildung*] of the human being as a moral [*sittlichen*] creature.” (CB, Ak 8: 113)

Related to the faculty of freedom is the possibility of culture. What is important to emphasize is that what counts as culture, according to Kant, is progressive, and substantively rational and freely chosen activity, and not some other kinds of for example tool-behavior or

even social group mechanisms that can be, according to some, found in nonhuman primates⁵⁹. (Louden, 2011, p. xxiii)

P_{KN83}: Culture of human beings is an activity which has to be chosen freely.⁶⁰

Also, culture is not necessarily cumulative, since human beings are not causally determined. Culture is only potentially cumulative. (Louden, 2011, p. xxiv) Therefore the culture may “grow” and build upon itself, but also it may not. As Kant points out in *CF*:

“(…) no one can guarantee that now, this very moment, with regard to the physical disposition of our species, the epoch of its decline would not be liable to occur (...) For we are dealing with beings that act freely, to whom, it is true, what they ought to do may be dictated in advance, but of whom it may not be predicted what they will do (...)” (CF, p.149)⁶¹

Another thing that distinguishes human beings from other possible rational beings is the specific conditions under which the faculty of reason has developed. These conditions are those of discord, or antagonism. This is sometimes called unsocial-sociability. In Kant's words:

“Human beings have an inclination to *associate* with one another because in such condition they feel themselves to be more human, that is to say, more in position to develop their natural predispositions. But they also have a strong tendency to *isolate* themselves, because they encounter in themselves the unsociable trait that predisposes them to encounter resistance everywhere, just as they know that they themselves tend to resist others. It is this resistance that awakens all human powers and causes human beings to overcome their tendency to idleness and, driven by lust for honor, power, or property, to establish a position for themselves among their fellows, whom they can neither *endure* nor do *without*.” (Idea, Ak 8: 20-21)

So human beings develop their faculty of reason in part because of the inhospitable and tenuous situation they find themselves in the relation to other human beings. On one hand

⁵⁹ There are numerous studies conducted which aim to describe and explain the tool-behavior and evidences of material culture as well as social group mechanics in non-human primates. For examples see Šestak, Jalšenjak (2009).

⁶⁰ This may go against very popular idea today about infusing corporate culture in employees. If they accept it under some external pressure, which is obviously present, then it is not a real culture but merely a façade.

⁶¹ Louden (2011, p. xxiv) uses the classical citation method to point out this text, namely: Ak 7: 83. This method is not used here because the edition available does not use it.

they are drawn to others by their nature, but also due to their nature are prone to distancing themselves from others. The following proposition about human beings can thus be given.

P_{KN84}: Human beings are both drawn to and inclined to isolate themselves from other human beings.

Self-production or self-making, as Wood (2003, p. 41) puts it, of human beings according to Kant must be taken to include interactions with other human beings and the influence of the society⁶², and education. Basically, from Kant's point of view: "Human being can become human only through education. He is nothing but what education makes of him." (Ed, Ak 9: 443) By education Kant means: "(...) specifically care (maintenance, support), discipline (training) and instruction, together with formation⁶³." (Ed, Ak 9:441)

P_{KN85}: Human beings can become human only through education.

When combining what Kant writes in *Rel* (Ak 6:26), and *Anth* (Anth, Ak 7:322), human beings can be viewed as having four natural predispositions. Those predispositions are: the predisposition to animality, the technical predisposition, the pragmatic predisposition, and the moral predisposition. (Wilson, 2006, p. 44)⁶⁴

P_{KN86}: Human beings have a predisposition to animality.

P_{KN87}: Human beings have a technical predisposition.

P_{KN88}: Human beings have a pragmatic predisposition.

P_{KN89}: Human beings have a predisposition to morality.

The predisposition towards animality, as it is claimed by Wilson (2006, p. 62, 70) has several ends. Those are self-preservation, propagation of the species through sexual drive and

⁶² From the understanding that human beings can fully develop most of its natural predispositions only in a society it can be stated that in Kant's theory of human nature humans are intrinsically communal, and not primarily an isolated individuals. (Wilson, 2006, pp. 45-46)

⁶³ Formation (*Bildung*) very broadly refers to the entire process of spiritual and mental formation. Because of that it can encompass education, instruction, discipline and culture. See footnote "a" in Ed p. 437.

⁶⁴ In *Anth* there is no mention of the predisposition to animality, and in *Rel* there is no mention of the technical predisposition. According to Wilson (2006, p. 61) this, at the first glance inconsistency, disappears when the purpose of the books is considered. Namely, the *Anth* deals with what is specific to human beings when compared to other beings on earth, and *Rel* is concerned with the source of evil in the human beings. So, there is actually no inconsistency between the texts.

preservation of the offspring, and the community with other human beings or social drive⁶⁵. Kant says it like this:

“The predisposition to animality in the human being may be brought under the general title of physical or merely mechanical self-love, i.e. a love for which reason is not required. It is threefold: first, for self-preservation; second, for the propagation of the species, through the sexual drive, and for the preservation of the offspring thereby begotten through breeding; third, for community with other human beings, i.e. the social drive.” (Rel, Ak 6: 26)

What is important is that while nature does provide these ends, no means to accomplish them are provided. Unlike other animals human beings have to find the means through discipline. When comparing animals and human beings, Kant believes that human beings need a master, because they have to be educated on how to operate in accordance to maxims and laws. (Wilson, 2006, p. 47)

Considering the technical predisposition it is stated that human beings have to develop skillfulness (*Geschichtlichkeit*) and with it they can choose any ends they like. (Wilson, 2006, p. 73) Basically, all sciences and arts are the effect of the cultivation of the skill, and this also applies to all theoretical knowledge – and by extension to the technical predisposition. (Wilson, 2006, p. 74) There is also a connection between skill and culture. The reason this is so is because culture consists of exercising mental faculties, and they depend on the cultivation of the natural skill. (Wilson, 2006, p. 75) Basically, culture belongs to the development of the technical predisposition as its end. Finally, the fulfillment of the technical predisposition is not fully achievable during the lifetime of an individual, because, as Wilson (2006, p. 75) claims, the drive to acquire scientific knowledge as a form of culture is completely out of proportion to man’s life span. Kant’s words are:

“The drive to acquire science, as a form of culture that ennobles humanity, has altogether no proportion to the life span of the species. The scholar, when he has advanced in culture to the point where he himself can broaden the field, is called away by death, and his place is taken by the mere beginner who, shortly before the end of his life, after he too has just taken one step forward, in turn relinquishes his place to another.” (Anth, Ak 7:325)

⁶⁵ The fourth end can be added and that is the preservation of the ability to enjoy the pleasures of life, but still on the animal level. The fourth end can be found in *The Doctrine of Virtue* (Ak 6:420; according to Wilson, 2006)

The development of the pragmatic predisposition depends on the social civilization of human beings. The end of the third predisposition is civilization, and it seems to come in three different ways. According to Wilson (2006, p. 76) the ways civilization comes about are: through the cultivation of arts and sciences; through cultivation and refinement in social life; through civil constitution. At this point Kant uses the already mentioned concept of unsociable-sociability. What happens in culture is that it brings out the competition between human beings. There are no seeds of discord in animal predisposition. The seeds of discord are found in the capacity for culture because culture creates situations of inequality. There are two ways that civilization can solve the discord which is fueled by culture: establishment of a civil constitution, and institution of marriage. (Wilson, 2006, p. 78)

The end of the pragmatic predisposition is the individual happiness, i.e., every human being is inherently interested in their own happiness. So, the nature has given the end of the third predisposition, but unlike with the technical predisposition where human beings have talents to achieve the end, for the pragmatic predisposition there are no means given to human beings by nature. Only thing human beings have been given by nature are feelings which can tell us are we happy or not. In addition to this, nature does not make it easy for human beings to achieve happiness (various perils, inequality between human beings in culture, inconsistency of the natural predispositions, etc). Therefore in order for humans to achieve at least a bit of happiness, concludes Wilson (2006, pp. 79-80), human beings are driven to develop prudence.

Prudence⁶⁶ is defined as: “the readiness in the use of means to the universal end of man, namely happiness.” (LoE, Ak 27: 246) For an individual, material things that are required for happiness have to be limited by taste and sociability, as not to offend others. The full definition of happiness is not possible because it is always tied with the opinions of others, and with a particular era. (Wilson, 2006, p. 80) In short, happiness is the end of the third predisposition, and prudence is the means to achieving that predisposition.

Concerning the predisposition to morality, there are several issues present. First, according to Kant, the moral law is present in human beings from birth, and it seems that it

⁶⁶ According to Kant prudence is different than cunning. A person who has prudence (*Klugheit*) will serve both his purpose and the others peoples' purposes. On the other hand, a person who is cunning (*Arglist*) will only serve his shortsighted end, he is not only immoral, but also imprudent since no one will trust such a person in the future. (Wilson, 2006, p. 32) It can be said that prudence presupposes using others but with their consent, and not coercion. (Wilson, 2006, p. 53)

does not have to be developed.⁶⁷ Education cannot pass on the idea of morality, which is innate.

“The question here is: whether the human being is good by nature, or evil by nature, or whether he is by nature equally susceptible to one or the other, depending on whether this or that formative hand falls on him (*cereus in vitiumflecti* etc.). In the latter case the species itself would have no character. - But this case is self contradictory; for a being endowed with the power of practical reason and consciousness of freedom of his power of choice (a person) sees himself in this consciousness, even in the midst of the darkest representations, subject to a law of duty and to the feeling (which is then called moral feeling) that justice or injustice is done to him or, by him, to others. Now this in itself is already the intelligible character of humanity as such, and in this respect the human being is good according to his innate predispositions (good by nature). But experience nevertheless also shows that in him there is a tendency actively to desire what is unlawful, even though he knows that it is unlawful; that is, a tendency to evil, which stirs as inevitably and as soon as he begins to make use of his freedom, and which can therefore be considered innate. Thus, according to his sensible character the human being must also be judged as evil (by nature). This is not self-contradictory if one is talking about the character of the species; for one can assume that its natural vocation consists in continual progress toward the better.” (Anth, Ak 7:324)

This situation becomes clearer when human being is looked at as both moral and natural being. The natural being has a need for education. Humans as natural beings develop characters and this character reflects the development of moral predisposition. To be able to acquire a character is caused by the predisposition for morality. (Wilson, 2006, p. 81) And precisely, the development of a good character is the end of the fourth predisposition. (Wilson, 2006, p. 83) The means to achieve that end (good character) is wisdom. Wisdom serves the same purpose in the predisposition for morality, as discipline did for predisposition for animality, skill for the technical predisposition, and prudence for the pragmatic (humanity) predisposition. It has a role to limit prudence, because otherwise prudence would only look at benefit of an individual. And, finally wisdom teaches that happiness is not achieved, and definitely not secured, through money and honor, and that an individual is limited in his powers and lifetime and that his animalistic, technical and pragmatic drives are not the end.

⁶⁷ By claiming that human beings have a natural moral predisposition, Kant is able to avoid a problem that many other theories of human nature have. Namely, when reading different theories of human nature many of them have troubles with explaining the motivation for altruistic or moral action. Kant's theory is not one for them because Kant places moral directives right at the beginning of the theory of human nature itself. (Wilson, 2006, p. 43)

The full achievement of the destiny of human beings can be reached only with also fulfilling the predisposition to morality. (Wilson, 2006, pp. 85-86)

In the development of all of the four predispositions education is crucial. Wilson (2006, p. 87) summarizes it like this: “The talents and abilities of human beings are like germs that need to be developed out of them: ‘It is for us to make these germs grow into humanity, by developing the natural predispositions in their due proportion, and to see that human beings reach their destiny.’”

As was already stated, human beings are capable of perfecting themselves according to the ends they choose for themselves. Again the categorization of those ends is similar to the categorization of natural predispositions. Namely, human beings can adopt: animal ends, technical ends, pragmatic ends, or moral ends. (Wilson, 2006, p. 47) The last three are reasons why human beings are human. Of course it is possible that there are going to be conflicts in human nature between the predispositions.

More differences become noticeable between animals and human beings when vocation or destiny (*Bestimmung*) is examined. According Brand (2003, p. 93) Kant’s three famous questions are brought together not with the question about the essence and definition of human beings, but with the question about the purpose of human beings. Brandt (2003, p. 93) puts it like this: “(...) to what is a human being destined (*bestimmt*) by his nature and reason? Or, what is the vocation of the human species?”

Concerning the vocation of human being Kant is saying that it transcending the mere final natural vocation:

“The sum total of pragmatic anthropology, in respect to the vocation of the human being and the Characteristic of his formation, is the following. The human being is destined by his reason to live in a society with human beings and in it to *cultivate* himself, to *civilize* himself, and to *moralize* himself by means of the arts and sciences. No matter how great his animal tendency may be to give himself over *passively* to the impulses of comfort and good living, which he calls happiness, he is still destined to make himself worthy of humanity by *actively* struggling with the obstacles that cling to him because of the crudity of his nature. (Anth, Ak 7:324-325)

P_{KN90}: Human beings are destined to cultivate, civilize and moralize themselves.

Wood (2003, p.53) states that cultivation is the historical development of technical predisposition of human beings to devise means to their own ends (most basically self-preservation). Civilization is the historical development of the pragmatic predisposition to

pursue well-being or happiness through interaction, education, and moralization. Morality itself is the development of the predisposition of human beings to personality or devising and obeying rational laws through which society becomes a system of ends united and combined or “kingdom of ends”. Kant writes:

„The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as giving universal law through all the maxims of his will, so as to appraise himself and his actions from this point of view, leads to a very fruitful concept dependent upon it,; namely that *of a kingdom of ends*. By a *kingdom* I understand a systematic union of various rational beings through common laws.“ (Gr, Ak 4:433)

It can be said in conclusion to what differentiates human beings from other animals is their collective history created by them by cultivating, civilizing and moralizing themselves through faculty of reason. (Wood, 2003, p. 54) Furthermore, it seems that, according to Kant if one considers the “character of the human species” as “intelligence” one finds a “calling” (vocation) which separates humanity from other earth creatures. Basically, human beings can achieve their vocation only in a group and not as individuals. Kant says this:

„First of all, it must be noted that with all other animals left to themselves, each individual reaches its complete vocation; however, with the human being only the species, at best, reaches it; so that the human race can work its way up to its vocation only through progress in a series of innumerable many generations.“ (Anth, Ak 7: 324)

“However, for the ends of nature one can assume as a principle that nature wants every creature to reach its vocation through the appropriate development of all predispositions of its nature, so that at least the species, if not every individual, fulfills nature’s purpose. – With irrational animals this actually happens and is the wisdom of nature; however, with human beings only the species reaches it. We know of only one species of rational beings on earth; namely the human species, in which we also know only one natural tendency to this end; namely some day to bring about, by its own activity, the development of good out of evil.” (Anth, Ak 7: 329)

P_{KN91}: Human beings, in order to reach their vocation, have to be part of a group or a society.

Human beings definitely can be satisfied or unsatisfied because of a great variety of things. Concerning satisfaction, Kant will say it is not in the human nature to remain satisfied. What Kant is saying is that once one desire or group of them is satisfied another one will appear.

“But even if we sought either to reduce this concept to the genuine natural need concerning which our species is in thoroughgoing self-consensus, or, alternatively, to increase as much as possible the skill for fulfilling ends that have been thought up, what the human being understands by happiness and what is in fact his own ultimate natural end (not an end of freedom) would still never be attained by him; for his nature is not of the sort to call a halt anywhere in possession and enjoyment and to be satisfied .” (KU, Ak 5: 430)

P_{KN92}: It is in human nature to want continuously more.

This creates a difficulty for knowing what human happiness requires since inclinations are so variable. This in turn creates the practical problem for prudential reasoning. (Kain, 2003, p. 240) The final goal which is put in front of human beings by nature is happiness, and anthropology with a pragmatic orientation, such as Kant’s, has a prudential dimension in a sense that it tries to discover what is the best course of action for human beings to achieve happiness, as was already mentioned. Furthermore, proposition about human nature can be discovered in the following passage:

“There is, however, one end that can be presupposed as actual in the case of all rational beings (insofar as imperatives apply to them, namely as dependent beings), and therefore one purpose that they not merely could have but that we can safely presuppose they all actually do have by a natural necessity, and that purpose is happiness.” (Gr, Ak 4: 415-416)

P_{KN93}: Naturally necessary goal of human beings is happiness.

Generally speaking, Wilson (2006, p. 72) concludes that Kant’s contribution to research of human nature is in claiming that the part of human reality is animal, and with it subjected to nature’s providence and laws. Besides this there is also an even greater part which is determined by reason. The way human beings use their reason toward technical, pragmatic and moral ends, and this ability to use their reason is the place where human dignity is based, and why human beings have dignity while other animals do not.

P_{KN94}: Human beings have a predisposition towards both animality (self-preservation, reproduction, and sociability) and humanity.

In parts of Kant's philosophy presented here there are also ideas similar to those in theories of motivation. For example, concerning happiness of human beings Kant, the same as other authors in the thesis, thinks that things like honor and material wealth while somewhat important are not a road to happiness. Furthermore, the idea expressed in the proposition that human beings are destined to cultivate, civilize and moralize themselves seems to go in hand with Herzberg's idea (also shared by other authors in the text) that institutions should cater to the fulfillment of human beings and should help, and not inhibit, them in achieving their destiny. Again the influence of society and social context is crucial. Finally, the emphasis on the un-satisfiability of human beings Kant shares with all theorists of motivation researched in this thesis.

With Kant exposition of propositions on human nature made by philosophers is done. Before continuing to describing propositions on human action and motivation for action conclusion of this part is in order.

Conclusions

In the second part of the thesis the second hypothesis was tested. The hypothesis is:

H2: Philosophical–anthropological questions are only partially examined in the various aspects of organizational sciences

The researched showed that this hypothesis is validated. The philosophical-anthropological questions are to a certain degree examined in the organizational sciences. More precisely, the founders of three content theories of motivation in focus of this thesis have been influenced by philosophy even if they do not show the depth which is expected from philosophical study on human nature. This connection seems to end with the second generation research conducted within context of some specific theory of motivation. In that kind of research philosophical inputs are left aside altogether. The question remains what about actual application of those motivation theories to different business related environments. The question was left open because such research is beyond the scope of the present thesis. But it can nonetheless be mentioned that is probable that the trend of further separation between philosophy and organization sciences will be witnessed. This is why in addition to propositions about human nature made by theorist of motivation, propositions on the same topic made by selected philosophers were presented and overlaps were highlighted.

In the third part of the thesis propositions on human action and motivation for action will be presented.

3. HUMAN ACTION AND MOTIVATION FOR ACTION

Summary

In the third part of the thesis the third hypothesis is being researched:

H3: Action is one of the most relevant features of human beings. Actions, especially ones intrinsically motivated are fundamental to being human. Theories of action among other things explain intrinsic motivation

The third part of this thesis mirrors the second part's outline but the emphasis is on action (as something that human beings do) and motivation for that action and not on human nature in general. The propositions of selected content theorists concerning the topic are given, and are followed by propositions of selected philosophers. The part ends with a conclusion where the important sections of the subparts are emphasized.

In what follows various remarks made by different thinkers about human action will be presented. As an introductory remark it seems necessary to give a few explanations about action theory and its ontological dimension, because it will serve to better explain things that will later be said. As well as to point out some overlapping points between theories of action in philosophy and theories of motivation in organizational sciences.

3.1. Overlapping points of philosophy of action and theories of motivation

Most issues discussed in the contemporary philosophy of action are not directly connected to the present thesis and hypotheses. However, some issues are connected. One of them is the issue of research done on collective action. It seems as if insights from philosophy of action are sort of prerequisites for different managerial theories, or at least the discussions run in parallel. From the philosophy of action point of view it would appear that collective action: "occurs if and only if (...) two people are doing something together." (Gilbert, 2010, p. 67) It seems there are few approaches to collective action, or better said to the conditions for collective action. They are: "personal intentions approach", "we-intentions approach", and "joint commitment approach". (Gilbert, 2010, p. 67) Here "joint commitment approach" deserves more attention because it has some kind of contractual element to it. (Gilbert, 2010,

p. 67) The contractual element seems important for the work-related context since some kind of contractual relation – even if it is not formal – is expected in work related issues.

In the joint commitment approach Margaret Gilbert (2010, p. 71) suggests that collective action can be explained by invoking a concept of joint commitment. First, when an individual makes some kind of decision, he imposes certain kind of normative constrain on himself. The agent makes some personal commitment. Similarly, collective actions can be explained by joint commitment. In this case, more than one human being commits each other, by “mutually expressing to one to another their readiness jointly to commit them all in a particular way, where these expressions are common knowledge.” (Gilbert, 2010, pp. 71-72) So, collective action usually starts with some kind of an agreement, which cannot be revoked independently of other parties. The agents in the collective action are by agreement jointly committed to emulate as far as possible the single being performing whatever was agreed upon. (Gilbert, 2010, p. 72)

Another possible overlap between management and philosophy of action is the issue of habitual actions. When looking at history of philosophy many philosophers did have a habit-friendly attitude. (Pollard, 2010, p. 76) If habits are looked at as if they: “transform performances which may once have required attention and concentration into actions which come so naturally and easily that we just find ourselves doing them, whilst we think about other things” (Pollard, 2010, p. 74) then habits are also relevant for management practice. Especially management practices as they were understood at the in the beginning of the 20th century by people such as Frederick Taylor and his “scientific management”, and in the theoretical approach to management which was later labeled as Theory X by Douglas McGregor. (Kiechel, 2012, p. 63). If, habits spare human beings need for any consideration (Pollard, 2010, p. 75) then it would seem that they are of use to management especially if the general idea is to simplify tasks in order to be more efficient in the production. This might be true in terms of sheer efficiency, but than a problem of efficiency vs. humanity appears. Therefore, the issue is: do we just simplify tasks. It seems that motivational theorists presented in this thesis would not agree with that.

Alignment becomes more obvious if one looks closely at habitual actions. There are several characteristics of habits which are notable. First, habits are acquired through repetition. Second, agents become “habituated” to certain pattern of behavior. Third, the will of an agent has some kind of influence on habit – at least in a way of choosing to repeat or not actions that will result in a habit. (Pollard, 2010, pp. 77-79) Second of these three characteristics, i.e., the change of “habituation” deserves more attention. First, the intellect is required less and

less for the performance of habits, once the process of habituations is complete. In other words, the actions become spontaneous reactions to certain circumstances. Second, once habituation is complete the awareness of an agent for performing the action diminishes. Human beings stop noticing familiar things. (Pollard, 2010, p. 78)⁶⁸ Mentioned is important for two reasons. While it is true that automatization of actions may lead to greater efficiency, speaking in the work-related context, still the fact that the role of the intellect diminishes seems to go against many of the remarks made by philosophers on the need of human beings to use their reason, an idea also repeated in content theories of motivation. The second reason is that such actions, with diminished use of reason and awareness for the action itself may lead to boredom, another negative state of human beings.

After sketching some of the possible overlapping points in the following sections propositions on motivation made by selected motivational theorists as well as philosophers will be presented.

3.2. Propositions of selected content theorists on motivation

In the following three subsections propositions on motivation made by Maslow, Herzberg and SDT are going to be presented in more detail.

3.2.1. Propositions about motivation in Maslow's work

In this subpart, Maslow's ideas on motivation – more related to the work context – will be presented. They are followed with further remarks on motivation for action in the work context. The difference between this subpart and previous subparts concerning Maslow is that focus is on the work related issues.

One of the central themes of Maslow's theory of human motivation is the concept of basic needs. According to Maslow (1943) there are “at least five sets of goals, which we may call basic needs” and they are organized in a hierarchical manner. Those sets are: physiological needs, safety needs, love needs, esteem needs, and self-actualization needs. The need for self-actualization is the focus that Maslow uses when talking about management and

⁶⁸ There are also other characteristics of habituation but they are not as important at this point and are not always accepted. For example intellect is not only unrequired, it is necessarily absent in habitual actions, or that habituation while diminishing awareness for actions which are habits may enhance awareness of other things. Finally human beings become attached to wider range of circumstances such as places or people connected to their habit. (Pollard, 2010, pp. 78-79)

work related issues, and subsequently motivation. He collected his notes on the subject in a journal, later published under the name of *Eupsychian management*. (Maslow, 1998, p. xx) Overall approach is based on Kurt Goldstein's term self-actualization, and it should summarize the growth-promoting management policies. Basic goal of such management practice is two sided. One side is related to human beings' need for growth, and the other to what is prosperous for the company. This can be seen from the following quote:

“One basic question is, what conditions of work, what kinds of work, what kinds of management, and what kinds of reward or pay will help human nature to grow healthy, to its fuller and fullest statue? That is, what conditions of work are best for personal fulfillment? But we can also turn this about to ask, granted a fairly prosperous society and fairly healthy to normal people, whose most basic needs – gratification in food, shelter, clothes, etc. – can be taken for granted, then how can such people be used best to foster the aims and values of an organization? How best they be treated? Under what conditions will they work best? What rewards, nonmonetary as well as monetary, will they work for best?” (Maslow, 1971, p. 227)

P_{MAC95}: Eupsychian management is concerned with both growth prosperity of human beings and the prosperity for the company.

If practitioners only see the second goal of management (prosperity of company), which often seems to be the case, then it will create problems related to catering for their employees' needs.

Maslow says: “And it can also be assumed that classical economic theory, based as it is on an inadequate theory of human motivation, could also be revolutionized by accepting the reality of higher human needs, including the impulse to self-actualization and the love for highest values.” (Maslow, 1971, p. 228) From this it can be seen that Maslow thinks that accepting the reality of “higher” human needs will change for the better the economics and management practice which is somehow lacking in grasping the full human condition. Furthermore, Maslow's approach sometimes labeled as Theory Z of management: “(...) presupposed that people, once having reached a level of economical security, would strive for a life steeped in values, a work life where the person would be able to create and produce.” (Maslow, 1998, p. 72) It is easy to see the alignment between this position and his theory of human needs. This is where philosophy can help management. Even more, ignoring philosophical insights on human condition, and philosophy behind the theories can hurt people. As Maslow about his management policies emphasizes: “This is not a guide to

exploitation.” (Maslow, 1971, p. 228) His ideas about management are not some kind of a trick to use people more successfully for ends which are not their own.

A little side note is needed here. Maslow seems not to be concerned with the management style which is appropriate for the gratification of the “lower set” of human needs as it can be seen from the following:

“Clearly, different principles of management would apply to these different kinds of motivational levels. We don’t have any great need to work out management principles for the lower levels in the motivation hierarchy. My main purpose here is to keep on making more explicit the high level of personal development that is unconsciously being assumed” (Maslow, 1998, p. 19)

There are challenges brought up for traditional way of approaching the work related issues by Maslow’s research. Those challenges seem to be aligned with his theory of needs.

“It draws some of the truly revolutionary consequences of the discovery that human nature has been sold short, that man has a higher nature which is just as “instinctoid” as his lower nature, and that his higher nature includes the needs for meaningful work, for responsibility, for creativeness, for being fair and just, for doing what is worthwhile and for preferring to do it well.” (Maslow, 1971, p. 228)

Quote above is repeated here from the part on human nature because besides explaining and giving remarks on human nature, it also clarifies what should be the center points of management practice. Human beings have a need for meaningful work, for responsibility, for creativeness, for being fair and just, for doing what is worthwhile and for preferring to do it well. The following propositions can be read out of this:

P_{MAc96}: Human beings have a need for meaningful work, for responsibility, for creativeness, for being fair and just, for doing what is worthwhile and for preferring to do it well.

What Maslow is saying in this proposition is in alignment to what, for example both Aristotle and Kant have argued regarding human nature in the propositions stated in second part of the thesis. Namely, according to Aristotle, human beings have an intellect and they desire knowledge by nature (e.g., P_{AN55}, P_{AN56}, P_{AN60}, P_{AN62}, P_{AN65}), humans need to exercise their intellectual capabilities in order to be happy (e.g., P_{AN64}), and they are social beings (e.g., P_{AN67}, P_{AN69}). These characteristics of human nature that Aristotle mentions could not be

catered to without securing meaningful work for employees (which is different than just simple toil) and that they have a chance to be creative and to work in a fair and just social context. Kant's statements also reinforce Maslow's position. Namely, according to Kant human beings are capable of perfecting themselves (e.g. P_{KN81}) through cultivation, civilization, and moralization (e.g., P_{KN90}) which is not possible without appropriate social surroundings. Again, these characteristics could not be successfully catered to (or it would be extremely difficult) without a work context similar to what Maslow is describing.

Another interesting Maslow's idea that is relevant to the work related setting is that human beings cannot be motivated in a work related context solely by pay. This is because if their lower needs are gratified, and money usually makes this possible, people become motivated by higher kinds of compensation for their work. Maslow gives a few examples of such possible "payments". Those are: affection, belongingness, dignity, respect, honor, appreciation, opportunities for self-actualization, fostering of highest values (truth, beauty, efficiency, etc.). (Maslow, 1971, p. 228) From this the following proposition can be created.

P_{MAc97}: Human beings cannot be motivated solely by monetary compensation.

To finish the presentation of Maslow's ideas on motivation in a work related context it is appropriate to point to Maslow's response to complaints about constant requests to management made by employees. When looking at the literature available in the field of management in his time Maslow (1971, p. 232-234) noticed that a lot of managers were complaining about the fact that employees did not show enough gratitude, although they were being treated in the enlightened management fashion. They were often suggesting switching back to the authoritarian fashion in management. Maslow points out that it is very unlikely that complaining will stop. Maslow creatively points out that people complaining about the rose gardens live an excellent life, being able to worry about such an issue.

P_{MAc98}: Human beings will always complain about something, if one need is gratified, another will arise.

In the following subpart propositions on motivation made by Herzberg will be presented.

3.2.2. Propositions about motivation in Herzberg's work

Herzberg's remarks on motivation are derived from his two-dimensional theory of human needs. From that foundation also stems the idea what is the primary function of a business organization. So, both ideas of what motivates human beings, as well as the idea of encouraged management practices come from the same source. Therefore, in this subsection, first the primary function of an organization will be defined, and second the ideas on what motivates human beings will be presented.

Herzberg's opinion is that the primary function of a business organization is to implement the needs for man to enjoy a meaningful existence. Herzberg says it like this:

“The primary function of any organization, whether religious, political or industrial, should be to implement the needs for man to enjoy a meaningful existence. For the first time in history, we have the opportunity to satisfy man's inherent wants. Yet what value to man if industry manufactures commodities to supply material comfort at the expense of human development and happiness?” (Herzberg, 1966, p. X)

P_{HeAc99}: The primary function of any organization should be to implement the needs for man to enjoy a meaningful existence.

The question what is the primary function of any organization is a big issue. This also applies to the question what is a purpose, or better said the primary purpose, of a business organization. Herzberg thinks that the primary purpose is to support the development of human beings. Unfortunately, profits are often taken to be the primary for a business organization. If profits are considered to be the primary purpose then it is not strange that “industry manufactures commodities to supply material comfort” as Herzberg noticed. Such a situation brings harm to “human development and happiness”, because it only emphasizes the “materialistic”, “biological”, or “animal” side of human beings. It is not bad thing *per se* to cater for that set of needs but it neglects the other aspect of human nature and therefore it inhibits full human development. The loop is closed between understanding profit as the primary purpose of a business organization and catering to material comfort by the fact that profits are necessary for material comfort. In such a system there is hardly any room for the other aspect of human beings. Contrary to that, all philosophers treated in this thesis have

pointed out that there are two aspects of human beings (e.g., P_{AN53}, P_{AN56}, P_{HN72}, P_{HN73}⁶⁹, P_{KN94}). This opinion is also shared by all content theorists included (e.g., P_{MN2}, P_{HeN30}, P_{SN32}). Both philosophers and theorists of motivation state that failure to recognize and acknowledge both aspects of human beings inhibits human development.

Obviously the question of motivation is important if organization strives to fulfill its primary function. What is important to emphasize at this moment is that according to Herzberg (1968) to be motivated for something is different than to be “kicked” to do something. “Kicking”, as an act of making someone do something, can have various meanings. Of course, it can mean to physically kick someone, it can also mean to psychologically kick someone. Both the physical and psychological versions are negative approaches to making someone do something. On the other hand there is also a handful of positive approaches to “kicking” someone to do something. Some of these methods, according to Herzberg (1968), are: reducing time spent at work; spiraling wages; fringe benefits; job participation, etc. What is important is that they, whatever they are, are still not motivation because they result only in short-time movement and then require more and more resources to work. All of the above are extrinsically based kinds of making human beings do something. According to Herzberg (1968), the real motivation is a self-motivation, it is also sometimes described as intrinsic motivation.

P_{HeAc100}: Human beings can be forced to do something by various methods, some positive, some negative, still if the results are short-termed than that is not motivation.

P_{HeAc101}: Intrinsic motivation, or self motivation is the real motivation.

In order to envision a theory of “real” motivation, Herzberg starts from his understanding of human nature. As it was already presented in the second part of the thesis. According to Herzberg there are two sets of needs in human nature. First set are needs which arise from the animality of human beings, and they are focused on avoidance of pain. The second set are needs which “push” human beings to grow psychologically. The Motivation-Hygiene⁷⁰ theory

⁶⁹ Propositions P_{HN71} and P_{HN72} which are related to natural and artificial virtues for which Hume claims that human have also points to dual aspect of human beings. Namely, some of natural virtues such as for example love for children can easily be seen as shared by other animals. Perhaps not as “love” but definitely as attachment to children with some specific – role driven – attitudes and properties.

⁷⁰ Herzberg’s Motivation-Hygiene theory is somewhat similar to an industrial engineering approach to the issue of personnel management. Industrial engineering approach revolves around the concept that human beings are mechanistically oriented and economically motivated. In that concept human needs are best met by attending the

got its name by referring to the mentioned satisfiers and dissatisfiers. Dissatisfiers since in relation to the environment are named hygiene factors as an analogy to the medical term meaning “preventative and environmental” (maintenance factors can also be used as a term for dissatisfiers), while satisfiers are named motivators, since they appear to motivate human beings. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 74)

The study from which Herzberg’s theory was developed was originally conducted on 200 employees who were engineers and accountants. The theory was later tested and confirmed with different populations in regards of geography, socio-economical status, according to the position and type of the company, etc (see Herzberg, 1966, pp. 92-129) Employees were asked to recall the times when they were feeling really good about their jobs. After the analysis of their answers Herzberg reports five main factors. There were others, but only those factors for which it was determined that they differentiate statistically between positive and negative job attitudes are listed here in the main text.⁷¹ (Herzberg, 1966, p. 77) The factors that were presented in the end stand out as strong determiners of job satisfaction,

individual to the most efficient process. The goal of management would be to structure jobs in a way that leads to the most efficient operations, or to create the most efficient use of “human machine” paying attention to the devise an appropriate incentive system and working conditions. The difference between Herzberg’s approach and industrial engineering is that Herzberg is not focused on rationalizing work to create efficiency, but to enrich the work in order to “bring about effective utilization of personnel”. (Herzberg, 1968)

⁷¹ The complete list of first-level factors, i.e. “objective element of the situation in which respondent finds a source for his good or bad feeling about the job” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 193) is the following (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 193-198) (listed in order of appearance): 1. *Recognition*: Basically refers to some act of recognition of the person speaking to someone. It also included “negative recognition”, i.e. acts of criticisms or blame. In this factor the focus is more on the act of recognition, if the report included statements characterizing the nature of interaction then it was placed in the interpersonal relations. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 193-194); 2. *Achievement*: Reports involving specifically mentioned success or also failure. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 193); 3. *Possibility of growth*: Includes the likelihood of someone moving upward in the organization or onward. It also includes the possibility of advancement in its skill. (Herzberg, 1966, pp.194-195); 4. *Advancement*: When an actual change in the person’s position occurred. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 195); 5. *Salary*: All reports in which compensation played a role. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 195); 6. *Interpersonal relations – superior*: Reports include verbalization about the characteristics of the interaction between the persons speaking, and their mutual relation. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 195-196); 7. *Interpersonal relations – subordinate*: Same as the above but in a subordinate relation. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 195-196); 8. *Interpersonal relations – peers*: Same as the above but in a peer relation. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 195-196); 9. *Supervision – technical*: Competence/incompetence or fairness/unfairness of the supervisor were central that is what differentiates this factor from the interpersonal relations factors. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 196); 10. *Responsibility*: Reports which were related to expressing satisfaction about being given the responsibility for ones work, or being given the responsibility for some new work. If there was a discrepancy reported between the authority need to complete the job and the authority actually given then it was place in the company policy and administration (which is indicative of poor management). (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 196-197); 11. *Company policy and administration*: Overall adequacy/inadequacy of the organization and management, and harmfulness or beneficial effect of the company’s policy. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 197);12. *Working conditions*: Related to physical conditions of work such as facilities, lighting, tools, space, and in general environmental characteristics. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 197); 13. *Work itself*: Mentioning of the actual doing of a job. Job as a source of good or bad feelings. Jobs can be described as routine or varied, creative or stultifying and etc. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 197); 14. *Factors in personal life*: If some aspect of the job affected the personal life which in turn affected the job itself. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 197); 15. *Status*: Only if the some sign of status as a factor in feelings about a job was reported. It did not include advancements per se which are in the different category. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 197-198); 16. *Job security*: Relates to objective signs of presence or absence of job security. For example tenure, company stability, etc. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 198)

and lead to higher levels of performance. Those factors are: *achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility, and advancement*. Herzberg points out that work itself, responsibility and advancement were found to be of greater importance for lasting change of attitudes. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 72-73) The following proposition can be made regarding employee motivation in a work related context:

P_{HeAc102}: Strong determiners of job satisfaction are achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility, and advancement

On the other hand when asked about what factors were involved in job dissatisfaction the employees responded that major “dissatisfiers” were: *company policy and administration, supervision, salary, interpersonal relations and working conditions*. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 74) If those “dissatisfiers” were kept under control it would lead employees to staying in the organization.

P_{HeAc103}: Strong determiners of job dissatisfaction are company policy and administration, supervision, salary, interpersonal relations and working conditions

It seems that all “satisfiers” are connected to what a human being actually does on the job, and all of the mentioned “dissatisfiers” are in relation with to the context or environment in which an employee is doing his job. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 74) Furthermore, employees reported that hygiene events led to job dissatisfaction because of the need to avoid pain. In Herzberg’s words: “They represent the environment to which man the animal is constantly trying to adjust, for the environment is the source of Adam’s suffering.” (Herzberg, 1966, p. 75) On the other hand, motivators led to job satisfaction because of the need for growth. Which follows the pattern of the previously mentioned two dimensional need structure. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 75)

It seems important that the industry should treat human beings in terms of their complete nature rather than in terms, how Herzberg tells it, of those characteristics that appear to be suitable to their organization. Treating employees only one-sidedly will slowly cripple the company by absenteeism, resistance to change, high turnover, interpersonal clashes, etc. Also, this approach will result in reduction of creativity. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 170) Herzberg’s work related theory can be summed up in the following proposition.

P_{HeAc104}: Both the animalistic, and the “higher” needs of human beings have to be catered to in order to have real motivation, and job satisfaction.

Another important thing is that job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction were not obverse to each other. The opposite of job satisfaction is no job satisfaction and not job dissatisfaction and *vice versa*. Also, satisfiers contribute very little to job dissatisfaction and dissatisfiers very little to job satisfaction. (Herzberg, 1966, pp. 76-77) That is not strange because, Herzberg claims, in the end the hygiene factors do not possess characteristics necessary for giving an individual a sense of growth. Growth is dependent on achievements, and achievements require tasks, hygiene factors do not relate to task, but to the environment of a task. On the other hand “hygienic environment” will prevent discontent with a job. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 78) Improved hygiene will last only for a short while, because the avoidance needs of human beings in Herzberg’s theory are recurrent. Because of that, things like demands for improved safety, improved salary, working conditions, etc will be continuously put in front of the management. (Herzberg, 1966, p. 169)

The question now is: why does this matter at all to practice? Tentative answer might be given as follows. From organizational perspective it is important to understand that hygiene factors do not stimulate employees to put more effort in their work related activities. If this is not understood then when hygiene changes are implemented higher level of performance might be expected. When higher performance is not reached it is possible that management might become resentful of employees. On the other hand, if the difference between hygiene factors and motivators is understood and changes which are in accordance with that understanding are implemented, then two things will probably happen. First, employees will be better off on their jobs, and second, higher levels of performance will be successfully reached. Being familiar with, at least rough sketch of, human nature furthers the need understanding of the difference and relevance of both avoidance (hygiene) and growth (motivator) factors.

In the following propositions on motivation made by the proponents of SDT will be given.

3.2.3. Propositions about motivation in SDT

In this subsection SDT's position on the question of free-will⁷² will be outlined. This is followed by propositions on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, intrinsic and extrinsic life-goals, and eudaimonic way of living. Finally, propositions related to the optimum work environment for the maximization of employees' well-being will be presented.

SDT does not believe that there is free will. Because if there were free-will, then causation would be defied: "Free will, as the term is typically used, means essentially that behavior defies causation, that it is not lawful. But, SDT is a scientific framework that assumes a lawful, causal determination of behavior, so the critical questions concern the nature of the causation and the principles by which behavior is lawful." (Ryan, Deci, 2000a)

The basic issue behind the question of self-determination is: "To what extent can people decide their own behaviors?" (Deci, 1980, p. 3) Deci also claims that part of the reason why this notion has been subjected to disapproval is that it has often been confused with the concept of free-will, which of course has often been mentioned in context of the question are people free. The question are people free has in turn often been thought to be similar to the question to what extent can people decide their own behaviors. Deci (1980, p. 4) thinks that the concept of self-determination is a valuable one, and that it is independent of the notion of free will.

Deci understands the question of free will versus determinism as a question: is the behavior of human beings fully determined by some force or can it be freely chosen by human beings? He even references Sartre's *Existentialism and Human Emotion* as an example of thinking that existence preceded essence, which would mean, again according to Deci, that human beings come into existence as empty organisms and then take on their essence through totally free choices. (Deci, 1980, p. 4) Deci disagrees with this because: "The implications of this point of view is that behavior is not lawful and ordered. In other words, when people accept the free-will assumption, they accept that behavior cannot be understood or predicted." (Deci, 1980, p. 4) This understanding is rejected by Deci because it collides with the psychologists' understanding and practice. He makes this quite clear: "It is, however, precisely the order and lawfulness of behavior with which psychologists are concerned. Thus

⁷² According to Deci (1980, p. 3) unlike philosophy, psychology has previously paid little or no attention to the debate of free will versus determinism, and on the concepts of freedom and self-determination. The explanation that Deci gives for that situation is that since psychologists are empirical oriented scientists, and their model was mechanical, there was not much room for the concepts such as self-determination. (Deci, 1980, p. 3) But Deci also, in the same place, states that in contemporary time there has been a shift from the mechanical metatheories towards theories which accept internal mental events as useful in explaining behavior.

we must reject this free-will position; otherwise it makes little sense for us to continue our psychological inquiries into why people do what they do.” (Deci, 1980, p. 4)

P_{SAC105}: Self-determination (being able to determine one’s behavior) is independent of the question of free will.

On the other hand, it is all right that people can be self-determining through ordered processes. This can also be said that they have will. (Deci, 1980, p. 5) And it has to be understood in a following way:

“Such a postulate would be meaningful if we were to view will as the capacity of human beings to make choices about how to behave based on the information, both internal and external, that is available to them. In other words, people would be assumed to be flexible and able, at will, to change their behaviors as the information available to them changes.” (Deci, 1980, p. 5)

That does not mean that it is a freedom from causation. (Deci, 1980, p. 5) Deci concludes that if the concept of will is understood like that then there is no “inconsistency between the rejection of free will and the acceptance of will – “the capacity to choose behavior based on inner desires” (Deci, 1980, p. 5) – as a meaningful concept for psychology (meaningful in the sense of providing an opportunity for developing a consistent predicative system for explaining behavior).” (Deci, 1980, p. 5) Furthermore, precisely the presence of will is the basis of self-determination.

Of course, human beings are limited in their capacity for self-determination by various physicalistic and physiological forces. (Deci, 1980, p. 5) Finally, self-determination is defined by Deci (1980, p. 6) as: “(...) psychological construct referring to people’s flexibility and capacity both to choose from among the behavioral options (regardless of the number of options) and to accommodate to the situations in which only one option is available.” (Deci, 1980, p. 6)

According to Deci there are two important things that can be read from this definition. First, human beings “can decide among the behavioral options that are available or that they create from themselves”. And the second one is that “will is capable of managing motives so as to attempt satisfaction of as many as possible while holding the others in abeyance.” What he is saying is that, basically, people are able to choose, and their choosing operates lawfully. (Deci, 1980, p. 26) He continues like this: “This involves accepting one’s boundaries and

limitations, recognizing the forces operating on one, utilizing the capacity to choose, and enlisting the support of various forces to satisfy one's needs." (Deci, 1980, p. 26) The connection between the will, needs and self-determination can be seen from this quote. But, importantly, the will is also connected to competence and self-determination, the previously mentioned intrinsic needs of human beings. (Deci, 1980, p. 26) Deci (1980, p. 26) says: "People need to will; they need to be self-determining and competent, and that requires that they make choices." He goes on to argue that human beings need to feel competent and self-determining in relation to environment and includes the intrinsic motivation in the mix stating that: "Intrinsic motivation, the human need to be competent and self-determining in relation to the environment, energizes people's will." (Deci, 1980, p. 27)

P_{SAC}106: Intrinsic motivation is the factor of energization of the will to action.

Deci is suggesting that the energy operations of will come from intrinsic property of human beings. That intrinsic property of human beings is intrinsic motivation. In his words: "I asserted, however, that the energy for willing, the energy for the very process of deciding, is a basic, innate motivational propensity. It is intrinsic motivation, the human need to be competence and self-determining." (Deci, 1980, p. 208) And again:

"Intrinsic motivation provides the energy for the various functions of the will. It underlies the process of deciding whether one is choosing behavior to satisfy physiological drives or intrinsic and affective needs; it provides the energy to oppose the force of drives and to control the forces of emotions; and it allows the will to hold back in abeyance motives that for one or another reason cannot be satisfied at that time." (Deci, 1980, p. 208)

Behaviors such as walking or singing can be either extrinsically or intrinsically motivated. Operationally they are distinguished by whether they are performed for an extrinsic award. They are distinguished dynamically in terms of underlying needs. Extrinsic motivation is based in physiological drives, and the substitute needs, and intrinsic motivation is based in the need for competence and self-determination and the specific needs that differentiate out of the basic need. (Deci, 1980, p. 209) Following proposition can be presented:

P_{SAC107}: Extrinsic motivation is based in physiological drives, and the substitute needs, and intrinsic motivation is based in the need for competence and self-determination and the specific needs that differentiate out of the basic need.

Another important topic for SDT is eudaimonia⁷³ and eudaimonic way of living. Ryan, Huta, and Deci (2008) predict that eudaimonic way of living is associated with many positive outcomes such as subjective well being or just feeling good. For example: indicators of personal growth, environmental mastery, positive relationships, life purpose, self-acceptance, vitality, health improvement, sense of meaning and a greater sense of purpose in life (Ryan, Deci, 2004) The authors also point out that there is a trend in the world today to be pulled away from eudaimonic living when faced with consumerism practices. SDT researchers use the term eudaimonia in a following way:

“As we stated at the outset, we conceive of eudaimonia as *referring to a way of living, not to a psychological state or out-come*. Specifically, it is a way of living that is focused on what is intrinsically worthwhile to human beings. In stating this we are making a broad claim that there are intrinsic values built into human nature and that these values are universal. Within our formal theory of eudaimonia we specify at least some of these intrinsic values, and at the same time we argue that the list is not in any way closed.” (Ryan, Huta, Deci, 2008, italics inserted)

According to the SDT eudaimonic living is the one which is more valuable and it can be characterized with the four motivational concepts (Ryan, Huta, Deci, 2008):

- (1) pursuing intrinsic goals and values for their own sake, including personal growth, relationships, community, and health, rather than extrinsic goals and values, such as wealth, fame, image, and power;
- (2) behaving in autonomous, volitional, or consensual ways, rather than heteronomous or controlled ways;
- (3) being mindful and acting with a sense of awareness; and
- (4) behaving in ways that satisfy basic psychological needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy.

⁷³ A short note on the use of word *eudaimonia* is needed. The usual translation of the Greek word *eudaimonia* (or Latin *beatitudo*) is happiness in a well-being sense. Definitely it can be said that the use of a term of “being happy” is substantially different than the word well-being, although it is not impossible that they sometimes overlap. (Haybron, 2011)

As it is possible to see from mentioned above, in SDT there are two different categories of life goals for human beings. First kind is so called extrinsic variations which incorporate valuing of wealth, fame, and an appealing image. These goals do not contain inherent worth. The second category of life goals is termed intrinsic aspirations, and they incorporate valuing of personal growth, close relationships, community contribution, and physical health. This second category contains inherent worth and they are more likely to support basic need satisfaction. What is important is that the distinction between two categories of life goals has been reported and observed across great variety of cultures in the world, and studies are reporting that wellness of human beings is more supported with intrinsic goals, and that applies not only to variety of countries and cultures but also to contexts. (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, pp. 12-13)

Although it can be argued that since extrinsic goals are quite hard to attain and because of that once attained they will make a human being happy, studies report that since they do not support the fulfillment of basic psychological needs in such a way as do intrinsic goals human beings who have attained them report lower psychological health and well-being. (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, pp. 13-14) Two, probably, basic tenets of contemporary economical worldview are that human beings are selfish and rational agents. So how it is possible that goals associated with the overall social good could contribute to happiness of human beings? As an answer authors state that: “Human nature is prone toward connectedness, and evolved to find inherent satisfactions in helping. In fact, when able to help volitionally, humans derive both need satisfaction, and well-being enhancement. As with happiness, the aim of helping is not these hedonic outcomes, but they do however occur.”⁷⁴ (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, pp. 14-15).

Authors summarize:

“(…) research from SDT has shown that pursuit and attainment of intrinsic (relative to extrinsic) aspirations is associated with enhancement of psychological and relational health. Importantly, such associations have been observed in numerous life contexts and across diverse cultures, lending credibility to the postulate that the pursuit and attainment of intrinsic aspirations facilitates optimal functioning and wellness, a

⁷⁴ This position is not without support. For example in Weinstein, N. & Ryan, R. M. (2010). “When helping helps: Autonomous motivation for prosocial behavior and its influence on well-being for the helper and recipient.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 98, 222-244 . It was reported that when people volitionally help one another both the helper and the helped gained in well-being, and with that they experience the satisfaction of the three basic psychological needs of human beings, which did not happen when human beings were controlled in their activities of helping

finding that appears to be universal. In large part this positive effect of intrinsic life goals, which are oriented toward personal growth and relationship/community values, is attributable to greater basic psychological need satisfaction. As people pursue more intrinsic, eudaimonic goals they are more likely to feel autonomous, competent, and connected with others, all of which contribute to a sense of wellness.” (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, pp. 15-16)

From this the following propositions can be derived:

P_{SAC108}: Pursuit of life goals with intrinsic values adds to the optimal functioning and attainment of well-being of human beings.

Regarding the application of SDT to work setting it can be said that it is important that management promotes autonomy, gives positive feedback in an informational context (i.e. supporting autonomy and promoting competence and with it self-determination) and with that facilitates intrinsic motivation. This attitude will have an impact on employee’s motivation. (Deci, Ryan, 1985, p. 311) Such autonomy supportive work climate will in turn, as the tenets of SDT suggest, have a positive impact on general well-being of workers.

P_{SAC109}: Autonomy supportive work climate will have positive effect on the employees.

Besides work climate that is supportive of autonomy, the personal autonomy is critical for well-being. This has been verified in numerous studies. The authors point it out like this:

“For example, Diener, Ng, Hartr, and Arora (2010)⁷⁵ analyzed data from a worldwide Gallop poll and found that across nations autonomy was one of the strongest predictors of positive affect. That is, being able to exercise autonomy is associated with subjective emotional happiness. This finding supports earlier studies by Chirkov, Ryan, Kim, and Kaplan (2003)⁷⁶.” (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 11)

The importance of autonomy is not only visible, according to SDT, in the overall wellness of human beings, but also in the specific situations and contexts. The authors state that: “SDT

⁷⁵ Diener, E., Ng, W., Hartr, J. Arora R. (2010). “Wealth and happiness across the world: Material prosperity predicts life evaluation whereas psychological prosperity predicts positive feeling.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 99, 52

⁷⁶ Chirkov, V. Ryan, R. M., Kim, Y., & Kaplan, U. (2003). “Differentiating autonomy from individualism and independence: A self-determination theory perspective on internalization of cultural orientations and well-being.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. 84, 97-110.

makes a more specific prediction: not only are aggregate happiness and wellness dependent on autonomy, autonomy is also important at the levels of domains, situations, and settings.” (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 11) In summary, concerning the importance of autonomy, it can be stated that:

“In fact, autonomy has proven critical to full functioning and wellness in multiple contexts, including sport, religion, relationships, work and leisure (see Ryan & Deci, 2010). The findings from studies across these domains show how greater autonomy facilitates behavioral persistence; task performance; and greater psychological, physical, and social wellness. Thus, the relative autonomy with which behavior is regulated appears to be an important aspect of “the good life.” (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 12)

P_{SAC110}: Personal autonomy is important for leading the good life for every human being.

In this subsection the propositions found in SDT related to the will, motivation, and the work environment which will be supportive of the maximization of well-being of humans have been presented. With this the exposition of propositions that can be found in the selected content theories of motivation is completed. In what follows the propositions of philosophers on motivation will be presented.

3.3. Propositions of selected philosophers on motivation

In the following three subsections propositions about motivation made by Aristotle, Hume, and Kant are going to be presented.

3.3.1. Propositions about motivation in Aristotle’s work

Actions, in the context of everyday business related activities, mostly fall into the category of voluntary actions. For the purpose of this text the following Aristotle’s description of voluntary⁷⁷ is going to be used: “Since that which is done under compulsion or by reason of ignorance is involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the moving principle

⁷⁷ This is not to ignore the debate about what Aristotle actually thought about what is a voluntary action. For the details about Aristotle and the possible understanding of the voluntary, as well as discussions connected to it please see: Coope, U., (2010). „Aristotle“, in: O’Connor, T., Sandis, C., *A Companion to the Philosophy of Action*. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 439-446.

is in the agent himself, he being aware of the particular circumstances of the action.” (E.N., III, 1, 1111a22-4) In this subsection what Aristotle thinks about actions will be presented. In what follows his views, as presented in the *Rhetoric* (Rhet.), *De An*, *EN*, and *Movement of Animals* (MA) are will be described.

In the Rhet (I,10, 1368b25-1369b30) Aristotle is discussing what a prosecutor and a defender must consider concerning what can induce human action. It seems that Aristotle first points out that every action (of every person) is either due to that person or is not due to that person. What actions are not due to persons it seems that some of them are due to *chance* (cause of the action cannot be determined), and some to necessity. Out of the actions due to necessity some are due to *compulsion* (actions take place contrary to the desire or reason of an agent) and some to *nature* (actions have an internal and fixed cause, they happen uniformly). Action due to the person himself and caused by that person are due to *habit* (actions are habitual) or desire. Desires can be rational or irrational. *Rational desire*, Aristotle says, is wishing and wishing is a desire for good (actions which appear useful either as ends or as means to ends). Irrational desire can be *anger* (causes of all acts of revenge) or *appetite* (cause of all actions that appear pleasant). Aristotle concludes that: “(...) every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite.” (Rhet I,10,1369a5) If out of all seven things that represent incentives and motivation for action, the four of them do it for actions due to the person itself (habit, reasoning, anger, and appetite), then the following proposition can be given.

P_{AAc111}: Action can be caused by habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite.

Furthermore, Aristotle sums up this part of his Rhet. with the following: “(...) all actions due to ourselves either are, or seem to be, good or pleasant. Moreover, as all actions due to ourselves are done voluntary (...) it follows that all voluntary actions must either be or seem to be either good or pleasant (...)” (Rhet, I,10, 1369b19-24) Therefore additional proposition from Rhet can be stated.

P_{AAc112}: All voluntary actions are, or seem to be, good or pleasant.

When reading *De An*, *EN*, and *MA* Aristotle puts a lot more emphasis on the notion of desire than in *Rhet*. In *Rhet* desire is one of several possible causes of action. Before proceeding and sketching the accounts for action in the mentioned writings, it is appropriate to point out that

in them Aristotle is talking about movement of animals, but something similar happens with human also. In *De An* Aristotle says that desire moves the animal. His words are:

“ (...) that which produces movement and is moved is the faculty of desire (for that which is moved is moved in so far as it desires, and desire as actual is a form of movement), while that which is moved is the animal; and the instrument by which desire produces movement is then something bodily. Hence it must be investigated among the functions common to body and soul.” (*De An*, III, 10, 433b13)

Charles (2011, p. 82) comments on Aristotle's words like this: “(...) concerned with the affections (*pathe*) of the soul quite generally, including sensual desire (*epithumein*) and perception as well as anger and fear”. Furthermore, Charles (2011, p. 82) points out that in *De An* there is a general account of sensual desire which is considered to be a passion of the same general type as anger, fear and confidence. And even more, account for those three can apply to all or almost all affections of the soul. The mentioned account is the following:

- First, sensual desire is a psychophysical process (perhaps essentially connected with the heating of the blood).
- Second, as the result of the heat provided by desire there is some kind of psychophysical process in the part of the agent which corresponds to the hinge joint. This process is common to both the soul and the body.
- Finally, the result of the second process is that the limbs are moved in just the way appropriate for the desired action.⁷⁸

In the MA it is possible to find similar yet different account of action. According to Charles (2011, p. 84) that account has four steps.

- First, the object of pursuit or avoidance is thought about or imagined. This can be practically everything, friends, enemies or whatnot.
- Second, fear, confidence, or sexual arousal occurs, accompanied by heat or coldness.
- Third, the connate *pneuma* expands or contracts.
- Finally, fourth, the limbs move.

⁷⁸ This Aristotle's reading is different from dualistic, materialistic, spiritualistic, or functionalistic accounts after Descartes. (Charles, 2011, p. 75) One of the important features is that e.g. desire is psychophysical process. (Charles, 2011, p. 82)

This account also applies to cases when object in question is remembered or anticipated. Here, according to Charles (2011, pp. 84-85) imagination prepares desire which in turn prepares certain affections. All of this results in the organic parts (probably limbs) moving.

In this account, desire generally replaces cases of confidence, fear and sexual arousal. What happens is that heating or cooling are components of the mentioned things but they can occur whenever human beings are aware of what is pleasant or painful. It seems that desire in Aristotle means not only sensual desire but also things brought by thought, imagination and perception. Perhaps desires are brought up by an object thought to be pleasant or painful. As Aristotle says:

“(…) the object we pursue or avoid in the field of action is, as has been explained, the origin of movement, and upon the thought and imagination of this there necessarily follows a heating or chilling. For what is painful we avoid, what is pleasant we pursue, and everything painful or pleasing is generally speaking accompanied by a chilling and heating (…)” (MA 701b35f)

Be that as it may, Charles (2011, p. 90) summarizes what was said about the desire in the following way:

“desire is, in Aristotle’s account, like anger: some type of bodily process (perhaps a heating of the blood around the heart) caused in a given way for the sake of a given goal (compare De Anima 403a27ff). Both are inextricably psychophysical processes (...). What distinguishes desire from (for example) sexual arousal mentioned in De Motu 11 or other types of boiling of the blood is that it, unlike them, is inextricably connected with grasping that something is to be done (703b8ff). It is a boiling-of-the-blood type of grasping that something is to be done.”

The question now appears to be what the ultimate goal of human beings is. What is the most pleasant thing, and can pleasure even be counted as a valued goal, especially the ultimate valued goal? It seems that, according to Aristotle, in life there are ends which somehow have an inherent worth and precisely pursuing this inherently worthy ends is important for his concept of living well, or *eudaimonia*. And that those goals contribute more to the well-being of human beings.⁷⁹ As was already said, the usual translation of *eudaimonia* is happiness in a well-being sense. In philosophy, well-being is commonly used to describe what is non-

⁷⁹ As was already said in SDT there are also two kinds of life goals. One kind is so called extrinsic goals, and the other has an inherent worth. Precisely life goals which have inherent worth are more supportive of the satisfaction of the basic needs. (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 12)

instrumentally or ultimately good for a person. It is common to distinguish theories of well-being as hedonist theories⁸⁰, desire theories⁸¹, or objective list theories. (Crisp, 2008)

Objective list theories, such as Aristotle's, are more important for the topic of this thesis. According to the objective list theories there are some items which constitute well-being of human beings. These items do not constitute it simply because they are pleasant or because they are desired. In other words:

“Objective list theories are usually understood as theories which list items constituting well-being that consist neither merely in pleasurable experience nor in desire-satisfaction. Such items might include, for example, knowledge or friendship. But it is worth remembering, for example, that hedonism might be seen as one kind of ‘list’ theory, and all list theories might then be opposed to desire theories as a whole.” (Crisp, 2008)

What is considered to be good-maker depends on the theory. For example one of the versions of the objective list theories is perfectionism in which what makes things constituents of well-being is their perfecting human nature. (Crisp, 2008) In that way, if it is in the nature of human beings to acquire knowledge, then, according to perfectionism, knowledge is a constituent of well-being. (Crisp, 2008)

At this point Aristotle's discussion of human function and the ultimate goal of human life from EN can be quite informative. In EN I Aristotle, according to the commentators, does two things. Namely, he sets down the criteria which the ultimate good must satisfy and he identifies, in the general way, his field of research. (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 47) Right at the beginning of EN Aristotle mentions that there is a difference between goods or ends every inquiry or art aims at, as it can be seen from: “But a certain difference is found among ends⁸²; some are activities, others are products apart from the activities that produce them.” (EN 1094a3-5)

⁸⁰ Hedonistic theories can be broadly classified in at least two categories. The first category is so called “psychological hedonism” and the second “evaluative hedonism” or also sometimes called “prudential hedonism” which states that well-being consists in the greatest balance of pleasure over pain. (Crisp, 2008)

⁸¹ Desire theories were basically developed with the development of welfare economics. Basically pleasure and pain of human beings are hard to measure, analyze and give conclude based on the results. On the other hand, preferences of human beings can be tracked, measured and analyzed much easier. There are different versions of the desire theories. The simplest version of the theory is so called present desire theory. (Crisp, 2008) According to the present desire theory individual human being is better off to the extent that their current desires are fulfilled. (Crisp, 2008)

⁸² Concerning this sentence Pakaluk (2005, p. 49) uses the word goals instead of ends as it stated in the version used in this thesis, and points out that Aristotle will drop the talk of ends and talk about goals.

So, what counts as the ultimate goal of human beings and what are the criteria for determining such goal? Criteria are described in the following passage:

“Now, as there are many actions, arts and sciences, their ends are also many; the end of medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity – as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others – in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that latter are pursued.” (EN 1094a6-17)

Pakaluk (2005, p. 50) says that Aristotle suggests the following criteria for comparison of goals: “when X and Y are goals, and X is for the sake of Y, then Y is better than X” Following this, and in Aristotle’s context, the highest discipline has the highest goal. Aristotle continues:

“If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good.” (1094a18-22)

Here it seems that Aristotle is giving a definition of the best thing. After this Aristotle first rejects things such as pleasure, honor and wealth as such goals. (EN I, 5) Later in EN (I, 7) Aristotle starts the search for what the ultimate human good actually is. Right at the beginning he seems to propose three⁸³ criteria. Those are: ultimacy, self-sufficiency, and preferability. (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 68) Regarding the ultimacy criteria Aristotle notes:

“Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more complete than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more complete than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else.” (EN 1097a30-35)

⁸³ But only two are mentioned later in his recapitulation. (Pakaluk, 2005, p .68).

In that way it seems that Aristotle is emphasizing those goals: “sought only on account of themselves and not for the sake of something else”⁸⁴ (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 69)

For the self-sufficiency, Aristotle gives the following definition of a self-sufficient good: “as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing” (EN 1097b15-16) This definition, according to Pakaluk (2005, pp. 71-72) is not without problems, but he suggests that the meaning of it is the following:

“self-sufficient good is something such that its attainment implies a rest from effort and does not imply further need. (...) Aristotle conceives of a goal as an activity that is repeated periodically, and which serves to give direction to other things a person does. If so, then such an activity would be self-sufficient, to the extent that it could be understood as a kind of rest from exertion, and so the extent that that activity itself implied no need of something outside itself”.⁸⁵

The third criterion is preferability. In short, the highest good, when compared individually with any other particular good, without any incremental addition, will always be preferred. (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 73) Aristotle says it like this:

“(...) and such we think happiness to be; and further we think it most desirable of all things, without being counted as one good thing among others – if it were so counted it could clearly be made more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods; for that which is added becomes an excess of goods, and of goods the greater is always more desirable.” (EN 1097b16-20)

In short Aristotle summarizes everything like this: “Happiness⁸⁶, then, is something complete and self-sufficient, and it is the end of action.” (EN 1097b20)

After summarizing the criteria for the highest good in the same chapter of EN follows the so called Function argument⁸⁷ which should limit the field of search for the highest good

⁸⁴ There is a discussion going on among scholars concerning the Criterion of Ultimacy. Namely some scholars (Such as Pakaluk, 2005) prefer the Selection to identify the ultimate good. In this view the “most goal-like goal” is simply some good. On the other hand people sometimes also emphasize Collection, i.e., it is most important how complete the goods are. The more complete they are the better they are.

⁸⁵ Here again the debate between using Selection, or Collection to identify the ultimate good is present. Pakaluk (2005, p. 72) again sides with the use of Selection because he thinks that more self-sufficient an activity is, less it would become combined and require other activities. Still the proponents of the Collection approach believe that only a good which includes anything that someone might need can assure that life is not in need of something.

⁸⁶ Greek *eudaimonia*.

⁸⁷ Hope May (2010) in her book *Aristotle's Ethics. Moral Development and Human Nature* also discusses the Function argument (pp. 40-45) while talking about the motivational system of human beings. She states that human beings are driven by a desire for ultimate goal or a calling which is *eudaimonia*, some kind of rational activity. This is pointed out here because, as far as I know, it is one of the few books trying to combine some

remarking that such good can be found only among those things that human beings can do because they have virtues. (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 74) So, the Function argument should make clearer what human good is, than just saying *eudaimonia*. (Lawrence, 2006, p. 51) Before looking at the argument another thing should be noted. Connected to the argument is the question which kinds of lives are best suited to human beings. Should human life be a contemplative or political? (Lawrence, 2006, pp. 63-64) Without diving into the depths of the discussion, Lawrence, in the mentioned place, states that Aristotle does not argue for a value monism. Human beings, namely have inevitable physical, emotional and social human needs, so it is sometimes best to address these and not to let ourselves go to a complete contemplative lives. Nonetheless humans should arrange individually to have as much as free time as possible for contemplation.

In the text that follows the Function argument is given in full and a short description is provided. The text of the argument is divided into six sections for clearer understanding. In this Pakaluk (2005, pp.74-82) is followed:

“Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function.” (EN I, 7, 1097b22-28)

“Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he naturally functionless? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these?” (EN I, 7, 1097b28-33)

“What then can this be? Life seems to be common even to plants, but we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then an active life of the element that has a rational principle (...)” (EN I, 7, 1097b33-1098a4)

“(…) (of this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and exercising thought); and as this too can be taken in two ways, we must say that life in the sense of activity is what we mean; for

kind of motivation research and philosophy. The mentioned book differs from this thesis, by the scope. While May only covers Aristotle, the topic of this thesis is much wider.

this seems to be more proper sense of the term. Now if the function of man is an activity of soul in the accordance with, or not without, rational principle, (...)” (EN I, 7, 1098a4-8)

“(...) and if we say a so-and-so and a good so-and-so have a function which is the same in kind, e.g. a lyre player and a good lyre-player, and so without qualification in all cases, eminence in respect of excellence being added to the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to do so well) (...)” (EN I, 7, 1098a8-12)⁸⁸

“(...) if this is the case, [and we state the function of man to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activity or action of the soul implying a rational principle, and the function of a good man to be the good and noble performance of theses, and if any action is well performed when it is performed in accordance with the appropriate excellence: if this is the case,] human good turns out to be activity of the soul in conformity with excellence, and if there are more than one excellence in conformity with the best and most complete. But we must add ‘in a complete life’. For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy.” (EN I, 7, 1098a12-20)

It would seem that every one of the sections of the argument has a clear goal. In the remainder of the text each section will be briefly explained. In the section 1097b22-28 Aristotle gives the basic reasoning for the Function argument. In short, to see what human good is we need to look for what human being can do only through having those traits which make someone a good human being. (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 75) The basis for such opinion is the idea that function (work) of a thing is the sake of which it exists, and doing that work well is the good of that thing. But only a good thing of a kind achieves its function well. Furthermore, the thing is good thing of its kind through having the relevant virtues that make it good thing of certain kind. Basically, Pakaluk (2005, p. 75) concludes that the Function argument suggests that we examine the various virtues and the sorts of actions that are distinctive of them.

In the section 1097b28-33 of the Function argument Aristotle continues with idea that human beings do indeed have a function⁸⁹. Apparently Aristotle does not seriously consider

⁸⁸ In order to perhaps enable better understanding, the same passage, but translated by Pakaluk (2005, p. 80) runs as follows: “But we don’t mark a distinction between the kind of work to be done by X, and the kind of work to be done by a *good X*: for instance, we don’t mark a distinction between the kind of work to be done by *harpist*, and the kind of work to be done by a *good harpist*. And we speak in this way, then, not making any qualifications, in all cases. Yet we *do* mark what gets added to the work through the *good* traits of a practitioner. To wit: we say that “the work to be done by a harpist is to play the harp” but “the work to be done by a *good* harpist is to play the harp *well*.”

⁸⁹ Korsgaard (2008, p. 130) says that this passages can be read in two ways. One way is the astonishment (What! All this things have a function and human do not?). The other way is like it is an argument (bodily parts

the possibility that human beings do not have a function because nature generally acts for the sake of some goals. In same way human beings who are a part of the nature will also act for the sake of certain goals. Aristotle does indeed provide two arguments for such an opinion but they are not very clear. For example, the second argument seems to be that human beings would not have been equipped by nature with certain parts if there was no function to be performed. And more, to attribute the function to a part without the function of a whole seems implausible. (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 76)

Be that as it may in the third section (1097b33-1098a4) Aristotle points that function of a human being is connected to something that is distinctive of humans, and that the function is a life involving reason⁹⁰. Or more precisely: "kind of life displayed in action of the part that possesses reason." (Pakaluk, 2005, p.77) In the fourth section of the Function argument (1098a4-8) Aristotle points out that merely having a power does not count as function or work of a thing. In order to be what we are looking for, it has to be actualized. So, in other words, it is not possible to achieve human function by for example sleeping. (Pakaluk, 2005, p.77)

Finally, in the fifth section (1098a8-12) Aristotle tries to combine everything said about the function, virtue, goodness and good achievement. According to Pakaluk (2005,p. 80) the correct interpretation of the Function argument is the following:

1. A good human being, that is, someone who has virtues, carries out the human function well.
2. For someone to carry out its function well is for it to attain what is good for it.
3. Thus, a good human being attains what is good for him.

Here the second premise is what is being argued for in the fifth section. More precisely, only someone with the virtues achieves the human function which can reasonably be accounted as a goal. (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 81)

have a function it only makes sense if there is a function of the whole). Korsgaard concludes that both of the readings depend on the teleological framework. Pakaluk (2005, pp. 76-77) on the other hand, asks is it possible to hold a view that human beings have a function and to necessary be committed to the teleological framework. His answer is that that there are perhaps common sense analogies. For example, to think about talents that human beings have. If someone has some talent people would usually consider it a shame not to develop them and to abandon them. Success in that person's life may depend on how the talent is developed.

⁹⁰ There are objections to this view such as that this is not o distinctive of human beings, or that distinctiveness alone is enough to determine the function of a thing, etc. Still for the purpose of this text it is enough to point out that Aristotle thinks that there is a function of human beings, and that it can be found by looking at something which is distinctively human.

In short, it can be stated that the Function argument has four steps. First step is to assert that human beings have a function. The second step is to say that human function is rational activity. The third step is the qualification that the function is accomplished by good human beings. Fourth step is that the ultimate good of a human being is to be located in the virtuous activity (in the sixth section (1098a12-20) of the Function argument as presented here). (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 82)

P_{AAc113}: Human beings have rational activity as function.

Final thing needs to be pointed out. In Aristotle's philosophy: "The desirer is, no doubt, responsive to the goods (or goals) he seeks, themselves the starting point of the process that leads to action. (...) But neither the goals themselves nor the skills are (or can plausibly be) described as "using" desire (or desirer) to achieve their ends. Indeed, it is the desirer who uses his skill to achieve the ends he has set himself." (Charles, 2011, p. 92)

Before describing prepositions about motivation in the philosophy of David Hume a short excursion is needed. Namely the numerous similarities between Aristotle's philosophy and SDT have to be mentioned.

3.3.1.1. Excursion: The similarities between Aristotle and SDT

Certain elements of Aristotelian philosophy can be found incorporated in the SDT theory. Generally, according to Ryan and Deci (2012, p.1), psychological theorizing and philosophy can complement each other quite nicely. In their words: "(...) psychological theorizing can be informed by philosophy and philosophy by empirical psychological research." (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 1) Ryan and Deci are of the opinion that the effort of combining psychology and philosophy (and indirectly management science) can yield worthwhile outcomes. They are precise about this: "Thus, despite the difficulties of integrating philosophy and empirical-psychological methods, the effort is worthwhile, because it is necessary to address the circumstances of human well-being, a topic of wide interest and importance for policy and practice." (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 3)

The aimed at result of actions in Aristotle's thought are very similar to those in the SDT.⁹¹ Namely, both the SDT theorists and Aristotle are trying to get to *eudaimonia*. Philosophically speaking it is possible to distinguish two different senses of the term happiness. First possible sense is the use of term happiness as a "value term, roughly synonymous with well-being or flourishing". (Haybron, 2011) The second sense, in which happiness can be used, is" purely descriptive psychological term, akin to "depression" or "tranquility". (Haybron, 2011) For the purpose of this thesis, the term happiness will be used as noted in the first case; because that is the way the SDT researchers use the term.

"As we stated at the outset, we conceive of eudaimonia as *referring to a way of living, not to a psychological state or out-come*. Specifically, it is a way of living that is focused on what is intrinsically worthwhile to human beings. In stating this we are making a broad claim that there are intrinsic values built into human nature and that these values are universal. Within our formal theory of eudaimonia we specify at least some of these intrinsic values, and at the same time we argue that the list is not in any way closed." (Ryan, Huta, Deci, 2008, italics inserted)

Aristotle in his account of citizenship, human potentials and politics points out two potentials of human beings. Those are social (in EN) and intellectual (in Metaph). Together with the emphasis on the eudemonic ideas it is amazingly complement with the SDT and with its emphasis on the trans-culturally verified existence of the three basic psychological needs of human beings (together with pointing out the potentials for self-determination, good relationships and competent – intellectual and physical – activity) as well as understanding eudaimonia as a way of living that is central to complete wellness of human beings. (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, pp. 5-6)

Ryan, Curren, and Deci (2012, p. 10) suggest that it is possible to draw two hypothesis from Aristotle's philosophy regarding the lifestyles that are supportive of basic need satisfaction and in that regard to the wellbeing of human beings. Those hypotheses are:

1. "If Aristotle is correct, the good life is one that is volitional, with individuals experiencing both autonomy and ownership of their actions. Thus, lifestyles associated with being controlled by extrinsic rewards and punishments, or which take place within social contexts that are controlling or autonomy-thwarting, should be detrimental to wellness." (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 10)

⁹¹ Although there are many similarities between Aristotle and SDT, there are also differences. Foremost on the differences side, while Aristotle's theory was completely deductive the SDT is not, because the progress of the theory depends in big measure on empirical testing.

2. “A second Aristotelian hypothesis is that the excellent pursuit of intrinsic goods, especially those that are good for both self and community will be most compatible with thriving.” (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 10)

The things said in these two points are clearly related to what all content theorists of motivation, not just SDT, are saying. For example, propositions made by Maslow that human beings need to experience creativity, fairness, meaningfulness, and that management should help facilitate actions which are concerned both with the prosperity of individuals as well as companies (e.g., P_{MAc95}, P_{MAc96}) support the mentioned two points. Similar situation is with Herzberg (e.g., P_{HeAc99}, P_{HeAc104}) where he points that companies should, as their primary function, cater to the needs of human beings need for real growth, and that these needs entail catering both to “lower” and “higher” sets of needs. Failure to do that will result in neglect of at least a part of human nature, and will most likely bring about lower performance in a work place.

For the end, it is appropriate to emphasize the role of being mindful and aware in life. Self-reflection plays an important part in ancient Greek philosophy and Aristotle also emphasized and promoted such reflection. Similar to that, in SDT being mindful about the choices one makes is emphasized as well. The mindfulness⁹² is defined in the context of SDT as: “receptive attention to present experience”. (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 16) the point is that being mindful will help to choose things and actions which are more consistent with well-being and intrinsic aspirations, and less with passable pleasures and responses to threats. (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 16) The idea about mindfulness is that “(...) by adding clarity and vividness to experience, mindfulness may also contribute to well-being and happiness in a direct way.” (Brown, Ryan, 2003) And the rationale for it is: “(...) if we have intrinsic motives to fulfill our potentialities or actualize, being aware and mindful will put us more in touch with these inherent propensities and help protect us from being derailed by various pressures or threats.” (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 16) Another important contribution of mindfulness, according to SDT, is that an open awareness may be helpful in choosing one’s behaviors that are consistent with one’s needs and values. (Deci, Ryan, 1980) In this way, continues SDT, mindfulness may facilitate well-being through self-regulated activity and fulfillment of the basic psychological needs of autonomy, relatedness and competence. (Brown, Ryan, 2003)

The authors summarize the role of mindfulness like this:

⁹² Originally the concept in SDT context is derived from Buddhist tradition and stands for being attentive to and aware of what is taking place in the present.

“(…) SDT-based research shows how mindfulness yields benefits for personal, relational, and broader societal wellness, and appears to be an important contributor to living well. Living well requires acting with awareness, which allows the individual to experience greater autonomy and integrity, and to more consistently pursue valued goals, resulting in greater happiness.” (Ryan, Curren, Deci, 2012, p. 17)

In the following subsection propositions Hume made about motivation will be presented.

3.3.2. Propositions about motivation in Hume’s work

One of Hume’s most famous ideas is that reason is not capable of being the sole immediate cause of our actions. (Copleston, 2003, p. 319) The basic beliefs which are necessary for practical life of human beings are indeed fundamental, but not derived from rational arguments. This is not to say that reason has no role in practical life, or that human beings have no reason, but, according to Hume, reason is not capable of being the sole immediate cause of our actions. Hume will even go further claiming that: “Reason is, and ought to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” (T., p. 415)

In this section the role of reason, as Hume sees it, will be presented. Second, Hume’s theory of motivation and more modern Humean theory of motivation will be described. The section closes with Hume’s discussion on predictability of human behavior.

According to the commentators the focus on “slavish”⁹³ position of reason is brought on by a picture of human nature in which reason and passions are battling each other. In that picture the reason is controlling the distorting passions which, since contrary to reason and virtue, are understood as a threat. (Baillie, 2001, p. 79) Hume talks about it like this: “Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates.” (T., p. 413) What Hume thinks is wrong in the above mentioned picture of human nature is the idea that both reason and passion are in themselves able and sufficient to cause human action. Baillie (2001, p. 80) puts it like this:

⁹³ Baillie (2001, p. 87) claims that Hume’s intention was to criticize the rationalist perspective in ethics. This can be seen from: “On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, ancient and modern, seems to be founded; nor is there an ampler field, as well for metaphysical arguments, as popular declamations, than this suppos’d pre-eminence of reason above passions.” (T., p. 413)

“Underlying this picture is the assumption that both reason and passion are, in themselves, sufficient to cause action. That is, they are taken to share a common capacity to control and initiate behaviour, and to be competing over its exercise. Hume denies this assumption, arguing that ‘reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will’ (T 413), and that its role in the production of action is essentially subsidiary and supportive to that of passion. While it is equally true to say that *passion* alone cannot constitute a motive for action, he will argue that it holds all the executive power, with reason merely working to advise on its use.” (Baillie, 2001, p. 80)

To simply know (faculty of reason) that if we do X then Y will happen is not enough for action, because the resulting Y must be seen as involving or is causally related to some actual or anticipated pain or pleasure. (Baillie, 2001, p. 81) Reason, although unable to motive by itself is useful for satisfying the end that has already been set. So Baillie (2001, p. 80) concludes:

“In conclusion, since the will is a practical capacity, essentially relating to action, whereas demonstrative reasoning deals only with relations between ideas, the only way in which such abstract considerations could influence the will would be by assisting causal inferences: ‘Abstract or demonstrative reasoning, therefore, never influences any of our actions, but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects’ (T 414).”

The following proposition can be stated.

P_{HAc114}: Reason, although unable to motive by itself is useful for satisfying the end that has already been set.

Baillie (2001, pp. 87-88) goes to offer a following metaphor to clarify Hume’s position:

“I will now propose another metaphor that corresponds better to the big picture that Hume is setting out. Consider the human agent as a company, with passion and reason respectively represented as executors and advisors. Passion (that is, the passions themselves) alone has executive authority to motivate the will and initiate action. However, it is incapable of determining the right thing to do. While it can ‘press the button’, supplying the final link in the causal chain leading to a volition to act, it relies on advice from a team of experts who can recommend the best way to satisfy its goals. Since a smart director takes the advice of his experts, they can make the executive directorship change its mind on what it wants. If reason tells passion that what it wants cannot be done, or can be done at too much cost, or that its plan is based on inadequate

or false information, the executive will revise the plan of action. In other words, while reason can oppose passion in direction of the will by providing information that the desire is not viable, or is based on false information, it cannot do so directly, but only via a change in the passions. It can supply information that can lead to a desire ceasing, or being replaced by another contrary desire. But Hume's main point remains, that reason is relegated to a non-executive advisory role within the mechanics of motivation." (Baillie, 2001, pp. 87-88)

So, previously mentioned sentence about the "servant position" of the reason, does not mean that reason is not important. On the contrary, as it was seen in the metaphor of a company, reason gives important and necessary service to both action, and morality. According to Hume, when looking over the presented evidence, there is no way that reason alone can serve as the foundation of morality. Moral differences are felt and because of that they cannot be grasped by reason. (Norton, 2006, p. 163). He puts it like this:

"Reason may be subservient to the passions, but the service it offers is essential to morality. Our desires, we might say, give us certain goals, but reason, because only it can inform us of the relations of causes to effects, is required to direct these desires to their goals. On other occasions, however, reason informs us that our desired end is unattainable or would be harmful. In these latter cases, "our passions yield to our reason without any opposition." (Norton 2006, p. 163)

If Hume is right then the question is what is the "reason for human action"? According to Baillie (2001, p. 86) Hume is implying, but not explicitly saying, that the reason for action is a complex state involving two factors: (1.) at least one passion, which sets the purpose of the action, and (2.) at least one informational state such as a belief. These two states are contently related. For example, they can be contently related in a way that information represented in the belief is important to the attainment of the desire.

The question now is what exactly those passions are? The word passion is not used in today's sense, meaning some kind of unregulated emotion, or a very strong emotion. Hume uses the word in the sense other philosophers of the period have used it, meaning emotions and affects in general. He is basically concerned with the analysis of the "emotional aspect of human nature, considered as a source of action, not with moralizing about inordinate passions." (Copleston, 2003, p. 319) Coplestone wraps up the talk about passions, reason and action with the statement that Hume has obviously adopted an anti-rationalist position which would mean that:

“Not reason but propensity and aversion, following experiences of pleasure and pain, are the fundamental springs of human action. Reason plays a part in man’s active life, but as an instrument of passion, not as a sole sufficient cause. Of course, if we consider simply the theory that natural inclinations rather than the conclusions of the abstract reason are the influential factor in human conduct, we can scarcely call it a revolutionary or extravagant theory. (...) Hume realized very clearly not only that the man is not a kind of calculating machine but also that without the appetitive and emotional aspects of his nature he would not be man.” (Copleston, 2003, p. 328)

Hume’s theory of motivation and the contemporary Humean theory of motivation are not the same thing. In the following text first Hume’s theory of motivation is described. This is followed by description of Humean theory of motivation. Generally saying, motivations as understood in Humean theory of motivation are important because they have an explanatory role in explanations of certain bodily movements that classify those movements as actions. Basically, if such a constitutive explanation of certain bodily movement is available then those movements are actions. There are bodily movements for which there is no intrinsic motivation-means ends belief explanation available, so they are not actions. Reflexes might serve as an example. (Smith, 2010, pp. 153-154)

Background of Hume’s discussion on the role of reason and passions in T. (pp. 413-418) is widespread opinion that it is possible that passions and reason conflict about how a person should act. Radcliffe (2008, p. 478) claims that Hume offers two theses. First thesis is that reason cannot by itself motivate people to action; the second thesis is that reason and passion cannot be opposed to one another in directing our action. Hume’s words are: “I shall endeavor to prove *first*, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and *secondly*, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will.” (T., p. 413) Hume then gives the following reason to support the mentioned two theses. According to Hume, reason is the power to discover truth and falsity, and it can deduce necessary truths and to discover facts about the world based on experience. Neither the knowledge of conceptual relations, neither the knowledge of facts, nor anything that are functions of reason can initiate the impetus for action because we use it to discover features about things and how and if they are connected. (Radcliffe, 2008, p. 479)

To create an impetus for action some kind of emotion of attraction or aversion towards the object has to already exist. Hume says it like this:

“’Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or

embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction.” (...) ‘Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience. It can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us.” (T., p. 414)

Radcliffe (2008, p. 479) points out that there is a discussion going on about the Hume’s notion that we are motivated by the prospect of pleasure and pain. The issue is that since Hume thinks that beliefs⁹⁴ come from reason that would mean that reason does give us motives after all. Possible responses are that Hume never meant that all beliefs are derived from reason. Radcliffe (2008, p. 479) disagrees with this because she thinks that for Hume there are no non-inferential beliefs. Reason is always present in the belief forming activity, because even the simple perceptual beliefs go beyond what is given in sense perception.

Hume defends the second thesis, that reason and passion cannot oppose each other, by claiming that since reason cannot give rise to an impetus for action, it can also not stand in the way of such an opposition. Hume says the following:

“Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion. This consequence is necessary. ’Tis impossible reason cou’d have the latter effect of preventing volition, but by giving an impulse in a contrary direction to our passion; and that impulse, had it operated alone, wou’d have been able to produce volition. Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, that latter faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder any act of volition. But if reason has no original influence, ’tis impossible it can withstand any principle, which has such an efficacy, or ever keep the mind in suspense a moment. Thus it appears, that the principle, which opposes our passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only call’d so in an improper sense.” (T., pp. 414-415)

In a way that seems true, but what Stroud (1977, p. 163) points out is that we are not always aware of the passions or emotions (desires) that are always present in the production of action. It seems that Hume was also aware of this:

⁹⁴ For Hume the state of believing p is that of having a certain feeling or sentiment towards the idea of p, or of holding the idea of p in the mind with a certain sentiment or feeling. (Stroud, 1977, p. 161)

“’Tis natural for one, that does not examine objects with a strict philosophic eye, to imagine, that those actions of the mind are entirely the same, which produce not a different sensation, and are not immediately distinguishable to the feeling and perception. Reason, for instance, exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion; and except in the more sublime disquisitions of philosophy, or in the frivolous subtilities of the schools, scarce ever conveys any pleasure or uneasiness. Hence it proceeds, that every action of the mind, which operates with the same calmness and tranquillity, is confounded with reason by all those, who judge of things from the first view and appearance. Now ’tis certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, tho’ they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider’d merely as such. When any of these passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason, and are suppos’d to proceed from the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and falshood. Their nature and principles have been suppos’d the same, because their sensations are not evidently different.”

Invoking the calm passions is a dubious part of Hume’s philosophy of action. For example Stroud (1977, p. 165) thinks that whether a separate passion is in fact always involved in the causality of every action is still an issue. And that Hume by bringing up the calm passions still has not given the independent justification for his position.⁹⁵ From everything said about passions and reason the following proposition can be stated:

P_{HAc115}: Beliefs and desires are both necessary to produce human action.

Humean theory of motivation is basically a theory about the nature of the psychological states that constitute motivation, and those states are pairs of intrinsic desires and means-ends beliefs. Intrinsic desires are desires that agents have for things for their own sake, and they are actually a representations of how the world is to be. It can be said that they are goals. Means-ends beliefs are beliefs agents have about which means available to them will lead to the outcome they intrinsically desire, and they are representations of how the world is. (Smith, 2010, pp. 153-154) So, in Humean theory of motivation action originates with a desire that provides the goal for the actor, and when that goal is paired with a belief how to achieve the

⁹⁵ A different reading of Hume's theory of motivation can be found in Daniel Shaw (1989) “Hume’s Theory of Motivation”, *Hume Studies*, XV(1) 163-183. The author denies Stroud’s critique and offers an alternative interpretation. But since the intricacies are not the topic of the thesis they shall not be explored in more detail here.

goal. Both desire and belief are needed because actor must have a goal and some idea how to reach it. Individually there are not sufficient to have motive (Radcliffe, 2008, p. 477)

Another description of Humean theories of motivation can be given like this. Such theories are sometimes called the belief-desire theories. Basically the idea is that actions are both caused and explained by the presence of a connected set of beliefs (all informational states such as knowing, doubting, suspecting ...) and desires (states such as hoping, fearing) within an agent. The description of such theory provided by Baillie (2001, p. 91) is the following:

“The Humean theory employs a distinction (usually traced to Anscombe (1957)), between two different ‘directions of fit’ with regard to the world. Beliefs are described as having a *mind-to-world* direction: their job is, and their success depends on, accurately representing the way the world is. They say the world *is* a certain way, and succeed by being *true*; that is, if the world actually contains the state of affairs specified in the proposition believed. The functional role of beliefs in our cognitive system is to represent the world. A belief aims at truth, and a true belief is one that accurately represents the way the world actually is, in some respect specified in the content clause. Desires, on the other hand, aim at changing the way the world is. They are said to have a *world-to-mind* direction of fit – their subjects want the world to change such as to fit the specified content – and they succeed if the world makes this change. That is, desires succeed not by being *true*, but by being *satisfied*. This distinction is often described as being between *taking* p to be true, and *wanting* p to be true.”

The difference between described Hume’s theory and the contemporary Humean theory of motivation is that Hume thinks that passions or emotions (they include desires) are motives because they give goals to actor and initiate the impulse to act. So, in other words, he did not think that motives are composed of desires plus beliefs. Hume thought that various passions such as fear, joy, benevolence, anger, desire are able to set our ends. (Radcliffe, 2008, p. 477) The Humean theory of motivation considers desire as the one passion that plays the mentioned role. In addition, Hume thinks that beliefs that direct the passions to their goals are not reasons strictly speaking, even though they are necessary to produce resulting behavior. Beliefs are not treated as strictly reasons, because Hume thinks that actions are not subject to rational assessment. Be that as it may, Humean theory of motivation is derived from Hume’s theory as it can be seen from the fact that it supposes that there are two distinct mental states which are beliefs and desires (belief and passion for Hume) and they are both necessary to produce action.

To end this section Hume's thoughts on the predictability of human action will be presented. Baillie (2001, p. 70) claims that, according to Hume, human behaviour is predictable and it can be explained in the similar sense as any other natural occurrence. Hume will say it like this.

“Are the changes of our body from infancy to old age more regular and certain than those of our mind and conduct? And wou'd a man be more ridiculous, who wou'd expect that an infant of four years old will raise a weight of three hundred pound, than one, who from a person of the same age, wou'd look for a philosophical reasoning, or a prudent and well-concerted action?” (T., p. 401)

The reason for this is observed constant conjunction between character and action. (Baillie, 2001, p. 70) Hume puts it like this: “We must now shew, that as the *union* betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy, as that in any natural operations, so its influence on the understanding is also the same, in *determining* us to infer the existence of one from that of the other.” (T., p. 404) One of the example Hume gives is: “For is it more certain, that two flat pieces of marble will unite together, than that two young savages of different sexes will copulate?” (T., p. 402) When trying to explain natural phenomena in the physical world we are of course not completely successful in every instance. This can usually be contributed to having the incomplete knowledge of causal factors, and not the absence of the same. According to Hume actions of human beings can have motives which are different from the motives of actions done by other non-human animals, but in them there is nothing more free, God-like, or creative. (Baier, 2010, p. 516) In Hume's opinion we should have the same attitude when speaking about the behaviour of human beings. (Baillie, 2001, p. 69) And also, the practice of blaming, praising, and punishment would have no meaning if human actions themselves were temporary and perishable and were not caused by lasting passions and character traits in agents. (EHU, 8, using: Baier, 2010, p. 516) The following proposition about the predictability of human behavior can be given.

P_{HAc116}: The behavior of human beings can be predicted to a certain degree.

In short, Hume in his theory of action claims, as Stroud (1977, pp. 167-168) reports, that there are two parts present in production of an action. Those parts are belief and desire (or propensity). Furthermore, desires are not arrived at by reasoning, so it seems that reason can never produce action alone. Before proceeding to describe Kant's theory of action a passage

from the EPM might shine some light on the idea that reason has to be supplemented by something not derived from reason if action is to occur:

“Ask a man, *why he uses exercise*; he will answer, *because he desires to keep his health*. If you then enquire, *why he desires health*, he will readily reply, *because sickness is painful*. If you push your enquiries farther, and desire a reason, *why he hates pain*, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.

Perhaps, to your second question, *why he desires health*, he may also reply, that *it is necessary for the exercise of his calling*. If you ask, *why he is anxious on that head*, he will answer, *because he desires to get money*. If you demand *Why? It is the instrument of pleasure*, says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be a progress *in infinitum*; and that one thing can always be a reason, why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection.” (EPM, p. 293)

3.3.3. Propositions about motivation in Kant’s work

Kant’s theory of action overlaps with broader metaphysical topics such as his theories of freedom and causation and a broader context of his moral theory. (McCarty. 2009, p. xiii) Nonetheless in this subpart the emphasis is going to be more on explaining action of human beings, as Kant and the interpreters of Kant see it, than his moral theories. This may seem to just partially cover the topic of action, and to misrepresent Kant’s actual ideas, but it is necessary to keep the thesis focused on action and motivation, without expanding it further.

In connection to previously presented views on Hume’s and Humean theory of motivation it is worth noting that McCarty (2009, p. xxi) states that Kant can be understood as having accepted some version of belief-desire model of action, i.e., some version of Humean theory of motivation. Here (at least in higher cognitions context) maxims in Kant’s theory can be understood to play the same functional role as desires play in Humean theory. But they are not the same because in Kant’s theory maxims are principles and can be stated in the propositional form. So can, in the tradition Kant wrote in, desires and volitional states. Basically, in Kant’s tradition, a desire is a representation that something is good, and that is the same as what maxims are thought to be. So, the similarity between Kant and Hume regarding motivation is that both to act on a maxim or a desire an agent needs to have a belief that some action falls under the maxim, or using the Humean context that it can satisfy a desire. Whether an agent will actually act on the maxim depends on the psychological force of

the maxim or, again in Humean words, on the strength of the desire. Kant calls the psychological force of the maxim the “incentive” as it will be shown later in text.

Before progressing further, a few remarks on action, Kant’s general idea of causality, and human action are needed. After that the origin of action from lower cognitions is described and it will serve as a basis for higher cognitions. Finally, Kant’s views on the freedom of action will be described in more detail.

According to Watkins (2010, p. 522) Kant’s conception of human action is the following: “substance causes an effect when it acts according to its own nature, powers, and circumstances so as to determine the (change of) state of a substance”. With this Kant is able to explain two things. A first thing is the assertion on a necessary connection between cause and effect. (Hume did not manage to do that.) Kant’s view explains this in this way: if substances have natures, then they necessarily act according to them, and the effects follow necessarily. Second thing is the claim that all events in the sensible world occur according to universal laws of nature. This is explained by Kant’s view because if there is a model of causality that involves natures of substances, then laws of nature are derived from general natures of substances that are causally active in bringing about events in the world. (Watkins, 2010, pp. 522-523)

Frierson (2005) gives a nice overview of the Kant’s empirical account of human action. His approach is going to be used in this part. According to mentioned Frierson’s paper there are two main aspects of Kant’s empirical account of human action. One aspect is Kant’s connection to the eighteenth-century faculty psychology, and another is his connection with biological theories of that time and the idea of natural predispositions that underlie human action. Concerning the first aspect, Kant provides the relationship between the three⁹⁶ main faculties of the soul. Those three main faculties of the soul are: desire, feeling, and cognition. The faculty of desire is important for explaining action. Desire plays the same role in psychology that for example momentum does in physics. Kant says, and Frierson (2005, p. 9) reports: “To the extent it [desire] appertains to anthropology, it is then that in the thinking being, which [corresponds to] the motive force in the physical world [L]iving things do something according to the faculty of desire, and lifeless beings do something when they are impelled by an outside force. (Ak 25:577)”

⁹⁶ It seems that positing three main faculties Kant followed the idea of Crusius and resisted the reduction of the faculties of the soul which was a trend set by Wolff and followed by Baumgarten whose book on metaphysics Kant used in his lectures. (Frierson, 2005)

Insofar, continues Frierson, as representation is the ground of an action that brings about some state of affairs it is a desire. Again he quotes Kant: “the faculty of the soul for becoming cause of the actuality of the object through the representation of the object itself = ... the faculty of desire” (AK: 29:1012; cf. 6:211, 399; 7:251) Basically, here “object” means anything that can be desired and it is a possible purpose of an action, and desires give rise to actions. In short, desire is a representation that leads to an action. In this way there are no action which are not preceded by a desire, and no desires that do not lead to actions. (Frierson, 2005, p. 9)

Kant establishes relationship between the faculties of the soul in the following way:

“Pleasure precedes the faculty of desire, and the cognitive faculty precedes pleasure [W]e can desire or abhor nothing which is not based on pleasure or displeasure. For that which give me no pleasure, I also do not want. Thus pleasure or displeasure precedes desire or abhorrence. But still I must first cognize what I desire, likewise what gives me pleasure or displeasure; accordingly, both are based on the cognitive faculty.” (Ak 29:877-8)

As it can be seen from passage quoted just above cognition of an object gives rise, at least on certain occasions, to a feeling of pleasure or pain, and that feeling gives rise, again sometimes, to a desire or aversion for the object. Once the desire⁹⁷ is present, human being is committed to action, and that action follows necessarily in the absence of unforeseen obstacles. It is similar relationship present between cognition and feeling.⁹⁸ (Frierson, 2005, p. 10) So, cognition and desires are connected with feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and desires lead to an action, but it seems that not all cognitions lead to desire or aversion, so an account why does the series sometimes work and why sometimes it does not is needed. Frierson (2005, p. 13) posits predispositions as casual basis of connections between specific cognitions and desires.

In the discussion on the main faculties of the soul Kant does not stop at naming only the cognition, feelings and desires. He deepens the distinction with higher and lower faculties

⁹⁷ Here Frierson points out that the word desired is used by Kant not in the usual way in English language. For Kant desire marks the end of deliberation, and not factors taken into account in deliberation.

⁹⁸ It is worth pointing out that while in the empirical psychology Kant generally puts the feeling of satisfaction and dissatisfaction as a cause of any desire in his moral philosophy there are some indications that no feeling precedes purely moral volitions (Ak 5:71-2, cf. 4:401n, 5:9n, 6:212, 29:1024). Frierson believes that it is possible reconcile these passages with the general model of motivation. (Frierson, 2005, pp. 11-12) For this thesis this discussion is going to be skipped because, again, its prime focus is not moral philosophy. Also, connected to the idea that desire, as Frierson uses it, marks an end to deliberation, McCarty (2009, p. 12) disagrees.

of cognition, feeling, and desire. The lower faculties are primarily receptive while the higher faculties are, as Kant puts it, self-active and spontaneous. (Frierson, 2005, p. 13) In the following few lines each of the higher and lower faculties is going to be briefly described.

Lower faculty of cognition is referred to as sensibility and includes senses and imagination and they are further broken down into different inner and outer senses, memory, productive and fictive imagination, and anticipation of future events. The higher faculty of cognition is referred to by the term understanding which entails reason, the understanding and the power of judgment as cognitive powers. For the faculty of desire it is lower if the desire is the direct result of the senses, if it is the result of understanding or reason, a desire belongs to the higher faculty of desire. This distinction is important because the causal mechanisms of desire are not the same whether they belong to higher or lower faculty. Considering faculty of desire the difference is between motivation by immediate intuitions and motivation by principles or concepts. (Frierson, 2005, p. 15) As Kant puts it, every desire:

“has an impelling cause. The impelling causes are either sensitive or intellectual. The sensitive are stimuli <stimuli> or motive causes [Bewegungsursache], impulses. The intellectual are motives [Motive] or motive grounds [Bewegungsgrunde] If the impelling causes are representations of satisfaction and dissatisfaction which depend on the manner in which we are [sensibly] affected by objects, then they are stimuli. But if the impelling causes are representations of satisfaction or dissatisfaction which depend on the manner in which we cognize the objects through concepts, through the understanding, then they are motives. [28:254, cf. 29:895]” (Frierson, 2005, p. 15)

So, desires are important. In addition to everything said, Kant gives a more general account and basis for connections between faculties of the soul. Some cognitions, as was already mentioned, do not give rise to feelings, and some feelings to desires. Kant tackles the problem in a deterministic style in a way that every connection between cognition and a desire is a causal connection in accordance with a natural law. In order to provide the explanation why some cognitions give rise to desires or aversions while others do not, Kant draws on the idea of natural predispositions (*Naturnanlage*). They are fundamental, basic, powers that can be classified but not easily reduced to a more basic level.⁹⁹ (Ak 8:110; 8:111, cited according to Frierson, 2005, p. 18)

⁹⁹ Frierson (2005, p. 18) mentions that by depending on unexplained natural predispositions he is close to Hume. On the other hand, Kant will use these predispositions to explain the regularities of human behavior, which Hume is not inclined to do.

According to Frierson (2005, p. 19) for explaining human action basic predispositions to the faculty of desire are most important. Although, Kant describes the propositions for every faculty of the soul they will not be described here. The basic predispositions of the faculty of desire are going to be described here because of their importance for human action. First the predispositions for the lower faculty of desire are given and then the predispositions of the higher faculty of desire are described.

Frierson (2005, p. 19) posits that basic predispositions serve to answer why certain cognitions cause desire. They explain why it happens. It is somewhat similar to the role of gravity in Newton's explanation why the mass of earth causes the apple to fall. Gravity is basically what explains why this happens. Similar is with predispositions. So, for the lower faculty of desire Kant explains the role of natural predispositions in connecting cognitions and desires using instincts, propensities and inclinations. They will be described in the following text in the presented order.

Instincts as defined in his lectures on anthropology are: "the first impulses according to which a human being acts" (25:1518; cf. 8:111f., 25:1109, cited according to Frierson, 2005, p. 20) Frierson (2005, p. 20) continues:

"Instinct, that *voice of God* which all animals obey, must alone have guided the novice. It allowed him a few things for nourishment, but forbade him others (*Genesis* 3:2-3). – But for this it is not necessary to assume a special, now lost instinct, it could have been merely the sense of smell and its affinity with the organ of taste, but also the latter's familiar sympathy with the instruments of digestion, and also the faculty of pre-sensation, as it were, of the suitability or unsuitability of a food for gratification, such as one still perceives even now" (Ak 8:111)

Basically what happens here is that human beings have a sensory cognition of some kind of food, and that cognition gives rise to a desire. The connection of cognition and desire is because of the instinct for that food. (Frierson, 2005, p. 21) Be that as it may, not many actions can be explained by instincts alone. That is why Kant also uses inclinations. Inclinations, similar to instincts, explain why desire rises from cognition, but unlike instincts, inclinations are not natural predispositions. Inclinations are acquired, through past experiences. There is a new casual connection between past experiences and inclination. This connection also needs to be explained. Kant uses propensity to explain that. Propensity is a kind of natural predisposition which Kant defines as: "The subjective possibility of the emergence of a certain desire, which precedes the representation of its object, is propensity

(propensio)". (Ak 7:265) Basically, inclinations are not predispositions they are the result of experience of objects for which someone has a propensity. (Frierson, 2005, p. 22) There are in short two different causal origins of desire for the lower faculty of desire. For them there is no further causal explanation. One causal origin is instinct and the other one is inclination.

In Kant's theory only human action done from habit, reflex or mere instinct originates from the lower faculty of desire, everything else is the result of some level of deliberation. (Frierson, 2005, p. 23) Thus, considering higher faculty of desire, explanation for the connection between cognitions and desire is character. Character is differently used by Kant, but for this topic the character is going to be used in a sense of "character simply" (*Character schlechthin*) which is defined as that property of the will by which the subject has tied himself to certain practical principle. Basically, as Frierson (2005, p. 24) puts it, a person whose actions are explained by reference to their character is someone whose faculty of desire is determined by principles coming from higher cognitive faculties. This can be seen from the following passage:

"But simply to have a character signifies that property of the will by which the subject binds himself to definite practical principles that he has prescribed to himself irrevocably by his own reason. Although these principles may sometimes indeed be false and incorrect, nevertheless the formal element of the will in general, to act according to firm principles (not to fly off hither and yon, like a swarm of gnats), has something precious and admirable in it; for it is also something rare." (Ak 7:292)

In short, while instincts and inclinations ground a regular connection between lower cognitive states and desires, so character acts as a ground for a regular connection between higher cognitive states, principles, and desires. (Frierson, 2005, p. 24) Basically, "the essential characteristic of character ... belongs to the firmness of the principles". (Ak 25:1175, cited according to Frierson, 2005, p. 24) So an agent who acts from a stable set of principles has character.¹⁰⁰

The question is now where does character come from. Kant says that "character comes not from nature, but must be acquired" and it depends on prior propensity to character and various influences that cultivate propensity. (Ak 25:1172, cited according to Frierson, 2005, p. 26) Here is where education comes in as the most important influence on character. Besides

¹⁰⁰ The principle itself will act as a motive only when it is connected with either sensibility, or some lower desire. In the case of higher desires the lower desire that underlie the efficacy of the principle may not be immediately in alignment with the principle, but they are there because without lower desires the principle would not be motivationally effective. This applies to all but moral principles because the effective moral principle will be purely intellectual. Sensuous desires may be present but are not necessary. (Frierson, 2005, pp.25-26)

education there are also some other factors involved such as politeness, promotion of self control and combating passions, and others such as practical principles such as do not lie, etc. (Frierson, 2005, p. 28)

It was already mentioned that maxims are motive forces behind actions, in the higher cognition context. Kant defines maxims as the “subjective principle of volitions”, or “of acting”. (McCarty, 2009, p. 3) Kant says: “A maxim is the subjective principle of volition; the objective principle (i.e., that which would also serve subjectively as the practical principle for all rational beings if reason had complete control over the faculty of desire) is the practical law.” (Ground Ak 4:401) and “A maxim is the subjective principle of acting (...)” (Ground Ak, 4:420) Examples of such maxims can be: “to let no insult pass unavenged”. Anyway, maxims seem, according to McCarty (2009, p. 3) essential for human action, and it is assumed that every action has a maxim and it supposedly gives reason for action in some sense. Therefore maxims can be seen as a major premise in a practical syllogism.¹⁰¹ In addition, the connection between maxims and desires is basically that to have a maxim is to desire something because Kant never objected to the Leibnizian and Wolffian tradition of the idea that desires represent their objects as good. (McCarty, 2009, p. 13)

What is important is that, according to Kant, all actions have a causal account, although a more complex causal account is needed for more complex actions. Thus, lower desires are explained by inclinations (or instincts) while higher desires have a more complex account. So higher cognitions (principles of reason) may give rise to desires if they are explained by character¹⁰² which is in turn influenced by education, politeness and similar things. Finally, the character is explained by agents’ propensity and sometime temperament¹⁰³ which have no further causal explanation.¹⁰⁴ (Frierson, 2005, p. 29)

So to conclude, according to Watkins (2010, p. 524), Kant's account of intentional human action is: “to say that a human being acts is to say that a substance whose nature involves rationality and a range of propensities and predispositions exercises its faculty of desire (or determines its will) according to its specific character and circumstances so as to

¹⁰¹ Further discussion on the practical syllogism and the role of maxims as major premise in the syllogism can be found in McCarty (2009, pp. 4-9).

¹⁰² Another thing worth adding is that Kant realizes that a character in the strict sense may come to be only in the old age, but even people who do not act consistently have some sort of character, albeit a flawed character, but it still serves to provide a basis for explaining connection between principles and desires. (Frierson, 2005, p. 29)

¹⁰³ Some temperaments acquire character more easily than others. For example, melancholy temperament adopts a character first and sanguine not so easily. (Frierson, 2005, pp. 26-27)

¹⁰⁴ Frierson points out that Kant's account of human beings is the total opposite of the popular interpretation made by Blackburn called the “Kantian Captain“. The so called captain is a being completely immune to all burdens and gifts that come to human beings from their internal animal nature, socialization and external surroundings. (Frierson, 2005, p. 31)

bring about in the world an object which it represents as good.” From all of this it is possible to highlight the following proposition.

P_{KAc117}: Desires give rise to action.

Concerning freedom of human beings it is often thought that Kant had thoughts only about the physiological and the non-rational side of human beings. This is not so strange when some of the more popular quotes are looked at. Wood (2003, p. 43) gives the following examples:

“ (...) all the actions of human being in appearance are determined in accord with the order of nature by his empirical character and the other cooperating causes; and if we could exhaustively investigate all the appearances of his power of choice down to their basis, then there would be no human action we could not predict with certainty, and recognize as necessarily given its preceding conditions. Thus in regard to this empirical character there is no freedom, and according to this character we can consider the human being solely by observing, and, as happens in anthropology, by trying to investigate the moving causes of his actions physiologically.” (KrV A 550/ B 578).

“Now, since time past is no longer within my control, every action that I perform must be necessary by determining grounds that are not within my control, that is, I am never free at the point of time in which I act.” (Ak 5: 94)

These are good examples how easy it is to form the previously mentioned conclusions about Kant’s view on human nature and freedom. It seems that Kant, according to the passages cited, insisted on the fact that if one knows relevant preconditions then the human action can be precisely calculated. On the other hand, as was already pointed out, Kant is insisting that humans are uncaused causes of their actions, that they are transcendently free. (Frierson, 2005, p. 2) It seems that Kant thinks that human freedom is transcendental and not psychological. The psychological account of human action is deterministic in a way that actions follow from prior states in accordance with natural laws. The actions, although empirically determined, are free, because their agents are not determined at noumenal level by empirical cases. (Frierson, 2005, p. 3)

Concerning human action, and in opposition to quoted passages, Wood (2003, p. 44) claims that conception of humans as moral agents presupposes freedom. Some of the examples Wood (2003, p. 44) gives for this opinion are:

“The human being is one of the appearances in the world of sense, and to that extent also one of the natural causes whose causality must stand under empirical laws. As such he must accordingly also have an empirical character, just like other natural things. We notice it through powers and faculties which it expresses in its effects. In the case of lifeless nature and nature having merely animal life, we find no ground for thinking of any faculty which is other than sensibly conditioned. Yet the human being, who is otherwise acquainted with the whole of nature solely through sense, knows himself also through pure apperception, and indeed in actions and inner determinations which cannot be account at all among impressions of sense; he obviously is in one part phenomenon, but in another part, namely in regard to certain faculties, he is merely intelligible object, because the actions of this object cannot at all be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility” (KrV A 546–7/B 574–5)

“A faculty of choice, that is, is merely animal (*arbitrium brutum*) which cannot be determined other than through sensible impulses, i.e., pathologically. However, one which can be determined independently of sensory impulses, thus through motives that can only be represented by reason, is called free choice (*arbitrium liberum*), and everything that is connected with this, whether as ground or consequence, is called practical. Practical freedom can be proved through experience. For it is not merely that which stimulates the senses, i.e., immediately affects them, that determines human choice, but we have a capacity’ to overcome impressions on our sensory faculty of desire by representations of that which is useful or injurious even in a more remote way; but these considerations about which in regard to our whole condition is desirable, i.e., good and useful, depend on reason.” (Krv A 801–2/ B 829–30)

“Natural necessity was a heteronomy of efficient causes, since every effect was possible only in accordance with the law that something else determines the efficient cause to causality; what, then, can freedom of the will be other than autonomy, that is, the will's property of being a law to itself? But the proposition, the will is in all its actions a law to itself, indicates only the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as object itself as a universal law. This, however, is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality; hence a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same.” (Ak 4:447)

“It is not enough that we ascribe freedom to our will on whatever ground, if we do not have sufficient ground for attributing it also to all rational beings. For, since morality serves as a law for us only as rational beings, it must also hold for all rational beings; and since it must be derived solely from the property of freedom, freedom must also be proved' as a property of all rational beings; and it is not enough to demonstrate it from certain supposed experiences of human nature (though this is also absolutely impossible and it can be demonstrated only a priori), but it must be proved as belonging to the activity of all beings whatever that are rational and endowed with a

will. I say now: every being that cannot act otherwise than *under the idea of freedom* is just because of that really free in a practical respect, that is, all laws that are inseparably bound up with freedom hold for him just as if his will had been validly pronounced free also in itself and in theoretical philosophy. Now I assert that to every rational being having a will we must necessarily lend the idea of freedom also, under which alone he acts. For in such a being we think of a reason that is practical, that is, has causality with respect to its objects. Now, one cannot possibly think of a reason that would consciously receive direction from any other quarter with respect to its judgments, since the subject would then attribute the determination of his judgment not to his reason but to an impulse. Reason must regard itself as the author of its principles independently of alien influences; consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must be regarded of itself as free, that is, the will of such a being cannot be a will of his own except under the idea of freedom, and such a will must in a practical respect thus be attributed to every rational being.” (Ak4: 447–8)

From these, and similar remarks made by Kant it seems that he believes that human beings are free in the choices they make. Although, according to Kant, we can never have the complete knowledge of human will he still points out the empirical manifestations of human freedom such as: development of new capacities, variability of ways of life, the progress of human culture, the development of reason and historical development of Enlightenment. (Wood, 2003, p. 44) On this note, Copleston (2003b, p. 391) remarks that the freedom of human beings can translate itself into action within the world. The following proposition can be made

P_{KAc118}: Human beings have freedom.

Even more, in regards to predicting human behavior, guesswork can “predict” what human will do from time to time, but there can never be, at least according to Kant, anything similar to predictive science of human behavior similar to how mechanics deals with its topics. (Wood, 2003, p. 45)

P_{KAc119}: Human behavior cannot be predicted with the same precision as natural occurrences.

Concerning human motivation Wood (2003, p. 50) writes the following relying on the Kant’s passage:

“A contradiction appears to lie in the claim *to have representations and still not be conscious of them*; for how could we know that we have them if we are not conscious of them? (...) However, can still be indirectly conscious of having a representation, even if we are not directly conscious of it. – Such representations are then called *obscure*; the others are *clear*, and when their clarity also extends to the partial representations that make up a whole together with their connection, they are then called *distinct representations*, whether of thought or intuition. The field of sensuous intuitions and sensations of which we are not conscious, even though *we* can undoubtedly conclude that we have them; that is, *obscure* representations in the human being (and thus also in animals), is immense. (...)” (Ak 7: 135)

“Kant’s view that we are psychologically opaque has more to do with a set of ideas more often associated with later thinkers, such as Nietzsche and Freud. Kant holds that most of our mental life consists of “obscure representations,” that is, representations that are unaccompanied by consciousness; if we ever learn about them at all, we must do so through inference (Ak 7: 135–7). This is partly because many representations are purely physiological in origin, and never *need* to reach consciousness. But in some cases, Kant thinks, we have a tendency to *make* our representations obscure by pushing them into unconsciousness.” (Wood, 2003, p. 50)

Kant, as was already mentioned, claims that human action must follow universal laws of nature and they must involve necessity. Kant seems to aim at the difference between knowable realm of spacio-temporal appearances and unknowable but conceivable realm of non-patio-temporal things in themselves. Because this distinction allows that we keep determinism in the context of the appearances and freedom in the context of things in themselves. (Watkins, 2010, pp. 524-525)

Also, Kant defines freedom in two ways: in a negative sense, and a positive one. In a negative sense freedom is defined as independence from sensible causes. This so called empirical freedom is assured by moral actions being located at the non-empirical level of things in themselves. In the positive sense freedom is defined in a way that the soul is not only free of determinants applicable to the world of appearances but also for giving itself a law due to its practical rationality and then its principle is autonomous. (Watkins, 2010, p. 525) Besides this, it also seems important that the empirical actions of human beings depend on the non-empirical ones, that is, on adoption of a maxim, of the free agents. For the conclusion it may be mentioned that Watkins (2010, p. 525) says:

“Kant’s basic idea is that a human being acts morally if the soul, as a thing in itself whose nature includes rationality, freely adopts a maxim (a subjective principle) which

subordinates happiness to the moral law (as expressed by the “categorical imperative”) in accordance with its character or, as he puts it, “conformably with the conditions of the subject”. As with Kant’s general model of causality, we have a substance (the soul) that exercises its causal powers (its will) according to its nature (its rationality and character) and circumstances (being faced with the choice between happiness and the moral law).”

Conclusions

In the third part of the thesis the following hypothesis was tested:

H3: Action is one of the most relevant features of human beings. Actions, especially ones intrinsically motivated are fundamental to being human. Theories of action among other things explain intrinsic motivation.

In the literature studied the hypothesis was confirmed. Namely, all of the researched theories of action indeed acknowledge the importance of action for human beings. It is basically self-understandable and does not need further explanation. Human beings act. Concerning the second part of the hypothesis all theories of action will point out to some intrinsic basis for action. As it was seen with Aristotle, Hume, and Kant that basis is usually the feeling of pleasure in contrast to pain. Where pleasure drives human beings to reach for something and pain drives them to shrink away from it.

4. PROPOSITIONS ON HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN ACTION

In the first section of the present thesis “The objective, hypothesis, and a formal outline of the thesis” the following hypotheses are stated:

- (H1) Issue on human being is interior of philosophy, although not always explicatively stated. This issue persists throughout history of philosophy.
- (H2) Philosophical–anthropological questions are only partially examined in the various aspects of organizational sciences.
- (H3) Action is one of the most relevant features of human beings. Actions, especially ones intrinsically motivated are fundamental to being human. Theories of action among other things explain intrinsic motivation.
- (H4) If (H1) – (H3) are verified, then philosophical anthropology provides the framework for a more complete understanding of contemporary theories of motivation.

In this part all propositions will be organized in a consistent manner in order to show the link between (H1-H3) and the most important hypothesis (H4). In the conclusion (H4) and propositions which fall under it will be explicated in more detail.

(H1) Issue on human being is interior of philosophy, although not always explicatively stated. This issue persists throughout history of philosophy.

Introductory propositions

P1_{H1} Issue on human being is interior to philosophy.

P2_{H1} Although not always explicatively stated.

P3_{H1} The issue persists throughout history of philosophy.

Verification

H1 is verified through P1-P3.

Overview

Issue on human being is interior to philosophy, some philosophers explicitly state their opinions concerning humans, while other are more reluctant to so. Importantly, those who are

reluctant still unavoidably are presented with a challenge what humans are? Finally, that being the case the issue persists throughout the history.

(H2) Philosophical–anthropological questions are only partially examined in the various aspects of organizational sciences.

Propositions and partial understanding of human nature in theories of motivation

Propositions on human nature by selected content theorists

P_{MN1}: In order to find out what human beings ought to do, they first must find what their nature is.

P_{MN2}: Human beings are both part of the material and “spiritual” world.

P_{MN3}: Human beings have to be looked at as a whole. This in turn implies that there is an underlying unity or integrity of human beings.

P_{MN4}: Human beings have a higher nature which is “instinctoid” as well as lower nature.

P_{MN5}: “Spiritual life” is species wide, so are its traits.

P_{MN6}: The potentiality of the “spiritual life” must be actualized by culture.

P_{MN7}: There are goals, ends, purposes which are basic to human beings.

P_{MN8}: There are basic, non-culturally related, universal goals.

P_{MN9}: Human needs are arranged in hierarchies.

P_{MN10}: Human being is perpetually wanting animal.

P_{MN11}: Human beings are irremovably tied to biological part of their nature, and the “biological needs” stemming from it.

P_{MN12}: Human beings need to feel safe and secure.

P_{MN13}: Human beings require love, affection and belongingness.

P_{MN14}: Human beings require both self-recognition, and recognition by their peers.

P_{MN15}: Human beings have a need to actualize their potential, and in that way to fulfill themselves, otherwise discontent will appear.

P_{MN16}: Human beings are not *tabula rasa*.

P_{MN17}: Human beings at the minimum are their temperament, their biochemical balances.

P_{MN18}: Human beings are searching for meaning.

P_{MN19}: Human beings are choosing, deciding, and seeking animals.

P_{HeN20}: Human beings have a need to give unified meaning to the information they receive.

P_{HeN21}: From Adam’s account it seems that main motivation of human beings is the avoidance of pain.

P_{HeN22}: From Abraham’s account it seems that human beings can achieve much, because they are given innate potential.

P_{HeN23}: Human beings are adaptable to various situations, much more than other animals.

P_{HeN24}: Human beings can experience suffering from almost unlimited number of sources.

P_{HeN25}: Human beings, because of their experiences of past pains, present pains, and anticipated pains, find their existence hard.

P_{HeN26}: Human beings have a need to use their mental abilities and that motivates them.

P_{HeN27}: Human beings can continue to grow after their biological peak has been reached, which is different than animals.

P_{HeN28}: Human beings are aware of mortality, individuality, and loneliness.

P_{HeN29}: Belief in potentiality gives meaning to life of human beings.

P_{HeN30}: Human beings have two set of needs. The so called Adam's needs which are avoidance of many different version of pain, and Abraham's needs which are phenomenalized by the urge to realize their potential, to grow psychologically.

P_{HeN31}: Human beings can achieve happiness only by catering to both animal and human set of needs which is present in them.

P_{SN32}: Origins of human needs and nature are in the evolutionary history of mankind, and it includes basic psychological needs and integrative propensities.

P_{SN33}: There are three universal, innate, psychological needs which are rooted in human beings. Those needs are: competence, autonomy, and relatedness, which when satisfied can bring about positive outcomes, and provide well-being

P_{SN34}: One of defining feature of human beings is curiosity.

P_{SN35}: Human beings are social organisms.

P_{SN36}: Self regulated actions are accompanied with the experiences of integrity, volition, and vitality.

P_{SN37}: Human beings acquire their social identities over time, once acquired they regulate the way people live their lives.

P_{SN38}: Human beings are active, growth oriented beings.

P_{SN39}: Human beings have an adaptive design which incorporates engaging interesting activities, exercising capacities, trying to achieve social connection, and to have a sense of self.

P_{SN40}: There are intrinsic values built into human nature and these values are universal.

P_{SN41}: Eudaimonia is necessarily rooted in human autonomy.

P_{SN42}: Intrinsic motivation reflects the potential of human beings.

P_{SN43}: Positive feeling of vitality and interest that attend intrinsic motivation are evolved features of human nature.

P_{SN44}: The natural tendencies towards intrinsic motivation can be activated or inhibited by social/environmental factors.

P_{SN45}: Human beings have inherent interests in acquiring knowledge and skills.

P_{SN46}: Human beings are looking for challenges, and they try to conquer them.

P_{SN47}: Human beings are aware of their mortality.

P_{SN48}: Individuals naturally want/need to be effective in a society, and the society has influence on how well an individual will accomplish that.

Propositions concerning partial understanding of human nature in content theories of motivation

P_{PUN49}: Originators of selected theories of motivation were acquainted with philosophy and they referenced philosophers often.

P_{PUN50}: In significant manuals, guidelines, and textbooks concerning theories of motivation there is no mention of philosophical basis for those theories.

P_{PUN51}: In research and in overviews of application of SDT to business contexts there is no explicit mention of human nature.

P_{PUN52}: Determining knowledgeability of philosophical basis for management practices in companies is complicated and it is beyond scope and limits of the present research, although, P_{PUN50} to P_{PUN51} indicate that philosophical basis is not present as well.

Propositions on human nature by selected philosophers

P_{AN53}: Human beings are the only animals that possess the speech.

P_{AN54}: Human beings possess the logos.

P_{AN55}: The *logos* is distinctive of human nature and behavior.

P_{AN56}: Only human beings, compared to all other animals, examine and consider what they see.

P_{AN57}: Human nature and essence is divine.

P_{AN58}: Human beings have the capacity to acquire the greatest variety of arts, out of all beings, due to their intellect.

P_{AN59}: Human beings desire knowledge by nature.

P_{AN60}: Human beings have the intellect and are capable of thought.

P_{AN61}: Human action cannot be determined with mathematical precision.

P_{AN62}: For human beings the mode of existence is to be self-aware as perceiving and as thinking.

P_{AN63}: For human beings the existence is an actualization of prospective happiness.

P_{AN64}: The activity of intellect is crucial for happiness of human beings.

P_{AN65}: Human beings are by nature endowed with intellect, and the intellect is the most distinguishing feature of human beings.

P_{AN66}: Human being should try to live in accordance with the best in them, i.e., with the faculty of intellect.

P_{AN67}: Human beings are the most political of animals.

P_{AN68}: Human beings are the only animals with the sense of moral qualities.

P_{AN69}: Human beings are, by their nature, inclined to live in connection to other human beings.

P_{HN70}: Human nature remains the same across cultures.

P_{HN71}: There are some virtues in human being which are fundamental propensities of human nature, and they motivate all human beings.

P_{HN72}: Natural virtues are love for the children, beneficence, generosity, clemency, moderation, temperance, frugality.

P_{HN73}: Artificial virtues in human beings, those evolved due to connectedness of human beings, are justice, fidelity and allegiance.

P_{HN74}: Human beings exhibit inclination to create general rules, which are immune to self-interest.

P_{HN75}: Human beings exhibit principle of sympathy.

P_{HN76}: Human nature is uniform.

P_{HN77}: Human beings act following certain patterns, failure to do so results in a feeling of blame. (regarding duties)

P_{HN78}: The self is a “bundle of perceptions”

P_{HN79}: Memory by showing the relation of cause and effect among different perceptions discovers personal identity.

P_{KN80}: Human beings have an ability to become rational, they are not so immediately.

P_{KN81}: Human beings are capable of perfecting themselves.

P_{KN82}: Human beings are free.

P_{KN83}: Culture of human beings is an activity which has to be chosen freely.

P_{KN84}: Human beings are both drawn to and inclined to isolate themselves from other human beings.

P_{KN85}: Human beings can become human only through education.

P_{KN86}: Human beings have a predisposition to animality.

P_{KN87}: Human beings have a technical predisposition.

P_{KN88}: Human beings have a pragmatic predisposition.

P_{KN89}: Human beings have a predisposition to morality.

P_{KN90}: Human beings are destined to cultivate, civilize and moralize themselves.

P_{KN91}: Human beings, in order to reach their vocation, have to be part of a group or a society.

P_{KN92}: It is in human nature to want continuously more.

P_{KN93}: Naturally necessary goal of human beings is happiness.

P_{KN94}: Human beings have a predisposition towards both animality (self-preservation, reproduction, and sociability) and humanity.

Verification

H2 is verified through proposition P49-52, and these are backed by propositions P1-48 and P53-94).

Overview

Selected content theories of motivation claim that humans are not just biological machines and that this other aspect is equally important. Humans have needs that concern both physical and non-physical aspects of their lives. Capability of intrinsic motivation is inherent to humans as is conquering challenges and acquiring knowledge and skills. (P1-48)

Originators of selected content theories of motivation were influenced by philosophy while building their theories. The influence disappears as one moves from theories to application. (P49-52)

According to selected philosophers there some distinctive features of humans (speech, natural and artificial virtues, predisposition toward animality and humanity both, and freedom). Humans are capable of thinking, learning, and acting according to what they think and learn. (P53-94)

(H3) Action is one of the most relevant features of human beings. Actions, especially ones intrinsically motivated are fundamental to being human. Theories of action among other things explain intrinsic motivation.

Human action and motivation for action

Propositions concerning motivation for action by selected theorist of motivation

P_{MAc95}: Eupsychian management is concerned with both growth prosperity of human beings and the prosperity for the company.

P_{MAc96}: Human beings have a need for meaningful work, for responsibility, for creativeness, for being fair and just, for doing what is worthwhile and for preferring to do it well.

P_{MAc97}: Human beings cannot be motivated solely by monetary compensation.

P_{MAc98}: Human beings will always complain about something, if one need is gratified, another will arise.

P_{HeAc99}: The primary function of any organization should be to implement the needs for man to enjoy a meaningful existence.

P_{HeAc100}: Human beings can be forced to do something by various methods, some positive, some negative, still if the results are short-termed than that is not motivation.

P_{HeAc101}: Intrinsic motivation, or self motivation is the real motivation.

P_{HeAc102}: Strong determiners of job satisfaction are achievement, recognition, work itself, responsibility, and advancement

P_{HeAc103}: Strong determiners of job dissatisfaction are company policy and administration, supervision, salary, interpersonal relations and working conditions

P_{HeAc104}: Both the animalistic, and the “higher” needs of human beings have to be catered to in order to have real motivation, and job satisfaction.

P_{SAc105}: Self-determination (being able to determine one’s behavior) is independent of the question of free will.

P_{SAc106}: Intrinsic motivation is the factor of energization of the will to action.

P_{SAC107}: Extrinsic motivation is based in physiological drives, and the substitute needs, and intrinsic motivation is based in the need for competence and self-determination and the specific needs that differentiate out of the basic need.

P_{SAC108}: Pursuit of life goals with intrinsic values adds to the optimal functioning and attainment of well-being of human beings.

P_{SAC109}: Autonomy supportive work climate will have positive effect on the employees.

P_{SAC110}: Personal autonomy is important for leading the good life for every human being.

Propositions concerning motivation for action by selected philosophers

P_{AAc111}: Action can be caused by habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite.

P_{AAc112}: All voluntary actions are, or seem to be, good or pleasant.

P_{AAc113}: Human beings have rational activity as function.

P_{HAc114}: Reason, although unable to motive by itself is useful for satisfying the end that has already been set.

P_{HAc115}: Beliefs and desires are both necessary to produce human action.

P_{HAc116}: The behavior of human beings can be predicted to a certain degree.

P_{KAc117}: Desires give rise to action.

P_{KAc118}: Human beings have freedom.

P_{KAc119}: Human behavior cannot be predicted with the same precision as natural occurrences.

Verification

H3 is verified through proposition P95-110, and P111-119.

Overview

Theories of motivation emphasis intrinsic motivation for action, obligation of companies to enable employees to develop environment supportive of full human development which basically means an environment suitable for catering to both “lower” and “higher” human needs. (P95-110)

Selected philosophers supply conceptual analysis of intrinsically motivated human action (see P112, P115, and P117), and explication of the very process how humans are motivated for action and precisely these analyses, in spite of their differences, is what is lacking in contemporary theories of motivation. (P111-119)

(H4) If (H1) – (H3) are verified, then philosophical anthropology provides the framework for a more complete understanding of contemporary theories of motivation.

Verification

The verification of H4 consists out of two parts. First the formal part which goes as follows:

(H4) is verified if (H1), (H2), and (H3) are verified.

(H1), (H2), and (H3) are verified (see Overviews in the text above).

Therefore, (H4) is verified.

In addition, it can be shown from the propositions stated in this thesis that philosophical anthropology indeed provides a framework for more complete understanding of contemporary theories of motivation (as shown in Table 1). In order to do so it is not necessary to include all the propositions throughout the thesis. Namely, based on the propositions, it is stated that all authors are concerned with the same general themes and that their propositions expand the knowledge of those themes.

The reason for using these themes is that when looking from an organizational perspective it is important to research and understand motivation. One of the relevant features for motivation of human beings is that they are curious. Besides curiosity, human beings also have other needs. Our entire work life is set in the social context, where both material and “higher” factors are present. Finally, it seems that there are similarities between human beings. So, general themes are the following:

1. Human beings share some characteristics. (referred to as human nature).
2. Human beings are part of the “material” world, but because their characteristics they are not enclosed in it. (referred to as material vs. higher)
3. Human beings are social beings. (referred to as sociality)
4. Human beings have needs. (referred to as needfulness)
5. Human beings are curious. (referred to as curiosity)
6. Human beings are motivated for and by certain factors. (referred to as motivation)

Examples of propositions in this thesis categorized according to themes are stated just below. It is important to point out that, since themes are so closely related, there is a certain overlap between themes and propositions. This is why sometimes the same proposition is stated more than once. But this was done only in cases where it was necessary to do so for clarity sake,

otherwise the proposition was stated as belonging to just one theme. This does not mean that, if proposition also relates to a different theme, it should be neglected in the context of that other theme also.

1. Human beings share some characteristics. (referred to as human nature).

P_{MN3}: Human beings have to be looked at as a whole. This in turn implies that there is an underlying unity or integrity of human beings.

P_{MN5}: “Spiritual life” is species wide, so are its traits.

P_{MN7}: There are goals, ends, purposes which are basic to human beings.

P_{MN16}: Human beings are not *tabula rasa*.

P_{HeN21}: From Adam’s account it seems that main motivation of human beings is the avoidance of pain.

P_{HeN22}: From Abraham’s account it seems that human beings can achieve much, because they are given innate potential.

P_{HeN24}: Human beings can experience suffering from almost unlimited number of sources.

P_{HeN26}: Human beings have a need to use their mental abilities and that motivates them.

P_{SN33}: There are three universal, innate, psychological needs which are rooted in human beings. Those needs are: competence, autonomy, and relatedness, which when satisfied can bring about positive outcomes, and provide well-being

P_{SN38}: Human beings are active, growth oriented beings.

P_{SN39}: Human beings have an adaptive design which incorporates engaging interesting activities, exercising capacities, trying to achieve social connection, and to have a sense of self.

P_{SN40}: There are intrinsic values built into human nature and these values are universal.

P_{AN54}: Human beings possess the *logos*.

P_{AN55}: The *logos* is distinctive of human nature and behavior.

P_{AN62}: For human beings the mode of existence is to be self-aware as perceiving and as thinking.

P_{AN65}: Human beings are by nature endowed with intellect, and the intellect is the most distinguishing feature of human beings.

P_{HN70}: Human nature remains the same across cultures.

P_{HN76}: Human nature is uniform.

P_{KN86}: Human beings have a predisposition to animality.

P_{KN87}: Human beings have a technical predisposition.

P_{KN88}: Human beings have a pragmatic predisposition.

P_{KN89}: Human beings have a predisposition to morality.

2. Human beings are part of the “material” world, but because their characteristics they are not enclosed in it. (referred to as material vs. higher)

P_{MN1}: In order to find out what human beings ought to do, they first must find what their nature is.

P_{MN4}: Human beings have a higher nature which is “instinctoid” as well as lower nature.

P_{MN11}: Human beings are irremovably tied to biological part of their nature, and the “biological needs” stemming from it.

P_{MN19}: Human beings are choosing, deciding, and seeking animals.

P_{HeN21}: From Adam’s account it seems that main motivation of human beings is the avoidance of pain.

P_{HeN22}: From Abraham’s account it seems that human beings can achieve much, because they are given innate potential.

P_{HeN23}: Human beings are adaptable to various situations, much more than other animals.

P_{HeN27}: Human beings can continue to grow after their biological peak has been reached, which is different than animals.

P_{HeN31}: Human beings can achieve happiness only by catering to both animal and human set of needs which is present in them.

P_{SN32}: Origins of human needs and nature are in the evolutionary history of mankind, and it includes basic psychological needs and integrative propensities.

P_{AN53}: Human beings are the only animals that possess the speech.

P_{AN56}: Only human beings, compared to all other animals, examine and consider what they see.

P_{HN72}: Natural virtues are love for the children, beneficence, generosity, clemency, moderation, temperance, frugality.

P_{HN73}: Artificial virtues in human beings, those evolved due to connectedness of human beings, are justice, fidelity and allegiance.

P_{KN86}: Human beings have a predisposition to animality

P_{KN89}: Human beings have a predisposition to morality

P_{KN94}: Human beings have a predisposition towards both animality (self-preservation, reproduction, and sociability) and humanity.

3. Human beings are social beings. (referred to as sociality)

P_{MN6}: The potentiality of the “spiritual life” must be actualized by culture.

P_{MN13}: Human beings require love, affection and belongingness.

P_{MN14}: Human beings require both self-recognition, and recognition by their peers.

P_{HeN28}: Human beings are aware of mortality, individuality, and loneliness.

P_{SN35}: Human beings are social organisms.

P_{SN37}: Human beings acquire their social identities over time, once acquired they regulate the way people live their lives.

P_{SN44}: The natural tendencies towards intrinsic motivation can be activated or inhibited by social/environmental factors.

P_{SN48}: Individuals naturally want/need to be effective in a society, and the society has influence on how well an individual will accomplish that.

P_{AN67}: Human beings are the most political of animals.

P_{AN69}: Human beings are, by their nature, inclined to live in connection to other human beings.

P_{HN74}: Human beings exhibit inclination to create general rules, which are immune to self-interest.

P_{HN75}: Human beings exhibit principle of sympathy.

P_{KN85}: Human beings can become human only through education.

P_{KN91}: Human beings, in order to reach their vocation, have to be part of a group or a society.

4. Human beings have needs. (referred to as needfulness)

P_{MN9}: Human needs are arranged in hierarchies.

P_{MN10}: Human being is perpetually wanting animal.

P_{MN12}: Human beings need to feel safe and secure.

P_{MN15}: Human beings have a need to actualize their potential, and in that way to fulfill themselves, otherwise discontent will appear.

P_{HeN20}: Human beings have a need to give unified meaning to the information they receive.

P_{HeN26}: Human beings have a need to use their mental abilities and that motivates them.

P_{HeN30}: Human beings have two set of needs. The so called Adam's needs which are avoidance of many different version of pain, and Abraham's needs which are phenomenalized by the urge to realize their potential, to grow psychologically.

P_{SN33}: There are three universal, innate, psychological needs which are rooted in human beings. Those needs are: competence, autonomy, and relatedness, which when satisfied can bring about positive outcomes, and provide well-being

P_{AN63}: For human beings the existence is an actualization of prospective happiness.

P_{AN64}: The activity of intellect is crucial for happiness of human beings.

P_{HN71}: There are some virtues in human being which are fundamental propensities of human nature, and they motivate all human beings.

P_{HN77}: Human beings act following certain patterns, failure to do so results in a feeling of blame. (regarding duties)

P_{KN92}: It is in human nature to want continuously more.

P_{KN93}: Naturally necessary goal of human beings is happiness.

5. Human beings are curious. (referred to as curiosity)

P_{MN18}: Human beings are searching for meaning.

P_{HeN20}: Human beings have a need to give unified meaning to the information they receive.

P_{HeN26}: Human beings have a need to use their mental abilities and that motivates them.

P_{SN34}: One of defining feature of human beings is curiosity.

P_{SN45}: Human beings have inherent interests in acquiring knowledge and skills.
P_{SN46}: Human beings are looking for challenges, and they try to conquer them.
P_{AN59}: Human beings desire knowledge by nature.
P_{AN64}: The activity of intellect is crucial for happiness of human beings.
P_{HN79}: Memory by showing the relation of cause and effect among different perceptions discovers personal identity.
P_{KN87}: Human beings have a technical predisposition.
P_{KN90}: Human beings are destined to cultivate, civilize and moralize themselves.

6. Human beings are motivated for and by certain things. (referred to as motivation)

P_{SN42}: Intrinsic motivation reflects the potential of human beings.
P_{MAc97}: Human beings cannot be motivated solely by monetary compensation.
P_{HeAc100}: Human beings can be forced to do something by various methods, some positive, some negative, still if the results are short-termed than that is not motivation.
P_{HeAc104}: Both the animalistic, and the “higher” needs of human beings have to be catered to in order to have real motivation, and job satisfaction.
P_{SAC107}: Extrinsic motivation is based in physiological drives, and the substitute needs, and intrinsic motivation is based in the need for competence and self-determination and the specific needs that differentiate out of the basic need.
P_{AAc112}: All voluntary actions are, or seem to be, good or pleasant.
P_{HN71}: There are some virtues in human being which are fundamental propensities of human nature, and they motivate all human beings.
P_{HAc114}: Reason, although unable to motive by itself is useful for satisfying the end that has already been set.
P_{HAc115}: Beliefs and desires are both necessary to produce human action.
P_{KAc117}: Desires give rise to action.

From the propositions categorized according to themes (1-6) it is possible to see the similarity between themes discussed by theorists of motivation and philosophies of human nature. All themes are present in both philosophy and motivation science. Furthermore, all philosophers at least to a certain degree cover the selected themes. Theorist of motivation will have more complete understanding of the themes they are interested in if they are acquainted with philosophies of human nature and all of this is presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Similarities of themes and Ps between theories of motivation and philosophies of human nature resulting with a framework for more complete understanding of theories of motivations¹⁰⁵

Themes	Theories of motivation			Philosophies (of human nature)		
	P (examples)	Theory	×/✓	×/✓	Philosophy	P (examples)
human nature	P _{MN3} P _{MN5} P _{MN7} P _{MN16}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN54} P _{AN55} P _{AN62} P _{AN65}
	P _{HeN21} P _{HeN22} P _{HeN24} P _{HeN26}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN70} P _{HN76}
	P _{SN33} P _{SN38} P _{SN40}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN86} P _{KN87} P _{KN88} P _{KN89}
material vs. higher	P _{MN1} P _{MN4} P _{MN19}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN53} P _{AN56}
	P _{HeN21} P _{HeN22} P _{HeN23} P _{HeN27} P _{HeN31}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN72} P _{HN73}
	P _{SN32}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN86} P _{KN89} P _{KN94}
sociality	P _{MN6} P _{MN13} P _{MN14}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN67} P _{AN69}
	P _{HeN28}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN74} P _{HN75}
	P _{SN35} P _{SN37} P _{SN44} P _{SN48}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN85} P _{KN91}
needfulness	P _{MN9} P _{MN10} P _{MN12} P _{MN15}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN63} P _{AN64}
	P _{HeN20} P _{HeN26} P _{HeN30}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN71} P _{HN77}
	P _{SN33}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN92} P _{KN93}
curiosity	P _{MN18}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AN59} P _{AN64}
	P _{HeN20} P _{HeN26}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN79}
	P _{SN34} P _{SN45} P _{SN46}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KN87} P _{KN90}
motivation	P _{MAc97}	M	✓	✓	A	P _{AAc112}
	P _{HeAc100} P _{HeAc104}	He	✓	✓	H	P _{HN71} P _{HAc114} P _{HAc115}
	P _{SN42} P _{SAc107}	S	✓	✓	K	P _{KAc117}

Overview

In the section “The objective, hypotheses, and the formal outline of the thesis” it is stated that what contemporary content theories of motivation lack in theory and in application is, among other things, more complete conceptual understanding of human motivation for action. By verifying (H1) to (H3) this lack is obvious. What (H4) explicates is that philosophical anthropology provides a framework that contemporary theories lack. This is further strengthened by categorizing themes which are present in theories of motivation. By comparing these themes with the themes in philosophies of human nature it can be seen that they are the same.

¹⁰⁵ Abbreviations and symbols are the following: M = Maslow, He = Herzberg, S = SDT, A = Aristotle, H = Hume, K = Kant, P = proposition, ✓ = there is, × = there is not.

5. CONCLUSION

Hypotheses were the following:

- (H1) Issue on human being is interior of philosophy, although not always explicatively stated. This issue persists throughout history of philosophy.
- (H2) Philosophical–anthropological questions are only partially examined in the various aspects of organizational sciences.
- (H3) Action is one of the most relevant features of human beings. Actions, especially ones intrinsically motivated are fundamental to being human. Theories of action among other things explain intrinsic motivation.
- (H4) If (H1) – (H3) are verified, then philosophical anthropology provides the framework for a more complete understanding of contemporary theories of motivation.

Overview of (H1). Issue on human being is interior to philosophy, some philosophers explicitly state their opinions concerning humans, while other are more reluctant to do so. Importantly, those who are reluctant still unavoidably are presented with a challenge what humans are? Finally, that being the case, the issue persists throughout the history.

Overview of (H2). Selected content theories of motivation claim that humans are not just biological machines and that this other aspect is equally important. Humans have needs that concern both physical and non-physical aspects of their lives. Capability of intrinsic motivation is inherent to humans as is conquering challenges and acquiring knowledge and skills. (P1-48) Originators of selected content theories of motivation were influenced by philosophy while building their theories. The influence disappears as one moves from theories to application. (P49-52) According to selected philosophers there some distinctive features of humans such as speech, natural and artificial virtues, predisposition toward animality and humanity both, and freedom. Humans are capable of thinking, learning, and acting according to what they think and learn. (P53-94)

Overview of (H3). Theories of motivation emphasis intrinsic motivation for action, obligation of companies to enable employees to develop environment supportive of full human development which basically means an environment suitable for catering to both “lower” and “higher” human needs. (P95-110) Selected philosophers supply conceptual analysis of intrinsically motivated human action (see P112, P115, and P117), and explication


of the very process how humans are motivated for action. Precisely these analyses, in spite of their differences, are what is lacking in contemporary theories of motivation. (P111-119)

Overview of (H4). (H4) is verified if (H1), (H2), and (H3) are verified. (H1), (H2), and (H3) are verified (see Overviews in the text above). Therefore, (H4) is verified. In the section “The objective, hypotheses, and the formal outline of the thesis” it is stated that what contemporary content theories of motivation lack in theory and in application is, among other things, a complete conceptual understanding of human motivation for action. By verifying (H1) to (H3) this lack is obvious. What (H4) explicates is that philosophical anthropology provides a framework that contemporary theories lack. This is also seen when comparing the themes discussed in theories of motivation and philosophies of human nature (Table 1).

Contemporary theories of motivation (a) have significant lack in theory and presumably in application. On the other hand, at least selected philosophers, in spite of their differences, agree at that (b) action is important for humans, or to put it more obviously – humans act. Given that they do not list typical extrinsic motivators while explicating human action, they in a broader way or even, in more primordial meaning of the expression, defend intrinsic motivators. Namely, in case of Aristotle e.g. *eudaimonia*, in case of Hume e.g. prospect of pleasure and consequent emotion, and in case of Kant e.g. pleasure and subsequent desire.

What seems to be obvious? First thing is that contemporary theories lack something, as closer to practice they are (see previously a). Second thing, that at least some philosophical accounts of human being and action explicate that which these contemporary theories lack (see previously b, as show bellow).

Figure 1: Relation between theories of motivation and philosophical anthropology



For example, most companies these days have HR departments at least nominally. This shows that they for whatever reason care for their workforce. Now, say that a company A faces some employee-motivation issues. In order to resolve these issues A decides that it would be the best thing to increase salaries and they act accordingly. However, as it is often mentioned in literature, the issue persists. HR departments in such cases mostly blame employees. Nobody is happy.

As it is known, the way a thing or a characteristic is defined something which has that will fall under the same description. If being fat is defined as bad everyone who is fat (has that “thing”) will also be considered bad. If today homo oeconomicus is emphasized as the supreme human aspect, than it is not strange that the HR department in our case acted only by catering to extrinsic needs of employees by increasing salaries.

Opposed to such a view content theorists in this thesis will emphasize non-material aspects of human being as well as needs stemming from them. Let us go back to the case. By catering only to material aspects of human beings HR ignored the non-material aspects. Employees recognized this but they realized that such incentive was not supportive of their non-materialistic, sometimes referred to as “higher”, needs. Basically, what employees have is a desire to fully develop themselves as human beings but they realize that they are not in

the supportive environment for this desire. As Hume would probably say, they have desires which aim at changing the world and they have beliefs about how the world actually is and what means are at their disposal for fulfilling their desires. Unfortunately, in company A desires that employees have and their beliefs are not in alignment. Thus, employees are not motivated for action, and the A still faces the same problems as it did before increasing salary. Depending on preference different philosophers can be used in order to reach the source of the problem and perhaps solve it. And precisely that is the point of the thesis – if one wants to resolve problems in contemporary content theories of motivation one needs to look back at philosophical accounts of human being and action.

5.1. Further research

The present research was intended and done in terms of conceptual research and critical analysis of selected content theories of motivation and also of selected philosophies of human being i.e. philosophical anthropologies. So, this is in the same time the limitation of the research and of results.

However, for the further research an alternative experimental method can be suggested, namely to research actual policies and actions of HR officers in companies especially concerning their resolving motivation issues of employees, and their level of understanding actual philosophies behind their management practices.

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List of tables and figures

1. Table 1: Similarities of themes and Ps between theories of motivation and philosophies of human nature resulting with a framework for more complete understanding of theories of motivations.
2. Figure 1: Relation between theories of motivation and philosophical anthropology.

Curriculum vitae



Europass Curriculum Vitae

Personal information

First name(s) / Surname(s) **Borna Jalšenk**
Address Ilica 12
10000 Zagreb (Croatia)
Telephone(s) 0038514831673
E-mail(s) bjalsen@zsem.hr
Nationality Croatian
Date of birth 23/05/1984
Gender Male



Mobile | 00914831673

Work experience

Dates 01/09/2009 →
Occupation or position held Lecturer: Introduction to philosophy course, Business ethics course, Croatian studies (2011, 2012)
Main activities and responsibilities Teaching undergraduate level courses, preparing syllabi, quizzes, etc
Name and address of employer Zagreb School of Economics and Management
Jordanovac 110, 10000 Zagreb (Croatia)

Type of business or sector Education

Dates 01/10/2008 →
Occupation or position held Lecturer: History of Philosophy course – Modern Philosophy
Main activities and responsibilities Teaching undergraduate level courses, preparing syllabi, quizzes, etc.
Name and address of employer Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus, University of Zagreb (part-time)
Jordanovac 110, 10000 Zagreb (Croatia)

Type of business or sector Education

Dates 01/09/2010 →
Occupation or position held AACSB Accreditation Team member
Main activities and responsibilities Involved in all segments of AACSB accreditation work
Name and address of employer Zagreb School of Economics and Management
Jordanovac 110, 10000 Zagreb (Croatia)

Type of business or sector Education

Dates 01/09/2009 - 01/09/2010
Occupation or position held International office coordinator
Main activities and responsibilities Responsible for the international cooperation of Zagreb School of Economics and Management
Name and address of employer Zagreb School of Economics and Management
Jordanovac 110, 10000 Zagreb (Croatia)

Type of business or sector Education

Education and training

Dates 01/09/2008 →

Title of qualification awarded | PhD candidate in philosophy
 Name and type of organisation providing education and training | Croatian Studies, University of Zagreb (University)
 Borongajska cesta 82, 10000 Zagreb (Zagreb)
 Dates | 01/09/2003 - 15/06/2008
 Title of qualification awarded | Mag. phil., Mag. Relig.
 Principal subjects / occupational skills covered | Master in philosophy and religious science
 Name and type of organisation providing education and training | Croatian Studies, Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus, University of Zagreb (University)
 Jordanovac 110, 10000 Zagreb (Croatia)

Personal skills and competences

Mother tongue(s) | **Croatian**

Other language(s)

Self-assessment
 European level (*)

English

German

Understanding				Speaking				Writing	
Listening		Reading		Spoken interaction		Spoken production			
C2	Proficient user	C2	Proficient user	C2	Proficient user	C1	Proficient user	C1	Proficient user
A1	Basic User	A1	Basic User	A2	Basic User	A1	Basic User	A1	Basic User

(*) [Common European Framework of Reference \(CEF\) level](#)

Organisational skills and competences

Member of several scientific conferences organisational boards:

2010 "9th International Conference on Corporate Social Responsibility – CSR and global governance", SRRNet and Zagreb School of Economics and Management

2009 "CSR applied to various stakeholder groups", Zagreb School of Economics and Management

2009 "Filozoski odjeci suvremenosti", Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus

2007 "Philosophy and Politics", Faculty of Philosophy of the Society of Jesus

Computer skills and competences

Microsoft Office programs, Internet

Driving licence(s) | B

Additional information

Founder of the Internet portal on Philosophy (www.filozofija.org)

Coordinator of Association for Promotion of Philosophy Filozofija.org

Editor of the on-line dictionary of philosophical terms for www.filozofija.org

Author of the proposed study program for "Liberal Arts" at ZSEM

Guest editor (with Mirna Koričan) of ZSEMRevija za management (ZSEMReview for Management), 2011.

Rewards and scholarships:

Dean's award for contributions during study (2007)

Scholarship at Institut Catholique de Paris (2005)

Rector's reward for student paper "So Similar, yet so different" (in Croatian) (2004/2005)

Croatian national grant: category A (for especially talented students) (2004/2008)

International experience:

Visiting faculty member St. Ambrose University (518 West Locust Street Davenport, IA 52803, United States)

31.05.2012 - 31.08.2012

Teaching experience

History of philosophy seminar: Economics teachings in modern philosophy (FPSJ, University of Zagreb, Acad. year 2011/12).

Croatian Studies (ZSEM, Acad. year 2010/11, 2011/12, 2012/13).

History of philosophy seminar: Man and state in modern philosophy (FPSJ, University of Zagreb, Acad. year 2010/11).

History of contemporary philosophy: Selected contemporary debates in philosophy (FPSJ, University of Zagreb, Acad. year 2009/10).

History of philosophy seminar: God in modern philosophy (FPSJ, University of Zagreb, Acad. Year 2009/10).

Business ethics and CSR (ZSEM, Acad. year 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11, 2011/12, 2012/13).

Introduction to philosophy (ZSEM, Acad. year 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11, 2011/12, 2012/13).

History of philosophy: modern philosophy (FPSJ, University of Zagreb, Acad. year 2008/09, 2009/10, 2010/11, 2011/12, 2012/13).

Analytical philosophy of language (FPSJ, University of Zagreb, Acad. year 2007/08).

History of philosophy seminar (FPSJ, University of Zagreb, Acad. year 2006/07).

List of articles:

Jergovski, Antonija; Jalšenjak, Borna; Krkač, Kristijan, Korporacijska društvena neodgovornost zaposlenika, in: Koplek, Ivan (ur.), Zasluguje li radnik pravednu plaću? Etička - religijska- politička promišljanja (Filozofsko-teološki institut Družbe Isusove, Zagreb, 2012) pp. 189-201. (article based on a talk given during the symposium)

Vukas, Jurica; Gvozdanić, Igor; Jalšenjak Borna, Elementi poslovne etike u financijskom sektoru s naglaskom na investicijske fondove, in: *Obnovljeni život* 67 (2012), 1:45-58 (survey article).

Buzar, Stipe; Jalšenjak, Borna; Krkač, Kristijan; Lukin, Josip; Mladić, Damir; Spajić, Ivan, Habitual Lying, in: *Philosophical Papers and Reviews* 2(3) (2010), 34-39 (overview article). Available at: <http://www.academicjournals.org/ppr/PDF/pdf2010/Oct/Buzar%20et%20al.pdf>

Šestak, Ivan; Jalšenjak Borna, Škvorc o marksizmu, in: *Vrhbosnensia* 14 (2010), 2:341-371. (professional paper)

Jalšenjak, Borna; Mladić, Damir, Filozofska antropologija, in: Krkač, Kristijan (ed.), *Uvod u filozofiju (MATE, Zagreb, 2009)*. (overview article)

Krkač, Kristijan; Jalšenjak, Borna. Pravidni društveni ugovor kao temelj stvarnog društva, in: *Obnovljeni život* 64 (2009), 2:179-197. (original scientific paper)

Šestak, Ivan; Jalšenjak, Borna. Čovjekovo opstojanje i životinjsko postojanje, in: *Obnovljeni život* 64 (2009), 1: 7-32. (original scientific paper)

Conferences:

"Zasluguje li radnik pravednu plaću?" (Centre for business ethics, Faculty of Philosophy Society of Jesus, 2012). Paper presented: Jergovski, Antonija; Jalšenjak, Borna; Krkač, Kristijan, Corporate Social Irresponsibility of employees.

"Antička ekonomija" (Zagreb School of Economics and Management and Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb – Department of Anthropology, 2012). Paper presented: Jergovski, Antonija; Jalšenjak, Borna O Grcima i gospodarima – Pregledni prikaz tematike ropstva u Aristotela i Gučetića.

"Problem zla" (Faculty of Philosophy Society of Jesus, student symposium, 2011), Paper presented: Buzar, Stipe; Jalšenjak, Borna, Karl Jaspers i pitanje krivnje: je li moguće govoriti o božjoj krivnji?

"Filozofska refleksija kao poticaj za (...)" (Faculty of Philosophy Society of Jesus, student symposium, 2010), Paper presented: Buzar, Stipe; Jalšenjak, Borna, Roddenberryevska kočija.

"Filozofski odjeci suvremenosti" (Faculty of Philosophy Society of Jesus, student symposium, 2009), Paper presented: Buzar, Stipe; Jalšenjak, Borna, Dobar, loš, zao. Veneer teorija ljudske moralnosti I povezane rasprave.

"Kritika u filozofiji" (Croatian Studies, 2008). Paper presented: Buzar Stipe; Jalšenjak, Borna, L'État, c'est moi: samoodređenje i otcijepljenje.

"Open Philosophical Questions" (Croatian Studies, student symposium, 2007). Paper presented: "My Dog is Laughing": What and How with Anthropomorphisms in Cognitive Ethology.

"Consciousness" (Faculty of Philosophy Society of Jesus, student symposium, 2006). Paper presented: Animal Consciousness and Morgan's Canon.

Other publications:

Martinović, Maja; Jalšenjak, Borna; Nemili je incident društvo DIOKI d.d. neopravdano izložio negativnom publicitetu (case study), in: Martinović, Maja (ed.), MARKETING u Hrvatskoj. 55 poslovnih slučajeva (MATE d.o.o., Zagreb, 2012).

Jalšenjak, Borna; Krkač, Kristijan, Društveno odgovorno poslovanje [Corporate Social Responsibility]. Textbook for 2nd grade of economic highschoools (MATE d.o.o, Zagreb, 2012).

Afterword to Ludwig von Mises, Antikapitalistički mentalitet (MATE. d.o.o., Zagreb, 2010.) 85-93 (with Kristijan Krkač).

Translations:

Dan R. Ebener, Jesus on Leadership (Dan R. Ebener, Isus o vodstvu u poslovanju) in: ZSEMReview 2011:159-162

Ludwig von Mises, Anticapitalistic Mentality (Ludwig von Mises, Antikapitalistički mentalitet (MATE. d.o.o., Zagreb, 2010.)

Book Reviews of Other Authors:

Đuro Vidmarović (ur.), Sjećanja i prilozi za povijest diplomacije Republike Hrvatske. Prvo desetljeće; Knjiga prva, SixSigma (2009).

Davor Pečnjak (ed.), Understanding: from Perception to Morals, Institute for Philosophy, Zagreb 2007, Obnovljeni život, (63) 2 (2008) 243-245.

Miljenko Belić, Ontology. To Be, and Not Not-to-Be, What Does it Mean? (Philosophical-Theological Institute of the Society of Jesus), Status Questionis 3 (2008)189-192.

Memberships:

SRRNet - Social Responsibility Research Network