doctoral thesis
The impact of incumbents and voters on the political budget cycle

Velibor Mačkić (2015)
Sveučilište u Zagrebu
Ekonomski fakultet
Metadata
TitleUtjecaj političara i birača na političko-proračunski ciklus
AuthorVelibor Mačkić
Mentor(s)Mirjana Dragičević
Abstract
U doktorskoj disertaciji analizira se utjecaj političara i birača na političko-proračunski ciklus (engl. political budget cycle, PBC) u devet zemalja članica EU (Austrija, Njemačka, Španjolska, Češka, Hrvatska, Slovačka, Italija, Nizozemska i Švedska) u vremenskom razdoblju 1995. – 2012. godine. Osnovni cilj disertacije bio je teorijski prikazati i identificirati uloge političara i birača na stvaranje političko-proračunskog ciklusa u nekoj državi, na općoj (nacionalnoj) i regionalnoj razini. U teorijskom dijelu rada prikazane su osnove teorije javnog izbora, političke ekonomije proračunskog deficita, te modeli političko-poslovnih ciklusa i PBC-a. U empirijskom dijelu istraživanja, na uzorku odabranih članica EU, dobiveni rezultati potvrdili su da je model PBC-a temeljen na moralnom hazardu optimalan, te kao takav najtočnije identificira ulogu političara i birača u stvaranju PBC-a na općoj (nacionalnoj) i regionalnoj razini. Korištena metodologija obuhvaća dinamičku panel analizu prilikom testiranja postavljenih hipoteza o utjecaju političara, te panel analizu prilikom testiranja postavljenih hipoteza o utjecaju birača. Dobiveni nalazi istraživanja potvrđuju postojanje PBC-a na svim razinama proračuna: opće konsolidirane, središnje i regionalne države. Također, potvrđeno je da razina fiskalne centralizacije utječe na razlike između uočenih PBC-a na različitim proračunskim razinama. I konačno, potvrđena je dominantna uloga političara u stvaranju PBC-a, dok su hipoteze o utjecaju birača odbačene.
Keywordspolitical-budget cycles public choice theory political economy of budget deficits political-business cycles general government budget central government budget regional government budget EU dynamic panel analysis PROBIT
Parallel title (English)The impact of incumbents and voters on the political budget cycle
Committee MembersHrvoje Šimović (committee chairperson)
Vojmir Franičević (committee member)
Zdravko Petak (committee member)
GranterSveučilište u Zagrebu
Ekonomski fakultet
PlaceZagreb
StateCroatia
Scientific field, discipline, subdisciplineSOCIAL SCIENCES
Economics
General Economy
UDK330
SOCIAL SCIENCES
Economics. Economic science
Study programme typeuniversity
Study levelpostgraduate
Study programmeEconomics and Business Economics
Academic title abbreviationdr. sc.
Genredoctoral thesis
Language Croatian
Defense date2015
Parallel abstract (English)
Doctoral dissertation focuses on the analysis of the impact of incumbents and voters on the political budget cycle (PBC) in 9 EU member states: Austria, Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovak Republic, Italy, Netherlands and Sweden, in the time period 1995-2012. The main motivation of this dissertation was to understand what are the underlining reasons of budget deficits that appear in the election year. The empirical strategy went even further in order to exactly identify on which budget level (general, central or regional) the budget deficit, that is present at the general government level, appears. In order to take into account all control variables, the dissertation also took into consideration various levels of fiscal (de)centralisation, administrative arrangements as well as whether countries in the sample are “old” or “new” EU member states. Two main research objectives were set in the dissertation. The first objective was to theoretically present and identify roles that incumbents and voters have in creating PBCs on the national and regional levels. Thus, in the theoretical part of dissertation foundations of public choice theory, political economy of budget deficit, political-business cycles and political-budget cycles were presented. The second research objective was empirically oriented. Based on the theoretical foundations of incumbents and voters behaviour, i.e. their wish to maximize their respective utility functions, two equations were written and econometrically tested in STATA. The first one concerning incumbents and their goal of maximizing re-election and the second one that tested economic theory of voting in order to see whether voters maximize their utility in the election period. Also, additional research goal was to determine what is the optimal model of political budget cycle for the countries in the sample based on the presented model of political budget cycles and the obtained empirical results.
Parallel keywords (Croatian)političko-proračunski ciklusi teorija javnog izbora politička ekonomija proračunskog deficita političko-poslovni ciklusi proračun opće konsolidirane države proračun središnje države proračun regionalne države EU dinamički panel PROBIT
Versionaccepted version
Resource typetext
Access conditionAccess restricted to students and staff of home institution
Terms of usehttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
NoteSažetak na engleskom jeziku u radu je u proširenom obliku.
URN:NBNhttps://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:148:093111
CommitterSilvana Brozović